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This thesis explores the role of the statutory requirement for South African auditors to report 
certain irregularities to an independent regulatory body. Detailed interviews with some of the 
country’s leading minds in auditing and corporate governance illustrate how a whistle-
blowing duty impacts the functioning of quality control systems. Although the reporting 
requirement does not result in a paradigm shift in audit practice, it is perceived by some 
stakeholders as contributing to the scope and relevance of audit reporting. Enacted to 
enhance corporate transparency, accountability and compliance with laws and regulations, it 
also becomes an important source of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy for the audit 
profession. Motifs of disciplinary power reinforce claims to legitimacy by creating a valid 
expectation of active reporting by auditors in the spirit of promoting effective whistle-blowing. 
There is, however, no guarantee that every irregularity is reported. The opacity of the audit 
process allows the practical limitations of the reporting requirement to be decoupled from 
symbolic displays that reassure stakeholders that external regulation is reforming audit after 
confidence in its self-regulatory franchise has been eroded by prior scandals. This is not to 
say that the reportable irregularity provisions are irrelevant. What these findings highlight is 
that the plurality of external regulation gives rise to varied (and at times conflicting) views on 
arms-length control of the profession.   
In this way, the research adds to the auditing literature by avoiding the mainstream approach 
of using inferential testing to make an economic case for external regulation. Instead, an 
interpretive technique highlights the relevance of powerful social and institutional forces 
shaping regulatory practice. Critical analysis of an example of a recently amended reporting 
requirement also provides an interesting case study for exploring real-world issues when it 
comes to the application and effect of external regulation, simultaneously offering evidence 
in support of the social construction of audit practice, quality control and credibility theorised 
by leading institutional auditing researchers such as Humphrey and Power. The research is 
also the first to examine the role of a whistle-blowing duty for South African auditors, despite 
the statutory requirement dating to the 1950’s. This is not only useful for local practitioners 
and academics seeking better to understand the legal duty: by contributing to the scant body 
of critical auditing research in an African setting, this research highlights important 
conceptual issues which are relevant for informing the on-going debate on the role of 
external regulation in ensuring high quality audit practice, relevant and reliable audit reports 
and the continued credibility of the attest function.  
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 I: LISTS AND SCHEDULES 
 
I: I GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS  
 
Abbreviation Full Name Jurisdictions 
ACCA Association of Chartered Certified Accountants International 
AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants USA 
AIU Audit Inspection Unit (part of the FRC) UK 
APC Auditing Practices Committee  South Africa 
APB Auditing Practices Board UK 
The Big Four Deloitte, Ernst Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers Various 
CA Chartered Accountant South Africa 
CA(SA) The professional designation : Chartered Accountant (South Africa) South Africa 
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators Europe 
CICA Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Canada 
CIMA Chartered Institute of Management Accountants International  
CPA Certified public accountant USA 
EU European Union Europe 
E&Y Ernst & Young International  
FRC Financial Reporting Council UK 
FSA Financial Services Authority UK 
GAAS Generally Accepted Auditing Standards Various 
IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board International 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board International  
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales UK 
ICAS  Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland UK 
ICSA Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators UK 
IFAC International Federation of Accountants International 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards International 
IFRS for SME’s International Financial Reporting Standards for Small and Medium-
sized Entities 
International 
IIRC International Integrated Reporting Committee International  
IOD Institute of Directors in Southern Africa South Africa 
IRBA The Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors South Africa 
IRC Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa South Africa 
ISA International Standards on Auditing International 
ISAE International Standards on Assurance Engagements International 
ISQC 1 ISQC1: Quality Control for Firms That Perform Audits and Reviews 
of Historical Financial Information and Other Assurance and 
Related Services Engagements 
International  
ISRE International Standards on Review Engagements International 
ISRS International Standards on Related Services International 
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Abbreviation Full Name Jurisdictions 
ITT International Telephone and Telegraph  USA 
JSE Johannesburg Securities Exchange  South Africa 
King-I The King Report on Corporate Governance (1994) South Africa 
King-II The King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa (2002) South Africa 
King-III The King Code of Governance for South Africa (2009) and King 
Report on Governance for South Africa (2009)  
South Africa 
MI Material irregularity  South Africa 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development International 
PAAB Public Accountants and Auditors Board South Africa  
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board USA 
POB Public Oversight Board USA 
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers (Incorporated) International 
RA  Registered auditor South Africa 
RAA Registered accountants and auditors South Africa 
RI Reportable irregularity  South Africa 
SAAA The Southern African Accounting Association  South Africa 
SAAPS South African Auditing Practice Statements South Africa 
SAICA South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa 
SAS Statement on Auditing Standard USA 
SEC Securities Exchange Commission  USA 
SOX The Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) International 
The Code The International Federation of Accountants' Code of Professional 
Conduct 
International 
USA/US United States of America/United States USA 
 
I: II ABBREVIATED NAMES OF LEGISLATION  
 
Abbreviation Full Name Jurisdictions 
APA Auditing Profession Act No. 26 of 2005.  South Africa 
Companies Act 
(1973) Companies Act No. 61 of 1973.  South Africa 
Companies Act 
(2008) Companies Act No. 71 of 2008.  South Africa 
CA Chartered Accountants Designation (Private) Act No. 13 of 1927 South Africa 
FICA Financial Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 of 2001 South Africa 
MLR Money Laundering Regulations 2003, No. 3075. UK 
PAAA Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act No. 80 of 1951 South Africa 
PIDA Public Interest Disclosure Act  of 1998 UK 
POCA Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act No. 121 of 1998 South Africa 
SOCPA Serious Organised Crime and Police Act of 2005 UK 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 USA 
WPA Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 USA 
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1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1: RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
In South Africa, over and above the duty to express an opinion on a client’s financial 
statements, the external auditor is obligated, in terms of s45 of the Auditing Profession Act 
No. 26 of 2005 (APA), to bring ‘reportable irregularities’ (RI’s) to the attention of an 
independent regulator: the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA). This 
additional reporting requirement, which may be regarded loosely as a form of whistle-
blowing, has its genesis in the 1950’s when the South African Government took the position 
that auditors owed a duty to society to do more than just provide a generic opinion on 
financial statements.  
Subsequently, the collapse of Apartheid, the country’s reintroduction to the global market 
and persistent socio-economic challenges has served as an impetus for local corporate 
governance reform (Rossouw et al, 2002; West, 2006; Diamond and Price, 2012). The audit 
profession has not been insulated from this. The introduction of the King Report on 
Corporate Governance (King-I) during 1994 provided the country with a governance 
framework which included a clear focus on the relevance of high quality external audit to 
serve the information needs of shareholders (Institute of Directors [IOD], 1994). This thinking 
was confirmed with the release of King Reports in 2002 and 2009 which continued to 
emphasise the importance of external audit as an instrument of accountability, transparency 
and sound governance (IOD, 2002; IOD, 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2009; 
Solomon, 2010). Complementing this are revisions to codes of professional conduct, the 
introduction of additional auditing standards and the alignment of South African audit 
practice with international trends (PAAA, 1951; IOD, 1994; Nel, 2001; Puttick and van Esch, 
2003).  
The momentum for change continued into the 2000’s. A series of international corporate 
failures1, which directly or indirectly implicated auditors, led to a number of changes in the 
international audit arena (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Malsch and Gendron, 2011). The 
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) and formation of the Public Company 
                                               
1
 For example, ‘Enrongate’ cost the American investor over $55 billion. Scandals at Tyco and WorldCom added a 
further $6 and $3.8 billion respectively to the tab. This was followed by a restatement of revenue at Bristol-Myers 
of some $2.5 billion.  
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Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB) are the most common examples. A growing 
concern that capitalistic pressures at work on audit firms had detracted from the quality and 
reliability of audit reports was resulting in a wide-spread withdrawal of trust from the audit 
profession, necessitating the use of additional external regulation purportedly to reform the 
profession and restore confidence in it (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Canada et al, 2008; 
Riotto, 2008; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Arping and Sautner, 2012). South Africa was not exempt 
from this, especially after having to deal with a number of local corporate failures. As a 
developing economy, and relatively young democratic society, maintaining (at the very least) 
parity with international corporate governance developments is paramount for securing the 
legitimacy of its capital markets2 (West, 2006; Diamond and Price, 2012). As such, a number 
of statutory amendments were proposed echoing comparable moves in the USA and 
European Community (Konar et al, 2003). These include: mandatory partner rotation periods 
(s92 of the Companies Act, 2008); restrictions on the rendering of non-audit services (s44(6) 
of the APA, 2005; s93(3)a of the Companies Act, 2008); and regulation of audit committees’ 
duties (s94(7) of the Companies Act, 2008). Included in these audit-focused reforms, the 
APA superseded the Public Accountants and Auditors Act No. 80 of 1951 (PAAA) with an 
aim to, inter alia, entrenching audit’s role in serving the public interest (s2 of the APA). As 
part of this, the whistle-blowing duty enshrined in s20(5) of the PAAA was broadened and 
firmly entrenched in audit practice under s45 of the APA (Section 2.1).  
To date, South Africa remains one of the few jurisdictions where the auditor is faced with a 
generic3 duty to blow the whistle on certain client transgressions (Nel, 2001; Maroun and 
Gowar, 2013). This has been justified on the grounds that the standard audit report lacks 
sufficient depth, it being possible for the auditor to issue a clean report despite the 
occurrence of ‘acts’ or ‘omissions’ which may be contrary to the interests of various 
stakeholders (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006). The European Commission (2010b) International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) (2012) and Solomon (2009) make similar 
arguments, pointing out that, currently, audit reports ought to provide additional insights into 
audit findings in the name of enhanced governance. In addition, the statutory reporting duty 
forms part of the move towards more external regulation of the profession, aimed at 
reassuring stakeholders that regulators are responding to previous corporate debacles that 
have left trust in the audit practice shaken (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011).  
                                               
2
 This aspect of this thesis was discussed in detail at the Critical Perspectives on Accounting Conference (2011) 
(see Appendix G).  
 
3
 France, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and USA are examples of jurisdictions where auditors may be required 
to report issues noted during an audit to a third party. These duties are, however, in terms of the relevant auditing 
standards or apply in only limited circumstances, such as when dealing with money laundering (Schultz et al, 
1993; Nel, 2001; Maroun and Gowar, 2013). 
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Finally, local policy-makers were disappointed by the relatively low number of irregularities 
being reported under the PAAA and were worried that this signalled a lack of propensity by 
auditors to discharge their reporting duty, even if this was in the public interest (Nel, 2001; 
Manuel, 2002; Negash et al, 2003; IRBA, 2012b). These concerns were particularly relevant 
in a climate of deepening suspicion about the quality of audit reports and role of the attest 
function in protecting the interests of stakeholders (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; 
Opperman, 2009). A mandated whistle-blowing duty per the APA - with broader applicability 
than under the PAAA -  backed by sanctions for non-compliance was, therefore, promoted 
as a means of cultivating a reporting culture that not only adds to the scope of information 
made available by auditors but fosters improved compliance with laws, regulations and 
corporate governance standards (Nel, 2001; Opperman, 2009). In turn, the perceived 
relevance and standing of the audit profession in South Africa would be bolstered (Nel, 
2001; Opperman, 2009). The  academic literature on whistle-blowing supports this thinking, 
stressing how blowing the whistle can reduce corporate malfeasance, improve compliance 
with regulations and enhance a commitment to sound governance (Vinten, 2000; Vinten, 
2003; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Hwang et al, 2008; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010; Seifert 
et al, 2010).  
Ultimately, that South Africa has been ranked first globally for the quality of audit and 
reporting standards (IRBA, 2010b; IRBA, 2012c; King, 2012) and that international trends 
point to a growing use of arms-length checks and balances to restore users’ confidence in 
the audit process (Malsch and Gendron, 2011) appears to confirm the appropriateness of 
the country’s recent regulatory efforts. In this climate, s45 of the APA has become an 
accepted feature of South African audit practice. To date, however, there has been little 
formal research on local auditor regulatory developments and virtually no consideration of 
the role played by reporting irregularities in South African audit, despite the whistle-blowing 
duty being in effect for almost seventy years.  
 
1.2: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES: IDENTIFYING THE NEED FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to consider the role played by s45 of the APA (the RI 
provisions) in South African audits. This is done from three angles, inspired by agency 
theory (Chapter 4; Chapter 5), legitimacy theory (Chapter 6) and Foucauldian theories of 
power and control (Chapter 7).  
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In the light of the current debate on regulatory oversight for the audit profession and the 
scope and quality of audit reports (Committee of European Securities Regulators [CESR], 
2007; European Commission, 2010b; Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa [IRC], 
2011; IAASB, 2012), this research explores the perceived impact of a complementary 
statutory reporting duty on quality control systems (Chapter 4; Chapter 5) and the 
professional standing of South African audit firms (Chapter 6; Chapter 7). This is not only 
relevant for practitioners devoting considerable resources to ensuring compliance with laws 
and regulations and the execution of high quality audit engagements (IAASB, 2009x): the 
research is also one of the first to explore formally the role of a whistle-blowing duty (Section 
2.1.4) in the arms-length audit regulatory environment, rather than simply assuming that the 
proliferation of external regulation is synonymous with an improvement in audit quality 
(Vakkur  et al, 2010; Defond and Lennox, 2011; Humphrey et al, 2011). As explained by 
Humphrey et al (2011, p. 444), ‘there is still much being missed with respect to what is 
known and/or not known about audit quality’ and the impact of regulatory developments on 
quality control systems. This is especially true when it comes to the RI provisions, given the 
absence of direct research on the reporting requirements, despite the whistle-blowing duty 
originating in the 1950’s (Nel, 2001).  
To avoid the risk of traditional positivist approaches oversimplifying the relationship between 
regulatory oversight and quality control systems (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Humphrey, 
2008), the thesis relies on detailed interviews with leading auditing and corporate 
governance experts (O’Dwyer et al, 2011). This allows the researcher to understand better 
how those practitioners interpret and apply regulatory requirements. A detailed account of 
the RI provisions also indicates the need for more interpretive case studies on the impact of 
external regulation on audit practice identified by Power (2003), Khalifa et al (2007) and 
Humphrey et al (2008; 2011).  
The resulting normative stance should not be regarded as a threat to validity in a positivist 
sense. Instead, by relying on a qualitative approach (Chapter 3), the research concentrates 
on the practicalities of auditing (Power, 2003), asking questions about what might or should 
be happening in regulatory circles. As explained by Humphrey et al (2011), this style of 
research is particularly important for shedding light on the little studied interaction between 
audit regulation, practice and quality (see also O’Dwyer et al, 2011).  A critical review of 
audit regulation is also relevant due to the proliferation of arms-length regulation over the 
last decade (Maslch and Gendron, 2011). A number of studies have tested the impact of 
recently enacted regulatory measures, such as the introduction of PCAOB inspections, on 
quality surrogates usually in experimental settings or using archival data (for example, 
Carcello et al, 2011; DeFond and Lennox, 2011; Arping and Sautner, 2012). There are, 
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however, a great number of factors that impact on audit quality and practice which, due to 
the inherent limitations of quantitative techniques, have been largely overlooked by 
mainstream audit research (see Power, 2003; Khalifa et al, 2007; Humphrey et al, 2008).  
Connected with this is the need to examine the issue of audit regulation and quality in an 
African context4 (Power, 2003; Brennan and Solomon, 2008 Humphrey, 2008; Humphrey et 
al, 2011). Most of the prior auditing research is based in the USA, Europe or Australia (see 
Francis, 2004; Carcello et al, 2011; Humphrey et al, 2011). Furthermore, there has been 
almost no interpretive or critical auditing research in South Africa (see Coetsee, 2011; 
Maroun, 2012a). Studying s45 of the APA is, however, not only relevant for contributing to 
the scant body of local research on audit quality and practice. With auditors placed firmly in 
the public spotlight following a series of well-publicised scandals and the on-going financial 
crisis, South Africa’s RI provisions, which were only recently amended (Section 2.1.3), 
provide a specific and current example of external regulation aimed at, inter alia, contributing 
to the scope and quality of audit reports (Nel, 2001; Manuel, 2002). The whistle-blowing duty 
(Section 2.1.4) is, therefore, an interesting case study for interpretively examining the 
practical quality control issues being dealt with by practitioners and the perceptions of 
informed users of audit reports  (see Reiter and Williams, 2002; Harmon, 2006; Davila and 
Oyon, 2008; Scapens, 2008). It simultaneously adds to the current debate on the sufficiency 
of traditional audit reporting and underlying quality control systems for ensuring relevant and 
reliable audit reports (Sikka et al, 2009; European Commission, 2010b;  Humphrey et al, 
2011; IAASB, 2012).  
With the relationship between regulatory activity and the effectiveness of quality control 
systems at audit firms (and audit quality in general) not yet resolved in the academic 
literature (Carcello et al, 2011; Humphrey et al, 2011), the first part of this thesis explores the 
perceived impact of the RI provisions on the quality control systems of South African audit 
firms.  DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) and Palmrose (1988) define ‘audit quality’ as the joint 
probability of detecting and reporting material financial statement errors. ‘Audit quality’ can, 
however, be neither quantified nor directly observed (Power, 2003; Boone et al, 2010; 
Carrington, 2010). As a result, traits pointing to high quality audits are studied (for examples, 
see  Deis (Jr.) and Giroux, 1992; Deis and Giroux, 1996; Frantz, 1999; Fuerman, 2004; 
Bedard, 2012; Firth et al, 2012; Nagy, 2012; Wines, 2012; Zerni, 2012). For the purpose of 
this thesis, these ‘traits’ are those per ISQC1: Quality Control for Firms That Perform Audits 
                                               
4
 That South Africa is the continent’s largest and best developed economy, and a leader in the area of corporate 




and Reviews of Historical Financial Information, and Other Assurance and Related Services 
Engagements (ISQC 1) (IAASB, 2009x):  
 leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm, including adherence to relevant 
ethical requirements; 
 acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific engagements; 
 human resources and engagement performance (including consultation, monitoring 
and review); and  
 monitoring of quality controls within the audit firm. 
(van Esch et al, 2004; IAASB, 2009x) 
In keeping with an interpretive epistemology, agency theory is applied in Section 2.2 only to 
set the scene for the introduction of external audit as part of a system of checks and 
balances to mitigate agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003). The section also explains how a conflict between 
serving the interests of stakeholders and capitalistic incentives detracts from the 
independence of the audit profession, making a case for more arms-length regulation to 
ensure high levels of audit quality (Negash et al, 2003; Bazerman and Moore, 2011; Firth et 
al, 2012). The aim is not to develop an economic case for regulatory developments but to 
provide a context for interpretively analysing the views of auditing and corporate governance 
experts on the perceived impact of s45 of the APA on each of the quality control elements 
outlined by ISQC 1 (Chapter 4; Chapter 5). This ensures that the emphasis is not on remote 
inferential testing of quality surrogates (as with the majority of positivist studies) but on the 
views of individuals engaged at the interface between theory and practice5 (Power, 2003; 
Humphrey, 2008) and the ‘real life day-to-day drivers of audit quality’ (Humphrey et al, 2011, 
p. 450).  
Interconnected with the external regulation and its impact on quality control systems is the 
issue of the credibility of the attest function and its taken-for-granted-status as part of the 
corporate governance system (Power, 1994; Humphrey et al, 2011).   A quantitative finance 
paradigm, engendering a shareholder-centric view of corporate governance has become 
prevalent (Brennan and Solomon, 2008) and with it, perspectives on governance bounded 
by the assumption of rational utility maximisers (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991;  
                                               
5
 Consequently using ISQC 1 as a ‘quality system benchmark’ is reasonable given its strong practical focus and 
the parallels between the requirements of the standard and the prior academic and professional literature, 
including South African corporate governance standards (Section 1.4.2).  
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Hill and Jones, 1992).  Modern society is, however, far more intricate and unpredictable than 
economic models based on the assumption of rationality allow for. Complex social and 
institutional forces are also at work. In this context, Brennan and Solomon (2008) identify the 
need for alternate perspectives on corporate governance, employing broader theoretical 
frameworks and notions of accountability (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Humphrey, 2008). This 
is true, even when it comes to the historically portrayed ‘neutral’ reporting and attest 
functions of accounting and auditing respectively (Burchell et al, 1980; Hopwood, 1987; 
Carruthers, 1995).  
In keeping with these recommendations, the thesis adopts an institutional perspective of 
auditing and associated regulatory developments. Section 2.3 and Chapter 6 examine the 
reporting duty through the lens of legitimacy theory asking: does s45 of the APA accord 
legitimacy to South African external audit? 
Legitimacy is paramount for the continuing existence of organisations, with the result that 
development of modern organisations can be interpreted, at least in part, by reference to the 
processes by which organisations seek and maintain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995). For the audit profession, where processes 
and outputs cannot be directly observed, and remain almost ‘mystical’ in the eyes of non-
experts, this may be especially true (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al, 1992; 
Power, 2003). From this perspective, the use of additional external controls over the audit 
profession may not be totally explained by the drive to improve audit practice and quality. At 
the heart of the balance between self- and arms-length regulation may be the need to 
maintain the perceived legitimacy of the audit profession itself, particularly after corporate 
scandals have impaired the ability of the profession’s internally-based reforms to inspire the 
confidence of stakeholders (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Unerman 
and O'Dwyer, 2004). Section 45 of the APA is an example of this. As a form of whistle-
blowing (Section 2.1.4) which may be contributing to audit quality control systems (Section 
2.2; Chapter 4; Chapter 5) and the divulgence of corporate irregularities (Section 2.3; 
Chapter 6), the reporting duty appeals to notions of acting for the greater good or in the 
public interest (Nel, 2001; Opperman, 2009). Concurrently, by signalling a move away from a 
traditional self-regulatory paradigm (Konar et al, 2003; Negash, 2004; Odendaal and De 
Jager, 2008), the whistle-blowing duty echoes comparable developments both abroad and in 
other institutional domains which appear to be encouraging arms-length regulation (Gavious, 
2007; Canada et al, 2008; Bazerman and Moore, 2011) and whistle-blowing (Vinten, 2000; 
IOD, 2009; European Commission, 2010b; KPMG, 2011). In doing so, s45 of the APA may 
be an important source of moral, pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy for the South African 
Audit Profession.  
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More critical perspectives are, however, also possible. The RI provisions, just by appealing 
to formal rational reporting structures backed by statute, may form part of an audit-
perception management exercise. What may be more relevant than actual reporting to the 
IRBA is the simple appearance of a reporting protocol designed to reassure users. In this 
way, the role of the RI provisions may be the active and influential mobilisation of 
‘conceptions of reform to the point where regulation itself becomes more relevant than the 
regulated practice’ (Hopwood, 1990, p. 84). This may not necessarily be a contradiction of 
the view that the RI provisions are a genuine source of legitimacy. In complex social 
environments, claims to legitimacy frequently go hand-in-hand with the careful cultivation of 
‘institutionalised myths’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fogarty et al, 1991; Suchman, 1995).   
In this context, there has been some work on the interconnection between legitimacy and the 
audit profession. Edwards (2001), Chandler (1993) and Carrington (2010), deal with the 
relevance of perceptions, the cumulative accomplishments of practitioners, and the 
importance of professional appearance in contributing to a type of legitimacy reserve. 
Humphrey et al (1990; 1993b; 2008) and Power (1992; 2003) explore ‘auditing rituals’ 
through the lens of legitimacy theory and, most recently, O’Dwyer et al (2011) investigate 
how claims to legitimacy are used to expand the profession’s boundaries. Few studies have, 
however, examined the interconnection between legitimacy and regulation of the profession, 
barring isolated exceptions (for example, Fogarty et al, 1991; Fogarty, 1996; Sikka et al, 
1998; Malsch and Gendron, 2011). Even then, the prior research tends to be more 
conceptual, stopping short of carrying out a detailed situation-specific study with the result 
that more needs to be done in explicating the social context of auditing (Sikka et al, 2009).  
In addition, these studies, consistent with the criticisms of Brennan and Solomon (2008), 
have a narrow focus, being concerned almost exclusively with the situation in the USA and 
Europe.  
‘We can and have to learn more from the experiences of auditors within and across different 
firms, contexts and nations’ (Humphrey et al, 2011, p. 433). Understanding how s45 of the 
APA contributes to the legitimacy of the South African audit profession not only provides 
case-specific support for institutional auditing theorists. Showing how processes of 
legitimisation at work in an American or European context apply in an African setting assists 
in developing a conceptual approach to understanding audit regulatory developments 
mindful of the interconnections between audit practice, the importance of audit quality and 
claims for legitimacy and how these contribute to the continued existence of the attest 
function (see Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 2003; Humphrey et al, 2011). In doing so, 
the research also adds to the body of whistle-blowing literature which, while discussing the 
various drivers of and impediments to effective whistle-blowing (Near and Miceli, 1995; 
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Hwang et al, 2008), stops short of drawing a connection between external audit, whistle-
blowing, transparency, accountability and legitimacy (consider Llewelyn, 1996; Llewelyn, 
2003). The result is the broader conceptualisation of external regulation of the audit 
profession which is unrestricted by agency theory, thereby adding to our understanding of 
mechanisms of accountability, and governance (see Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  
Notions of accountability and transparency suggest that s45 of the APA may also give rise to 
elements of disciplinary power and control (consider Moore, 1991; Roberts et al, 2006). In 
particular, the presence of Foucauldian ‘elements’ of enclosure, efficiency and disciplinary 
power may be relevant for understanding the relationship between the reporting duty and 
perceptions of underlying quality control systems or claims to legitimacy (Chapter 7).  
Despite the institutionalisation of arms-length regulation, the exact characteristics that allow 
it to restore confidence in the profession in the aftermath of corporate scandals have not 
been fully explored (Malsch and Gendron, 2011; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). Section 2.4 
and Chapter 7, therefore, provide an initial account of how the prescriptive requirements of 
s45 of the APA - coupled with sanctions for non-compliance with the reporting duty and 
motifs of enhanced visibility – reflect Foucauldian power and control. It may be the case that 
the RI provisions, by rendering a client’s transgressions ‘visible’ and subjecting the auditor to 
an additional formal reporting requirement, result in ‘disciplinary effect’ reinforcing any quality 
gains (Section 2.2; Chapter 4; Chapter 5) or a sense of legitimacy (Section 2.3; Chapter 6). 
Related to this, Foucauldian ‘elements’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993) may also shed light 
on how the RI provisions create a valid expectation of more effective reporting by auditors in 
the name of improved transparency and accountability. While several studies have 
employed similar techniques in a management accounting setting (Hopper and Macintosh, 
1993; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; Brivot and Gendron, 2011), few have done so in an auditing 
context. Using Foucault’s ‘technology’ of discipline and punishment, therefore, allows for 
different nuances of audit regulation to be illuminated and further highlights the role of RI’s in 
South African audit.  
Ultimately, this thesis is mindful of the body of corporate governance research (Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008) and, more specifically, research on auditing and audit quality (Francis, 
2004). These prior studies are, however, mainly positivist in nature, failing to explicate the 
complex interaction between social and economic forces (Hopwood, 1987; Carruthers, 
1995), especially when it comes to auditing and auditor regulation (Humphrey, 2008). The 
result is that important mechanisms of accountability are not examined in detail. This is due, 
in part, to an over-reliance on agency theory (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008). Related to this are the influences of the American research establishment 
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which has favoured quantitative studies over more interpretative or critical accounts6 (Ahrens 
et al, 2008; Merchant, 2008). Finally, much of the work on corporate governance is one 
dimensional. The focus is on studying organisations in a limited number of sectors or by 
reference to market-observed information. There is also a clear bias in favour of an Anglo-
Saxon context (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Böhm et al, 2013;).  Taking this into account, 
this study is able to make an important contribution by providing a unique insight into 
corporate governance in Africa. By relying on detailed interviews grounded in agency, 
legitimacy and power-control theories, the thesis speaks to the need for both methodological 
and theoretical eclecticism to examine more rigorously a specific element of corporate 
governance systems while contributing to the debate on the need for external regulation of 
the audit profession (see Humphrey et al, 2011). Further, this research is the first to deal 
with the role played by South Africa’s RI provisions in the audit arena, despite their being in 




Unless otherwise stated, technical terms have the same meaning as contained in the 
Glossary of Terms (see also IAASB, 2009b). The following terms are central to the study and 
are defined here.  
 ‘Audit’ refers to a professional engagement where the independent practitioner (the 
‘external auditor’) expresses a conclusion ‘designed to enhance the degree of 
confidence of intended users other than the responsible party about the outcome of 
the evaluation or measurement of a subject matter against criteria’ (IAASB, 2009b, p. 
2). Only South African-based audits are considered. Further, the thesis deals 
exclusively with audits of financial statements which are defined as ‘reasonable 
assurance engagements’ (IAASB, 2009c). For the sake of brevity, the proposal refers 
simply to ‘audits’ or ‘external audits’ as meaning ‘external audits of financial 
statements’. The audits are ‘external’ in the sense that they are executed by an 
independent practitioner with due care and skill (International Federation of 
                                               
6
 The same applies in South Africa where positivist research is far more common than alternative styles  
(Coetsee, 2011; Maroun, 2012a; Maroun, 2012b). 
 
7
 Special thanks for recommendations on the structure of this thesis must go the participants at the Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting Conference (2011); British Accounting and Finance Association Conference (2012);  
International Corporate Governance Conference (2012); Africa Leads Conference (2012); and King’s College 
London’s Doctoral Colloquia (2011; 2012).  
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Accountants [IFAC], 2006; IRBA, 2011).  This research will use the terms audit(or) 
and external audit(or) interchangeably. In addition, as the auditor will carry out 
procedures designed to verify certain financial information (IAASB, 2009l; IAASB, 
2009m; IAASB, 2009o), this thesis also uses the term ‘attest function’ or 
‘assurance engagement (function)’ to refer to an ‘audit’ engagement. These terms 
are used interchangeably.  
 ‘Audit quality control systems’ refers to an audit firm’s policies and procedures 
which are designed to provide assurance that external audit engagements are 
carried out to the highest possible standards (Financial Reporting Councail [FRC], 
2008a; IAASB, 2009x; IAASB, 2009e). These policies and procedures are those 
described by ISQC 1 and include: (a) leadership responsibilities for quality within the 
firm, (b) ethical requirements, (c) acceptance and continuance of client relationships 
and specific engagements, (d) human resources, (e) engagement performance and 
(f) monitoring (IAASB, 2009x). This thesis will use the terms ‘audit quality control’ and 
‘audit quality control systems’ interchangeably. ‘Audit quality control principles’ or 
‘audit quality control elements’ refer to the quality control metrics outlined by  
ISQC 1 collectively. These terms are also used interchangeably.  
 ‘Experts’ are individuals cognisant of the detailed requirements of International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA). They have several years of practical and/or academic 
experience dealing with auditing at a technical level.  Examples include audit 
partners, academics specialising in auditing and regulators of the audit profession.  
 A ‘reportable irregularity’ is: ‘any unlawful act or omission committed by any person 
responsible for the management of an entity, which - 
a) ‘has caused or is likely to cause material financial loss to the entity or to any partner, member, 
shareholder, creditor or investor of the entity in respect of his, her or its dealings with that 
entity; or 
b) is fraudulent or amounts to theft; or 
c) represents a material breach of any fiduciary duty owed by such person to the entity or any 
partner, member, shareholder, creditor or investor of the entity under any law applying to the 
entity or the conduct or management thereof’ (s1 of the APA, 2005). 
 
This thesis will refer to the provisions of the APA which mandate the reporting of 
‘reportable irregularities’ as ‘s45 of the APA’ or as the ‘reportable irregularity 
provisions’ or ‘RI provisions’. The terms are used interchangeably.   
 Research quality is concerned with whether or not research findings are valid and 
reliable. ‘Validity and ‘reliability’ refer to ‘contextual’ detail which provides an 
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indication of the credibility of the evidence and the basis for conclusions (Holland, 
2005, p. 250). Going hand-in-hand with this is clearly defining the purpose and scope 
of the research as well as its inherent limitations to allow the reader to reach his own 
informed conclusions (Neuendorf, 2002; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Parker, 2007; 
Creswell, 2009). When it comes to interpretive research, validity and reliability are not 
readily distinguishable and do not have precisely the same meaning as for 
predominately quantitative studies (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Creswell, 2009).  
 ‘Respondents’ refers to ‘audit experts’ and ‘informed users’ collectively. This 
research will use the term ‘respondent’ and ‘interviewee’ interchangeably.  
 A ‘user’ (also referred to as an ‘informed user’) is a user of an audit report who is 
knowledgeable of audit process in general; has several years of experience dealing 
with external auditors; and is aware of the regulatory environment in which auditors 
operate. Examples of ‘informed users’ would include members of audit committees; 
standard setters; senior financial and risk management officers of organisations; 
other regulators; or representatives of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE).  
 Whistle-blowing’ is the disclosure of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under 
the control of one party to an independent third party able to take action (adapted 
from Miceli and Near, 1984). ‘Whistle-blowing’ includes any form of reporting 
which challenges the respective party’s power, and which requires the whistle-
blower to assess the perceived benefits and costs, even if the act of reporting is 
obligated by codes of conduct or statute (Rotter, 1966). 
 
1.4: RESEARCH SCOPE  
 
This thesis explores the role of South Africa’s RI provisions in external audit. Three research 
questions are dealt with:    
A. Do the provisions of s45 of the APA have a perceived impact on the quality 
control systems of audit firms? 
B. Does s45 of the APA afford perceived legitimacy to South African external 
audit? 
C: Is s45 of the APA an example of surveillance machinery and a manifestation of 
disciplinary power?  
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Each question is informed by the results of detailed interviews with industry experts (Section 
3.3) and constitutes the basis for each of the result chapters.  
 
1.4.1: THESIS STRUCTURE  
 
This thesis is organised broadly as follows: Chapter 2 grounds the thesis in the prior audit-
related research and provides a basis for each of the research questions in Section 1.4. 
Section 2.1 provides a brief overview of corporate governance in South Africa, including the 
role of external audit and the RI provisions. Section 2.2 explores audit through the lens of 
agency theory and includes a review of the prior research on audit quality and the role of 
external regulation in improving it. Section 2.3 follows with an institutional account of audit 
practice informed by legitimacy theory. Section 2.4 continues with an interpretive style, 
examining Foucauldian theory of disciplinary power and its application in an accounting and 
auditing setting.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on the method. Chapter 4 explores the perceived impact of s45 of the 
APA on audit quality using detailed interviews. Chapter 5 complements the findings in  
Chapter 4, using a correspondence analysis (Section 3.2) to aggregate and add to the 
sentiments on the RI provisions’ relevance for audit quality. Chapter 6 examines the role of 
the RI provisions in contributing to the perceived legitimacy of the audit profession, including 
the possibility of s45 of the APA forming part of a carefully cultivated ‘myth’ (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) or a sophisticated perception management effort (Suchman, 1995) designed 
to add to the credibility of the attest function. Chapter 7 expands on this. It draws parallels 
between the RI provisions and elements of Foucauldian power and control; considers the 
relationship between motifs of disciplinary power and the legitimisation potential of the 
reporting duty; and critically evaluates how notions of disciplinary power may contribute to a 
‘ceremonial display’ designed to win stakeholders’ confidence and secure the legitimacy of 
audit practice.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides condensed findings, summarises the key contributions and 
limitations of the research and identifies areas for additional research, including 
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1.4.2: DELIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS8 
 
This thesis should be read in light of the following delimitations: first, the technical details of 
the RI provisions, being largely procedural in nature (IRBA, 2006), are not extensively 
examined. Legal issues encountered when interpreting the legislation are also not 
addressed. Such is a topic of legal debate; is beyond the scope of most audit engagements 
(IRBA, 2006); and is best suited to a dedicated research effort. A definition of ‘reportable 
irregularity’ and guidance on the reporting process is, however, dealt with in Section 2.1 and 
Appendix A to provide a backdrop for the research.  
Secondly, no effort is made to describe fully or to quantify the ‘expectation gap’ in South 
Africa. Auditor liability associated with s45 of the APA, as well as the debate on whether or 
not the auditor has a duty to detect and report fraud (Humphrey et al, 1992; Dennis, 2010; 
Houghton et al, 2011) are not specifically addressed. As discussed in Section 1.1, the RI 
provisions do not create duty to detect fraud (IRBA, 2006). The reporting duty also 
constitutes only a single aspect of audit practice. Accordingly, the audit expectation gap 
(Bourne and Minter, 1995; Houghton et al, 2011; Gold et al, 2012), especially in connection 
with fraud detection and prevention (Humphrey et al, 1993b), is not the focal point of this 
research. Related to this, the adequacy of legal protection available to auditors; the role of 
auditor liability in improving audit quality; and legal liability as a manifestation of disciplinary 
power are only touched on (Chapter 7) to retain the focus of the research on the role played 
by s45 of the APA in South African audits.   
Thirdly, the thesis examines the duty of South African auditors to blow the whistle only per 
the RI provisions. Other legislation such as the Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act No. 121 
of 1998 (POCA) and the Financial Intelligence Centres Act No. 38 of 2001 (FICA) may also 
give rise to a reporting duty, as may informal reporting requirements such as whistle-blowing 
hotlines at organisations. These examples of whistle-blowing are normally more restricted in 
nature and often industry or company specific. The RI provisions are broader (the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board [PAAB], 2003; IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006). In addition, due to 
the fact that s45 of the APA has, to date, applied most often in the context of financial 
statement audits (IRBA, 2006), the research will not explore the impact of whistle-blowing on 
other assurance or non-assurance engagements. Concurrently, equivalent foreign legislation 
is not examined in detail to retain the African perspective of the study and due to inherent 
                                               
8
 This section is included in the Chapter 1 per Creswell (2009) and Leedy and Omrdo (2001) who recommend 
that the scope of the thesis be defined upfront. A similar approach is followed by the IASB and IAASB.  
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cost and time constraints. A reproduction of this study in different jurisdictions is deferred for 
subsequent research.  
Thirdly, the study considers mainly the relevance of legitimacy theory and Foucauldian 
theories of power and control in exploring the case for the RI provisions. Other theoretical 
perspectives could have been emphasised, for example: theories of moral cognition 
(Sweeney and Roberts, 1997; Edwards, 2001) or modernity theory (Giddens, 1990; 
Giddens, 1991). Likewise, the thesis may have been couched predominantly in an agency-
theory construct more conducive to quantitative research techniques. The chosen theoretical 
basis reinforces the study’s interpretive style. Furthermore, the purpose of this thesis is not 
to provide an exhaustive account of every theory that can be used to explain regulatory 
development in an audit setting or to ‘quantify’ audit quality per and post the introduction of 
the RI provisions. Instead the use of theory is driven by themes emerging from the detailed 
interviews (Chapter 3) balancing the need for an ‘eclectic’ use of theory to ensure detailed 
accounts of the RI provisions (Coldwell, 2012; Humphrey, 2012) with the need for practicality 
and focus (Llewelyn, 1996; Weetman, 2012)9 
Fourthly, ‘there is no single agreed definition of ‘audit quality’ that can be used as a standard 
against which actual performance can be assessed’ (FRC, 2006, p. 16). In this context, 
ISQC 1 is used as a basis for defining ‘audit quality control systems’ (Section 1.3) similar to 
other studies that investigate audit quality by using ‘quality surrogates’ (Fernando et al, 
2010; Al-Thuneibat et al, 2011; Daniels and Booker, 2011). Other ‘quality criteria’ could have 
been applied. For example, DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) uses the size of the audit firm as a 
quality surrogate while Boone et al (2010) use the probability of the auditor issuing a going 
concern qualification as an audit-quality signal. Using ISQC 1 may run the risk of being taken 
‘hostage’ by professional perspectives and self-serving claims to expertise (Power, 2003, p. 
392). Further, the research will be unable to consider the adequacy of the professional 
standard given that it is used as a basis for describing audit quality control systems. ISQC 1 
is, however, applied internationally (Negash et al, 2003; European Commission, 2010a; 
Boolaky, 2011; Gold et al, 2012). It is similar in substance to equivalent American standards 
(Bedard et al, 2008) and the essence of principles of sound corporate governance, including 
South Africa’s King Report on Corporate Governance (see FRC, 2008a; IOD, 2009; 
Solomon, 2010). The standard also reflects the prior auditing research (Section 2.2; Chapter 
4) and has been subject to due process and commentary from multiple stakeholder groups. 
Concurrently it offers a wider ‘construct’ of audit quality and quality control systems than 
traditional positivist research has catered for. In turn, this allows the research to provide a 
                                               
9
 Special thanks go to the anonymous reviewers and audience at the British Accounting and Finance Association 
Conference (2012).  
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more holistic account of the functioning of audit quality control systems in a real-world setting 
(Humphrey, 2008; Humphrey, 2012). For this reason, the thesis assumes that the elements 
of an audit quality control system per ISQC 1 are valid, accurate and complete in all material 
respects10. Ultimately, however, it is not the objective of this research to explore the 
adequacy of ISQC 1 in detail.  
Fifthly, the thesis relies on detailed interviews with both informed users and experts (Section 
3.3) to provide a holistic account of the role of the RI provisions. The main objective of this 
research is not to explore variations in perceptions of experts from large and smaller audit 
firms with an aim to concluding on the effect of firm size on audit quality. Likewise, this 
research does not explicitly deal with describing and quantifying the audit expectation gap as 
discussed above (Humphrey et al, 1992; Gold et al, 2012). For this reason, detailed analysis 
of differences in opinions between users and experts is not carried out11. Where obvious 
differences in the views of experts at large or smaller firms, on the one hand, or users and 
experts, on the other, emerge, these are dealt with only to add to an overall understanding of 
the role of the RI provisions.  
On a final note, despite safeguards to reduce threats to validity and reliability to acceptably 
low levels (Chapter 3), these threats cannot be totally eliminated. Inevitably, there is the 
assumption that research participants acted with integrity, objectivity and due care when 
providing their responses and that they provided complete and accurate accounts12 
(Alvesson, 2003; Creswell, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 2011).   
                                               
10
 What Power (2003) does not discuss is the possibility of being taken ‘hostage’ by the arguably ‘closed’ 
perspectives of top-rated international journals. Jones et al (2006), for example, highlight the presence of  
‘invisible colleagues’ and ‘network groups’ with links to editorial boards of one such journal and how the majority 
of articles come from a consistent group of authors representing only a handful of tertiary institutions. 
Consequently, one cannot automatically assume that using a professional standard to define ‘audit quality’ is 
necessarily more of a validity threat than relying exclusively on formal academic publications from the leading 
journals. What should also be born in mind is that ‘peer review’ involves a limited number of academics only. It is 
not equivalent to due process followed by the IAASB involving multiple stakeholder groups unobscured by 
anonymity. In light of the views of Power (2003) and Jones (2006), this thesis uses perspectives on audit quality 
and audit quality control systems drawn both from the academic and professional literature.   
 
11
 This would also be inappropriate given the relatively small sample sizes and that fact that, unlike most 
expectation gap studies that draw on the opinions of multiple stakeholder groups (Gold et al, 2012; Porter 2012), 
this paper concentrates on subject experts rendering an analysis of the expectation gap moot. Together with 




 As discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, interviewees provided detailed accounts of their 
experiences with and perceptions of s45 of the APA which relate to the prior academic work on auditing. At the 
same time, several accounts are highly critical of the auditing or regulatory establishment and seldom are views 
on the whistle-blowing duty precisely the same.  This implies that the risk of rehearsed accounts or responses 
motivated by the desire to provide the politically or socially correct ‘answer’ (Alvesson, 2003), has been 
adequately managed by the researcher.  
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2: EXTERNAL AUDITS AND WHISTLE-BLOWING 
 
Chapter 2 reviews certain of the prior audit-related literature. The aim is not to provide a 
complete account of the research on auditing, auditing quality and audit quality control 
systems but rather to provide a context for this thesis. To this end, Section 2.1 provides a 
brief overview of corporate governance developments in South Africa, including audit-
specific reforms. This includes a summary of the history and operation of the South African 
auditor’s whistle-blowing duty. Section 2.2 follows with an agency theory perspective on 
audit and introduces the first research question dealing with the association between the RI 
provisions and audit quality. Section 2.3 identifies the need for more institutionally orientated 
research in accounting and auditing and derives the second research question dealing with 
s45 of the APA as a possible source of legitimacy for the audit profession. Finally, Section 
2.4 continues with the exploration of interpretive and critical audit research, examining the 
prior accounting research employing a Foucauldian theoretical lens and, by analogy, asks if 
the RI provisions may be reminiscent of Foucault’s model of disciplinary power and control.    
 
2.1: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, EXTERNAL 
AUDIT AND THE RI PROVISIONS   
 
2.1.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
Following democracy in 1994, international investment in South Africa began to increase, as 
did the number of incorporated companies and organisations listed on the JSE (Rossouw et 
al, 2002). In ensuring the sound functioning of this growing capital market, South Africa 
chose a broad corporate governance strategy that relied on a mix of external regulation 
complemented by professional codes and codes of best practice. For example, exchange 
controls, prohibitions on certain listing structures and restrictions on the trading of certain 
financial instruments have been commonplace (Rossouw et al, 2002; West, 2006). Company 
Law has also traditionally sought to regulate the relationship between shareholders, directors 
and corporations (Companies Act, 1973). In 1994, these measures were complemented by 
the introduction of King-I (IOD, 1994). King-I, in addition to financial and regulatory aspects 
of corporate governance, advocated a more holistic outlook on firm leadership which 
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stressed the importance of financial and ethical dimensions of the corporate governance 
landscape. King-I was not in response to any one particular corporate failure but rather 
identified the need to align South African business practice with international governance 
standards following political emancipation and to take cognisance of a number of prevailing 
social and economic ills (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; Diamond and Price, 2012).  Recognising 
the need for greater economic participation following Apartheid, the focus was on simplified, 
but high quality, financial reporting and on the principles of transparency, accountability and 
ethical, all-inclusive, business (IOD, 1994; Rossouw et al, 2002; Hamann et al, 2005).   
As such King-I (1994), entrenched the responsibility of a unitary board for ensuring financial 
reporting that met the information needs of users and maintaining an effective system of 
monitoring and control to safeguard an organisations’ assets. As part of this, it stressed the 
importance of external audit as a means of providing assurance on the fair presentation of 
financial statements and underlying controls. In addition, echoing the Cadbury Report 
(Solomon, 2010), King-I recommended that companies form audit committees which would 
assist with, inter alia, managing the relationship between the external auditor and 
management to ensure high levels of auditor independence.  
South Africa’s first democratic election was not a cure for the effects of almost sixty years of 
political and economic isolation (Hamilton et al, 2009; Diale, 2012). Adding to this was the 
Russian-Brazil-Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 which heightened risk aversion towards 
developing economies (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; Diamond and Price, 2012). Political and 
economic uncertainty, however, gave way to greater involvement by the country on the 
international stage and a period of fiscal growth. Integration into world markets also meant 
that South Africa became more susceptible to varying trends and changing sentiments in 
foreign jurisdictions (Rossouw et al, 2002; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). For example, the 
evolution from a shareholder-centric view of corporate governance to broader conceptions of 
the interests of multiple stakeholder groups and relevance of non-financial reporting 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Christopher, 2010; Solomon, 2010) taking hold in the UK had 
a direct impact on South African corporate governance developments (IOD, 1994). Being a 
developing economy heavily dependent on international capital and eager to demonstrate its 
legitimacy as an international player, South Africa was quick to refine its existing governance 
principles to echo sentiments abroad and allow it to take a leading role in the corporate 
governance arena (Rossouw et al, 2002; Konar et al, 2003; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; 
Solomon, 2010; King, 2012).  
In this context, King-II (2002), proposed a move from a narrow view on firms’ performance to 
more inclusive, ‘triple-bottom-line’ reporting. Changes concerned, for example, the role and 
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function of the board of directors and company officers, information technology, risk- 
management and social, health and environmental reporting. In particular, the need for 
sound audit services was dealt with to ensure the continued relevance of the attest function 
and reliability of annual reports (IOD, 2002; Rossouw et al, 2002; Puttick and van Esch, 
2003; Diamond and Price, 2012)13. King-II continued with a principles-based approach, 
being strongly influenced by codes of governance in the UK, particularly the importance of a 
broader focus on stakeholder interests (West, 2006; Solomon, 2010). Revisions also took 
cognisance of corporate failures both domestic and abroad, as well as an increase in both 
the volume and level of complexity of economic transactions (Nel, 2001; Deker, 2002; West, 
2006; Maroun, 2012c). During 2009, the global financial crisis, persistent socio-economic 
inequality, resource constraints, climate change and mounting allegations of corruption in the 
public sector led to the release of King-III and the world’s first discussion paper on integrated 
reporting (IOD, 2009; IRC, 2011; King, 2012; Payne, 2012). These placed a renewed 
emphasis on the need for balanced, holistic reporting (integrated reporting) that takes 
cognisance of both financial and non-financial measures and communicates their 
interconnection with a company’s ability to create and sustain value responsibly in the short-, 
medium- and long-term (Solomon and Maroun, 2012).  
In this way, codification of the country’s first governance practices in 1994 signals a growing 
awareness of the need for holistic leadership that is in the interest of more than just capital 
providers. The ever-changing economic and regulatory environment leads to King-II in 2002 
with its emphasis on triple-bottom-line reporting. Finally, 2009 marks the beginning of an 
‘integrated reporting’ paradigm where, faced with mounting social, economic and 
environmental pressures, sound governance  necessitates new and innovative ways of 
doing business and of communicating both benefits and risks to varied and dispersed 
stakeholder groups (IRC, 2011; King, 2012). Despite considerable variations in the scope 
and emphasis of South Africa’s codes of corporate governance, what has, however, 
remained a common feature is the role of external audit in providing assurance, whether in 





                                               
13
 While King-II had a more ‘inclusive’ approach than King-I, it continued to stress the importance of the 
shareholder, capital and generation of reasonable returns (West, 2006; Diamond and Price, 2012).  
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2.1.2: AUDITING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Early references to some form of attest function can be traced to Ancient Egyptian, 
Babylonian, Greek and Roman societies where systems of checks and balances were put in 
place over government administrators, including tax and grain collectors (Nel, 2001; Puttick 
and van Esch, 2003). With the separation of manager and owner functions giving rise to the 
need for clear, honest accounting by agents to principals, more formal practices aimed at 
providing assurance over statements of accounts began to take hold (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983). The emergence of the Joint Stock Company and Industrial Revolution 
provided an added impetus to the development of modern audit practices (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Chandler et al, 1993; Edwards, 2001). The subsequent proliferation of 
companies (Coase, 1937; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983); widening ‘distance’ between 
shareholders and agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and growing recognition of the 
interests of multiple stakeholder groups (Solomon, 2010; International Integrated Reporting 
Committee [IIRC], 2011; IRC, 2011) have simply stressed the need for ever-more 
sophisticated attest procedures to provide assurance over financial reports. While auditing 
has changed substantially from ancient times, the fundamental principle on which it is based 
has, however, remained relatively constant: ‘men in positions of trust should be subject to 
public scrutiny’ and, thus, a form of control is needed to ensure that ‘stewards [are] more 
honest’ (Nel, 2001, p.121).  
In South Africa,  in line with earlier changes occuring in the UK, the formation companies 
and emerging agency problem gives rise to the early South African Accounting Profession 
and mandatory audit for companies (Puttick and van Esch, 2003). In 1894, The Institute of 
Accountants and Auditors and Auditors in the South African Republic, was formed influenced 
heavily by the Institute of Chartered Accounts in England and Wales (ICAEW) established in 
1880 (Nel, 2001). Following the Boer Wars, various provincial accounting bodies emerged 
which were partially unified following the establishment of a country-wide set of 
examinations; regulations to control entry to the profession; and the passing of the Chartered 
Accountants Designation (Private) Act No. 13 of 192714 (Puttick and van Esch, 2003). In 
1946, the Joint Council of Societies of Chartered Accountants of South Africa was 
constituted, later renamed the National Council of Chartered Accountants (SA) in 1966. It 
was not until 1951, however, that formal legislation aimed specifically at the auditing 
profession was introduced with the promulgation of the PAAA (Nel, 2001) which provided for, 
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 This legislation, which is still in effect, allows the use of the designation: Chartered Accountant (South Africa) 




inter alia, the registration of auditors15, and the formation of the PAAB. The PAAB was 
intended to serve the public interest by ensuring high standards of audit quality - including 
auditor independence - through various regulatory efforts (Nel, 2001; Puttick and van Esch, 
2003). In 1980, this was complemented by the provincial accounting bodies, under the 
National Council of Chartered Accountants, being superseded by a single member-body: the 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) with an aim to, among other goals, 
improve the quality of South African accounting and auditing, and bolster the standing of the 
profession.  
Today, in South Africa, audits are mandatory for all listed companies and for those 
companies with a sufficiently high public interest score (Companies Act, 2008). South 
African audits are carried out in accordance with ISA. Briefly, these require the auditor to 
express an opinion on whether or not a client’s financial statements are prepared in all 
material respects in accordance with the applicable reporting framework16 (IAASB, 2009c; 
IAASB, 2009e; IAASB, 2009g; IAASB, 2009h) and the Companies Act (2008) (IAASB, 
2009ab; IRBA, 2009a; IRBA, 2009b). In discharging this duty, the auditor ought to assess 
the risk of misstatement due to fraud and error, including non-compliance with relevant laws 
and regulations. He should design and execute audit procedures to reduce this risk to 
acceptably low levels. This should not, however, be construed as implying that the auditor 
has an active duty to seek out every fraud or legal  transgression (IAASB, 2009g; IAASB, 
2009h). In addition, ISA – read with the codes of professional conduct (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 
2011) – require the auditor to maintain client confidentiality. Barring a modification of the 
audit report, and in the absence of a legal duty to the contrary, the auditor is, therefore, 
effectively prohibited from divulging client information (PAAB, 2003; IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 
2009h; FRC, 2011). This could lead to a peculiar situation where actions of a client, even if 
contrary to the public interest, or relevant for assessing the organisation’s commitment to 
sound governance, would not be communicated to stakeholders unless it had a material 
impact on the financial statements and resulted in a modified audit report.   
 
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, South Africa has taken the position that a system of checks 
and balances over companies is a defining part of the local market. The existing tension 
between the duty of client confidentially and need to inform relevant stakeholders of 
potentially significant irregularities stands in stark contrast with this. The South African 
Government, therefore, took the position in the late 1950’s that ‘...an auditor owes a duty not 
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 In terms of the PAAA, only ‘registered auditors’ (RAs) were permitted to express an opinion on a client’s 
financial statements. Presently, a similar situation holds (IRBA, 2011).  
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only to his client but also to the public’ (Minsiter of Finance of the Republic of South Africa, 
1951 cited in Nel, 2001) and that consequently, arms-length regulation aimed at clarifying an 
auditor’s reporting duties would prove instrumental in enhancing the perceived quality of 
what was being reported by auditors and, hence, the confidence vested in the audit 
profession and local capital markets17 (Dunn et al, 1989; Nel, 2001; Konar et al, 2003; van 
Esch et al, 2004).  
Economic growth, social and political unrest, and increasing globalisation led to calls for a 
more holistic or comprehensive system of regulation (Odendaal and De Jager, 2008; 
Diamond and Price, 2012). As discussed above, South Africa replied with the introduction of 
King-I, and later King-II, which introduced several reforms and confirmed the country’s 
reliance on a hybrid system of corporate governance based on a combination of codified 
best practices and statute (IOD, 1994; IOD, 2002; King, 2012). The same was true in an 
audit context where codes of professional conduct and audit practice, coupled with the 
PAAA, served as the primary basis for regulating the activities of the profession (Nel, 2001; 
Puttick and van Esch, 2003). The early part of the twenty first century, however, saw 
material threats to the profession’s largely self-regulatory franchise. A number of corporate 
scandals occurring during the 1990’s and early 2000’s led to a ‘crisis of confidence in the 
auditing profession, and to serious questions being asked about the integrity of the financial 
reporting system and the quality and usefulness of information it generates’ (Odendaal and 
De Jager, 2008, p. 1).  At a global level, the fall of Enron and Arthur Anderson led to calls for 
additional reforms and investor protection (Malsch and Gendron, 2011; Tremblay and 
Gendron, 2011) with the ripple effects amplifying local debacles at, inter alia, Masterbond, 
LeisureNet and Saambou, and stimulating calls for further arms-length control over the 
profession (Nel, 2001; Manuel, 2002; Odendaal and De Jager, 2008). This development 
should also be seen against the backdrop of powerful forces of isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) which necessitated that local governance-based reforms mirror the 
proliferation of new laws and regulations in leading economies and, not by coincidence, 
some of the country’s most important trade partners and providers of capital  (Rossouw et al, 
2002; West, 2006; King, 2012).  
In this context, South Africa took steps to harmonise its accounting and auditing standards 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and ISA respectively, 
simultaneously revising its auditor codes of ethics and conduct. To add to these largely self-
regulatory efforts, amendments to Company Law mandated certain auditor independence 
                                               
17
 The Government stopped short, however, of imposing a fraud detection duty on auditors on the grounds that 
this would be impractical (Nel, 2001) and instead required certain irregularities, if detected during an audit, to be 
reported to the PAAB as discussed below.  
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requirements, echoing changes seen in Europe and, in particular, the USA (Konar et al, 
2003). For example, the principle of partner rotation as an auditor independence safeguard 
was historically dealt with only in terms of codes of professional conduct. The same was true 
of the need to manage the nature and extent of non-audit services rendered to an audit 
client (Puttick and van Esch, 2003). Section 92 of the Companies Act (2008) now imposes 
mandatory five-year rotation rules. Similarly, s93(3)a of the Companies Act, read with s44(6) 
of the APA, effectively restricts the rendering of non-audit services. While not as prescriptive 
as comparable requirements found in SOX (Riotto, 2008), the effect is, in substance, a 
prohibition on offering services to an audit client which would be construed as leading to a 
material ‘conflict of interest’ in the eyes of the IRBA (s44(6) of the APA). Analogously, the 
role of audit committees as part of the corporate governance system, particularly in assisting 
with the preservation of auditor independence, is no longer the sole domain of King-III. 
Section 94(7) of the Companies Act legislates a number of committee duties reminiscent of 
those found in SOX. With regards to the auditor in particular, these include, ensuring that the 
auditors do not render non-audit services that would compromise their independence; 
determination of auditor fees; and nomination and appointment of the auditor. 
In addition, the APA18 was promulgated. At the same time that the auditor peer review 
system in the USA was being challenged (Carcello et al, 2011; Malsch and Gendron, 2011), 
concerns were raised about the PAAB. Being funded and constituted by members of the 
profession, critics argued that it lacked the objectivity needed to regulate the audit profession 
effectively and was tainted by a perception of being reluctant to discipline its members. 
Under the APA, the IRBA, therefore, superseded the PAAB. Unlike its predecessor, the 
IRBA was vested with powers of inspection to add to the credibility of the audit review 
process bolstered by legislated sanctions for delinquent auditors that could be applied more 
broadly than under the PAAA. The IRBA would also have a more diverse board19 and enjoy 
multiple sources of funding (Konar et al, 2003; Odendaal and De Jager, 2008; IRBA, 2012a). 
In this way, rather than be concerned only with the interests of its members (Konar et al, 
2003), s2 of the APA expressly calls for the IRBA to protect the public interest (Konar et al, 
2003; Odendaal and De Jager, 2008).  
On the back of these changes, a statutory requirement under the PAAA, in terms of which 
auditors were obliged to blow the whistle on certain client transgressions, was revised and 
firmly entrenched as a part of audit practice (Dunn et al, 1989; PAAB, 2003; IRBA, 2006). As 
                                               
18
 The promulgation of the APA marks an increase in external regulation over the audit profession and serves as 
an example of how South Africa applies a ‘hybrid’ approach to governance, relying on a mix of regulation, 
professional standards and voluntary codes such as King-III (Diamond and Price, 2012; King, 2012).  
 
19
 Not more than 40% of the board may be auditors (IRBA, 2012a).  
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discussed in Section 1.1, historically low levels of reported irregularities under the PAAA 
were interpreted as a stumbling block to enhanced corporate transparency and a possible 
indicator that auditors lacked the independence needed for blowing the whistle on their 
clients. Consequently, in 2005, the APA broadened the reporting requirements, introducing 
penalties for non-compliance with the reporting duty (Nel, 2001; Opperman, 2009). Since 
then, the requirement to bring ‘reportable irregularities’ to the attention of the IRBA has been 
described as an important mechanism by which regulation contributes to a culture of 
compliance with laws and regulations by corporates, aiding in the reduction of white collar 
crime (Opperman, 2009). Simultaneously, it has been cited as a viable means of further 
integrating audit with existing processes of accountability (Nel, 2001) – a theme featuring 
strongly in codes of corporate governance seeking to entrench ideals of transparency, ethics 
and sustainability (IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2010). That this whistle-blowing duty is making a 
valuable contribution is supported by an excess of 3 000 reports to the regulator to date 
dealing with, inter alia, contraventions of the Companies Act, tax irregularities, estate agency 
contraventions, non-compliance with JSE rules, departures from labour laws and fraud 
(Wielligh, 2007; Opperman, 2009). Accordingly, proponents of the whistle-blowing duty 
argue that it represents a ‘step in the right direction if Government wishes to protect the 
financial interests of investors…the public at large, and ultimately the integrity of [local] 
financial markets’ (Opperman, 2009, p. 29) while simultaneously adding to the quality of 
audit reports and value-adding potential of the attest function (Nel, 2001).  
In this thinking, the South African Legislature was not alone. Calls for improved reporting by 
the auditors has been a topic of considerable debate by the European Community as 
evidenced by the European Commission’s (2010b) green paper on audit quality. Similarly, 
the UK, USA, France, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are among the various jurisdictions 
where auditors may be required to bring certain client conduct to the attention of third parties 
(Humphrey et al, 1993b; Nel, 2001; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
[AICPA], 2007; Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Kaplan and Schultz, 2007; Vakkur et al, 2010; 
Porter et al, 2012). What makes the South African context unusual is that that the imposed 
whistle-blowing duty is a broad one. It does not apply only in a financial services setting, in 
the public sector, or merely in terms of professional standards (Nel, 2001; Maroun and 
Gowar, 2013). Instead, the auditor is required to consider all information coming to his 
attention from any source when deciding whether or not suspected ‘reportable irregularities’ 





2.1.3: THE REPORTABLE IRREGULARITY PROVISIONS 
 
The PAAA is the genesis of the South African auditor’s mandatory duty to bring certain 
transgressions to the attention of, then, the PAAB. In terms of s20 (5) of the PAAA:  
‘If any person acting in the capacity of auditor to any undertaking is satisfied or has reason to 
believe that in the conduct of the affairs of such undertaking a material irregularity [MI]
20
 has 
taken place or is taking place which has caused or is likely to cause financial loss to the 
undertaking or to any of its members or creditors, he shall forthwith dispatch a report in writing to 
the person in charge of that undertaking giving particulars of the irregularity.…’ (s20(5)a of the 
PAAA). 
Having issued the initial report,  
‘[unless] within 30 days after an auditor has dispatched such a report, he has been satisfied that 
no such irregularity has taken place or is taking place or that adequate steps have been taken 
for the recovery of any such loss so caused or for the prevention of any such loss likely to be so 
caused, he shall forthwith furnish the [Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ board - an independent 
regulatory board] with copies of the report and of any acknowledgement of receipt thereof and 
reply thereto and such other particulars as he may deem fit’ (s20(5)b of the PAAA). 
In this way, the PAAA established what may be broadly defined as a whistle-blowing duty for 
South African external auditors (Section 2.3; Chapter 6). In 2001, the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Affairs of the Masterbond Group and Investor Protection in South Africa (2001), 
proposed a number of refinements to this whistle-blowing duty. As discussed in  
Section 2.1.2, in 2005 the APA superseded the PAAA and, inter alia, replaced the 
requirement for auditors to report ‘material irregularities’ (s1 of the PAAA, 1951) to the PAAB 
with the duty to inform the IRBA of ‘reportable irregularities’ (RI’s) (s1 and s45  of the APA, 
2005).  
Briefly, any ‘unlawful act or omission’ by a person responsible for a client’s management (s1 
of the APA, 2005; Appendix A1) (its management board) which has caused or is likely to 
cause material financial loss to different stakeholders; amounts to a material breach of 
fiduciary duty; or is an act of theft or fraud, must be reported ‘without delay’ to the IRBA (s45 
of the APA, 2005; IRBA, 2006; Appendix A1; Appendix A2). Like the PAAB, the IRBA is 
empowered to inform appropriate regulators of the irregularity (PAAB, 2003; IRBA, 2006; 
Appendix A3). The reporting duty under s45 of the APA is largely consistent with that under 
                                               
20
 The PAAA did not specifically define a ‘MI’. According to the PAAB (2003, p. 11), an ‘irregularity [would have 
arisen] from a breach of statutory provisions, the common law or the undertaking’s own constitution’ which had a 
material impact on shareholders and creditors. 
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the repealed s20(5) of the PAAA (Gawith, 2006; PwC, 2006; Wielligh, 2006). Three 
important difference expanding the scope of the reporting duty should, however, be noted.  
Firstly, the auditor suspecting a MI was first obliged to notify the client. It was only if, within 
30 days after informing the client, that the PAAB was notified of the irregularity and then only 
if the client had not responded appropriately to the respective transgression (Dunn et al, 
1989; PAAB, 2003). Fearing that auditors’ professional judgement could lead to inconsistent 
application of the whistle-blowing duty, or that auditors and clients would use the 30-day 
period to circumvent the need for the reporting, the 30 day window period was dispensed 
with in favour of reporting ‘without delay’ (Nel, 2001; Gawith, 2006; Wielligh, 2006). 
Therefore, within three days of the IRBA being informed (and not before) the auditor must 
notify the client of the suspected RI and afford the management board a reasonable 
opportunity to discuss the first report with the auditor (s45(2) of the APA, 2005). In addition, 
a second report sent to the IRBA - 30 days after the first report - is now more informative, 
divulging that either: no RI occurred; an RI did occur but has been remedied; or that the RI is 
continuing (IRBA, 2006; Appendix A1; Appendix A2).  
Secondly, and along similar lines, it was resolved that any act of theft or fraud involving 
those responsible for the management of the client, irrespective of perceived materiality, 
would be reportable to the IRBA (IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006). This was despite the possibility 
of proliferation of clearly trivial reporting (SAICA, 2001 cited in Nel, 2001; Wielligh, 2006) 
which the legislature felt would be outweighed by the added benefit of more frequent whistle-
blowing (Nel, 2001). Similarly while breaches of fiduciary duty and acts or omissions leading 
to financial loss would continue to be reportable only if material, these losses or breaches 
need not only be suffered by ‘members or creditors’ of the audit client to be reportable 
(s20(5) of the PAAA). The effects on a ‘partner, member, shareholder, creditor or investor’ 
would now also have to be considered (s1 of the APA) thereby further broadening the 
reporting duty (IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006; Wielligh, 2006). 
Finally, s20(5) of the PAAA usually applied only in cases where the auditor was acting in the 
capacity of an auditor to any undertaking (PAAB, 2003). Under s45 of the APA, a reporting 
duty can arise simply if one is the registered auditor of the entity, irrespective of the capacity 
in which the auditor is operating. This, together with the definition of an ‘audit’ under s1 of 
APA can potentially result in review (IAASB, 2009y; IAASB, 2009z) or other assurance 
engagements (IAASB, 2009u; IAASB, 2009v) also giving rise to a duty to report under s45 of 




In this way, the APA marked the entrenchment and widening of the auditor’s whistle-blowing 
duty (Nel, 2001; Wielligh, 2006 SAICA, 2001 cited in Nel, 2001). As discussed in Section 1.1 
and Section 2.1.2, the South African Government feared that the historically low volume of 
MI’s being reported to the PAAB were indicative of ineffective whistle-blowing policies that 
could be enhanced if the reporting duty was broader21 (Manuel, 2002). It would then be left 
to an independent regulator to conclude on whether or not the irregularity ought to be 
brought to the attention of the relevant third parties, rather than leaving this decision in the 
hands of the individual auditor (Nel, 2001). To ensure more active reporting, the APA makes 
non-compliance with the s45 of the APA an offence, leading to professional sanctions and 
fines, imprisonment or a combination of both22 (IRBA, 2006).   
By actively promoting the reporting of transgressions, Government was of the opinion that 
the RI provisions would improve corporate transparency and accountability, contributing to a 
culture of compliance among audited entities (Nel, 2001; Opperman, 2009; IRBA, 2012b), 
consistent with the views on whistle-blowing in general (Vinten, 2000; Vinten, 2003; Nam 
and Lemak, 2007; Hwang et al, 2008; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010; Seifert et al, 2010). 
At the same time, expanding the reporting duty resonated with the growing demands for 
improved auditor reporting in the context of corporate failures and an increased awareness 
of the need to meet the information expectations of multiple stakeholder groups (CESR, 
2007; Solomon, 2009; European Commission, 2010a). As such, it was hoped that s45 of the 
APA would, ultimately, contribute to the overall standing of the South African Audit 
Profession in the eyes of constituents.  
 
2.1.4: WHISTLE-BLOWING BY EXTERNAL AUDITORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The relationship between s45 of the APA; the act of divulging transgressions; and the issue 
of audit’s public responsibilities begs the question: is s45 of the APA an example of whistle-
blowing? Miceli and Near (1984, p. 824) define ‘whistle blowing’ as:  
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 This view was reaffirmed by the regulator. According to personal correspondence between the researcher and 
the IRBA, the introduction of s45 of the APA saw a significant increase in the number of irregularities reported 
from ‘only a handful’ to an average of 850 per annum over the last five years. Specific details on each reported 
irregularity were not made available to the researcher due to the need of the IRBA to protect the confidentiality of 
the parties involved (IRBA, 2012b).  
 
22
 Section 20(8) of the PAAA simply empowered the PAAB to impose professional sanctions on an auditor failing 
to perform his duties. It did not deal specifically with a contravention of s20(5) of the PAAA and did not explicitly 
criminalise non-compliance with the reporting duty.  
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 ‘The disclosure by 'organization members… of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under 
the control of the employer to persons or organizations who may be able to effect action.’ 
The act should not be motivated only by self-gain and should be for the greater good (Leeds, 
1963; Shotland and Huston, 1979; Near and Miceli, 1995; Vinten, 2000; Kaplan and Schultz, 
2007; Hwang et al, 2008). Using a ‘pro-societal’ model of behaviour, Staub (1978), Solano 
and Kleiner (2003) and Hwang et al (2008) explain that the whistle-blower probably seeks to 
ensure that positive societal behaviour prevails against the backdrop of maximizing utility for 
others, including himself. This implies that a fear of retaliation and sense of being removed 
from a transgression can lead to reduced incidents of whistle-blowing, even if reporting is in 
the best interests of society (Rotter, 1966; Latane and Darley, 1968; Dozier and Miceli, 1985; 
Roberts, 1991; Schultz et al, 1993; Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 
2010).   
Jubb (1999) has a similar definition although there are three differences. Firstly, he excludes 
internal reporting as an act of whistle-blowing. This argument is, however, refuted by 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Mitschow and Langford (2000) who argue that both internal 
and external reporting challenges authority and involve similar processes. Secondly, while 
Near and Miceli (1984) allude to the gravity of the reported improprieties, Jubb (1999) 
explicitly requires the wrong-doing to be ‘non-trivial’. Finally, Jubb’s (1999) definition stresses 
that the act of whistle-blowing should be non-obligatory although Rotter (1966) maintains the 
contrary on the grounds that even obligatory reporting challenges organisational power and 
requires the whistle-blower to assess the perceived benefits and costs.  
Considering the RI provisions, compliance with legislation amounts to the disclosure of 
otherwise confidential client information to the IRBA which is vested with authority to inform 
all interested third parties of the irregularity (IRBA, 2006). In this respect, although Near and 
Miceli (1984; 1995) refer specifically to divulgences made in an employer-employee context, 
the substance of reporting in both instances is consistent.  Concurrently, the requirement for 
‘unlawful acts’ or ‘omissions’ to be fraudulent or a material breach of fiduciary duty or trust 
(s1 of the APA) points to divulgence of more than trivial misconduct.  Although compliance 
with the legislation allows avoidance of fines, imprisonment and ethical sanctions, the auditor 
receives no compensation for reporting (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006; IRBA, 2011, s45 & 52 of the 
APA). This implies an absence of self-gain. In addition, s45 of the APA was introduced, in 
part, to combat impropriety, bringing transgressions to the attention of appropriate authorities 
with an aim of remedying wrong-doings (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006). This parallels the notion of 
whistle-blowing influencing change for a perceived greater good (Near and Miceli, 1995; 
Kaplan and Schultz, 2007) and is consistent with Rotter (1966), Dozier and Miceli (1985), 
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and Jacques (1961) who maintain that reporting - even if mandated by professional 
standards or statute - could still amount to whistle-blowing. Further, altruism beyond explicit 
legal requirements is not a prerequisite for disclosing ‘reportable irregularities’ to amount to 
whistle-blowing (see Hwang et al, 2008). Finally, the absence of direct legal protection 
offered by the APA for the auditor who, having reported an RI and now possibly faces a 
delictual23 or breach of contract claim (IRBA, 2006; Maroun and Gowar, 2013) implies that, 
as with ‘traditional’ acts of whistle-blowing, a sense of ‘fear of retaliation’ is present (Kaplan 
and Whitecotton, 2001; Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010).  
For these reasons, the RI provisions are consistent with Miceli and Near’s (1984) notion of 
‘whistle-blowing’. Although not occurring in an employer-employee context, the legislation 
requires what would amount to ‘illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices’ under the control of 
another to be reported to a third party, in this case, the IRBA, who is able to take action. The 
reporting duty, although obligatory, challenges organisational power in a similar fashion to 
voluntary reporting by employees and can give rise to comparable fear of retaliation that 
requires the whistle-blower to assess the perceived benefits and costs of reporting. Barring 
semantics, s45 of the APA is, therefore, an example of whistle-blowing for the purpose of 
this research24.  
The prior literature on whistle-blowing, however, tends to deal mainly with defining ‘whistle-
blowing’ (Miceli and Near, 1984; Near and Miceli, 1995; Jubb, 1999) or illuminating the 
processes involved in deciding whether or not to blow the whistle (Leeds, 1963; Miceli and 
Near, 1984; Jubb, 1999; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010). Some 
work has been done on whistle-blowing in an internal audit setting (Read and Rama: 2003). 
Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) also shed light on whistle-
blowing by subordinates in an external audit environment. Virtually no research, however, 
has been carried out on external auditors blowing the whistle on their clients. This is despite 
the increased attention on the need for auditors to, in addition to providing an opinion on a 
client’s financials, disclose further information obtained during the course of their audits on 
the state of compliance with laws and regulations and overall culture of governance at their 
clients (Solomon, 2009; European Commission, 2010b; King, 2012).  
                                               
23
 A ‘delict’ is wrongful or culpable conduct which causes harm to a person, property or personality of another 
(Maroun and Gowar, 2013).  
 
24
 Whether or not the RI provisions are exactly aligned with formal definitions of ‘whistle-blowing’ is not 
specifically the focus of this thesis. What is, however, important is that several respondents, discussing their 
perceptions of s45 of the APA, specifically refer to the RI provisions as tantamount to whistle-blowing and draw 
parallels between these provisions and other documented cases of whistle-blowing. The resulting connotations of 
the RI provisions being associated with whistle-blowing sheds light on s45 of the APA as a possible source of 




Looking specifically at s45 of the APA - as an example of whistle-blowing - what is not 
immediately apparent is the role of the regulatory duty in South African audit. The Nel 
Commission (2001) presents the RI provisions as a means of clarifying the auditors’ societal 
duty in connection with reporting transgressions. Similarly, the prior literature would imply 
that the reporting duty is an example of pro-social behaviour (Staub, 1978; Miceli and Near, 
1984; Near and Miceli, 1995) which, by divulging irregularities, improves transparency and, 
thus, adds to the perceived value and standing of the audit process (consider: Vinten, 2000; 
Vinten, 2003; CESR, 2007; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Hwang et al, 2008; Solomon, 2009; 
European Commission, 2010b; Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators [ICSA], 
2011; PwC, 2011b; IAASB, 2012). Formal research examining the role of the RI provisions in 
South African audits is, however, lacking. What is needed is rigorous, conceptual 
examination of the whistle-blowing duty to shed light on the practical operation of this 
corporate governance mechanism (see Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Laughlin, 2007; Brennan 
and Solomon, 2008).  
This thesis commences with this by asking if s45 of the APA has a perceived impact on the 
quality control systems of audit firms. As discussed in Section 2.2, what a number of recent 
corporate failures, several of which may have implicated the auditor, have done is shake the 
confidence vested in the profession’s self-regulatory efforts. Through the lens of agency 
theory, arms-length regulation becomes a means of introducing additional controls, 
balancing a conflict between owing a duty to the public to issue reliable audit reports and the 
drive for higher profits, even if detrimental to audit quality. The RI provisions, by creating an 
additional reporting duty, may directly improve the quality of information made available to 
stakeholders. Concurrently, as compliance with the whistle-blowing provisions will be 
dependent on the extent to which the auditor has complied with ISA (see IRBA, 2006; 
Humphrey et al, 2011), this may provide an indirect incentive for improving the quality of 










2.2: AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON AUDIT QUALITY  
 
2.2.1: AGENCY THEORY AND THE NEED FOR EXTERNAL AUDIT  
 
Central to the view that organisations constitute a nexus of contracts is the agency problem 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1976). This describes how, in the 
presence of imperfect information, divergent interests between managers and shareholders 
leads to actions on the part of agents that may not be in the best interest of their principals 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Solomon, 2010).  
Under the lens of agency theory, both principals and agents are assumed rational utility 
maximers, each seeking to improve their own position (see Hill and Jones, 1992; LaPorta et 
al, 1999; Fan et al, 2011). Consequently, shareholders - lacking the same degree of 
information possessed by managers -  are not able to determine practically whether or not 
their appointed agents discharge all of their duties or whether these are executed to the best 
of the their abilities (Arnold and de Lange, 2004; Solomon, 2010). ‘Unless conflicting 
objectives can be brought into equilibrium’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 307), costs are 
ultimately incurred by the principal (Hill and Jones, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; LaPorta 
et al, 1999; Arnold and de Lange, 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Dickins, 2010; Bradley 
and Chen, 2011). To reduce these costs to acceptable levels, owners may introduce 
incentive schemes or contractual restrictions on agents to align agents’ interests with their 
own (Hill and Jones, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Arnold and de Lange, 2004). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), for example, theorise that opportunistic behaviour among different 
contracting parties could be restricted by tailoring the respective contractual provisions and 
defining the scope and nature of agents’ duties (see also Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
This is no easy task with effective contract enforcement requiring diligent monitoring that 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue is the purpose of external audit. For auditing, however, to 
be effective in reducing opportunism, the auditor should be able both to detect breaches of 
contract and have a propensity for reporting these to the principals (DeAngelo, 1981b; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983).  In other words, for contractual arrangements to serve as a means 
of mitigating agency costs, effective monitoring of the arrangements in the form of high 
quality external audit is paramount (also consider Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Solomon, 
2009; Chen et al, 2011; Khan et al, 2011). If, alternatively, managerial incentives are used to 
align the interests of agents and principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Drury, 2005; Botten, 
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2009), a similar relationship between agency costs and high quality external audit is evident. 
Incentives again necessitate the use of contractual arrangements and are subject to 
manipulation or misapplication, whether due to rogue agents or misinformed principals 
(Francis and Wilson, 1988; Krishnan, 2003; IAASB, 2009l).  
From the agent’s perspective, a similar outcome results. Contractual arrangements and 
incentive schemes are often costly and will be unable to eliminate total shareholder losses 
yielding a residual loss (Cohen et al, 2002; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Epps and Guthrie, 
2010). Total residual losses would, however, have a maximum as, beyond some point, the 
owner would lower managerial compensation, sell the firm to one who is better able to 
monitor it or simply replace rogue managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, 
agents may also bear costs associated with the agency problem. Conformance or ex-ante 
bonding costs, for instance, are incurred when managers attempt to make credible 
commitments as a ‘bonding mechanism’ that allays the concerns of the principal (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Hill and Jones, 1992; Arnold and de Lange, 2004). One example of this 
would be the appointment of a high quality external auditor which signals to owners that 
agency problems are immaterial (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Krishnan, 2003; Fernando et al, 
2010).  
In this light, much of the prior corporate governance literature points to a positive relationship 
between agency costs and the demand for high quality audit services (DeAngelo, 1981a; 
Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Power, 1991; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Power, 2003; Epps 
and Guthrie, 2010; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Chen et al, 2011; Khan et al, 2011; Zerni, 2012). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983), for example, provide a historic account of the prevalence of 
incentive and contract-related agency problems in early English merchant guilds and 
regulated companies and of the possible beginnings of audit functions that were designed to 
address this. Audits were expected to be more than superficial, involving a detailed 
examination of expenses and monitoring for breaches of contract (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983; Sikka et al, 1998). Although not yet institutionalised, the early auditor was expected to 
be independent and to discharge his duties with due care. He could also be held 
accountable for a failure to do so (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Nel, 2001).  Similar 
developments occurred in Renaissance Europe where the need for a system of monitoring 
state officials arose as commercial activity increased and separation of the owner-manager 
function resulted (Nel, 2001).  The Industrial Revolution, emergence of joint stock 
companies, creation of limited liability concerns, and associated demands for refined 
financial reporting accentuated agency problems reinforcing the argument in favour of  an 
independent audit function (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; 
Chandler et al, 1993; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; Edwards, 2001; Nel, 2001).  With the 
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increase in the number of companies, the extent and complexity of their operation, and 
dispersion of ownership, an auditing profession as a technical and independent monitoring 
functioning emerges (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Hopwood, 1987; Zeff, 2003a).  
Considering developments within the audit profession, the relevance of agency theory may 
continue to hold. Economic pressures within organisations coupled with new commercial 
challenges can be seen as necessitating the evolution of accounting and auditing practice 
during the 19th and 20th century (Burchell et al, 1980; Hill and Jones, 1992; Chandler et al, 
1993; Nel, 2001; Baker and Owsen, 2002). Analogously, under the lens of stakeholder 
theory, more complex business relationships and organisations force corporate governance 
systems – including auditing systems - to deal with added complexity (consider: Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Fligstein and Feeland, 1995; Al-Twaijry et al, 2003; Zeff, 2003a; Lin and Liu, 
2010; Solomon, 2010). As summarised by Watts and Zimmerman (1983, p. 626), the 
longevity of audit, in one form or another, and its continued prevalence, ultimately confirms 
that the attest function is an ‘efficient method of monitoring contracts between managers and 
those supplying capital’ and an integral part of the agency theory paradigm (see also Power, 
1994; Baker and Owsen, 2002)25. 
 
2.2.2: AUDIT QUALITY 
 
While the prior corporate governance literature highlights a relationship between increasing 
agency costs and audit quality, it stops short of describing ‘audit quality’ or the factors that 
positively impact on it. With audit being an integral part of the system of checks and 
balances over organisations and the sound functioning of the capital market (Francis and 
Wilson, 1988; Griffin et al, 2010; Solomon, 2010), the need to understand the drivers of audit 
quality is clear. Audit quality is, however, impossible to observe directly (Power, 2003; 
Humphrey, 2008; Lawrence et al, 2011) with the result that several papers have turned to 
studying audit quality by measuring quality ‘surrogates’ (Francis, 2004).  
 
DeAngelo (1981b) provides one of the first efforts in this regard. She argues that audit 
quality is positively correlated with the size of the audit firm. Ceteris paribus, the audit 
profession is characterised by barriers to entry allowing incumbent firms to earn ‘client 
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 In exploring changing audit practices, however, Humphrey (1990; 2008), Power (1994; 2003) and Pentland 
(1993; 2000) point to more than just a drive for economic efficiency or quality. Powerful social or institutional 




specific quasi–rents (1981b, p. 184) that act as an incentive for rendering high quality audit 
services (see also Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Lim and Tan, 2008). The result is that the 
size and reputation of the audit firm becomes a form of collateral (see also Francis and 
Wilson, 1988; Lim and Tan, 2008), effectively guaranteeing a minimum level of audit quality 
that is higher for larger audit firms. Peel and Makepeace (2012), for example, find that the 
Big 4 charge a premium over their mid-tier four largest counterparts who, in turn, also enjoy 
a fee premium compared to smaller firms. The researchers conclude that this supports the 
hypothesis that the size and brand of the firm is associated with, at very least, a perception 
of higher quality services (see also Lim and Tan, 2008). The fact that larger firms, 
presumably characterised by greater information asymmetry between managers and 
principals and higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), tend to appoint one of the 
Big 4 as their auditors, lends weight to this argument (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Francis, 
2004; Griffin et al, 2010; Clinch et al, 2012).  
 
In addition, organisations audited by one of the larger audit firms tend to have lower levels of 
discretionary accruals (Francis and Krishnan, 1999), accruals that better track future 
profitability (Krishnan, 2003; Francis, 2004) and lower costs of capital (Fernando et al, 2010) 
and debt (Causholli and Knechel, 2012), than firms audited by smaller audit practices, 
although not all studies have consistently reached the same conclusion (see, for example, 
Lawrence et al, 2011). Focusing on the audit firms themselves, Church and Shefchik (2011) 
note that the Big 4, over the period 2004 to 2009, have fewer audit quality deficiencies than 
second tier practices. Palmrose’s (1988) findings: that the Big 4 audit firms tend to enjoy a 
lower rate of litigation per client than their smaller counterparts, provides additional evidence 
in support of DeAngelo’s (1981b) findings on the positive relationship between the size of 
audit firms and engagement quality.  
 
Audit reports may also be telling ‘quality indicators’. Francis and Krishnan (1999) and Boone 
et al  (2010), for example, find that Big 4 audit firms are more likely to issue a modified report 
which the researchers interpret as signalling independence, conservative application of 
accounting and auditing principles, resistance to client pressures and an indirect measure of 
audit quality (see also DeFond et al, 2002)26. Similarly, Geiger and Rama (2006), using 
regression modelling, document that the Big 4 are less likely to modify erroneously the audit 
report or refrain from issuing such a report on the basis of doubt over the going concern 
                                               
26
 Kaplan and Williams (2012) show that, over time, smaller audit firms may be more likely to modify their audit 
report due to concerns about the going concern assumption than the ‘Big N’. This may, however, be attributable 
to changes in the audit market, such as the collapse of Arthur Anderson and enactment of SOX which has seen 
the larger audit firms dispense with riskier clients. The Big N are also more likely to have developed sophisticated 
client acceptance and continuance protocols which further limit the need to modify audit reports due to going 
concern risk.  
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assumption (see IAASB, 2009q)  than smaller audit firms. While prior findings should not be 
construed as implying that the Big 4 firms always outperform smaller practices in terms of 
engagement quality (for examples see Boone et al, 2010; Cullinan et al, 2012), the past 
research suggests that, at least on average, this may be the case (see Dechow et al, 1996; 
Francis, 2004; Boone et al, 2010).  
Moving away from a direct quality/size distinction, differences in terms of industry 
specialisation may be an additional predictor of variations in audit quality (Lim and Tan, 
2008; Clinch et al, 2012). Audit firms with greater industry-specific knowledge and 
experience may apply professional judgement and standards more appropriately, possibly 
due to an enhanced sense of brand awareness, risk of litigation and greater availability of 
resources (Velury, 2003; Francis, 2004; Jenkins et al, 2006). Habib (2011), for instance, 
posits that development of industry specialisation is a costly exercise which can be justified 
only by rendering higher quality engagements which attract additional clients, allowing 
recovery of initial costs. This is affirmed by Fernando et al (2010) who find a negative 
relationship between levels of audit-industry specialisation and client cost of capital.   
Specialisation may also be a relevant quality surrogate at the audit-office level, especially 
since audit engagements tend to be coordinated and controlled from specific audit offices 
(Ferguson et al, 2003). Francis (2004), in a summary of audit quality research to date, for 
example, highlights how expertise within an audit-office (rather than for the entire firm) may 
be relevant for predicting high quality audit services. Similarly, Nagy (2012), concludes that 
the specialisation and experience of individual audit partners (see also Bedard, 2012; Zerni, 
2012) may be a relevant quality-predictor because it is the individual partner who is 
ultimately responsible for the audit engagement (see also IAASB, 2009e; IAASB, 2009x). 
Research from the USA and Australia complements this, suggesting that the quality benefits 
of specialisation may be more pronounced when the audit firm in question is both the 
national and city-specific industry leader (Ferguson et al, 2003; Francis et al, 2005). Inherent 
complexity of the audit process, however, means that the prior research does not reach a 
definitive conclusion on the exact extent to which degrees of specialisation positively impact 
on audit quality (Velury, 2003; Francis, 2004). 
In this light, other approaches to examining audit quality have focused on the issue of auditor 
independence. Fernando et al (2010), for instance, find evidence of audit tenure being 
positively  correlated with a client’s cost of capital, implying that long-standing relations with 
clients can lead to diminution of auditor independence and a perceived reduction in the 
credibility of the audit report  (see also IFAC, 2006; Dart, 2011; Firth et al, 2012). The longer 
the audit tenure, the greater the stream of client-specific ‘rents’, the greater the loss from 
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termination of the client relationship and the lower the probability of the auditor reporting any 
detected breach (DeAngelo, 1981a; IFAC, 2006). For similar reasons, growing familiarity 
with a client’s management (IFAC, 2006) may impair auditor independence, impact on the 
application of professional judgement and, hence, lower audit quality, especially for smaller 
audit practices (Li, 2010; Hardies et al, 2011). Combined with time pressures and profit-
orientated business practices, the threat to auditor independence and audit quality may be 
significant (IFAC, 2006; Sikka et al, 2009; Lee, 2012) leading to calls for additional 
regulations to safeguard auditor independence, most notably restrictions on the rendering 
non-audit services and the need for either audit partner or audit firm rotation (Gavious, 2007; 
Riotto, 2008; European Commission, 2010b; Bazerman and Moore, 2011). 
When it comes to the issue of rotating audit firms, the prior research does not reach a 
consensus. Elitzur and Falk  (1996), for example, argue that auditor rotation may have the 
opposite effect on audit quality by restricting auditors’ ability to develop industry or client-
specific expertise. Likewise, Myers et al (2003, p. 796) conclude that ‘increased audit tenure 
does not lead to reduced audit and earnings quality’ although caution that this should not be 
construed as suggesting that refraining from embarking on audit firm rotation would lead to 
improved audit quality (see also Francis, 2004; Dart, 2011). 
Similarly, there is uncertainty as to the precise relevance of rendering non-audit services 
(Lim and Tan, 2008; Liao et al, 2013). These have been the focus of considerable debate in 
both the academic and professional literature, especially following the Securities Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) prohibitions on audit firms rendering these types of services to their 
assurance clients (see Francis, 2004; Gavious, 2007; Sikka et al, 2009; European 
Commission, 2010a; Chahine and Filatotchev, 2011; Dart, 2011; Ianniello, 2012).  Dopuch et 
al (2003), for example, in an experimental setting, provide evidence that where practitioners 
concurrently render audit and non-audit services, the result is a decline in auditor 
independence and, hence, audit quality (see also Gwilliam et al, 2000; IRBA, 2011). This 
may be especially true in low litigation risk environments where the potential for legal action 
against auditors does not provide an adequate safeguard against economic dependence on 
a client (Liao et al, 2013). Ashbaugh et al (2003), Asare et al (2005), and De Fond et al 
(2002), however, conclude that non-audit services may not automatically point to lower 
quality audits. In some cases, the rendering of these services may improve audit quality by 
providing the auditor with a greater understanding of the client or by leading to efficiency 
gains (Ezzamel et al, 2002; IFAC, 2006), especially if the auditor is also an industry 
specialist (Lim and Tan, 2008). From a more critical perspective, Schmidt (2012) suggests 
that non audit services may simply create the impression of a decline in independence which 
is exploited in the context of a highly litigious audit environment in the USA.  This, ultimately, 
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leaves one with the conclusion that there is only ‘some possibility that high levels of non-
audit services may impair audit quality’ (Francis, 2004, p. 357, emphasis added).  
A related stream of research considers the relevance of corporate governance structures 
and exogenous regulatory developments. For instance, Dechow et al (1996) and Liao et al 
(2013) point to an increased likelihood of auditors detecting misstatements when the 
respective client’s board of directors is more independent. Complementing this is the sound 
functioning of audit committees which have a key role to play in moderating the relationship 
between auditors and management with an aim to improving the audit reporting process and 
lowering threats to auditor independence (see Gavious, 2007; IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2010; 
Dao et al, 2012). More directly, high quality audit committees may add materially to the audit 
planning and testing process, as well as the scope of the attest function, leading to efficiency 
and quality gains (Chan et al, 2012). In some jurisdictions this is enhanced by a legal duty of 
audit committees to appoint and remunerate auditors (Rockness and Rockness, 2005; 
Riotto, 2008; IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2009). Shareholder activism may complement this. For 
example Dao et al (2012), find that when shareholders vote on the appointment or retention 
of the auditor, although audit fees are not reduced, audit quality, measured by reference to 
abnormal accrual levels and the number of prior period restatements, are reduced (see also 
Mayhew and Pike, 2004; FRC, 2007). 
Going hand-in-hand with improvements in the corporate governance arena, and of particular 
interest for the purpose of this thesis, is the issue of increased arms-length regulation for 
audit firms, especially after a number of corporate scandals have shaken confidence in the 
functioning of external audit. Allegations of a lack of independence, inappropriate oversight 
by accounting bodies and underlying capitalistic pressures ushered in a calls for more 
external regulation of the accounting and auditing community (for examples, see Canada et 
al, 2008; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Bazerman and Moore, 2011). Most notable has been the 
enactment of SOX which, consequently, has received considerable attention from 
accounting academics.  
One of the more recent SOX studies, carried out by Chambers and Payne (2011), finds that 
accrual persistence (which serves as their audit quality proxy) improves after the introduction 
of the legislation. Analogously, Carcello et al (2011), detect a significant improvement in 
accrual quality as a result of inspections by the PCAOB in post-SOX America, concluding 
that, the enactment of SOX has had a positive effect on audit quality. More specifically, 
Church and Shefchik (2011) find that the introduction of independent quality reviews by the 
PCAOB has led to a marked decrease in the number of control deficiencies by audit firms 
from the period 2004 to 2009. From a slightly different perspective, DeFond and Lennox 
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(2011) find that SOX has encouraged lower-quality auditors to exit the market, thereby 
improving audit quality on average27.  
Although SOX may be an example of arms-length regulation having unintended 
consequences (Vakkur et al, 2010; Bronson et al, 2011), the initial argument is that external 
regulation has an important role to play in regulating minimum levels of audit quality (see 
Byington and Sutton, 1991; Manuel, 2002; Bazerman and Moore, 2011). Bazerman and 
Moore (2011), for example, argue that the traditional self-regulatory model has been unable 
to safeguard adequate levels of auditor independence, pointing to the possible use of 
additional regulation in response (see also Gavious, 2007; Sy and Tinker, 2008). Similarly, 
Canada et al (2008) demonstrate how a combination of public scrutiny, financial scandals, 
and growing discontent with auditors’ self-regulation franchise provides the genesis of SOX 
which the authors describe as ‘one of the greatest protections in history for the public 
interest within the arena of the financial markets and related corporate behaviour’ (2008, p. 
987). Finally, with repeated corporate scandals and criticism of the audit profession 
mounting, external regulation provides an important source of reassurance to users of audit 
reports. Additional laws and regulations allow governments to demonstrate that they are 
responding to a perceived decline in audit quality and that users can continue to place 
reliance on audit reports (Manuel, 2002; McMillan, 2004; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004)28 
 
2.2.3: EXTERNAL REGULATION THROUGH THE LENS OF AGENCY THEORY  
 
As discussed above, agency theory predicts the use of checks and balances to control 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Solomon, 2010; Houghton et al, 2011). A capitalistic approach suggests that, if agency 
relationships can be adequately managed internally and by market forces, further external 
intervention is not required. With most agency costs already under control, the marginal 
costs of additional external regulation would exceed the marginal benefits (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Hill and Jones, 1992; Gwilliam et al, 2000; Tian 
and Twite, 2011).   
                                               
27
 There is, however, no definitive conclusion on the effect of SOX and, in particular, PCAOB inspections on audit 
quality. For example Bishop et al (2012) find that while larger firms are less likely to have an audit quality 




 Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) and McMillan (2004) also suggest that the reassuring effect of external 
regulation may be superficial, a line of thought explored in more detail in Section 2.3, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
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From this perspective the state of self-regulation that has traditionally characterised the audit 
profession (Zeff, 2003a; Odendaal and De Jager, 2008) can be interpreted as a signal that 
external audit was seen as initially functioning adequately as part of the agency cost control 
machinery and that intervention by lawmakers was not required (Edwards, 2001; Konar et al, 
2003). The converse may also be true. The emergence of additional auditor regulation can 
be seen as an indication that consumers of audit services no longer perceive audit as 
adequately mitigating the negative effects of diverging interests between principals and 
agents (Byington and Sutton, 1991; Peecher et al, 2007; Haigh and de Graaf, 2009). The 
promulgation of the SOX serves as a prime example (consider: Konar et al, 2003; Canada et 
al, 2008; Stein, 2008; Victoravich, 2010).  In other words, an increase in residual losses is 
interpreted, in part, as being caused by a decline in audit quality, and hence effectiveness of 
the audit process (Gwilliam et al, 2000; Nel, 2001; Negash, 2004). As residual losses grow, 
additional external regulation makes sense as the marginal costs of added regulation are 
less than the marginal benefits of improved audit quality.  
 
Nel (2001), Byington and Sutton (1991) and Shaked and Sutton (1981) explain that self-
regulation’s role is vested in the fact that the audit quality cannot be directly observed. This 
makes it difficult for external regulation to mandate changes that would bring about desirable 
reform within the confines of a marginal cost and benefit analysis. A closer examination of 
the audit industry, however, points to the existence of a monopoly or oligopoly. The industry 
enjoys substantial barriers to entry (Byington and Sutton, 1991); it is dominated by four large 
audit firms (FRC, 2008b; European Commission, 2010b; FRC, 2011); buyers are often 
forced by law to use the audit services (see, for example, Simunic, 1980; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Zeff, 2003b; Solomon, 2010); and cannot directly observe the quality of 
audit having to infer it from brand reputation or experience, making product differentiation 
difficult (DeAngelo, 1981a; Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Power, 1994). If the profession 
behaves like a monopoly, then it has little incentive to raise the quality benchmark above the 
absolute minimum. Audit firms must trade off higher levels of quality against lower levels of 
profit, something very difficult given capitalistic pressures at work in the audit industry (Sikka, 
2004; Low et al, 2008; Baldvinsdottir et al, 2009) 
 
If the buyer is dissatisfied, one of his only recourses is to raise the cost of poor audit quality, 
for example, by instituting legal action or changing audit firms. Audit firms have an incentive 
to improve audit quality to address directly these losses (Byington and Sutton, 1991; Gaa, 
1991). Monopoly powers, and the desire for higher profits, however, mean that the audit 
profession is still only motivated to increase audit quality to the minimum required level 
(Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Byington and Sutton, 1991; Gaa, 1991; Pesqueux, 2005). As an 
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example, Humphrey and Moizer (1990), Byington and Sutton (1991) and Zeff (2003a) argue 
that the profession responds to widespread criticism with a flurry of new auditing and 
accounting standards. Similarly, in interpreting the change in the auditors’ duty with respect 
to detecting and reporting fraud, Humphrey et al (1993b, p. 42) describe a complex political 
process seeking to ‘manage the interplay between [the audit profession’s] own interests and 
any competing public duties’ (see also Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1992). 
Ultimately, this may be designed to create the impression of improved quality while, in 
substance, leaving audit practice largely unchanged.  
 
‘Reforms’ can, therefore, be seen as improving audit quality but only by the bare minimum.  
Similar arguments are raised by Pesqueux (2005), McMillan (2004) and Power (1994). 
Concurrently, setting additional standards allows the profession to control the definition of 
‘accepted’ minimum requirements making it difficult for buyers to prove substandard work 
and hence materially raise quality levels (Byington and Sutton, 1991). The end result is a 
welfare loss which may justify the need for additional external regulation aimed at improving 
audit quality.  
 
These perspectives suggest that the relationship between auditor and users of audit reports 
may echo the classical principal-agent problem in the sense that an expectation gap (see 
Dennis, 2010; Houghton et al, 2011) emerges between users, on the one hand, demanding 
reliable, high quality audits and auditors, on the other hand, potentially motivated to place 
profitability before audit quality (consider Gwilliam et al, 2000; Pesqueux, 2005). In this 
context, a highly litigious environments and lengthening chorus of criticism in the aftermath 
of Enron et al challenges the self-regulation status quo. More regulation is an indicator that 
the perceived costs of lower quality are sufficiently large to warrant a response from 
regulators (consider: Humphrey et al, 1993b; Peecher et al, 2007; Haigh and de Graaf, 
2009; European Commission, 2010b; Bazerman and Moore, 2011). Concurrently, if the audit 
industry is characterised by monopolistic behaviour, then market forces alone will result in 
only a minimum level of quality standards leading to a welfare loss and again justifying the 
need for external regulation to enhance materially audit quality. In other words, external 
regulation becomes akin to systems of checks and balances - in a traditional corporate 
governance setting - dealing with divergent interests of agents and principals. 
 




2.2.4: A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON AUDIT QUALITY AND EXTERNAL 
REGULATION  
 
In reaching this conclusion the exact means by which regulation impacts on audit practice 
has not been dealt with. The technicalities of audit remain a ‘black box’ (Power, 1994) that 
the prior research largely disregards in favour of inferential testing. Audit practice itself is not 
considered. Rather, how quality surrogates - most often discretionary accruals - change 
before and after the promulgation of external regulation, like SOX, are tested (Humphrey, 
2008). ‘Audit quality’, therefore, remains narrowly defined. Seldom are multiple factors that 
could have a bearing on how audit firms execute engagements considered and rarely are 
the professional standards specifically dealt with. Related to this, few studies examine the 
application of those standards and regulatory requirements by audit practitioners inspired by 
an interpretive epistemology (Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008).  This leads Solomon and 
Trotman (2003, p. 409) to conclude that, the ‘audit profession is rapidly advancing in 
response to change in its environment’ but that ‘auditing scholarship is advancing at a much 
slower pace’. These researchers, although favouring the use of experimental testing, point to 
an important role that context-specific research could play in shedding light on the intricacies 
of audit practice, audit quality and external regulation (Carcello, 2005; Humphrey, 2008; 
Humphrey, 2012).  
For these reasons, rather than seeking to ‘test’ audit quality control systems, by using a 
single assumed quality surrogate, ISQC 1 is used to describe a quality-control-framework to 
analyse certain of the operational effects of the RI provisions on South African audit firms. 
Although, this may run the risk of professional bias (Power, 2003, p. 392), examining the 
perceived effect of s45 of the APA on ISQC 1 quality control ‘elements’ offers an opportunity 
to document precisely how an example of external regulation may impact certain aspects of 
audit practice and, indirectly, notions of audit quality.  
In this respect, the Nel Commission (2001), and then Manuel (2002), suggested that the RI 
provisions would improve the confidence vested in South African external audit. The RI 
provisions marked a move towards more arms-length control over the profession after 
corporate scandals led to the profession’s self-regulatory franchise being questioned. 
Section 45 of the APA would entrench a duty to report more than just in terms of the generic 
audit report  adding value for stakeholders in the process (see also European Commission, 
2010b; IAASB, 2012). Concurrently, and as discussed in Section 2.1, several measures 
were introduced to limit the application of professional judgement which could lead to 
inadequate reporting and broaden the original whistle-blowing duty enshrined in s20(5) of 
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the PAAA.  Although the RI provisions do not create an active duty to detect RI’s, including 
fraud, whether or not the auditor has discharged the reporting duty in good faith is 
inextricably linked to the extent to which he has complied with ISA  (IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 
2009h). Non-compliance with s45 of the APA is also an offence, giving rise to fines, 
imprisonment or both (IRBA, 2006; Maroun and Gowar, 2013). In addition, a failure to 
discharge faithfully the RI provisions may undermine the public standing of the respective 
firm and engagement leader (Chapter 6), result in professional sanctions, give rise to the risk 
of legal action and effectively brand the auditor as acting contrary to the public interest (Nel, 
2001; Manuel, 2002; IRBA, 2006). As such, it may be reasonable to expect that the RI 
provisions provide an added incentive for an audit firm to ensure that engagements are 
executed to sufficient standards and that it has, by default, made reasonable efforts to 
discharge its duties under s45 of the APA. To date, however, there has been no direct 
research carried out on the implication of the RI provisions for audit practice and quality.  
Accordingly, the first research question is:  
A. Do the provisions of s45 of the APA have a perceived impact on the quality 
control systems of audit firms? 
 
This question is broken down into six sub-questions (A1-A6), each consistent with the 
provisions of ISQC 1 and the prior audit quality literature and which also serve as the basis 
for the correspondence analysis29 (Chapter 5).  
Firstly, and as discussed above, ethical fibre - most notably independence - is paramount 
(Bazerman and Moore, 2011). Carrington (2010) and Wines (2012), for example, argue that 
the auditor’s professional standing, including both independence of fact and appearance 
(SAICA, 2012), are an integral part of high quality audits. The sentiment is shared by the 
IFAC Code (2006) and equivalent quality control standards in the USA (Bedard et al, 2008) 
which see independence of staff, and the culture of leadership driving firm-wide ethics, as 
crucial. A similar message is advanced in codes of corporate governance (IOD, 2009; 
Solomon, 2010).   
When it comes to ISQC 1, the standard adopts a conceptual approach to audit firm 
governance (IAASB, 2009x). It requires audit firms to promote an ‘internal culture’ which 
champions engagement quality (IAASB, 2009x, p. 5) including the need to ensure the 
highest standards of ethical conduct. Threats to integrity, objectivity, professional 
competency and due care, professional behaviour and confidentiality must, therefore, be 
                                               
29
 References to statements in the correspondence analysis are to row headings included in the correspondence 
table (Table 3.1) denoted ‘R1’ to ‘R9’.  
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identified and mitigated appropriately (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x). In particular, the audit 
firm’s leadership should pay attention to the ethical culture of the firm as a whole and the 
need for firm-wide policies that stress the importance of ethical behaviour (IAASB, 2009x, p. 
14). Active and responsible leadership should be complemented by a performance 
measurement system which emphasises the relevance of audit quality and aligns it with the 
strategic objectives of the firm (Cohen et al, 2002; FRC, 2008a; Oosthuizen, 2011). These 
views provide the basis for the statements R1 and R2 in the correspondence analysis 
(Section 3.2.2) and inform the first two sub-questions:  
1. Do the provisions of s45 of the APA cause engagement leaders to take a 
greater leadership responsibility role on external audits?   
2. What implications have s45 of the APA had on the perceived relevance and 
importance of adherence to ethical principles on external audits? 
Secondly, professional standing and reputation as a high quality auditor are also about 
association (Carrington, 2010; Bazerman and Moore, 2011; Wines, 2012). For this reason, 
ISQC 1, like US Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) (Bedard et al, 2008), 
requires the use of formal client acceptance and continuance policies. For example, it 
recommends that firms only undertake those engagements which they have the necessary 
resources and skills to execute, a requirement which ensures ethical business conduct and 
avoidance of engagements characterised by an unacceptably high level of risk (IAASB, 
2009x). As such, client acceptance and continuance decisions become integral for 
engagement quality and sound professional conduct (see also Cohen et al, 2002; Asare et 
al, 2005; Farag and Elias, 2011). King-III confirms this thinking, encouraging the use of 
formal codes of conduct and effective leadership that cultivate a culture of ethical awareness 
(IOD, 2009). Although not directly addressing client acceptance and continuance by audit 
firms, King-III refers to sustainable business practices and effective risk management, which 
would include an assessment of an organisation’s business relations (Solomon, 2010; IRC, 
2011; King, 2012). The need for clients to be serviced ethically and in a sustainable fashion 
while effectively managing operating and reputational risks also echoes principles of good 
corporate governance (see also Cohen et al, 2002; Asare et al, 2005; IOD, 2009; Farag and 
Elias, 2011; IRC, 2011; SAICA, 2012). This thinking informs statements R2 and R7 in the 
correspondence analysis (Section 3.2.2) and the third sub-question:  
3. Does s45 of the APA lead to a more robust client acceptance and continuance 




Finally, professional appearance and independence alone are not adequate (Humphrey and 
Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al, 1992; Carrington, 2010). Under ISQC 1, audits ought to be 
executed to the highest standards in accordance with ISA (R3 in the correspondence 
analysis) and relevant regulatory requirements (IAASB, 2009x; PwC, 2010). To achieve this, 
effective human resource practices are important. Engagement teams require appropriate 
skills, resources and ethical standing to discharge their professional duties (R3 in the 
correspondence analysis) (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x). Concurrently, effective monitoring, 
supervision and consultation for complex issues involving high levels of judgement become 
paramount (R4 in the correspondence analysis) (IAASB, 2009x), re-emphasising the need 
for effective engagement leadership (R1 in the correspondence analysis) (IAASB, 2009e). At 
the heart of this, ISQC 1, similar to the essence of codes of corporate governance, stresses 
the importance of continuous improvement, internal quality control and sound documentation 
standards (R5 in the correspondence analysis) as well as the need for staff to feel both 
personally responsible and accountable for inferior engagement quality (R9 in the 
correspondence analysis). In this way, and in line with the sentiments of King-III, a 
commitment to sound audit practice becomes inextricably part of the sustainability of the 
audit firm (R7 in the correspondence analysis) and a possible source of confidence in (R6 in 
the correspondence analysis) and perceived legitimacy or value (R6, R7 and R8 in the 
correspondence analysis) of external audit. In other words, compliance with ISA - backed by 
sound engagement quality control protocols – is paramount for ensuring that audit reports 
are reliable, contribute meaningfully to corporate transparency and accountability and secure 
confidence in both the audit profession and the capital market system (R6 in the 
correspondence analysis)30. Hence the last three sub-questions ask: 
4. What are the implications of s45 of the APA on the perceived importance of 
human resource practices?  
5. To what extent has s45 of the APA impacted on the performance of external 
audits including supervision, consultation and review in connection with these 
audits?  
6. Has s45 of the APA led to a more comprehensive continuous improvement and 
monitoring process at the audit firm level? 
 
 
                                               
30
 The association between the RI provisions and claims to legitimacy or credibility is discussed in detail in 
Section 2.3, Section 2.4, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
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2.2.5: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON AUDIT QUALITY 
 
That external regulation can be attributed to the need for improved audit practice and quality 
in the name of economic rationality and efficiency is not, however, universally accepted 
(Fogarty et al, 1991; Humphrey, 2008; Humphrey, 2012). In particular, the agency theory 
view of the world, although widely used as a theoretical base (Hill and Jones, 1992; Brennan 
and Solomon, 2008), is not without limitations. The model mandates that the population of 
managers is homogenous by virtue of the utility maximisation assumption (Kaplan and 
Ruland, 1991). The work of Jansen and Meckling (1976) has a strong positivist world-outlook 
that is characterised by reductionism and the ability to achieve equilibrium. In addition, 
agency theorists ‘often see the world as surrounded by efficient markets (Hill and Jones, 
1992, p. 134), simply ignoring human interactions beyond contractual arrangements 
between managers and agents and other stakeholders (Solomon, 2010). As a result, 
developments in accounting and auditing systems, due to changes within organisations and 
social developments beyond the boundaries of the firm are not elaborated on (Kaplan and 
Ruland, 1991; Hill and Jones, 1992; Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Solomon, 2010; Talaulicar, 
2010). Ultimately, agency theory’s economic focus makes it potentially restrictive (Baxter et 
al, 2008; Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  
 
For example, if material agency costs do exist, then theoretically market forces alone would 
drive the demand for external audit and legislated audit services would be redundant. At the 
extreme, if markets were perfectly efficient, then external audit would be replaced by the all-
knowing market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Tian and Twite, 2011). 
Yet increasingly, more jurisdictions mandate the use of external audit and attempt to 
regulate audit quality (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Nel, 2001; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; 
Gavious, 2007; Riotto, 2008; IOD, 2009). This implies that agency theory does not provide a 
comprehensive account of developments in auditor regulation in the real world. In order to 
better understand the role of external regulation, and the case for South Africa’s RI 
provisions, s45 of the APA needs be considered from alternate theoretical perspectives 
(consider Llewelyn, 1996; Humphrey, 2008). Stein (2008), Power (2003), Kaplan and Ruland 
(1991), Burchell et al (1980) and Hopwood (1987), for instance, suggest that developments 
in accounting and auditing, while being explained in part by agency theory, require the 
concurrent use of institutional theories for a richer rendition (consider: Fogarty, 1992; 
Roberts, 2001; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Dillard and 
Roslender, 2011; Grant, 2011; Harris and Ogbonna, 2011).  Under the lens of 
institutionalism, the emergence of and compliance with external regulation may not only be 
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due to the need for economic efficiency but also part of a complex social process allowing 
organisations and institutions to secure legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 
1995; Al-Twaijry et al, 2003).  When corporate scandals shake the confidence vested in 
external audit and its self-regulatory franchise (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004), arms-length 
regulation of the profession may be an important means of restoring a sense of credibility in 
the attest function. When it comes to the RI provisions, the requirement to report client 
transgressions to an independent regulator (IRBA, 2006), appeals to acting in the public 
interest (Nel, 2001; Manuel, 2002) and conceptions of whistle-blowing as socially desirable 
(Vinten, 2000; Hwang et al, 2008; PwC, 2011b), may be important sources of pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive legitimacy (Section 2.3; Chapter 6).   
 
2.3: AUDIT QUALITY, EXTERNAL REGULATION AND LEGITIMACY 
THEORY  
 
2.3.1: LEGITIMACY THEORY  
 
‘Legitimacy’ may be defined as:  
 
‘A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574) . 
Organisations seek legitimacy because, in evoking a sense of desirability, appropriateness 
and ‘uprightness’, legitimacy garners support from jurisdictions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). It leads to organisations being seen as more 
‘natural’, ‘meaningful’ and ‘trustworthy’ with resulting ‘continuity and credibility being mutually 
reinforcing’ (Suchman, 1995, p.574-575). Gaining, maintaining and repairing claims to 
legitimacy is, however, no easy task due largely to the very ethereal and highly dynamic 
nature of legitimacy.  
For example, Fogarty (1992) explains ‘legitimacy’ cannot be directly observed.  It is a 
subjective concept being influenced by moral cultural and social variables including past 
experiences and how these are interpreted (Power, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Llewelyn, 1996; 
Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Georgiou and Jack, 2011). At the broadest level, legitimacy 
may be thought of as either strategic or institutional in nature, adding to an innate sense of 
subjectivity and difficulties encountered when attempting to ‘pinpoint’ sources of legitimacy. 
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In the first instance, it is seen as a resource to be used by organisations to achieve goals. 
Alternately, ‘legitimacy’ may be interpreted as rooted in ‘constitutive beliefs’ leading to 
legitimacy and institutionalisation becoming synonymous31 (Suchman, 1995). Ultimately, the 
prior research identifies three ‘sub-sets’ of legitimacy, each of which is inherently normative, 
socially constructed and transient in nature, albeit to varying degrees.  
Pragmatic legitimacy is rooted in an organisation’s policies having perceived value for its 
immediate constituents (exchange legitimacy) or due to the organisation being regarded as 
responsive to  constituents’ interests (influence legitimacy) (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Fogarty, 1992; Fligstein and Feeland, 1995; Suchman, 1995; 
Georgiou and Jack, 2011).  A variant of pragmatic legitimacy, dispositional legitimacy, 
argues that ‘modern institutional orders’ have personified organisations leading constituents 
to afford legitimacy to those organisations that are ‘moral’, ‘trustworthy’ or ‘socially 
responsible’ (Suchman, 1995; Solomon, 2010). Pragmatic legitimacy is, however, ultimately 
based largely on ‘self-regarding utility calculations’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 585) and can be won 
using tangible rewards.  
Moral legitimacy results from an assessment of whether an activity is well placed within 
socially constructed value systems and, in its purest form, transcends self-interests. 
Organisations may be judged morally on what they have accomplished (consequential 
legitimacy); on assessment of the social acceptability of attaining outputs (procedural 
legitimacy); or on whether or not the organisation is located within a morally favoured sector 
(structural legitimacy) (Goldhamer and Shils, 1939; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Abbott, 1981; 
Molm, 1986; Suchman, 1995). These structures become important for legitimisation 
particularly where processes and outputs cannot be directly observed and may lead to the 
organisational identity, as opposed to its actual competency, becoming a determinant of 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
 
Finally, an organisation may be accepted as legitimate on the basis of generally accepted 
belief, (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Powell, 
2007). If an organisation’s activities or purpose are understood within a broader cultural 
context, resulting comprehensibility can accord legitimacy, especially when  organisational 
                                               
31
 Legitimacy may be thought of as either a strategic or institutional construct. The former sees legitimacy as an 
organisational resource used to achieve specific goals. The latter sees legitimacy as synonymous with 
institutionalisation: aimed at making organisations seem ‘natural and meaningful’. Being reliant on social belief-
sets, tensions between agents and principals are less relevant for institutional views on legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995, p. 576). As audit firms face both operational challenges and institutional pressures 
(Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Wyatt, 2004; IRBA, 2011), no explicit distinction is made in this thesis between 




accounts ‘mesh both with larger belief systems and with experienced reality of the 
audience’s daily life’ (Abbott, 1981; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995, p. 582). 
From a different perspective, cultural ‘givens’ or ‘truths’ can lead to alternatives for an 
organisation or its practices being disregarded and the ‘legitimated entity becomes 
unassailable’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 583). 
 
2.3.2: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON AUDITING  
 
Traditionally, accounting was portrayed as a neutral means of collecting, processing and 
reporting information with the aim of facilitating sound economic decision-making (Hopwood, 
1987; Carruthers, 1995; Barth, 2008; Intenational Accounting Standards Board [IASB], 
2010). Likewise, audit was seen as a technical-rational function (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  Under the lens of agency theory, Section 2.2 touched on how auditing serves as part 
of the systems of checks and balances designed to manage divergent interests of agents 
and principals (Hill and Jones, 1992; Baker and Owsen, 2002; Solomon, 2010). Section 2.2 
also alluded to the continued relevance of agency theory for explaining developments in 
audit and accounting practice. Economic pressures, coupled with growing commercial and 
industrial activity, necessitated the evolution and refinement of audit and accounting services 
to maximise efficiency, enhance reporting effectiveness and provide a source of value for 
stakeholders (see Burchell et al, 1980; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Chandler et al, 1993; 
Walsh and Stewart, 1993).  
 
In exploring changing audit practices there may, however, be more at work than just 
economic forces (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Pentland, 1993; Armstrong, 1994; Power, 
1994; Pentland, 2000; Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008). Peecher et al (2007), Powell  (2007; 
2010), Quattrone (2004), Humphrey and Moizer (1990) and Hopwood (1987), for example, 
suggest that accounting systems, and how these change over time, are a product of  
pressures at work within organisations, including broader societal changes (see also Miller 
and O'Leary, 1987; Humphrey and Moizer, 1990). Agency problems at the organisational 
level (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and increasing numbers of stakeholders (Solomon, 2010; 
IRC, 2011) are still important accounting change-determinants. Varying societal 
expectations, institutionalisation and the need for legitimacy are, however, also important 
(see also Burchell et al, 1980; Hopwood, 1987; Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Power, 2003; 
Parker, 2007; Peecher et al, 2007; Bengtsson, 2011; Bronson et al, 2011; Georgiou and 
Jack, 2011). As explained by Power (2003, p. 379): ‘accounting systems, in their broadest 
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sense, function often more to legitimate individual and organizational behaviour than to 
support efficient and rational decision making’. This sentiment echoes the theories of Meyer 
and Rowan (1977): that the emergence and development of organisations may be attributed, 
not only to economic rationality, but to a complex process whereby formal rational or 
institutional structures are used to accord a sense of legitimacy. Longevity of the 
organisation is no longer secured solely by virtue of changes that make it more profitable or 
efficient, but using formal structures, processes and symbolic displays to confer credibility 
and trust (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Carruthers, 1995; Suchman, 1995).  
 
One such process or ‘display’ may be the use of external audit. Being an important part of 
the corporate governance landscape (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Baker and Owsen, 
2002; Solomon, 2010; Dart, 2011), external audit is integral to the system of checks and 
balances  that ultimately serves to reduce agency costs to acceptable levels (for examples 
see Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Lim and Tan, 2008; Fernando et al, 2010).  By having a 
value-adding potential, the attest function effectively boils down to a possible source of 
pragmatic legitimacy. For example, the fact that organisations audited by a high quality 
external audit have lower costs of capital and fewer discretionary accruals (Section 2.2) 
implies that audit is able to offer actual benefits for stakeholders while simultaneously 
appearing responsive to the information needs of users of financial statements that would 
otherwise be constrained by the self-serving interests of distant managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Hill and Jones, 1992; Clinch et al, 2012). 
Exchange and influential legitimacy may, therefore, result.  
 
Complementing this is audit’s technical risk-based focus (IAASB, 2009c; IAASB, 2009k; 
IAASB, 2009m). Audit procedures are not simply informal or random but the product of well 
researched professional standards, scientific-type processes, and the application of 
prudential professional judgement by a highly trained independent practitioner (Humphrey 
and Moizer, 1990; Power, 2003; Sikka, 2009). Professional auditing standards take this one 
step further. They allow for, not only the expression of an opinion on a client’s financial 
statements, but also a means for evaluating: the design and operating effectiveness of 
controls; key risk areas; and approaches for reducing these risks to acceptable levels  
(IAASB, 2009i; IAASB, 2009j; IAASB, 2009l; IAASB, 2009w; IAASB, 2011). While 
accentuating a perceived benefit for stakeholders, that this approach also attests to the very 
financial procedures and processes carried out at the audit client (MacLullich, 2003) may 
confer a sense of procedural legitimacy on the auditee. This benefit may be magnified by the 
expansion of audit services into the area of risk and integrated reporting, effectively 
influencing a large number of stakeholders to regard audit as an imperative for assessing an 
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organisation’s structural and consequential legitimacy (Power, 1991; Power, 1994; O'Dwyer 
et al, 2011). As explained by Power (1994) the attest function is aligned with the ideals of 
quality, good governance and sense of accountability and, as such, an important source of 
moral and pragmatic legitimacy for the audited.  
 
Integral to this may be the complex operational, financial and institutional environments in 
which modern organisations function (Giddens, 1990; Giddens, 1991; Unerman and 
O'Dwyer, 2004).  Where users of financial reports are not able to comprehend fully these 
documents or directly observe the processes taking place within organisations, external 
audit plays a significant role in preserving the credibility of the capital market process 
(Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004).  The simple fact that a company’s financial statements have 
been audited by an independent professional (IAASB, 2009x) with technical expertise 
(Humphrey and Moizer, 1990), therefore, becomes an important means of securing the 
legitimacy of the organisation’s financial reporting and, hence, its credibility in the eyes of 
stakeholders (consider Power, 1994; IOD, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 2011). It may very well be 
the case that acts of ‘resistance [to external audit] look like attempts to preserve abuses of 
privilege and secrecy’ (Power, 1994) to the point where audit has come to be seen as an 
indispensable part of daily corporate life (consider Power, 1999; Pentland, 2000; Solomon, 
2010) and possible source of cognitive legitimacy for an organisation with a ‘clean’ audit 
report.  
 
To, ‘generate trust in financial statements’, however, ‘audit practice must generate trust in 
itself’ (Power, 2003, p. 380). In other words, a paradox emerges in terms of which audit, as a 
socially constructed practice, is both able to confer legitimacy on organisations while, at the 
same time, dependent on its own perceived legitimacy in order to do so (see also Power, 
1997; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; O'Dwyer et al, 2011). For this reason the growing 
importance of accounting systems; increased information demands of varied stakeholder 
groups; emergence of laws mandating external audit; and the growing complexity of 
accounting and auditing standards has been identified with the institutionalisation and 
professionalisation of accounting and auditing. The primary aim: securing claims to 
legitimacy (Burchell et al, 1980; Zucker, 1986; Power, 1994; Fligstein and Feeland, 1995; 
Baker and Owsen, 2002).   
 
In this light, the accounting and auditing fraternity has actively recruited mainly cosmopolitan 
workers, simultaneously dictating minimum levels of entry requirements to the profession 
and levels of technical knowledge (Burchell et al, 1980; Chandler et al, 1993; Edwards, 
2001). Going hand in hand with this has been the development of a formal autonomous role 
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for accounting and auditing backed by professional bodies which represent member 
interests (Burchell et al, 1980; Hopwood, 1987; Cooper and Robson, 2006); the 
standardisation of accounting and auditing practice (Power, 1995; Power, 2003; IAASB, 
2009|); and the codification of informal procedures (Hopwood, 1987; Power, 1995; IAASB, 
2009x), each of which adds to the image of the profession as a repository of revered 
technical expertise (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1994) and, thus, of a legitimate 
player. 
  
MacLullich (2003), for example, explains how a move to risk-based auditing may be 
attributed not only to the need for more efficient audit practice, but to the desire to 
perpetuate belief in the ‘rituals’ of auditing. The existence of formal auditing and accounting 
standards rooted in conceptual frameworks and professional judgement become 
synonymous with the view of auditors as expert decision-makers working tirelessly to reach 
an informed conclusion on the fair presentation of financial statements (Humphrey and 
Moizer, 1990; MacLullich, 2003; Wyatt, 2004). The result is an appeal to exchange and 
influential legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  
 
Power (1994; 1995) also sees audit as socially and contextually driven. He argues that 
auditing standards, decision aids and working papers are not only about ensuring high levels 
of audit quality. They play an important role in ‘confer[ing] credibility by linking particular 
audits to generally accepted knowledge’ (Power, 1995, p. 324). Audit sampling (IAASB, 
2009o; IAASB, 2009p), for instance, facilitates a delicate balance between the application of 
professional, but still normative, judgement and the use of visible techniques for the 
execution of audit tests that can be used to enhance the credibility of the audit process 
(Power, 1992; Power, 1995; Power, 2003). Likewise, a reliance on structured approaches to 
audit (see IAASB, 2009l; IAASB, 2009k; IAASB, 2009m) ‘reflects the increasing demand for 
legitimate and transparent forms of standardised practice’ (Power, 2003, p. 381).  
 
Continuing under a lens of legitimacy theory, Humphrey and Moizer (1990) provide an 
account of the audit planning process. They explain that, in addition to improving audit 
quality, audit planning is an important ‘marketing’ tool. The planning process not only 
ensures efficient and effective practice (IAASB, 2009k; IAASB, 2009m) but allows for the 
legitimisation of the nature, timing and extent of audit work and of the fee charged. As a 
result, technical professional standards and ‘scientific’ approaches (Power, 1992; Power, 
2003) to audit practice become an important form of impression management that secures 
the continued standing of the attest function and its perceived moral and pragmatic 
legitimacy (Power, 1995; Pentland, 2000; MacLullich, 2003; Power, 2003).   
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This is reinforced by claims to serving the public interest. With users of financial statements 
unable to appreciate every aspect of the financial reporting system, external audit serves to 
express an opinion on financial statements and, therefore, becomes a means of ensuring 
trust in investment markets (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004). Underlying this is a taken-for-
granted confidence in external audit as central to protecting the interests of stakeholders 
(Power, 1994; Pentland, 2000; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004) emanating from images of 
professionalism, technical training and expertise, prudential professional judgement and the 
independent practitioner (consider Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Humphrey and Moizer, 
1990; Power, 1994; Mosso, 2003; Francis, 2004; IAASB, 2009c). At the extreme, these 
professionals came to be seen as a class of ‘gentlemen’, highly skilled and beyond reproach 
(Chandler et al, 1993; Edwards, 2001), possibly signalling the achievement of cognitive 
legitimacy (consider: Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1994; Sikka et al, 1998). The 
result is that a modern capital market without an independent external audit function has 
become almost unimaginable (see Power, 1994; Power, 2003; IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2010).  
Legitimacy is not, however, static (Suchman, 1995; Power, 2003; Rodrigues and Craig, 
2007; Georgiou and Jack, 2011; Smith-Lacroix et al, 2012). If the accounting profession is 
built on the trust vested in it by society (Power, 2003; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; O'Dwyer 
et al, 2011; SAICA, 2012) it needs to preserve its claim to legitimacy to ensure continued 
existence. In other words, just as economic pressure may stimulate organisational change, 
together with emerging social or contextual issues, challenges to institutional legitimacy may 
also result (Suchman, 1995). For the audit profession in particular, this may be especially 
true when corporate failures shake the confidence vested in the attest function (Kaplan and 
Ruland, 1991; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Sikka, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 2011;  
Smith-Lacroix et al, 2012).  
 
2.3.3: EXTERNAL REGULATION OF THE AUDIT PROFESSION AS A SOURCE 
OF LEGITIMACY 
 
EXTERNAL REGULATION AND AUDITOR LEGITIMACY  
 
Auditors’ roles and responsibilities are a hotly debated topic, particularly in the aftermath of 
corporate failures (Tremblay and Gendron, 2011; Gold et al, 2012). Scandals inevitably lead 
to a diminution of trust in the audit profession and are often followed by an increase in 
defined responsibilities or a reduction in autonomy (Byington and Sutton, 1991; Gaa, 1991; 
Humphrey et al, 1992; Laughlin, 2007; Marnet, 2007; European Commission, 2010a;  
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Tillema and ter Bogt, 2010). In each instance, the aim is purportedly an improvement in the 
functionality and quality of the audit process (Hopwood, 1987; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; 
Canada et al, 2008). As explained by Hopwood (1987, p. 211) ‘much accounting change has 
resulted from such conceptions of an accounting potential’.  Enhancing this potential 
provides a means of addressing the ever more demanding needs and interests of separated 
managers and owners, and a growing body of other stakeholders, thereby securing 
legitimacy (Burchell et al, 1980; Burchell et al, 1985; Hopwood, 1987; Suchman, 1995). In 
this respect, a self-regulatory approach has proved instrumental in reassuring constituents of 
the credibility of the external audit process (see Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Humphrey and 
Moizer, 1990; Edwards, 2001; Zeff, 2003a; Rockness and Rockness, 2005; Bayou et al, 
2011). Peer reviews to ensure high quality audit engagements, often under an established 
accounting body (see Zeff, 2003a; Carcello et al, 2011; Malsch and Gendron, 2011);  the 
development of codes of conduct (examples include IFAC, 2006; SAICA, 2012); controlling 
entry to the profession through formal examinations (Byington and Sutton, 1991; Chandler et 
al, 1993; Low et al, 2008) and continuous revision of technical standards (for examples see 
Barth, 2008; IASB, 2010; FRC, 2011; IAASB, 2012) are examples of the largely self-
regulatory measures that have, historically, been integral to maintaining the legitimacy of the 
audit profession.   
 
In each case, a self-regulation is used to bolster the trust vested in the profession and 
preserve its credibility (Mosso, 2003; Chang et al, 2009a; Chang et al, 2009b; Carrington, 
2010; Chiaburu, 2010). As Power (1995), Humphrey and Moizer (1990) and Khalifa et al 
(2007) explain: auditing standards, technicalities, claims to independence and quality 
assurance processes become part of the ‘rituals’ of social legitimisation and hence a 
demonstrable commitment to the serving the interests of constituents. As discussed 
previously, auditors were historically seen as ‘gentlemen’ (Edwards, 2001) - a professional 
elite acting in the public interest and above ethical reproach. They were automatically trusted 
(Humphrey et al, 1992; Wyatt, 2004; Baldvinsdottir et al, 2009; Guénin-Paracini and 
Gendron, 2010). Concurrently, the very purpose of and need for audit becomes generally 
accepted as an integral part of the corporate governance landscape (see Power, 1994; 
Solomon, 2010; Humphrey, 2012) signalling the attainment of cognitive legitimacy for the 
profession and, by default, its self-regulatory franchise.  
Under a banner of self-regulation, a legitimacy reserve (see also Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Suchman, 1995; Edwards, 2001) has resulted meaning that isolated issues have not led to a 
material threat to the profession’s standing. Faced with a corporate failure, the profession 
has been able to create an effective ‘firewall’ between challenges to previously won 
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legitimacy and the on-going ‘essence’ of the institution (see Zucker, 1986; Suchman, 1995). 
For example, assumed deficiencies have been successfully ascribed to a misunderstanding 
of the scope of external audit by constituents and responded to with calls for educating users 
about the nature and purpose of the audit function (Fogarty et al, 1991; Sikka et al, 1998; 
Gold et al, 2012). In other instances, the profession has reviewed its independence protocols 
(European Commission, 2010b; Dart, 2011; Wines, 2012), bolstered quality review 
processes (Nel, 2001; FRC, 2008a; FRC, 2010; Carcello et al, 2011) and revised 
professional standards (see Byington and Sutton, 1991; IAASB, 2012) with an aim to 
demonstrating its commitment to high quality audit practice and, thus, preserving its 
legitimacy. Paradoxically, the result is that even when corporate failures strike, the response 
has been a call for ever more monitoring and review in the form of additional audit (Power, 
1994; Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010).  
 
Repeated failures and corporate scandals can, however, begin to ‘deplete’ an institution’s 
legitimacy reserve (Suchman, 1995). They signal to users that automatic or taken-for-
granted belief in the sound functioning of the audit system may be unfounded and that 
external intervention could be necessary (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Boolaky, 2011; 
Wines, 2012). As summarised by Anderson and Ellyson (1986, p. 99): 
‘Many leaders of the profession strongly believe...that dealing with [audit quality].... perception 
problems ultimately boils down to this question: Will the profession adequately and credibly 
regulate itself-or will the public demand that the Government play the cop on the beat?’  
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) point to the latter. Exploring the demise of Arthur Anderson, 
they argue that the collapse of Enron led to a widespread withdrawal of trust from the expert 
system, with the result that a corporate scandal - initially limited to only a single organisation 
and its auditor -  soon had implications for the legitimacy of the audit profession (and its self-
regulation franchise) on a global level.  For these researchers,  the audit opinion is an 
example of a ‘token symbol’ in the sense that is has little value in itself but is, nevertheless, 
able to convey the soundness of the financial statements and communicate the results of the 
audit process (an ‘expert system’)32. That users place reliance on the audit opinion, in spite 
of the fact that many have only limited knowledge of the expert system, implies that there is 
some measure of trust in the process and assumption that the ‘token symbol’ carries value. 
In other words, and as discussed previously, there is the generally accepted belief (cognitive 
legitimacy), rooted in past experiences and perceptions of users (a legitimacy reserve) that 
the audit opinion is appropriate and is backed by high quality audit evidence. When, 
however,  
                                               
32
 Unerman and O’Dwyer’s (2004) work is based on Giddens’ (1991; 1990) theory of modernity.  
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‘a particular abstract system fails to meet widely held expectations of non-expert outsiders, 
processes of reflexivity may lead to a widespread withdrawal of trust by these non-experts and 
development of cynicism towards this abstract system’  (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004, p. 978) . 
In other words, ‘unconscious trust’, an indicator of cognitive legitimacy, can be undermined 
by numerous and repeated scandals (Giddens, 1990; Mosso, 2003; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 
2004, p. 979 & 984). In this setting, the profession’s self-regulatory efforts can come to be 
perceived as simply minimising the perception of the weakness of the audit process (Kaplan 
and Ruland, 1991; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004) and increasingly ineffective at securing 
legitimacy (see Mosso, 2003; Zeff, 2003b; Bazerman and Moore, 2011). For example, 
Unerman and O ‘Dwyer (2004) describe how non-expert users of audit reports develop a 
new-found appreciation for the fallibility of external audit and limitations of the profession’s 
review and quality controls processes. Accordingly initial efforts in the USA to ‘ring fence’ the 
Enron debacle or to attribute it to isolated issues, readily resolved by existing self-regulatory 
measures, are unsuccessful (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004). A deepening crisis of legitimacy 
results, culminating in a review of the credibility of the assurance function in several 
jurisdictions and, most notably, the promulgation of arms-length regulation for the audit 
profession (Manuel, 2002; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Canada et al, 2008). Effectively, 
cynicism leads to acts of self-regulation being seen as mere symbols used to conjure up 
pragmatic or procedural legitimacy but lacking in substance (Edwards, 2001; Fuerman, 
2004; Sikka, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005; Marnet, 2007).   
More critical still,  the profession may be seen as exerting economic and political power in 
pursuit of self-gain with little regard for its stated objective of serving the public interest 
(consider Power, 1994; Mitchell and Sikka, 2002; Zeff, 2003a; Pesqueux, 2005; Marnet, 
2007; Low et al, 2008; Baldvinsdottir et al, 2009). For example, suspicion has been raised 
that the ‘independence’, ‘integrity’, ‘professional competency’ and ‘due care’ amount to a 
‘professional mystique’ that is used to further the economic interests of members of the 
profession (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al, 1992; Pesqueux, 2005). As a 
result, the efforts of the profession alone to respond to various corporate failures, and more 
recently the global financial crises, are not enough (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Odendaal 
and De Jager, 2008; Riotto, 2008; Bayou et al, 2011; Carcello et al, 2011). Delegitimized 
structures are, therefore, ‘quarantined’ and monitors put in place by independent regulators 
to prevent subsequent failures (Suchman, 1995).  The promulgation of SOX, with mandatory 
audit quality provisions (Riotto, 2008; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Bronson et al, 2011; Cullinan et 
al, 2012); formation of the PCAOB (Mosso, 2003; Kaplan and Williams, 2012), revocation of 
Author Anderson’s licence (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004); and calls for separation of non-
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assurance practice from existing audit firms (European Commission, 2010b; Bazerman and 
Moore, 2011; Wines, 2012) serve as examples.  
Each case points to the introduction of an ‘audit quality discourse’. Exogenous control of the 
profession is offered to constituents as a key means of improving existing audit practice 
following a number of widely publicised corporate failures. The focus on audit efficiency, 
drive for increased competitiveness and variation of service offering appears to be tempered 
by the need for quality control (IAASB, 2009x; IAASB, 2009e) - including formal 
documentation of how firms ensure the execution of engagements to high standards - and 
the application of sound professional judgement (PCAOB, 2006; PCAOB, 2007; Blankley et 
al, 2012). Khalifa et al (2007) describe this as highlighting a key relationship between 
discourse and practice that shows how audit firms have possibly embraced a more 
stakeholder-centric outlook in the wake of additional arms-length control over audit practices.  
In this context, the USA, UK, France, Italy, Austria, Canada, Germany, Australia and New 
Zealand Governments and regulatory bodies are responding to a perceived crisis of 
legitimacy in the audit profession by moving away from a system of self-regulation to one 
where audit practice is increasingly subject to external control (Nel, 2001; Konar et al, 2003; 
Laughlin, 2007; Canada et al, 2008; European Commission, 2010b; Bronson et al, 2011; 
Kaplan and Williams, 2012).  With self-regulation no longer seen as a viable source of 
legitimacy, external regulation may come to be interpreted as a bona fide effort to improve 
quality and restore confidence in the ‘expert system’ (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Unerman 
and O'Dwyer, 2004; Odendaal and De Jager, 2008; Riotto, 2008; Bayou et al, 2011; Carcello 
et al, 2011). As alluded to by Zucker (1986), Kaplan and Ruland (1991) and Suchman 
(1995), with the efficiency of one legitimising technique reduced, alternate means of 
enhancing audit legitimacy are needed.  
South Africa’s RI provisions may be one such example and this provides the basis for the 
second research question:  









 SOUTH AFRICA’S RI PROVISIONS AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY? 
 
Discussing the promulgation of s20(5) of the PAAA, the South African Minister of Finance 
noted: 
‘A most important aspect of this piece of legislation is Parliament’s recognition of the principle 
that an auditor owes a duty not only to his client but also to the public. For many years auditors 
have been in doubt as to their responsibility to the public. Parliament has now given a clear and 
unequivocal answer’ (Minister of Finance of the Republic of South Africa cited in Nel, 2001, p. 
318).  
The European Commission (2010b), Solomon (2009; 2010), CESR (2007) and IRC (2011) 
argue that improved reporting by external audit is paramount for enhancing investor 
confidence in the capital market and audit process itself.  As explained by Power (1994; 
2003), audit is effectively valueless unless meaningful results can be communicated to the 
relevant stakeholders (see also O'Dwyer et al, 2011). From this perspective, the RI 
provisions can be seen as taking cognisance of this, adding to the scope of the auditor’s 
reporting duty in order to provide additional insights into organisations’ activities (Nel, 2001; 
SAICA (2001), cited in Nel, 2001). Other jurisdictions rely on comparable reporting duties for 
a similar reason.  
Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden, for example, require auditors to report certain 
irregularities to directors. France, Iran and Malaysia extend this duty by mandating that 
certain offences be reported to appropriate authorities (Nel, 2001). The UK, Ireland and 
Australia also have instances where reporting transgressions to third parties is required 
(Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Institute of Chareted Accountants of Scotland [ICAS], 2010; ICSA, 
2010). As a general rule, EU Member States are obliged to report ‘any fact or decision which 
is liable to constitute a material breach of laws, affect the ability of the company to continue 
as a going concern, or lead to a qualified audit report’ to relevant authorities. The reporting 
duties apply mainly to the financial services sector (European Commission, 2010b). Finally, 
in the USA, SOX indirectly mandates a broad form of whistle-blowing in that s404 of SOX 
requires auditors to report formally on control deficiencies. (Riotto, 2008; Epps and Guthrie, 
2010). Professional standards may give rise to additional reporting duties in limited cases 
(AICPA, 1972; Nel, 2001; AICPA, 2007; AICPA, 2009; IAASB, 2009h). Each instance 
speaks to the need for improved communication standards, enhanced transparency and 
defining auditors’ reporting responsibilities (see also IAASB, 2012).  
Conceivably, the growing societal demand for improved and clarified reporting by auditors 
may provide an impetus for mandated whistle-blowing duties (consider, for example, 
68 
 
Hopwood, 1987; Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Power, 2003; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 
2010). Based on the work of Suchman (1995), it may be argued that whistle-blowing is itself 
increasingly seen as a legitimate act by some constituencies (see, for example, Hwang et al, 
2008; IOD, 2009; Seifert et al, 2010; KPMG, 2011). More specifically, the whistle-blowing 
literature suggests a source of pragmatic and moral legitimacy. For example, whistle-blowing 
is perceived by some stakeholders as an invaluable means of improving transparency and 
fortifying confidence in the respective organisation (Vinten, 2000; Vinten, 2003; ICAEW, 
2004; Hwang et al, 2008; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010). According to Staub (1978), the 
act of reporting transgressions  becomes ‘pro-social’ in the sense that it is based on a quest 
for maximisation of societal, as well as personal, utility and, thus, interconnected with a 
sense of moral duty (consider also Miceli and Near, 1984; Crotty, 2007; Hwang et al, 2008). 
Accordingly, far from being ‘subversive and undesirable, [the act of reporting transgressions] 
may sometimes deserve high praise’ (Vinten, 2000, p. 1). As explained by Reckers-Sauciuc 
and Low (2010), examining the crisis of confidence post Enron et al, there is a strong 
connection between ethics, moral commitment, openness and whistle-blowing with the result 
that:   
‘Some standard of ethics needs to be upheld; and businesses truly need to adopt policies, 
practices and procedures that advance integrity-in-action (not just talk) if we are ever going to 
recover our bearings. Provisions for whistle-blowing without retaliation would be one such 
practice’ (2010, p. 259).  
 
A similar sentiment is evident in the popular media where several examples may be found of 
the  efforts of whistle blowers being championed as a moral ideal in the public interest 
(consider Vinten, 2003; Boswell and Anderson, 2011; Vecchiatto, 2011). For instance, 
Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing have become akin to case studies for ethical 
breakdowns where the utility of whistle-blowing was demonstrated and actions of the 
respective whistle-blowers were celebrated by some stakeholders as promoting societal 
welfare (see, for example, Staub, 1978; Vinten, 2003; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Hwang et al, 
2008). This view is iterated by, inter alia,  PwC (2011a; 2011b) and the ICSA (2010; 2011) 
who argue that sound whistle-blowing mechanisms have an important function to play in 
ensuring a firm’s commitment to ethical business conduct.  King-III (IOD, 2009); allegations 
of price-fixing at Sasol and Tiger Brands (Crotty, 2007); and the introduction of a fraud 
hotline with direct links to the Presidency (Mboyisa, 2009) provide South African-specific 




From this perspective, whistle-blowing is an integral part of the governance machinery 
entrenching ideals of transparency, accountability and stewardship (Vinten, 2000; ICAEW, 
2004; IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2009; Solomon, 2010). As an example of auditors being 
expected to bring certain transgressions into the open, the RI provisions may be a means of 
achieving similar ends (consider: Nel, 2001; European Commission, 2010b; KPMG, 2010; 
Seifert et al, 2010). For this reason, active encouragement of improved reporting protocols in 
auditing circles is gaining acceptance (consider: Schultz et al, 1993; Read and Rama, 2003; 
IRBA, 2006; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Hwang et al, 2008; IRBA, 2010a). Contemporaneously, 
it may be part of a growing societal expectation for additional disclosure by auditors (ICAEW, 
2004; CESR, 2007; Solomon, 2009; European Commission, 2010b; ICAEW, 2010; IAASB, 
2012). By legislating reporting duties for auditors, law makers may be capitalising on 
perceptions of whistle-blowing, backed by the formality of an Act of Parliament, to add to the 
perceived legitimacy of the external audit process and the quality of information reported by 
auditors.  In other words, with whistle-blowing seen as ‘pro-social’ (Staub, 1978; Solomon, 
2010; PwC, 2011b), compliance with the RI provisions may be tantamount to conforming to 
societal expectations and providing perceived value for constituencies securing a sense of 
both pragmatic and moral legitimacy (consider: Fogarty, 1992; Suchman, 1995; Rodrigues 
and Craig, 2007).  
At the extreme, the use of an apparently rational public interest reporting requirement may 
form part of the ‘cognitive base’ of the profession’s activity. That the RI provisions are 
enshrined in statute; executed by independent and highly trained professionals; apparently 
rational; and purportedly in the public interest, may allow the act of whistle-blowing to afford 
a sense of cognitive legitimacy to the South African audit profession  (consider DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995).   
From a slightly different perspective, the same social context in which whistle-blowing is 
championed can have a coercive effect on organisations, leading to the emergence of formal 
policies and procedures which encourage the act of reporting transgressions in order to win 
public favour and, hence, secure legitimacy (consider Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 
1995; Al-Twaijry et al, 2003). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) provide an example of the subtle 
operation of ‘coercive isomorphism’ whereby smaller, urban organisations are indirectly 
compelled to introduce hierarchical structures to secure their legitimacy in the eyes of 
hierarchically organised corporates upon which they are dependent. By analogy, similar 
processes of coercive isomorphism may be at work when considering the RI provisions. The 
formal, technical,  legal aspects of the RI provisions may leave  the audit firm with a sense of 
being compelled to honour its legal responsibilities in order to demonstrate to constituents 
legitimate operating procedures  (consider DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995). 
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This may be especially true given that the RI provisions appeal to notions of acting in the 
public interest (Nel, 2001), implying that the failure to comply with the whistle-blowing duty 
could be construed as mala fides. In other words, ‘because these [provisions] are considered 
proper, adequate, rational and necessary, organizations must incorporate them to avoid 
illegitimacy’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 345). 
Concurrently, and as discussed above, a host of corporate failures and the on-going 
financial crisis has shaken the confidence vested in the audit profession’s self-regulatory 
framework (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Bazerman and Moore, 
2011). Being perceived as non-compliant with the RI provisions could be construed as failing 
to recognise constituents’ concerns and, thus, pose a threat to the standing of the respective 
audit firm (consider Suchman, 1995).  By the same token, with the international community 
appearing to favour the use of additional exogenous control over the profession (consider 
CESR, 2007; European Commission, 2010b; Arping and Sautner, 2012), for the South 
African regulator to shy away from a similar move may have smacked of ineffectiveness, a 
failure to meet international standards, and a limited recognition of the importance of sound 
external audit practice (Nel, 2001; Konar et al, 2003). The result is a refinement of the 
whistle-blowing duty, expansion of its scope and the use of material sanctions to deter non-
compliance as a possible signal that the South African audit profession is also moving 
towards greater use of arms-length regulation (Section 2.1).  
‘Uncertainty is...a powerful force that encourages imitation’ in the quest for legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 151). An organisation, by modelling itself on those appearing 
most successful, prominent or revered may be able to rationalise its own operations or win 
comparable support from constituents, thereby bolstering notions of legitimacy (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Al-Twaijry et al, 2003). As explained by Ashforth and 
Gibbs (1990, p. 178):  
‘To the extent that [generally accepted] paradigms exist for the relevant domain, structures, 
and processes, legitimacy may be gained by simply conforming to the paradigms 
…[I]somorphism "signals" the fitness—the apparent willingness and ability of the organization 
to fulfil constituents' role expectations’.  
 
In this context, if leading economies are heeding the call for additional arms-length 
regulation, then it may be possible for a developing country to bolster the perceived 
legitimacy of its own auditing profession by appearing to adopt comparable ‘innovations’. 
The USA responds to criticism of auditors with SOX and the introduction of the PCAOB 
(Canada et al, 2008; Carcello et al, 2011). The European Community explores mandatory 
auditor independence provisions and additional reporting requirements  
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(European Commission, 2010b). Likewise, South Africa attempts to demonstrate its effort at 
reform with a revision to its company law (Konar et al, 2003; Companies Act, 2008), the 
drive for a more independent regulatory body for auditors (Konar et al, 2003) and the 
entrenchment of the RI provisions to broaden the auditor’s reporting duty in the name of 
serving the public interest (Nel, 2001).  
 
2.3.4: LEGITIMACY, EXTERNAL REGULATION AND REPORTABLE 
IRREGULARITIES: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Complex ‘ceremonial displays’ or ‘institutional myths’ are frequently used to justify to 
constituents that organisations make valid, useful or legitimate contribution to society (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). For the audit profession, whose entire technical process culminates in 
only a single, highly standardised report on a client’s financial statements (IAASB, 2009s), 
this may be no exception. For example, the audit profession seeks formal charters or legal 
backing for its services (Power, 1994; Power, 1997; Power, 1999). In attempting to expand 
its jurisdictional claims, appeals are made to notions of pragmatic and moral legitimacy by 
demonstrating the utility of the respective services or by attempting to enlist the support of 
powerful stakeholder groups to champion new lines of service (Power, 1997; O'Dwyer et al, 
2011). Operationally, the profession relies on highly trained staff, professional standards 
subject to due process, claims to independence and a balance between prudential 
professional judgement and quasi-scientific audit process to rationalise audit practice, albeit 
that this remains largely invisible to all but the audit firm itself (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; 
Power, 1992; Power, 1995; Sikka and Willmott, 1995). In short, the audit profession 
becomes an example of a highly institutionalised, socially constructed, technical practice 
(Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008).  
Attempts to ‘control and coordinate the activities in institutionalized organisations [however] 
leads to conflicts and loss of legitimacy’ with the result that ‘elements of structure are 
decoupled from activities and each other’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 357).  To this end, 
organisational purpose is left deliberately vague and little effort is dedicated to defining 
clearly technical performance (Hopwood, 1990). Concurrently, the evaluation of actual 
achievements against well-defined benchmarks is replaced by ‘ceremonial’ forms of 




‘The advantages of decoupling are clear. The assumption that formal structures are really 
working is buffered from inconsistencies and anomalies involved in technical activities. Also, 
because integration is avoided, disputes and conflicts are minimised, and an organization can 
mobilize support from a broader range of external constituents’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 
357). 
McLullich (2003) provides an audit-specific example. The emergence of risk-based audit 
regimes appeals to the ideal of flexible application of judgement; offers additional value for 
clients by identifying control deficiencies; and stresses the importance of a more rational 
approach to audit testing (see also Power, 2003; Khalifa et al, 2007). In reality, however, this 
amounts to little more than impression management - ‘reconfiguring’ standard ‘audit 
discourse’ as a ‘discourse of assurance’ (MacLullich, 2003, p. 808). Practitioners apply 
detailed checklists, effectively reducing professional judgement to a sequence of processes 
to ensure adherence to ‘best practice’ (Fogarty, 1992; McMillan, 2004) or a quasi-scientific 
method (Power, 1992; Power, 2003) that legitimises the attest function. To further win public 
confidence, cautionary language is stressed with the introduction of ‘assurance’, ‘audit 
comfort’, ‘quality control’ and ‘risk-management’ introduced to audit parlance (MacLullich, 
2003; Khalifa et al, 2007; Humphrey, 2012).  
Where reliance on audit is rooted in rituals of verification (Power, 1995), the use of jargon 
and clever imagery conjures up belief in a highly professional, well defined, carefully 
researched approach to audit practice that secures claims to pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimacy (consider Hopwood, 1990; Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Sikka et al, 1998; Pentland, 
2000; Power, 2003; Sikka, 2004). The ‘reform’, however, ignores the importance of tackling 
auditor independence problems (Low et al, 2008) and the need to cultivate bona fide 
professional skills (McMillan, 2004; Wyatt, 2004). Instead it leaves ‘existing structures intact 
without any substantive change in operationalisation of (autonomous) judgement’ 
(MacLullich, 2003, p. 808).  
Fogarty et al (1991) adopt a similar perspective. In response to a perceived expectation gap, 
the researchers elaborate on how the audit profession adopts professional standards that 
take some steps towards creating fraud-related responsibilities for the practitioner. Despite 
this, no guidelines on how these responsibilities are to be implemented practically are 
issued; audit practice remains largely unchanged; and the training of audit professionals 
refrains from adopting a focus on the need for fraud detection. ‘Accepting responsibility for 
fraud in the absence of any realistic prospect of detection forms a classic instance of 
decoupling under institutional theory’ (Fogarty et al, 1991, p. 206). This modus operandi 
allows the profession to be placed in a ‘positive space’ where it simultaneously accepts 
responsibility for resolving the expectation gap with additional education while abrogating 
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responsibility for effecting material amendments to existing audit practice (Sikka et al, 1998). 
During the 18th and early 19th century, the role of the auditor in addressing fraud risk is 
emphasised in order to win legitimacy for the emerging profession (Chandler et al, 1993). As 
audit becomes more institutionalised, the fraud detection function is effectively downplayed - 
decoupled from the main purpose or objective of audit which relies on claims to 
independence, professional competency and expertise to secure continued credibility 
(Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Sikka et al, 1998).  
Fraud-associated responsibilities cannot be totally eliminated due to the generally held belief 
that, at least to some extent, auditors ought to play a role in the detection and prevention of 
fraud (see for example Humphrey et al, 1993a; Dennis, 2010; Porter et al, 2012). 
Consequently, the profession has historically engaged in a delicate balance between 
appearing to accept increased responsibility for fraud detection and prevention, while not 
overtly accepting a formal duty to seek out fraud actively. This has successfully created the 
impression that the audit fraternity remains committed to serving the public interest and that 
it is accepting the need for change in response to mounting criticisms. Juxtaposed with this 
is the practical reality of audit practice left largely unaltered and defined in complex, obscure 
technical terms that successfully detract from the need for additional reform (Humphrey et al, 
1992; Power, 1994; Sikka et al, 1998).   
Likewise, where audit failures occur, the profession is wont to attribute this to an isolated 
occurrence or to the actions of rogue individuals (Sikka et al, 1998; Mitchell and Sikka, 2002; 
Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004). It tends to respond with revisions to professional standards 
and a surge of publications and press releases aimed at educating the misinformed public of 
the ‘true’ nature and scope of the assurance service (Byington and Sutton, 1991). Again, 
these efforts serve a mainly symbolic purpose. They do little to change audit significantly on 
the ground, while cultivating the belief that the audit community is aware of and responding 
to the concerns of key constituencies (Humphrey et al, 1992; Sikka et al, 1998; Humphrey, 
2012). Paradoxically, these professional standards and pronouncements dare not be too 
specific in case their ‘mystical’ properties be undermined (Hopwood, 1990; Humphrey et al, 
1992, p. 149).  
By effectively ‘decoupling’ operational changes from the image of a high quality assurance 
function that strives to serve the public interest, the audit profession is able successfully to 
preserve its claim to legitimacy (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al, 1992) while 
simultaneously appearing to take on additional responsibilities so that the emphasis is on the 
potential of audit services rather than actual practice (Hopwood, 1987; Humphrey et al, 
1992). As explained by Power (1994, p. 39) a sharp contrast emerges between the image of 
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auditing championing accountability and transparency and a professional function that is 
‘often very specialised and opaque to a wider public’. Audits may provide comfort to 
stakeholders who are remote from day-to-day practices but the operation of complex 
institutional processes tends to deter more extensive enquiries and may render audit a 
powerful ‘form of image management rather than a basis for substantive analysis’ (see also 
Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Sikka et al, 1998; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; O'Dwyer et al, 
2011). These examples confirm the theorisations of Meyer and Rowan (1977): 
 ‘Societies promulgate sharply inconsistent myths’ leaving organisations to ‘link the 
requirements of ceremonial elements to technical activities and to link inconsistent ceremonial 
elements to each other’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 356). 
Seldom are the ceremonial requirements ignored during this ‘reconciliation’ process, for 
ceremonial requirements are an important source of moral or cognitive legitimacy (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Power, 2003). By the same token, underlying technical 
activities are also an important source of legitimacy which an organisation would also be 
reluctant to dispense with (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fogarty, 1992; Power, 1994). As a 
result, a process of ‘decoupling’ is followed in terms of which technical activities are 
separated from carefully cultivated ‘myths’ allowing the organisation to operate efficiently 
according to its defined technical standards while simultaneously maintaining a perceived 
alignment with cultural or societal expectations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Effectively, this 
allows the organisation to carry on with day-to-day technical activities while maintaining face 
with important constituents. 
In this context, that external regulation can be used to bona fide improve audit quality, as 
suggested in Section 2.2, and thus bolster the credibility of the audit profession has not been 
universally accepted (McMillan, 2004; Messner, 2009; Powell, 2010; Mitra and Hossain, 
2011). Under the lens of institutionalism, auditor regulation does not guarantee enhanced 
operating efficiency (see also Fogarty et al, 1991; Al-Twaijry et al, 2003).  Instead, 
exogenous control of the profession may be an example of the ‘formal structures’ that ‘reflect 
the myths of...institutional environments’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 341).  
As theorised by Sikka et al (1998), Humphrey (1992) and Power (1994) it may, be that arms-
length regulation becomes part of a process of decoupling. The enactment of new laws 
suggests that underlying problems contributing to a decline in audit quality are resolved. At 
the technical level, audit remains an opaque process (consider Power, 2003; Francis, 2004; 
McMillan, 2004), which naturally begs the question: how can an external regulator hope to 
understand the audit process and define the relevant mechanisms to improve audit quality? 
With audit being socially and contextually driven there is no precise definition of the nature 
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and purpose of audit. This implies that external regulation may simply reflect the ‘aspirations’ 
of regulators (Power, 1994) or hopes for the ‘potential’ (Burchell et al, 1985; Hopwood, 1987) 
of audit practice which allay the fears of uniformed users and allows the technical operations 
of audit to remain unchanged and left incapable of direct contrast against social expectations 
(Fogarty, 1996; Sikka et al, 1998; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Humphrey, 2012).  
Consequently, when it comes to external regulation, it may well be a case of ‘actively and 
influentially mobilis[ing]’ conceptions of reform to the point where regulation itself becomes 
more relevant than the regulated practice (Hopwood, 1990, p. 84). More critical 
interpretations are also possible.  
On the one hand, regulations aimed at improving audit quality may be impacted by the 
agendas of powerful constituents including the pressures and incentives faced by regulators 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1979; McMillan, 2004; Laughlin, 2007; Humphrey, 2008). On the 
other, there is the risk of simply creating the impression of active reform while underlying 
problems remain unresolved (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 
1994). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004), for example, argue that regulatory reaction to 
corporate failures tends to defend the auditing system often avoiding more stringent 
measures until perceived levels of trust are so materially threatened that the expert system 
would no longer be able to ensure the functioning of capital markets. In other words, 
regulators tend to shy away from actively tackling perceived audit quality problems (Power, 
1994; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005). As a result, external auditor 
regulation may be nothing more than a ruse used to create the impression of control, doing 
little to address the underlying problem of excessive capitalistic pressures leading to 
compromised audit quality (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Wyatt, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005; 
Sikka et al, 2009; Bayou et al, 2011). Accordingly:  
 ‘Audit can be likened to a shiny black box on the surface of which the aspirations of new 
regulatory programs can be reflected and made possible...[but] it is undesirable to look beneath 
the surface of audit practice into the box...[because] regulators do not want to know what auditing 
really is’ (Power, 1994, p. 25).  
This corroborates the position referred to by Laughlin (2007), Humphrey (2008; 2012) and 
McMillan (2004): that reform may simply be a means of superficially legitimising and 
fostering confidence in accounting and auditing systems if it is convenient to do so. As 
explained by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004, p. 988), a ‘withdrawal of non-expert trust...risked 
compromising the operation of investment markets, which are a key element underlying 
capitalism’ and, thus, also important for the very context in which politicians operate. As 
such, preserving trust in accounting and audit systems is not just about reassuring financial 
market participants but is ‘also clearly in the self-interest of many regulators’. In particular, a 
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failure to respond could result in a severe challenge to the legitimacy of the capital system, 
eroding state revenues and threatening ‘the comfortable…roles occupied by many of these 
regulators’ (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004, p. 988).  
From this perspective, policy developments may be seen as ‘buttress[ing] preconceived 
notions’ or agendas (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, p. 274). The enactment of laws, 
purportedly aimed at improving audit quality, may be used in a similar way - as a means of 
‘marketing’ claims to societal interest while primarily being about finding a ‘quick-fix’ to 
ensure political support (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004). What legislation, like SOX, may 
allow politicians to do is create the illusion of proactive measures to improve audit practice. 
While useful for winning votes, the modus operandi does very little to improve audit quality 
(see also Dollinger, 2012). Indeed, audit quality may never have been an issue for the 
legislators. For them, legitimacy may be fostered by the impression of acting in the public 
interest (see  Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Farrar, 2011). 
Similarly, Suchman (1995) explains how organisational legitimacy is often used as a 
‘resource’ to garner support for firms and how ‘self-serving claims of moral propriety’ are 
employed to ‘buttress these claims with hollow symbolic gestures’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). 
By inference, the same may apply to legislators. Regulation presented as seeking to improve 
audit quality may amount to ‘hollow gestures’ designed to allay public concerns about the 
sound functioning of capital markets on which governments themselves are dependent 
(consider: Power, 1994; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Humphrey, 2008). Alternately, auditor 
regulation can be interpreted as a simple means of, ‘isolating’ audit from the rest of the free 
market system to signal government’s concern and recognition of society’s fears regarding 
the soundness of audit processes with the aim of persuading constituents to continue 
trusting capital markets (adapted from: Suchman, 1995; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004).  
The end result may be hastily enacted legislation that, firstly, has unintended consequences 
which detract from any quality-enhancing potential (Vakkur et al, 2010; Bronson et al, 2011); 
secondly tackles the symptoms rather than the cause of the underlying problem (Unerman 
and O'Dwyer, 2004; Vakkur et al, 2010; Bronson et al, 2011); or, finally, oversimplifies the 
issues at hand (Power, 1994; McMillan, 2004; Jenkins et al, 2006). Paradoxically, this may 
actually undermine legitimisation efforts (Power, 1995). Frantic and dramatic displays by 
governments following audit failures may impair decision making and ‘dull’ instruments of 
legitimisation ‘that, if used with patience and restraint, might have saved them’ (Suchman, 
1995, p. 599). Consequently, legislation’s potential to effect material change and provide a 




SOUTH AFRICA’S REPORTABLE IRREGULARITIES 
 
It may be possible that similar processes of decoupling are at work with the South African 
auditor’s duty to report client transgressions. Although giving rise to an additional reporting 
duty, the RI provisions do not change audit practice (IRBA, 2006). No effort, for example, is 
made to resolve the expectation gap by creating a formal duty for auditors actively to detect 
fraud. By the same token, the legislation is unable to render audit processes more visible 
and, like risk-based audit procedures discussed by McLullich (2003), may do little to change 
how auditors internalise regulatory or professional developments. As such, the RI provisions 
may, in line with the arguments of Fogarty (1991), Humphrey and Moizer (1990) and Power 
(1994), amount to little more than a complex ceremonial process used by the legislature and 
audit profession to create the impression of active reform in the public interest, while the 
operational reality of external audit in South Africa remains largely unchanged.  
In addition, the effect of more arms-length regulation may simply cultivate a compliance-
driven mindset whereby new laws and regulations encourage a ‘check-box’ exercise rather 
than material reform for the benefit of constituencies (McMillan, 2004). Vakkur et al (2010), 
analysing the effects of SOX, for example, argue that, by encouraging a legalistic culture, 
SOX is reduced to simple acts of compliance.  From this perspective, perceptions of adding 
value or conforming to societal ideals are by-products of self-serving compliance rather a 
bona fide source of legitimacy (consider  Suchman, 1995; McMillan, 2004).  
By analogy, s45 of the APA’s prescriptive style (Section 2.1) raises the issue of whether or 
not the legislation truly enhances audit quality and perceived legitimacy or is simply a ‘check 
the box exercise’. If an irregularity is reported, this is possibly to avoid sanctions for non-
compliance rather than due to a sense of public duty or quest for higher levels of audit 
quality and transparency. Accordingly, can mandated whistle-blowing still serve as a quality 
or legitimacy enhancing tool? The RI provisions may simply be part of the process of 
superficially responding to crises of trust as discussed by, inter alia, Laughlin (2007), 
McMillan (2004) and Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004).   
Miller and O’Leary (1987) and Carruthers (1995) provide an alternate, although related, 
explanation for developments in accounting systems which may explain the RI provisions. 
Consistent with Hopwood (1987), Burchell et al (1980) and Kaplan and Ruland (1991), 
accounting does more than just fulfil a neutral functional role. At the same time, there may 
be more at work than displays – whether symbolic, political, economic or otherwise – aimed 
at fostering a sense of legitimacy (Miller and O'Leary, 1987).  
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Under the lens of institutionalism, the relevance of power and control should not be 
overlooked (Carruthers, 1995). When one considers that s45 of the APA is underpinned by a 
prescriptive approach to blowing the whistle (IRBA, 2006); that an attitude of simple 
compliance, discussed previously, may be indicative of an enclosing-type control  (see 
Roberts, 1991; McMillan, 2004); and that the duty is backed by sanctions for non-compliance 
(s52 of the APA, 2005; IRBA, 2006; IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 2012) the whistle-blowing duty 
becomes reminiscent of Foucauldian (Foucault, 1977) power and control.  Each of these 
‘elements’ gives rise to notions of the efficient body; detailed elaboration of acts; and a 
sense of normalising sanction. At the same time, a motif of surveillance is present in the 
potential of the RI provisions to render transgressions ‘visible’ (consider  Hopper and 
Macintosh, 1993; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; Cowton and Dopson, 2002). From this 
perspective, it may be the case that notions of disciplinary power encourage ‘normalising 
behaviour’ on the part of auditors and their clients, reinforcing the argument that the 
reporting duty may positively impact audit quality (Section 2.2; Chapter 4; Chapter 5) or that 
it is a bona fide means of entrenching a sense of moral and pragmatic legitimacy  
(Chapter 6). On the other hand, a sense of Foucauldian power may simply be part of the 
ceremonial processes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995) by which elaborate - and 
paradoxically subtle (Gordon, 1980) - displays of power are used to cultivate belief in the 
legitimacy myth that is s45 of the APA.    
 
2.4: THE RI PROVISIONS: ELEMENTS OF PANOPTICISM?  
 
Section 2.2 dealt with a rational, technical view of external audit as part of the system of 
checks and balances designed to mitigate agency costs. By attesting to the fair presentation 
of financial statements, the assurance function allows users to place confidence in financial 
reports, thereby allowing for efficient allocation of resources and reductions in the cost of 
capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Francis, 2004; Clinch et al, 2012). In explaining the 
‘audit explosion’ that has characterised modern society, Power (1994) and Pentland (2000), 
however, interpret audit as representing a move along a social continuum from a state of 
assumed confidence in the financial and investment system, to mounting distrust. At some 
point, non-expert users, unable to observe directly underlying processes or fully comprehend 
them, come to realise that an independent source of assurance is needed to ensure 
continued confidence in the capital market system (Chandler et al, 1993; Edwards, 2001; 
Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004).  
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In order for audit to reassure stakeholders of the credibility of what Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2004) describe as ‘expert systems’ it is, however, paramount that audit also command the 
confidence of constituents.  To this end, Section 2.2 touched on the importance of audit 
quality, including the need for auditor independence in both fact and appearance (Chapter 4; 
Chapter 5). From an institutional perspective, Section 2.3 evaluated sources of legitimacy of 
the audit profession, a key aspect of which has been the role played by self-regulation in 
‘guaranteeing’ the sound functioning of audit quality control systems and the standing of the 
profession (Edwards, 2001; Konar et al, 2003; Zeff, 2003a; Zeff, 2003b; Odendaal and De 
Jager, 2008). The self-regulatory ethos has, however, been challenged by numerous and 
repeated corporate scandals which, per Section 2.1 and Section 2.3, has led to calls for 
more arms-length control over audit practice and quality (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; 
Gavious, 2007; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Bazerman and Moore, 2011; Zerni, 2012). In other 
words, audit – as a means of reassuring trust in capital markets – is itself no longer able to 
command the trust of constituents, setting the scene for exogenous control over the 
profession. A tension between trust and regulation results33.  
Trust ought to reduce the need for external control by cultivating a relationship between 
parties where divergent interests are effectively narrowed (Black, 2008), something 
particularly important when the respective organisation or commercial context is complex, or 
obscure from the perspective of non-experts (Suchman, 1995; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 
2004). As explained by Giddens (1990; 1991) trust is interconnected with a vague or partial 
understanding of abstract processes and expert systems culminating in a sense of ‘faith’ or 
belief in the underlying, despite the absence of definitive information to support these beliefs 
(Suchman, 1995). Yet, in order for non-experts to place their confidence in these systems, a 
battery of checks and balances is demanded, one of which is external audit (Power, 1994; 
Pentland, 2000). When corporate failures occur in the context of an already partially 
regulated environment, the response is the introduction of more controls with audit itself 
subject to additional regulation (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Malsch and Gendron, 2011). 
Ironically, the monitors become the monitored.  
Arms-length regulation, introduced to reassure stakeholders or restore a sense of trust is, 
however, only required precisely because good faith belief in the respective expert system is 
lost (Black, 2008).  Regulation, therefore, substitutes for a loss of trust, rather than cultivating 
it. Exogenous controls over the audit profession are tantamount to a ‘reflexive’ awareness of 
flaws in audit, simultaneously signalling an effort to restore trust in expert systems (Unerman 
and O'Dwyer, 2004) and the fact that trust itself is no longer adequate - that taken-for 
                                               
33
 Special thanks must go to the participants and anonymous reviewers at the International Corporate 
Governance Conference (2012) for their comments on this aspect of the thesis.  
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granted belief in the system is lacking and that alternate means of legitimisation must be 
sought (consider Suchman, 1995; Mosso, 2003). This begs the question: what is it about 
external regulation that leaves stakeholders favouring it over the audit profession’s self-
regulatory franchise?   
As per Section 2.3, it may be the case that external regulation legitimises the profession, 
creating a ‘firewall’ between prior failures and the current efforts of the practitioners. Whether 
actual or symbolic, external regulation is able to ensure the continued support of 
stakeholders (Chapter 6). At the same time, external regulation may make a material 
contribution to audit practice and audit quality (Section 2.2; Chapter 4; Chapter 5). 
Alternately, what may make external regulation appealing to constituents is the presence of 
clearly defined rules that create a sense of control over the profession and which are backed 
by sanctions for non-conformance. In other words, motifs of disciplinary power may 
contribute to the case for external regulation, including s45 of the APA.  
Similar to the change impetus of industrialisation that Foucault (1977) identifies as 
underpinning the move towards techniques of disciplinary power, it may be that the need for 
a perceived sense of ‘visibility’ or ‘control’ over the audit profession gives rise to Panoptic-
like attributes of recently enacted external regulation. In other words, one reason for 
demands for arms-length regulation to replace the self-regulatory framework for the audit 
profession may be attributed to notions of disciplinary power. Motifs of surveillance, 
examination and normalising sanction, for example, may be at work in external regulatory 
developments reassuring users of audit reports that practical and socially desirable change 
at both the audit client and audit firm is taking place. As explained by Foucault (1977, p. 109) 
‘there must be no more spectacular but useless penalties’. Instead, disciplinary power 
should operate to clear economic and political ends (Gordon, 1980) such that ‘everyone 
must be able to read in it his own advantage’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 109).  
 
2.4.1: FOUCAULDIAN POWER AND CONTROL  
 
Foucault (1977) identifies three principles at the heart of disciplinary society: enclosure, 
notions of the ‘efficient body’; and the principle of disciplinary power. In the first instance, 
there are specific locations in which the individual is enclosed or contained. General 
enclosures are partitioned allowing specific functions to be defined and for each person to be 
made ‘known’ - capable of assessment and ranking, according to the appropriate criteria, 
and hence capable of being controlled (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980; Foucault, 1983; 
81 
 
Smart, 2002). The control-potential of the classroom is an example with students assigned to 
specific functional places characterised by strict hierarchies and the role of examination 
(Hoskin and Macve, 1986).  
Once individuals are ‘enclosed in identifiable, ranked, serialised and functional spaces, the 
principle of the efficient body can be brought to bear on them’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993, 
p. 194). Central to this is the timetable which defines when specific activities in each 
functional space take place with an aim to ensuring an efficient use of individuals’ limited 
time. This is complemented by the ‘temporal elaboration of the act’ used to specify the 
precise way in which an act is performed (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980) ensuring that ‘the 
detailed prescriptions (the knowledge) carried in regulation (the disclosure) and imposed on 
each individual (power) [convert] him or her into a manoeuvre...’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 
1993, p. 195).  
Finally, for principles of enclosure and the efficient body to be effected successfully, Foucault 
(1977) believed that disciplinary power was paramount. Accordingly, hierarchical 
surveillance, normalising sanctions and examinations become an inextricable part of the 
functioning of disciplinary society (Gordon, 1980; Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Hopper and 
Macintosh, 1993). In this ‘enclosed space’, sanctions for non-conformance are no longer 
only physical (Smart, 2002). They include a series of ‘punishments’ - routines, protocols and 
drills each aimed at subtly correcting and reducing non-conformity (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 
1980). 
Hierarchical surveillance emerged in 18th century Europe from conceptions of a ‘gaze’ that 
constrained the individual (Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Walsh 
and Stewart, 1993). Observation creates a sense of constant supervision underpinned by a 
system capable of relaying information on the observed. Key to this is that the system works 
on the behaviour of the individual without recourse to overt force but in a more insidious way 
(Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980). Disciplinary power is subtle or opaque on the one hand, but 
pervasive on the other, going almost unnoticed as it comes to be accepted as natural and 
inevitable (Gordon, 1980; Miller and O'Leary, 1987). In contrast to the ‘watchers’ who go 
unseen, the individual is rendered totally visible and, thus, manageable (Foucault, 1977; 
Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Cowton and Dopson, 2002).  
Accompanying this is a sense of examination and normalising judgement (Foucault, 1977; 
Gordon, 1980; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; Smart, 2002; Brivot and Gendron, 2011). As 
explained by Foucault (1977) and Hopper and Macintosh (1993), the functioning of 
hierarchical surveillance relies on a system of reward and penalty, complementing the 
traditional legal system by allowing previously undefined or largely ignored domains to be 
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subject to sanction for non-conformance with established norms (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 
1980; Foucault, 1983). Integral to this is the process of examination in terms of which the 
performance and output of the individual can be measured and assessed against predefined 
standards or expectations, allowing the ‘abnormal’ to be identified and then praised or 
punished accordingly (Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993). Examination 
also results in the reduction of transgressions to writing effectively creating an ‘archive’ that 
can be used to describe and measure the cumulative performance of the individual (Hoskin 
and Macve, 1986; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993). In turn, technologies of surveillance 
differentiate between and rank different individuals, ensuring a constant pressure to conform 
(Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Walsh and Stewart, 1993). In other 
words, mechanisms of disciplinary power can be seen as ‘a set of practices which [can] be 
specified and which positively [produce] ways of behaving and predispositions in human 
subjects’ (Goldhamer and Shils, 1939; Gordon, 1980; Hoskin and Macve, 1986, p. 106; 
McKinlay and Pezet, 2010).  
In this way Foucauldian ‘power’ and ‘control’ are not singular actions, but something 
‘circulating throughout the social body’ (Smart, 2002, p. 79). The aim is to render the 
individual ‘objectified’, ‘visible’ and subject to ‘normalisation’ (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980; 
Foucault, 1983; Neimark, 1990; Roberts, 1991; Roberts, 2001; Smart, 2002; Roberts, 2009). 
A traditional view of having power over another by virtue of the ability to control physically or 
dominate another (Goldhamer and Shils, 1939; Molm, 1986; Molm, 1989; Walsh and 
Stewart, 1993; Smart, 2002) is superseded by ‘a subtle, calculated technology of subjection’ 
(Foucault, 1977, pp. 220-221). The primary focus is not on disciplining the body, as was the 
case with old monarchical society (Foucault, 1977; Miller and O'Leary, 1987) but on the 
development of the apparatus of surveillance, means of registration, and techniques of 
investigation, research and archiving of information, each deployed to ‘useful’ ends 
(Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Hoskin and Macve, 1986; 
Smart, 2002; Roberts et al, 2006). As explained by Smart (2002, p. 87): 
‘Such a relationship of visibility, or even potential visibility, has constituted an important 
technique through which discipline has come to be exercised over the individual in a variety of 
institutions’ (emphasis added). 
This more subtle (Smart, 2002) aspect of disciplinary power is often described in terms of 
Bentham’s Panopticon. Here, power emanates from the fact that individuals are restricted to 
an enclosed space, subject to actual or perceived surveillance by an apparently ever-present 
and invisible observer. The result was the development of a ‘consciousness’ of surveillance; 
an automated disciplinary effect; and the rendering of constant observation unnecessary 
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(Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; 
Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Smart, 2002; Gumb, 2007). In essence: 
‘Disciplinary power moves the focus of control to individuals themselves; that is, by 
understanding that they are constantly under surveillance, individuals begin to oversee 
themselves, to regulate their own behaviour in the light of its assumed visibility to others….The 
functioning of power becomes automatic rather than as a result of a conscious exercise by 
some external agency’ (Cowton and Dopson, 2002, p. 193). 
 
Bentham, therefore, ‘invented a technology of power designed to solve the problems of 
surveillance’ and believed that the ‘optical system was the great innovation needed for the 
easy and effective exercise of power’ (Foucault in Gordon, 1980, p. 148). The panoptical 
metaphor is not, however, without its limitations. For example it implies a sense of enclosure 
of a limited number of individuals who are monitored for discreet departures from an 
established norm, often in a physical sense (Smart, 2002). It has, therefore, been able to 
provided fruitful insights into the operation of relatively simply and physically enclosed 
factories at the start of the Industrial Revolution (Walsh and Stewart, 1993). Modern writers, 
however, question whether the ability to gather, store and analyse data for transgressions by 
all individuals by an increasingly computer-based society goes well beyond the monitoring of 
delinquent factory workers in 18th and 19th century Europe (McKinlay and Pezet, 2010; Brivot 
and Gendron, 2011). An information technology society is a far cry from the bounded 
Panopticon where monitoring could be constrained ‘to specific geographical or temporal 
enclosures’ (Brivot and Gendron, 2011, p. 139). Advances in information technologies and 
communication systems mean vast new modes of surveillance expanding on the single 
panoptic gaze may be possible (Haggerty et al, 2011). Similarly, modern society may no 
longer be characterised by a single clear surveillance plan operating in well-defined or 
enclosed spaces (Gordon, 1980; Brivot and Gendron, 2011; Haggerty et al, 2011).  
Significantly, Foucault himself cited a failure to recognise the importance of resistance as 
‘another of the factors which shift Bentham into the domain of the unreal’ (Foucault in 
Gordon, 1980, pp. 162-163), a sentiment shared by inter alia Brivot and Gendron (2011), 
Haggerty et al. (2011), McKinlay and Pezet (2010), Gumb (2007) and Hopper and Macintosh 
(1993). Foucault goes on to describe the belief that disciplinary mechanisms, in particular 
surveillance, could have a transformative effect causing individuals to become virtuous, as 
naive (Foucault in Gordon, 1980, pp. 162-163). Resistance to the panoptic gaze implies that 
much of the perceived value and impact of the Panopticon may be illusory (Gordon, 1980; 
Smart, 2002) a notion explored in more detail below. What is more, Neimark (1990) argues 
that Foucauldian theories may be too ‘Eurocentric’. She asserts that they have possibly 
offered an alternative to traditional positivist outlooks that come to constitute a new and 
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constraining form of ‘orthodoxy’ which lacks critical bite and, accordingly, fails to provide a 
sufficiently thorough account of social phenomena.  
Despite these criticisms, however, the essence of Bentham’s Panopticon: that actual or 
perceived surveillance has an effect on human behaviour, remains relevant (Gordon, 1980; 
Hoskin, 1994; Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Brivot and Gendron, 2011). Foucault never 
claimed that Discipline and Punishment: the Birth of the Prison (or the Panopticon) provided 
a complete account of disciplinary power or mechanisms of modernity (see, for example, 
Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Smart, 2002).  Accordingly, although Foucauldian theory and 
the notion of the Panopticon are not without their limits (McKinlay and Pezet, 2010; Brivot 
and Gendron, 2011), Foucault is often cited as providing a seminal account of a power-
knowledge paradigm and the role of technologies of surveillance (Gordon, 1980; Smart, 
2002; McKinlay and Pezet, 2010; Haggerty et al, 2011). In direct challenge to Neimark 
(1990), Hoskin (1994) maintains that Foucault’s works, far from being limited to historic 
French settings, explicates the operation of technologies of surveillance, discipline and 
examination. Concurrently, it sheds light on power-knowledge paradigms and social 
practices in general. The focus is not, therefore, simply on history or language (Neimark, 
1990) but on the relevance of discourse and the making of the individual ‘known’, 
‘measurable’ and subject to change (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Hoskin, 1994; Quattrone, 
2004). Consequently,   
‘attempt[s] to box in Foucault will not hold. For he was not...a philosopher of power and 
language. Instead, he continues in the line of those....who have been concerned via rational 
analysis to understand how, as thinking, speaking, acting beings, we both construct and are 
constructed by our world’ (Hoskin, 1994, p. 69).  
Rather than dismiss Foucault, inherent shortcomings of his theory of power and control  
simply imply that disciplinary power, and in particular Panopticism, does not provide a 
complete account of studied phenomena (on the need for 'theoretical eclecticism', see 
Llewelyn, 1996; Llewelyn, 2003; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Humphrey, 2008; Coldwell, 
2012; Gibbon, 2012). The theory does, however, provide a fresh and critical insight into 
organisational and institutional forces beyond the narrowly defined perspective of traditional 
positivist research and has made a valuable contribution when applied in a management or 
accounting context (Moore, 1991; Hoskin, 1994; Quattrone, 2004). As such, Foucault’s 
‘model’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993) of power and control gives a reasonable framework 




2.4.2: POWER AND CONTROL IN AN ACCOUNTING SETTING 
 
Although Foucault did not deal directly with accounting and management (Miller and 
O'Leary, 1987), some scholars have interpreted his work, particularly Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison (1977), as a lens for ‘viewing’ accounting systems (Hoskin and 
Macve, 1986; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Walsh and Stewart, 
1993; Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Gumb, 2007; McKinlay and Pezet, 2010; Haggerty et al, 
2011). Hoskin and Macve (1986), for example, argue that many West Point graduates went 
on to managing the emerging railroad industry taking with them West Point’s system of 
surveillance, examination, discipline and punishment which later spread to other industries. 
For these researchers, management accounting become an integral part of the power-
knowledge-disciplinary practices described by Foucault (1977), a construct of accounting 
systems echoed by Miller and O’Leary’s (1987) view on standard costing as a mechanism of 
rendering individual inefficiency ‘visible’ and workers more accountable as a result.  
Similarly, rather than seeing developments in accounting as the sole product of rational 
economic forces, Hopwood (1987, pp. 212-214) describes how the construction of an 
organisational and social order underpin accounting systems. Accountancy, far from being a 
passive form of technical administration and a neutral repository of information (Section 2.3), 
becomes a means of attaining ‘economic visibility’ to ‘positively enable the governance and 
control of the organisation along economic lines’. From this perspective, an organisation’s, 
‘routine procedures’ immerse the employee in ‘a disciplinary, punishable web of discourses 
and practices which go on almost unnoticed and appear as natural’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 
1993, p. 190).  
Cowton and Dopson’s (2002) case study of a manufacturing concern highlights this. The 
prison cell becomes a loose metaphor for the actual or abstract ‘spaces’ assigned to 
employees, including different layers of managers, who are then subject to calculative norms 
and standards. ‘Enclosure’ is not necessarily about the physical confinement of the individual 
(Gordon, 1980; Smart, 2002) but rather about specification of a clearly defined purpose that 
dictates not only when and how the individual should act, but what it means to be a member 
of the respective institution or organisation (Fogarty, 1992; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; 
Cowton and Dopson, 2002). Cowton and Dopson (2002) go on to explain how accounting 
and management control systems make individual managers personally accountable for 
financial performance, effectively constituting a discourse for describing individual 
performance and rendering each person ‘known’ and controllable. Each profit centre or 
accounting function becomes an ‘enclosed space’ where the rules of accounting, costing, 
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production and efficiency define appropriate conduct and provide a basis for measuring 
performance. In this context, the accounting system plays a role, not just in collecting and 
processing information but in the very construction (enclosure) of knowledge at the heart of 
how the organisation is run (Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993)34. 
Analogously, Hopper and Macintosh (1993) draw a parallel between Foucault’s (1977)  
principle of enclosure and creation of profitability centres at International Telephone and 
Telegraph (ITT) where managerial control systems and the ‘discipline of the numbers’ are 
used to similar effect.  In both studies, prescribed roles, budgets and hierarchies define the 
spaces within which tasks are executed facilitating accountability and ‘normalising correction’ 
(Boland, 1987; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; Drury, 2005; Roberts et 
al, 2006). At ITT, in particular, Foucault’s efficient body principle can be seen in the 
requirement for each profit centre to submit its annual budget; scheduled meetings at which 
results would be reviewed by senior management; and the generally temporal focus of the 
accounting system. Each aspect is an example of how a regimented ‘time table’ of controls 
is used to achieve a sense of order (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993) and of how accounting 
systems play a role, not just in collecting and processing information, but in the very 
construction of knowledge at the heart of how the organisation is run (Miller and O'Leary, 
1987).  
For the principle of enclosure to be effective, partitioning is needed to ensure that each 
person is capable of being ‘known’ and ‘mastered’ within each functional space (Foucault, 
1977). The result is the creation of a series of posts or tasks facilitating supervision, ranking 
of individuals and enhanced functionality (Gordon, 1980; Smart, 2002). Enclosed spaces are 
‘idealised’ - rather than physical - and designed to organise and achieve a sense of control 
and order.  From the accounting perspective, the presence of partitioning is seen in the 
establishment of hierarchical management structures, defined ‘posts’, ‘job descriptions’, and 
ever more refined budgeting and monitoring systems (see  Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; 
Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Drury, 2005; Botten, 2009).  
 
Further, the principle of the efficient body (Foucault, 1977) suggests that timetables, 
operating manuals, and the ‘temporal elaboration’ of acts (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993, p. 
195) are designed to perpetuate the sense of control and order. Annual budgets must be 
submitted at prescribed times (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Botten, 2009); budgets and 
                                               
34
 To a lesser extent, the prior literature makes a similar case with the application of IFRS. As an example of 
codified accounting standards applied in multiple jurisdictions, IFRS may be seen as a source of Foucauldian 
power by constituting a dominant accounting ‘discourse’ that is used to both conceptualise and justify accounting-




operating plans need to focus on defined areas within the organisation (Ouchi, 1979; Hopper 
and Macintosh, 1993); accounting reports need to be prepared according to predetermined 
guidelines (consider  Ashton, 1992; Bedard et al, 2008); and there are strict hierarchies 
observed when reporting information (Botten, 2009) such that ‘information flows up the chain 
and orders flow down’ (Green (1984) in Hopper and Macintosh, 1993, p. 197).  
 
Concurrently, prescribed roles, budgets and hierarchies define the spaces within which tasks 
are executed, facilitating visibility, accountability and ‘normalising correction’ (Boland, 1987; 
Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Walsh and Stewart, 1993; Roberts et al, 2006). For instance, profit 
centres become obliged to submit annual budgets and schedule meetings at which results 
can be reviewed by senior management at prescribed times, leaving accounting systems 
characterised by a strong temporal focus. In other words, a regimented ‘time table’ of 
controls is used to complement a sense of surveillance and order (Hopper and Macintosh, 
1993). The creation of formal structures contributes to defining the role and purpose of the 
individual (Fogarty, 1992). Formalisation, centralisation, and notions of the ‘timing of actions’ 
have an important socialising effect on the individual, the effect being described as a form of 
‘bureaucratic coercion’ and a possible source of disciplinary power.   
 
Notions of disciplinary power, particularly conceptions of an ‘all seeing gaze’ in an 
organisational setting, is illustrated in Cowton and Dopson’s (2002) case study which 
demonstrates how review by senior management can have an individualising effect (see 
also Roberts, 1991; Fogarty, 1992), allowing individuals to be held accountable and subject 
to sanction. The authors describe the automated management control system as a ‘keyhole’ 
through which management can ‘peer’ into the organisation’s different branches 
simultaneously offering ‘continuous accounting’ to evaluate actual performance against 
targets and to develop expectations. The result is the possibility of assessment at a 
moment’s notice (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Cowton and Dopson, 2002) and intervention 
‘at a distance’ (Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Drury, 2005; Brivot and Gendron, 2011, p. 138).  
Similarly, Hopper and Macintosh (1993) provide a detailed account of how profit centres may 
be used to render management’s performance transparent and subject to inspection or 
examination at any time. Central accounting headquarters become akin to a ‘panoptic tower’, 
where monthly accounting and operational reports are continuously reviewed and different 
responsibility centres are duly assessed and ranked according to perceived functional utility. 
Those who meet expectations are rewarded. The converse is also true. Leadership by 
example is used, together with traditional control systems, to ‘set the norm’ and effectively 
cultivate a ‘discipline of the self’ – as postulated by Roberts and Scapens (1985), Smart 
(2002) and Roberts (1991; 2006) – resulting in ‘normalising’ behaviour.  
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Although Foucauldian constructs of power and control, especially panoptic imagery, may not 
account entirely for the nature and extent of digital surveillance made possible by 
sophisticated management and accounting systems, Foucault’s work can be ‘meaningfully 
mobilized in examining surveillance from a broader angle’ (Brivot and Gendron, 2011, p. 
137). Brivot and Gendron (2011) explore the relevance of discipline-induced surveillance in a 
study on the introduction of knowledge management systems in a professional law firm. The 
possibility of being watched, plausible due to the rendering of various working papers 
‘visible’ to one’s peers, was found to be an important driver of behavioural change. 
Underlying this is the risk of sanction including the fear of being branded a poor professional. 
It is not only that performance is made ‘visible’ to superiors and may result in some form of 
punishment or praise that is relevant, but also the fact that the individual may be personally 
contrasted with the accepted norms (Walsh and Stewart, 1993; McMillan, 2004; Wyatt, 2004; 
Roberts, 2009).  The mere possibility of being watched suggests that, theoretically, one may 
be held individually accountable whether or not this actually transpires and that this can 
result in ‘self-monitoring’ even in sophisticated professional contexts  (Cowton and Dopson, 
2002; Roberts, 2009; McKinlay and Pezet, 2010).  
 
2.4.3: AUDIT AS A SURVEILLANCE MECHANISM 
 
Disciplinary forces at work in a professional law firm may be mirrored in a professional audit 
setting. Audit has its roots in the Latin term meaning ‘to hear’, originating from a formal 
reading-aloud of the accounts. It serves as a form of examination providing a ‘power of 
judgement’ based on numeric results and expectations that allows stewards to be held 
accountable (consider Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Power, 1994). In line with agency theory, 
audit is designed to render financial information more visible, resolving information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders (consider  Watts and Zimmerman, 1976; 
Power, 1994; IAASB, 2009m; Lin and Liu, 2009; Solomon, 2010; Clinch et al, 2012). At the 
extreme, ‘audit has assumed the status of an all-purpose solution to problems of 
administration and control’ becoming akin to a ‘control’ over ‘controls’ (Power, 1994, p. 38 & 
39) to the extent that alternate mechanisms of supervision, monitoring and control are left 
unthinkable (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1994). Accordingly audit may be seen as 
another example of a surveillance-based mechanism at work and reminiscent of 




A converse may also apply. When corporate failures occur, ‘reassurance is expected and 
deep-level changes are demanded’, often manifested in the demand for additional regulation 
that has both preventative elements and which serves as an effective deterrent mechanism 
(Tremblay and Gendron, 2011, pp. 259-260). Increasingly, professional service firms are 
subject to calls for improved transparency and accountability following publicised corporate 
scandals which has seen the ascendency of formal controls and the recognition of the 
importance of surveillance mechanisms (see, for example, Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; 
Bazerman and Moore, 2011; Brivot and Gendron, 2011; Paisey and Paisey, 2012). From the 
perspective of the audit profession, when corporate scandals begin to challenge the wisdom 
of the self-regulatory framework (see, for example, Zeff, 2003a; Zeff, 2003b; Pesqueux, 
2005; Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen, 2009), external regulation may be interpreted as a 
manifestation of power aimed at stimulating  behavioural or procedural change in the public 
interest (Canada et al, 2008; Riotto, 2008; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Carcello et al, 2011; 
Blankley et al, 2012; Paisey and Paisey, 2012). As an indication of isomorphic forces 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the number of auditor-specific regulations, including new 
regulatory bodies to secure the credibility of the attest function, have mushroomed (Malsch 
and Gendron, 2011). In this respect, Section 2.2 has already referred to how, in the USA and 
European Union, audit-focused regulations emerge, expanding on the existing reporting 
duties and how auditor rotation, appointment, remuneration, and ability to render non-audit 
services are subject to closer scrutiny and additional restrictions (Riotto, 2008; European 
Commission, 2010b; Deng et al, 2012).  
From a legitimacy theory perspective, Section 2.3 suggests that arms-length regulation 
implies an increased sense of control over the profession, possibly conferring a sense of 
pragmatic and moral legitimacy (consider Gavious, 2007; Sy and Tinker, 2008; Bazerman 
and Moore, 2011; Boolaky, 2011; Paisey and Paisey, 2012). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004), 
for example, suggest arms-length regulation may accord a sense of transparency to audit 
practice by restricting audit conduct, simultaneously mitigating the effects of threats to 
auditor independence. If audit can be better ‘contained’ within the ‘parameters’ of regulatory 
efforts, which impose sanctions for non-conformance and mandate review of audit firms by 
independent regulators, then it may be possible for audit conduct to be aligned with notions 
of the public interest calling for credible, high quality external audit (consider PCAOB, 2006; 
PCAOB, 2007; Church and Shefchik, 2011; Clinch et al, 2012).  
In this context, disciplinary power may fulfil an important function within the external 
regulatory paradigm. By appealing to a sense of transparency and accountability, while 
simultaneously restricting the activities of audit firms, panoptic-like control may provide an 
explanation for the demand for more arms-length regulation of the profession. As alluded to 
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in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, examinations, surveillance and normalising sanctions may 
create a reasonable expectation of change in the aftermath of the audit fraternity’s crisis of 
trust and contribute to either improving audit practice (Chapter 4; Chapter 5) or emphasising 
the perceived legitimacy of the audit profession (Chapter 6). This echoes the original views 
of Foucault (1977, p. 109) on the role of power and control in a modern context:  ‘there must 
be no more spectacular but useless penalties’. Instead, disciplinary power should operate to 
clear economic and political ends (Gordon, 1980) such that ‘everyone must be able to read 
in it his own advantage’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 109). Hence, the final sub-question addressed 
by this thesis asks:  
C. Is s45 of the APA an example of surveillance machinery and a 
manifestation of disciplinary power?  
Although the RI provisions may not correspond precisely with the image of the ‘panoptic 
gaze’, Foucault’s model of disciplinary power may offer valuable insights into the rationale 
for the whistle-blowing duty35. The rigid structure inherent in its reporting protocols; clearly 
defined reporting timetables; creation of a reporting ‘discourse’ and sanctions for non-
compliance (Section 2.1) may be reminiscent of Foucauldian elements of power and control.  
In particular, that the RI provisions are designed to bring otherwise unknown transgressions 
into the public domain (Section 2.1; Section 4.3) implies the possible operation of panoptic-
like surveillance. Prima facie, the whistle-blowing duty may be akin to the ‘keyhole’ described 
by Cowton and Dopson (2002) through which observers may peer into certain aspects of the 
organisation. In turn, a network of surveillance may become possible (consider Gordon, 
1980; Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Smart, 2002) enhancing transparency and accountability 
at the corporate level. By virtue of ‘surveillance’, ‘examination’ and ‘normalising sanction’ the 
reporting duty becomes more than just a theoretical one. It becomes practical or plausible, 
largely because of the consequences for non-compliance. If this is the case, then notions of 
power and control reinforce the initial arguments raised in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3: that 
the whistle-blowing duty may be a means of improving audit reporting standards and also 
affording a means of legitimacy. 
 
                                               
35
 Power has been investigated using various approaches. For example, Luke’s framework (cited in Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011) has been frequently employed. This paper uses a Foucauldian theoretical lens due to its focus 
on discourse and government which are relevant for examining the role of legislated auditor reporting (Malsch 
and Gendron, 2011). This approach also reflects the thinking in the comparable studies of Cowton and Dopson 
(2002) and Hopper and Macintosh (1993) which have inspired this aspect of the thesis. A detailed reconciliation 
of Luke’s conceptions of power and control with those of Foucault, as well as an analysis of which ‘model’ is more 




2.4.4: LIMITATIONS OF FOUCAULDIAN POWER AND CONTROL 
 
The panoptic metaphor, while illuminating various nuances of management control and 
accounting systems, does not provide a complete assessment of institutional behaviour 
(Neimark, 1990; McKinlay and Pezet, 2010). In an organisational context, for instance, the 
relevance of market forces, relations with other organisations and the role of technology are 
not dealt with (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Brivot and Gendron, 2011). In particular, the 
Foucauldian model does not - as touched on previously - take cognisance of the relevance 
of resistance in shaping organisational change and behaviour (Gordon, 1980; Roberts and 
Scapens, 1985; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993; Gumb, 2007; Roberts, 2009).  
Rather than provide complete visibility and control, systems of surveillance are frequently 
opposed whether overtly or otherwise (Gordon, 1980). Even where management controls 
come close to achieving a ‘panoptic’ gaze, a company may never be able to control totally its 
employees and, consequently, ‘their resistance play[s] a crucial role in delimiting 
[organisations’] actions’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993, p. 212). Similarly, Cowton and 
Dopson (2002) describe how panoptic control is not absolute. It is unable to influence totally 
the behaviour of all individuals who exhibit varied responses to the introduction of additional 
controls. Not all of these responses are conformist in nature. Even in a professional setting, 
where incentives for ‘normalised’ behaviour may be highest (Fogarty, 1992), resistance to a 
perceived ‘gaze’ may be present and play a relevant role in shaping individual behaviour. 
Brivot and Gendron (2011) demonstrate this in a professional law-firm setting. The 
researchers find that, while an awareness of surveillance does lead to some individuals 
altering behaviour as intended, subtle challenges to the status quo arise with the conclusion 
that control systems do not always lead to change in predictable ways. 
Roberts (2009) and Roberts and Scapens (1985) reach a similar conclusion. The 
proliferation of accounting-based controls and the desire to make organisations ‘auditable’ 
(Power, 1994; Roberts, 2009) does not always lead to improved visibility. Management may 
be simply about ‘keeping up appearances and fighting shadows’ (Power, 1997, p. 838; 
Drury, 2005). Alternately, Roberts (1991; 2001; 2009) warns that the individualising effect of 
surveillance paradoxically promotes self-preservation and the desire to find and exploit 
‘gaps’ in the field of visibility. For example, the introduction of fair value accounting - 
purportedly promoted with an aim to improving transparency and reliability of financial 
reporting - may, ironically, import ‘cloudiness’ into financial statements as preparers exploit 
inherent subjectivity in the determination of fair values (Smith-Lacroix et al, 2012). Likewise, 
the development of professional auditing and accounting standards characterised by 
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inherent complexity and subjectivity provides a basis for flexible or ‘creative’ application of 
underlying principles (Hopwood, 1990), particularly when a rules-based approach takes hold. 
These subtle forms of resistance may lead to a blind adherence to established norms 
cultivating a legalistic culture that undermines the potential of established policies and 
procedures (see  McMillan, 2004; Wyatt, 2004). At extremes, the system may become 
reflexive with the pressures of imposed power becoming so severe that the system creates, 
or at least magnifies, the very self-serving modus operandi that it sought to quash (Power, 
1994, p. 11; Roberts, 2001, pp. 1553-1554 & 1560).  
In this light, while s45 of the APA may be an example of a disciplinary power mechanism, 
there is no guarantee that practical benefits are actually realised. In other words, 
Foucauldian theory of power and control would imply that the visibility or ‘even the potential 
of visibility’ is an important technique ‘through which discipline is exercised over the 
individual’ and behavioural change is effected (Smart, 2002, p. 87). Resistance, including a 
legalistic mindset, however, imply that the practical ability of the RI provisions to serve as an 
instrument of disciplinary power may be limited. This may be problematic for the argument 
that the reporting duty makes a material contribution to the quality of assurance practice in 
South Africa, as alluded to in Section 2.1 and discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
Claims to pragmatic and moral legitimacy, as per Section 2.3 and Section 6.1, may also be 
undermined.  
At a practical level, notions of hierarchical surveillance, normalising judgement and 
processes of examination are also problematic. Audit is heavily rooted in preservation of 
client confidentiality (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x) and the application of professional 
judgement by a group of individuals who cannot physically be subjected to perpetual 
surveillance or generically defined standards of professional conduct (McMillan, 2004; 
IAASB, 2009x; IAASB, 2009k; Rosman, 2011). From the perspective of s45 of the APA how 
can a sense of disciplinary power result if the IRBA is realistically unable to know whether or 
not the auditor detected every RI and hence reported it appropriately, if at all? By inference, 
how can sanctions be imposed on delinquent auditors?  As argued by Debord, there is a 
contradiction between the mass of information available for collection and analysis and the 
capacity to do so (Debord, 1988 cited in Gumb, 2007) which undermines both actual 
surveillance and the power of assumed surveillance to yield, what Gordon (1980) and 
Roberts (1991; 2009) term, the ‘discipline of self’.  Inevitably in an apparent power-control 
relationship, a superior – in this case the independent regulator – will frequently be 
dependent on the subordinate (the auditor) for the provision of information, giving the 
opportunity to conceal, distort or ‘dress’ the information made available for assessment 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985, pp. 449-450). As argued by Cowton and Dopson (2002) and 
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Brivot and Gendron (2011), the panoptic metaphor’s sense of total control may, therefore, be 
illusory 
Adding to the limitations of the RI provisions as an example of disciplinary power in action is 
an apparent contradiction. Foucauldian principles point to the possibility of the reporting duty 
being a means of rendering both the auditor and the audited more visible. Juxtaposed with 
this are the views of, inter alia, Power (1992; 1994; 2003) and Humphrey (1990; 2008; 
2012): that legitimacy of audit practice is, paradoxically, intertwined with the inability of 
consumers of audit services to observe directly the audit process or objectively assess its 
findings.  
More specifically, from an agency theory perspective, it was argued that the ability of 
external audit to improve transparency and address the risk of information asymmetry 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is frequently cited as the reason for the growing relevance and 
legitimacy of external audit (Watts and Zimmerman, 1976; Power, 1994; IAASB, 2009|; 
IAASB, 2009a; Solomon, 2010). The precise role of auditor in reducing these agency costs 
is, however, both complex and subjective, resulting in an ‘expectation gap’ (Gaa, 1991; 
Porter, 1993; Power, 1994; Dennis, 2010; Chambers and Payne, 2011; Houghton et al, 
2011) that has the potential to undermine the perceived value of the assurance function 
(Section 2.2). Power (1994, p. 19), however, adopts a more critical view, suggesting that ‘the 
audit explosion has occurred because of, rather than despite, expectation gaps about the 
nature of audit’. Ambiguity plays to the diverse role and need for audit, ‘comforting politicians 
and a wider public that things are under control’ (see also Hopwood, 1990). Accordingly, it is 
undesirable to render the audit process visible or transparent because its very opacity is 
integral to its generally accepted existence as a plausible element of the capital market 
system (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1994; Power, 2003; O'Dwyer et al, 2011).  
A possible explanation for this tension is found by adapting institutional models of 
organisational behaviour elaborated on by Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Fogarty et al (1991; 1992; 1996) and Suchman (1995). Formal structures including 
the South African auditor’s whistle-blowing duties and associated penalty provisions may 
serve as powerful ‘institutional rules which function as highly rationalised myths that are 
binding on particular organisations’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 343). Where this is the 
case, social purposes or societal expectations become more relevant than technical 
attributes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) necessitating the decoupling of operational efficiency 
from the use of institutional processes or displays used to exploit the desires of constituents 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995). The increased 
demands for external audit to serve as a monitoring function (Power, 1994), including 
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perceived fraud detection responsibilities (Fogarty et al, 1991) serve as a key example. 
These ‘displays’ ensure confidence in financial reporting while auditing ‘on the ground’ 
continues unchanged, its processes remaining obscure - and almost mythical - to non-
experts (see also Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Sikka et al, 1998; Humphrey, 2012).  A 
similar line of thought was discussed in Section 2.3 which alludes to how the formal structure 
of the APA; its alignment with the notions of whistle-blowing as pro-social behaviour; 
prescribed ‘legalities’ or ‘rules’; and a reporting duty that is backed by ‘independent’, 
‘technical’ and ‘professional’ processes may be important symbolic efforts that afford 
legitimacy (Section 6.1). In the meantime, and as discussed in Chapter 4, the underlying 
technical nature of audit has been left largely unaltered (see also Humphrey and Moizer, 
1990; Power, 1994; Power, 2003).   
In the context of the RI provisions, reminiscent of Foucauldian power and control, an 
analogous conclusion may be reached. Rather than a practical source of disciplinary power, 
the RI provisions may be part of a ceremonial process which conjures up a ‘mystique’ 
embodying notions of surveillance, power and control to appeal to the cognitive belief in 
what Foucault (1977), Gordon (1980) and Smart (2002) describe as the ‘disciplinary society’. 
That the RI provisions may or may not materially alter audit practice (Section 2.2; Chapter 4; 
Chapter 5); serve as a significant source of legitimacy for the audit profession (Section 2.3; 
Chapter 6); or constitute a source of disciplinary power to ensure actual reform, is not 
paramount. What is key is cultivating belief in the assumption that external regulation, 
including the mandated whistle-blowing duty, works (consider Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Suchman, 1995).  In other words, s45 of the APA may, ironically, be a source of legitimacy – 
not due to changes made to audit practice in the public interest – but by appealing to a 
taken-for-granted assumption that examination, normalising judgement and panoptic 
surveillance provide a change impetus. At the heart of this is the fact that surveillance has 
become an integral and pervasive part of daily life (Gordon, 1980; Cowton and Dopson, 
2002; Brivot and Gendron, 2011) regarded as generally accepted,  plausible and ‘natural’  
As explained by Leon (2001, pp 3-4, cited in Brivot and Gendron, 2011): 
‘Surveillance always carries with it some plausible justification that makes most of us content to 
comply. [. . .] The fact that the camera is installed in the bar or at the intersection in order to 
reduce rowdiness or road accidents seems reasonable enough. [. . .] The advantages of 
surveillance for its subjects are real, palpable, and undeniable. We readily accept the point of 
it…’  
 
This taken-for-granted belief in the utility of disciplinary power goes hand-in-hand with 
processes of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As discussed in Section 
2.3 and Section 6.1 replicating a move towards external regulation may be an important 
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aspect of securing legitimacy for the South African Audit Profession. Seemingly championing 
the need for enhanced monitoring; sanctions for non-conformance; and enclosed reporting 
duties that appear to be taking hold abroad may reinforce this. The result: the RI provisions – 
by simply being reminiscent of Foucauldian power and control – create a sense of 
legitimacy. If this is the case, then exploring whether or not s45 of the APA is an example of 
disciplinary power in action needs to be carried out, not only from a Foucauldian perspective, 
but also through the lens of legitimacy theory (Section 7.2).  
 
To do so, a more exploratory research method is required (Creswell, 2009) that is not 
restricted by reductionism and the aim to ‘quantify’ results (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). As 
such, before proceeding with the discussion of the research findings, this thesis examines 
how more interpretive research is able to shed light on aspects of corporate governance left 
largely unstudied by the positivist research Establishment (Ahrens et al, 2008; Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008). Chapter 3 provides an overview of the role of ‘alternative’ research; details 
the research design; explains how respondents were selected for participation in the study; 
discusses the data collection and analysis process and summarises steps taken to ensure 
the quality and reliability of the findings.  
 
 
3: RESEARCH METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is grounded in a social constructivist world view and inspired by an interpretive 
epistemology. It adopts mixed methods relying on detailed interviews as the primary data 
collection instrument, complemented by a correspondence analysis to aggregate and 
summarise the perceptions on the RI provisions. In the context of defined theoretical 
frameworks (Chapter 2), the research focuses explicitly on the participants’ formulation of 
notions of audit quality, legitimacy and Foucauldian power and control associated with s45 of 
the APA.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 provides an overview of the research 
methodology followed by Section 3.2 which discusses the design of the data collection 
instruments (detailed interviews and a correspondence analysis). Section 3.3 describes the 
sample of participants. Section 3.4 continues by explaining the data collection and analysis 
process, including steps taken to ensure high levels of research quality. Section 3.5 details a 
quality control checklist and discusses ethics safeguards and Section 3.6 concludes.  
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3.1: OVERVIEW  
 
Ontology is concerned with the broad orientation of, or world view adopted by, a researcher 
and with how conceptions of reality are formed. Epistemology defines broadly how 
knowledge is gathered, a state of reality is interrogated and the subject matter of a research 
project is tackled (Creswell, 2009). Broadly, two epistemologies based on contrasting 
ontological perspectives can be discerned: positivist or non-positivist (interpretive) (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978; Ahrens et al, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Coetsee, 2011). The former is 
rooted in a ‘deterministic philosophy’ seeking to study cause and effect relationships ‘at a 
distance’ (Watts and Zimmerman, 1976; Falconer and Mackay, 1999). Often termed 
‘mainstream’ research (Ahrens et al, 2008; Coetsee, 2011), it tends to ‘reduce’ the subject 
matter to a discreet set of defined ideas, questions or hypotheses, subject to scientific 
testing (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Creswell, 2009). The aim is to describe, explain and 
predict while maintaining objectivity and ensuring scientific rigour, with the result that 
positivist research projects tend to be more quantitative in nature (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978; Davila and Oyon, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Coetsee, 2011).  
Interpretive research is concerned with understanding social constructions of a subjective 
reality and, thus, is traditionally reliant on qualitative methods (Parker and Roffey, 1997; 
Creswell, 2009). There is a higher degree of subjectivity which is seen as strength rather 
than a threat to result reliability (Creswell, 2009).  Validity is not described in terms of 
reproduction of findings and clinical objectivity but rather in terms of immersion in rich detail 
which must be well documented to allow readers to reach informed conclusions (Inanga and 
Schneider, 2005; Ahrens et al, 2008; Baxter et al, 2008).  
When it comes to accounting-based research, the prior literature argues that accounting and 
auditing systems are interconnected with organisational, institutional and social 
developments (Burchell et al, 1980; Hopwood, 1987; Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Kaplan 
and Ruland, 1991; Hopwood, 2000; Parker, 2007; Humphrey, 2008). As such, they are far 
more complex than economic models initially allow for, with the result that more flexible, 
exploratory approaches are needed to illuminate different nuances of accounting and 
auditing (Moore, 1991; Quattrone, 2004; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Khalifa et al, 2007; 
Laughlin, 2007; Marnet, 2007; Baxter et al, 2008; Cooper, 2008; Humphrey, 2008; 
Carrington, 2010). In this context, interpretive research seeks to highlight ‘the specific ways 
in which designers and users of accounting systems work with their constructive potential in 
the pursuit of specific agendas, and how their systems (and agendas) change in the process’  
(Ahrens et al, 2008, p. 842). A strong awareness of practical and social issues complements 
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this (Chua, 1986; Reiter and Williams, 2002; Alvesson, 2003; Inanga and Schneider, 2005; 
Parker, 2007; Ahrens et al, 2008; Davila and Oyon, 2008). Rather than strive to quantify 
results, seek complete objectivity, and pursue a unique ‘truth’ unaffected by the influences of 
different social factors (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Creswell, 2009), interpretive research 
concentrates on a rich analysis of behaviours and relationships in a real-world setting, 
especially in emerging areas of study (for example: Moore, 1991; Holland and Stoner, 1996; 
Holland, 1998a; Creswell, 2003; Willmott, 2008; O'Dwyer et al, 2011). 
In this context, notions of audit quality, legitimacy and disciplinary power are highly 
subjective and reflect a host of social, organisational and institutional stimuli (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Roberts, 2001; Power, 2003; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004). 
Given the research questions, ‘arms-length’ analysis, using analytical modelling or event 
studies is inappropriate. These techniques do not allow the research to ‘get as close to the 
phenomenon as possible to collect data on the primary....elements and how they are 
[interconnected]’ (Holland, 2005, p. 250). In particular, when it comes to regulation of the 
profession, empirically-orientated research may, ironically, be questionable as numerous 
social, economic and political pressures are often at work that can ‘lead to changes on the 
grounds of political necessity and expediency rather than being based on solid empirical 
evidence’ (Humphrey, 2008, p. 181). Accordingly, this research does not attempt to ‘test’ 
audit processes along the scientific lines of, for example, DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b), 
Palmrose (1988; 1997), Chen et al (2011) and Blay and Geiger (2013). Instead, it adopts an 
exploratory approach based on the view that regulatory developments in an audit and 
accounting setting are not driven only by rational economic forces but are socially 
constructed (Burchell et al, 1980; Sikka, 1992; Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008; Gibbon, 
2012) 
Illuminating the perspectives of those engaging with auditing on a daily basis can provide 
valuable insights for both academics and practitioners (Humphrey, 2008; Humphrey, 2012; 
Smith-Lacroix et al, 2012). While lacking mathematical elegance (Merchant, 2008), the risk 
of ignoring individual perspectives due to excessive reliance on ‘remote inferential empirical 
materials’ (Falconer and Mackay, 1999, p. 288) is reduced. A thorough exploratory 
approach, investigating whistle-blowing at the interface between theory and practical 
application and immersed in real-world issues is adopted (Power, 2003; McMillan, 2004; 
Ahrens et al, 2008).  
In addition, a preoccupation with positivist research styles dominated by agency theory has 
led to the marginalisation of alternate perspectives on corporate governance (Chua, 1986; 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). This research is mindful of this, 
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as well as of the lack of corporate governance research from an African perspective, on s45 
of the APA specifically and on whistle-blowing by external auditors in general (Section 1.2). 
Each of these shortcomings highlights clear ‘gaps’ in the existing body of research, 
reinforcing the argument in favour of a more exploratory or interpretive research strategy. To 
this end, this research adopts a mainly qualitative approach relying on detailed interviews, 
complemented to a limited extent by correspondence analysis, to investigate and explore the 
role of the RI provisions in South African audits.  
 
3.2:  RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
3.2.1: DETAILED INTERVIEWS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature Review 
A content analysis of the prior literature is used to identify ‘knowledge gaps’ in the existing 
research and provide a theoretical framework for the thesis (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; 
Creswell, 2009).The following contents or ‘theme categories’ were used to aggregate, 
classify and interpret previous scholarly works and draw relevant interconnections:  firstly, a 
broad category on corporate governance, agency theory and stakeholder theory. Included in 
this category is research on the role of external audit, definitions of ‘audit quality’, variables 
affecting audit quality and audit expectation gap. Second, an auditor regulation category 
which included details on the operation of s45 of the APA, debates on external and self-
regulation and whistle-blowing was added. Third, a category for work on conceptions of 
‘legitimacy’, as well as the application of legitimacy theory in different institutional and 
organisational contexts, was developed. Finally, Foucauldian-inspired research in 
accounting and management contexts (including certain of Foucault’s work and related 
commentary) was included in a ‘power and control’ category. This is presented 












Detailed interviews are a form of idiographic research (Alvesson, 2003; Creswell, 2009) 
where verbal content is complemented by insights from studying tone, expression and non-
verbal responses (Parker and Roffey, 1997; Alvesson, 2003). Participants are able to: give 
accounts of their experiences; express opinions supported by hypothetical reasoning; furnish 
explanations on the rationale behind their conclusions; and clarify ambiguities as needed, 
allowing for the underlying subject matter to be thoroughly described and explained (Holland 
and Stoner, 1996; Holland and Doran, 1998; Houghton et al, 2011; Smith-Lacroix et al, 
2012). In other words, the method ensures that the variables examined, emerging themes 
and documented accounts capture the perspectives of those involved in the practical 
application of the RI provisions.   
As the emphasis is on exploring detailed accounts of s45 of the APA, interviews are semi-
structured to allow the researcher to ‘remain open to pursuing emerging trends, themes and 
The role of s45 of 
the APA?  
Corporate Governance 
 
Overviews of agency and 
stakeholder theory 
Why is there a need for 
monitoring ?  
What is the role of external 
audit ?  
What is the justification for 
auditor regulation?  
Auditor Regulation 
 
What are the debates on 
auditor regulation?  
What is 45 of the APA and 
how does it work?  
What role does whistle-
blowing play in improving 
corporate governance? 
What is the link between 






What is ‘legitimacy’?  
Why do organizations seek 
legitimacy ?  
How do organisations gain 
legitiamcy?  
Is arms-length regulation an 
example of a legitimisation 
technique?  
Does s45 of the APA  










Disciplinary power at work in 
an organizational context 
What  is 45 of the APA and 
how does it work?  
Are motifs of disciplinary 







patterns’ (O'Dwyer et al, 2011, p. 39) as they arise during the interview process. Unlike a 
questionnaire, structured interviews, or models using archival data, the chosen method has 
a greater exploratory potential and is more flexible. It covers a broad range of topics and 
adapts as and when information emerges (Creswell, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Creswell, 
2009). For interpretive studies, this is especially important as the validity and reliability of 
findings is ultimately concerned with convincing the reader that that the underlying 
phenomenon has been explored in detail and that the results are effectively trustworthy 
(Laughlin, 2007; Davila and Oyon, 2008; Creswell, 2009).  
With positivist research, sophisticated statistical techniques conducive to reproduction of 
results constitute validity and reliability checks. This is not, however, conducive to more 
interpretive studies (Merchant, 2008; Creswell, 2009). Instead, semi-structured interviews 
allow respondents to ‘interpret and describe the phenomenon in their own way’ (Holland, 
2005, p. 250), providing for an extensive exploration of the subject matter (Creswell, 2009; 
O'Dwyer et al, 2011) without excessive restrictions imposed by scientific analysis. In other 
words, using detailed interviews for examining the role of the RI provisions adds to the 
quality of the findings by overcoming the risk of over-simplifying auditing systems or ignoring 
the relationship between theory and practice when investigating understudied aspects of 
corporate governance (Moore, 1991; Parker and Roffey, 1997; Power, 2003; Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2005; Ahrens et al, 2008). The intention is not to generalise or ‘reduce’ the problem 
to find a definitive solution but to illuminate and document multiple perspectives.  Detailed 
interviews, supported by a correspondence analysis, are able to capture the essence of the 
research problem and incorporate practicality by examining the viewpoints of leading experts 
and users on the ‘front lines’ of business developments (consider: Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 
1995; Power, 2003; Laughlin, 2007; Ahrens et al, 2008; Dillard, 2008) The result is direct 
and meaningful ‘engagements with practitioners...seeking out their perspectives on their 
work and its evolution’ (O'Dwyer et al, 2011, p. 39) addressing Power’s (2003) calls for more 
field-work-based auditing studies.  
Despite its tediousness, complexity of the data analysis process, and risk of researcher bias, 
validity concerns can be readily managed (Oakes et al, 1998; Creswell, 2009; Rowley, 
2012).   As such, detailed interviews provide an invaluable primary source of information in 
emerging areas of study (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Creswell, 2009; 
O'Dwyer et al, 2011). For example, Cohen et al (2002) used semi-structured interviews to 
understand the then little-investigated process of how auditors internalise the relevance of 
corporate governance when planning and executing an audit. This study uses similar 
techniques to investigate s45 of the APA and its perceived interrelationship with audit 
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quality, legitimacy and notions of disciplinary power, a topic which has not been the subject 
of direct research.  
In addition, traditional questionnaires, which depend on adequate coverage to ensure 
validity, were not expected to be successful due to traditionally low response rates, 
particularly on the part of audit experts (Rowley, 2012; Appendix B2). Interviews capable of 
providing detailed accounts form smaller sample sizes are, thus, more appropriate, 
especially given the complex nature of the subject matter; lack of direct prior research 
(Section 1.2); and intention of this research to explore critical perspectives on the RI 
provisions (consider Martens and McEnroe, 1992; Hassink et al, 2010; Georgiou and Jack, 
2011; Houghton et al, 2011; O'Dwyer et al, 2011; Rowley, 2012).  
To this end, semi-structured interviews are based on the provisions of ISQC 1 and the prior 
literature on audit quality, legitimacy and power and control theory. To ensure clarity and 
structure, interview agendas are largely aligned with the research sub-questions. Two 
interview agendas are used (Appendix B4). The first is for audit experts and, therefore, 
questions on audit quality and quality control systems are more technical. The second 
agenda is for informed users and, although similar to the first agenda, has a less technical 
focus on audit quality/quality control systems. This is due to the fact that the opaqueness of 
the audit process may have prevented users being privy to the same detailed information on 
the audit process as experts (Power, 1994; Power, 2003; FRC, 2010; KPMG, 2010; PwC, 
2010). Both agendas have been subject to peer review to ensure clarity, accuracy and 
appropriateness (ability to address the research objectives) by supervisors, the technical 
consultant and University of the Witwatersrand School of Accountancy’s Audit and 
Management Accounting Divisions. The interview agendas were also piloted (Appendix B3), 
as recommended by Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Leedy and Omrod (2001), with no 
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 Peer review, especially by the technical consultant, is an important quality check serving to ensure that the 




3.2.2: CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS37 
 
Interpretive research using detailed interviews runs the risk of becoming cumbersome  
(Merchant, 2008). This is especially so when the content is highly subject-specific. In such 
cases, quantitative methods can be used to aggregate findings, simplify the report and 
improve validity (Parker and Roffey, 1997)38. Consequently, a correspondence analysis is 
used to summarise the perceptions of experts on the perceived effect of s45 of the APA on 
audit quality due to the relatively technical nature of this part of the research (Chapter 5). 
The final correspondence plot (Figure 5.1) was also discussed with respondents during 
follow-up sessions to ensure a thorough analysis of the plot and afford participants an 
opportunity to take stock of and respond to the emerging collective ‘view’ on the role of the 
RI provisions in South African audits39. The intention was not to ‘quantify’ or ‘verify’ results, 
but to provide an easy-to-interpret two-dimensional plot (Bendixen, 1996; Maroun et al, 
2011) that reduces the complexity of ISQC 1; summarises key arguments and 
counterarguments on the association between the RI provisions and conceptions of audit 
quality; and facilitates additional discussion with interviewees. 
Rather than rely on a scientific approach for developing the survey questionnaire 
(correspondence table), a less rigid social constructivist technique similar to that described 
by Solomon and Maroun (2012) and Merkl-Davies et al (2011) is used. As discussed in 
Section 2.2.4, quality elements derived from ISQC 1 – and informed by the prior literature 
and local codes of governance – serve as row headings or statements in the Table 3.1 
below. Key subsections of the RI provisions (Section 2.1.3) serve as column headings. The 
researcher constitutes the ‘measurement instrument’, allowing for the ‘essence’ of ISQC 1 to 
be included in the correspondence table (see also Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Solomon and 
Maroun, 2012). Although this poses some threat to validity due to inherent subjectivity 
(Creswell, 2009), the approach is more conducive to smaller sample sizes in an exploratory 
setting where, paradoxically, a more scientific approach could be a hindrance. Further, the 
interpretive derivation of the correspondence table ensures that the correspondence results 
                                               
37
 Special thanks go to the commentators at the Southern African Accounting Association (SAAA) Conference 
(2011) and the British Accounting and Finance Association Conference (2012), as well as the anonymous 
reviewers from the International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation for their feedback regarding the 
correspondence analysis (Appendix G). 
38
 Although the correspondence analysis relies on principal component analysis to ‘reduce’ data (Section 3.4.2), 
the method remains largely interpretive, given the design of Table 3.1 and complementary role of the 
correspondence plot when carrying out follow-up interviews.  
 
39
 For this purpose the design and means of interpretation of the plot was explained to respondents, as discussed 
in this section and Section 3.4.   
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are easily incorporated in discussion with interviewees (Coldwell, 2012; Maroun, 2012b; 
Weetman, 2012).       
The final result is a 7 column x 12 row correspondence table (Table 3.1). Each row is 
labelled ‘R1’ to ‘R9’. Columns are labelled ‘C1’ to ‘C7’40.  Respondents were required to 
mark with an ‘X’ cells where quality characteristics (rows) correspond – in their opinions – 
with the respective column headings (the RI provisions).  Accordingly, each cell could have 
been marked with an ‘X’ or left blank equivalent to a response in the affirmative or negative 
respectively. Each ‘X’ was assigned a value of one. Non-responses were assigned a value 
of zero. Results were aggregated manually into a single frequency table and reduced to a 
two-dimensional plot using correspondence analysis (principal component analysis) courtesy 
STATA.  
A similar approach has been used in a marketing setting by Lee and Bradlow (2011), 
exploring product attribute relevance in the eyes of consumers. Correspondence analysis is 
employed to assign features of chosen products to particular ‘attribute dimensions’41. 
Principal component analysis reduces the findings to a graphical representation based on 
product reviews completed by a sample of customers that allows for easy ‘visualisation’ of 
the results. Correspondence analysis has also proved useful in studying the association 
between non-financial indicators and managerial performance, effectively ‘grouping’ 
responses from a questionnaire on the association between non-financial performance 
metrics and three fields of organisational activity, to facilitate easier analysis (Gaber and 
Stoica, 2012). In a similar study, Chan et al (2002) use a form of correspondence to examine 
how different training modules are perceived to impact a selection of work activities in a 
manufacturing case study. Finally, Maroun et al (2011) use correspondence analysis to 
identify themes in the tax literature and highlight associations between ‘tax fairness’ 
attributes and Capital Gains Tax.  Consistent with Merkl-Davies et al (2011), the ‘tax fairness 
matrix’ is driven by interpretive text analysis, similar to that followed in this research.  The 
correspondence table used in Chapter 5 is presented below.42 
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 The order of entries in the correspondence table and assigned symbols has no specific meaning. 
 
41
 The result is a brand-attribute matrix similar in substance to Table 3.1, albeit that the researchers chose a 
scientific approach relying on text mining to identify brands and attributes.  
 
42
 In keeping with an interpretive style, measures of internal consistency such as Cronbach Alpha are not 
required This is also justified by the fact that respondents either endorse a cell or not, meaning that the data 
scale is ordinal. It should be stressed that the correspondence plot simply serves as an easy-to-interpret 
summary of the perceived correspondence between the RI provisions (columns) and audit quality elements 





TABLE 3.1: CORRESPONDENCE TABLE  
  Quality Trait
43
 Provisions of s45 of the Auditing Profession Act 
      
    RI’s are to 
be reported 








report an RI 















RI’s include a 
material 






    C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
R1 Development of a culture of 
leadership with more 
participation by the 
engagement leader (para 9) 
       
R2 Awareness of the importance 
of ethical compliance (para 14 
&18) including client 
acceptance and continuance 
procedures (para 28) 
       
R3 Acknowledging the importance 
of resources & competency of 
engagement team (para 36) as 
well as the need for full 
compliance with ISA (para 46) 
       
R4 Ensuring appropriate 
consultation on contentious 
matters and resolution of 
differences of opinion (para 
51) 
       
                                               
43
 Paragraphs refer to the provisions of ISQC 1.  
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TABLE 3.1: CORRESPONDENCE TABLE  
  Quality Trait
43
 Provisions of s45 of the Auditing Profession Act 
      
    RI’s are to 
be reported 








report an RI 















RI’s include a 
material 






    C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
R5 More attention paid to internal 
quality control and continuous 
improvement processes  
including documentation 
standards (para 74) 
       
R6 Enhanced transparency and 
confidence in the audit process 
and increased perceived value 
for stakeholders (including 
improved reporting quality) 
       
R7 Enhanced sustainability for 
audit firms including reduction 
in overall audit risk 
       
R8 A sense of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the informed public 
       
R9 A sense of personal 
responsibility for auditors and 
auditors being held to account 




As the correspondence table relies on a thorough technical understanding of s45 of the APA 
and provisions of ISQC 1, it is completed only by experts44. The correspondence analysis 
was carried out immediately after the first round of detailed interviews. Data is, therefore, 
cross-sectional and will not capture changing perceptions over time. While this does detract 
from the exploratory potential of the data, it allows the research to focus on the specific time 
period under review. This means that the long term variables, such as changing cultures or 
political climates, are held constant.  Prior to administration of the correspondence analysis, 
the Table 3.1 was reviewed by the technical consultant and University of the Witwatersrand 
School of Accountancy’s Audit and Management Accounting Divisions. The correspondence 
table was then piloted (Appendix B1) with no material issues noted (Appendix B1)45.  
 
3.3: SELECTING PARTICIPANTS46  
 
3.3.1: POPULATION 
The population of experts consists of all Registered Accountants and Auditors (RAA) in 
South Africa. The population of users is less easily determined as multiple stakeholder 
groups may have an interest in audit for different reasons. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
population of informed users is taken to mean directors of companies, including audit 
committee members, listed on the JSE, relevant regulatory bodies and institutional investors. 
All users have at least ten years of audit-associated experience by virtue of either past 
service as an auditor; direct engagement with auditors in their current capacity or a 
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 This is not to say that users are not well informed of the audit process. As discussed in Section 3.3, they 
represent some of the leading auditing and corporate governance minds in South Africa. These users were not, 
however, practicing auditors and would not, therefore, have been able to provide current detailed insight on the 
application of the RI provisions on specific audit engagements.  
 
45
 The research confirmed the appropriateness of the correspondence analysis – as opposed to a traditional 
questionnaire – as part of the pilot study (Appendix B2).  
 
46




3.3.2: SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Audit experts 
Experts were selected using a purposeful selection technique mindful of ease of access.  
Firstly, all Big Four firms, the three largest second-tier audit firms, the IRBA, SAICA and 
South Africa’s top three universities were selected47 (adapted from Creswell, 2009). Each 
selected organisation is regarded as reputable as it is among the largest audit firms in South 
Africa (DeAngelo, 1981a; DeAngelo, 1981b), a registered member with the IRBA in good 
standing (IRBA, 2011), or a top-ranking South African university48. Participation by 
individuals at each of the selected organisations was driven solely by ease of access.  
Due to the limited number of experts dealing with s45 of the APA, as well as large volumes 
of  data collected during interviews, the number of interviews was limited (Bendixen, 1996; 
Holland, 1998a; Rowley, 2012). Sixty-eight experts were approached. Seventeen were 
interviewed and completed the correspondence analysis. A further forty seven could not be 
interviewed but did complete the correspondence table after being given instructions on how 
to do so and background on the nature and purpose of the research, as discussed below. A 
listing of interviewees may be found in Appendix F. Detailed interviews (and the 
correspondence analysis) were carried out in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria, 
South Africa, between 1 May 2011 and 1 October 2012 and lasted between one and three 
hours. All initial interviews were recorded electronically except four which were recorded 
manually49. 
This research is specifically focused on ‘gaining the perspectives of practitioners who had 
been directly involved in shaping assurance practice’ (O'Dwyer et al, 2011, p. 38) in South 
Africa. Although purposeful selection of experts may result in a degree of bias, it ensures 
that only knowledgeable participants were engaged in the research, given its technical 
nature (Creswell, 2009; Rowley, 2012). A comparable approach is employed by Brivot and 
Gendron (2011) and Cohen et al (2002) who purposefully select participants at specific 
levels within firms to ensure a focused and meaningful analysis. Similarly, Kaplan and 
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 Participants are drawn from the Big 4 and smaller firms. This ensures that different organisational contexts or 
cultures are captured by the interviews, adding to the depth of information gathered. The purpose of the research 
is not, however, to contrast the views of large and small audit practices with an aim to adding to the debate on 
whether or not the Big 4 provide higher quality audits than their smaller counterparts (Chapter 8).   
 
48
 Per the QS World University Rankings (2012)  
 
49
 The data collection and analysis process described in Section 3.4.1 applied mutatis mutandis to manually 




Schultz (2007) purposefully select participants with more practical experience to improve 
result quality for a study into whistle-blowing, while Creswell (2009) recommends selecting 
individuals who have a thorough understanding of subject matter to ensure research quality 
in qualitative studies. Ultimately, participants were selected based on their skill and 
experience for the purpose of explaining the role played by s45 of the APA in South African 
audits and not for ‘quantifying’ results using larger samples in a positivist style.  
As per Section 1.3, all experts are individuals with several years of practical or academic 
experience and extensive knowledge of ISQC 1 and the RI provisions, as well the audit 
environment and culture. Although some, for example Power (1995), argue that years of 
service may not be correlated with levels of expertise, and that this poses problems for 
generic auditor judgement research, due to the fact that this research studies a narrowly 
defined aspect of South African audits, this not regarded as a material issue.  
Informed users  
Detailed interviews were also conducted with informed users to complement the insights 
provided by audit experts50. Informed users were selected from among the ranks of the 
boards of directors of companies listed on the JSE, various regulatory and government 
bodies in South Africa, as well as institutional or professional investors. Ease of access and 
availability were the primary participation-determinants. 
All users are knowledgeable of the audit process and have several years of experience in a 
financial and governance setting. Most respondents were members of audit committees or 
representatives of government/regulatory bodies constituting some of the country’s most 
influential minds in the area of auditing and corporate governance. Thirty three individuals 
were approached. Thirteen participated in the research (Appendix F). All interviews were 
held between 1 May 2011 and 1 October 2012 in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria and 





                                               
50
 As discussed in Section 1.4.2, the aim of this research is not to contrast the views of experts and users with an 
aim to examining the audit expectation gap. Due to users’ having a high level of technical expertise (as well as 
relatively small sample sizes in light of the interpretive structure of this thesis), a more detailed evaluation of audit 





Although concerned with the opinions of respondents, rather than scientifically validated 
‘fact’, choosing well-informed participants becomes its own form of validity and reliability 
check, (Humphrey, 2008; O'Dwyer et al, 2011; Coldwell, 2012). In addition, by interviewing 
some of the country’s leading audit and governance experts, complemented by follow-up 
sessions and a correspondence analysis as appropriate, key themes or concepts were 
readily identified. In turn, these were contrasted with the comments of other respondents and 
with the perspectives found in the prior academic and professional literature to ensure high 
research quality (Holland, 2005).  
 
3.3.3: SAMPLE SIZE AND ACCESS 
 
Smaller sample sizes are common for qualitative studies (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; 
Creswell, 2009). For example, Cohen et al (2002), research the impact of clients’ corporate 
governance systems on auditors’ risk assessment processes, using detailed interviews as a 
data collection instrument. Due to time constraints and the volume of data generated, a total 
of thirty three interviews were conducted.  Likewise McCann et al (2003), in a study on 
socially responsible investment strategies, rely on twenty three interviews with well-informed 
investment specialists. Similarly, Holland (1998a) makes use of thirty three participants while 
Uddin and Choudhury (2008), Holland and Doran (1998) and Holland and Stoner (1996) use 
under thirty participants for their respective qualitative studies. In each of these cases, the 
intention is not ensuring statistical coverage but allowing for manageable data collection 
while still being able to gain detailed insights. By analogy, a total of thirty interviews 
averaging 90 minutes in duration are carried out. There were no withdrawals during the 
course of the study.  For ease of reference, this thesis uses U1-13 and E1-16 to identify the 
user and expert interviewees respectively. (The objective of this thesis is not, however, to 








3.4: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.4.1: DETAILED INTERVIEWS 
 
Participants were contacted via telephone or e-mail and invited to participate in the study 
after being given a brief description of the purpose of the research. A time was set for the 
interview and completion of the correspondence table (Table 3.1). A subsequent e-mail 
confirmed the meeting times.  Following a similar approach to O’Dwyer et al (2011), Cohen 
et al (2002), Holland and Doran (1998) and Holland and Stoner (1996), an agenda 
containing open-ended questions (Appendix B4) was e-mailed to participants at least three 
working days before the interview to allow participants sufficient time to consider their 
responses and ensure detailed accurate accounts. To address the risk of response 
rehearsal, the agendas were deliberately brief. The date, time, location, duration of meeting 
and attendees were recorded for each interview.  Interviews were conducted at the location 
of choice of the interviewee to encourage complete candour and participation.  
At the start of the interviews, participants were briefly reminded of the nature and purpose of 
the research; given the researcher’s details; and provided with additional information as 
requested. Time was spent establishing rapport with each interviewee to ensure participants’ 
confidence (Creswell, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 2011; Rowley, 2012). The background to the 
research was discussed, as well as general industry developments. Participants were 
informed that research was being carried out independently and was for academic purposes 
only. They were reassured that there are no ‘correct’ responses and that the purpose of the 
research was simply to explore their own perceptions and experiences. They were 
encouraged to talk freely and reminded of guaranteed confidentiality, their right to withdraw 
from the study at any point and  that each would receive a copy of the final report (adapted 
from Oakes et al, 1998; McCann et al, 2003; Brivot and Gendron, 2011; O'Dwyer et al, 
2011). Finally, a consent form was completed at the start of the interview (Appendix E). 
These steps were designed to reduce the risk of respondents withholding commentary or 
feeling compelled to provide responses perceived as being socially or politically appropriate 
rather than personal, unedited views (Alvesson, 2003). 
More specific agenda points were used to structure the interview (Appendix B4) although the 
interview process remained semi-structured in that unexpected questions or issues raised by 
participants were explored as and when they arose. This allowed for more detailed accounts 
on the role of the RI provisions in South African audits than if, for example, a questionnaire 
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was used. The extent to, and sequence in which, issues were addressed by respondents 
varied but the same issue, the operation of s45 of the APA, was dealt with at the start of 
each interview. (adapted from  Holland, 1998a; Holland, 1998b; O'Dwyer et al, 2011). 
As with most qualitative studies, the data collection and analysis process took place 
concurrently (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Creswell, 2009). As far as possible, the researcher 
refrained from interrupting or pre-empting the participant, leaving it to the interviewees to 
raise the majority of the issues and to go into detail on specific themes or concerns. 
Questions posed were, to the extent possible, neutral and non-leading. At the same time, 
respondents were, on occasion, asked to explain a particular concept or statement in 
different words or from different perspectives to address ‘script coherent expressions’ or 
resolve any ambiguities (Alvesson, 2003). As an additional validity safeguard, each interview 
was conducted individually to prevent dominant participants influencing the decisions of 
others and avoid the risk of a loss of anonymity affecting results.  
As most interviews were electronically recorded, the need to stop the interview to allow for 
note taking; the risk of incomplete data capture; and the risk of transcription error were 
reduced. The full attention of the researcher could also be devoted to the interviewee, 
adding to the quality of the results. Where recording was not permitted, the researcher used 
a touch pad to minute the meetings. In these instances, notes were made frequently to avoid 
the researcher unintentionally signalling participants (Alvesson, 2003).  All transcripts were 
assigned a unique code to ensure completeness and confidentially. Electronic recordings 
were transcribed and additional embedded comments added as soon as possible after the 
interview was completed. This included notes on areas for probing either in follow up 
sessions (see below) or other interviews (as per O'Dwyer et al, 2011).  
Data analysis was by means of a ‘data analysis spiral’ (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Rowley, 
2012). Firstly, recorded interviews were perused. Preliminary conceptualising and 
cataloguing was facilitated by informal note taking. The aim was to obtain a sense of the 
essence of each recording (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001, p. 153) which, as per Creswell (2009), 
Davilla and Wouters (2005) and Parker and Roffey (1997), was read several times. Initial 
notes on recordings were contrasted and general themes, categories and interconnections 
were identified. A ‘data mind map’ was used for this purpose (adapted from Oakes et al, 
1998; Holland, 1998a; Holland, 1998b; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Content was organised 
initially under headings and sub-headings consistent with those used in the literature content 
analysis (Section 3.2).  
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Closer scrutiny of field notes and the prior literature led to reclassification of interview 
content and research sub-codes as necessary. Final categories (axial codes) are 
summarised in Table 3.2.  
TABLE 3.2: AXIAL CODES USED FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
 #  Content category Description 
C-1 Importance of ethical values 
and leadership principles 
For example, content on the impact of s45 of the 
APA on ethics training and awareness; client 
acceptance and continuance; and engagement 
leader participation fell under this category. 
 
C-2 Human resource practices 
and engagement 
performance 
Commentary on engagement execution; constitution 
of audit teams; client acceptance and continuance 
and monitoring; and consultation and supervision 
are examples of content aggregated under this 
category. 
 
C-3 Continuous improvement Commentary on continuous improvement; perceived 
impact of s45 of the APA on audit quality in general; 
extent of reliance on audit reports; recommended 
developments for whistle-blowing regulation were 
included here.  
 
C-4 Legitimacy and credibility Notes on the meaning and relevance of legitimacy, 
including how auditors seek legitimacy, were 
documented under this category. Comments from 
informed users and experts on how and why s45 of 
the APA adds to the legitimacy of and trust vested in 
the audit process were included under this category, 
including any counterarguments or alternate views. 
This category also included commentary on 
expectation gaps, unintended consequences of the 
legislation, and governance of audit firms in general. 
 
C-5 Disciplinary power.  
 
The final category included literature and 
commentary from experts and informed users on 
notions of disciplinary power. Conceptions of the 
‘principles of enclosure’, ‘efficient bodies’ and 
‘surveillance’ (Foucault, 1977) inherent in s45 of the 
APA were included under this category, as well as 
how notions of power and control could impact on 
perceived audit quality and legitimacy.  
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Defining content categories (axial codes) using the provisions of ISQC 1, the prior literature 
and the research sub-questions (Section 1.4) is important for providing structure and 
ensuring that each sub-question is addressed. In effect, it allows the research process to be 
easily traced to the primary phenomenon under investigation (adapted from Parker and 
Roffey, 1997; Creswell, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 2011; Rowley, 2012). It also counters the risk 
of bias imported by the researcher imposing arbitrary or subjective categories. Further, using 
predetermined axial codes did not detract from the iterative and exploratory nature of the 
research. Specific themes or concepts emerging during the course of the interview and 
analysis process drove the development of sub-categories or open codes. Notes on the 
different phrases or comments were made on each transcript and used to summarise the 
significant points from each interview. Initially, notes were manually aggregated according to 
their similarities and interconnections, effectively coding them. All notes were numbered and 
cross referenced to a ‘code register’ or ‘legend’ to allow for easy data analysis. Codes with 
few or no allocations were aggregated. The product was a ‘summary table’ (O'Dwyer et al, 
2011) for each transcript which effectively ‘assigned’ the transcript content to different 
content ‘pools’ each of which is aggregated under the broad axial codes above (adapted 
from  Parker and Roffey, 1997; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Creswell, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 
2011). Transcripts were read several times for the purpose of coding until a sense of 
saturation was achieved (O'Dwyer et al, 2011).  
After the completion of the initial data analysis, follow-up questions were raised as needed. 
In this way, the research may be seen as a quasi policy-style-Delphi-study where additional 
questions are posed to participants to clarify emerging themes, elaborate on key arguments 
and counterarguments, and clarify any ambiguities. Conceptually, this is similar to a 
traditional Delphi where statistical patterns or anomalies are explored in greater detail, albeit 
that this study adopts a qualitative approach and does not seek a measure of statistical 
consensus (Novakowski and Wellar, 2008). Instead, the result was a highly flexible and 
dynamic data collection process with interviews, data transcription, coding, analysis and 
updating of results occurring almost continuously (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Creswell, 
2009). Grounding the interviews in the prior literature, execution of multiple interviews, and 
the use of follow-up sessions allowed for a form of result ‘triangulation’51 which contributed 
materially to the thoroughness of the findings and the reliability of any conclusions reached 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Alvesson, 2003; Creswell, 2009). (For Chapter 5, in particular, 
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 In this context, ‘triangulation’ does not imply the existence of a unique objective reality. Rather, it refers to 
using multiple data sources to achieve a detailed exploration of the phenomenon under review ensuring the 




the correspondence analysis, by aggregating perceptions, also provided an internal 
consistency check.)   
Follow-up questions were posed either telephonically, by e-mail or during additional 
interviews depending on ease of access, time restrictions of the participants, and budgetary 
limitations. These questions were derived from initial analysis of the interview transcripts as 
well as the findings from the correspondence analysis52. Data collection and analysis 
continued to a point where a sense of saturation, rather than a measure of consensus, was 
achieved (Alvesson, 2003; Novakowski and Wellar, 2008).  Consequently, only a limited 
number of follow-up sessions were held and not all participants were equally engaged in this 
process. This is an inherent characteristic of the chosen research methodology and not 
necessarily a threat to validity and reliability (Quattrone and Hopper, 2005; Creswell, 2009). 
Rather, this approach is inspired by a ‘reflexive pragmatism’ in the sense that, while different 
perspectives are explored, practically, ‘endless reflexivity’ needs to be balanced in the name 
of ‘direction and accomplishment’ (Alvesson, 2003, p. 14).  
Results were transcribed as described previously. Where necessary, additional interview 
material was reviewed several times and contrasted with original results from follow-up 
sessions, effectively complementing the already coded data or being used to revise the 
coding accordingly. At this stage, the findings from the prior literature and theoretical 
perspectives adopted for the purpose of this research (Chapter 2) were considered to add to 
the thoroughness of the analysis (Oakes et al, 1998; Ventovuori et al, 2007; Ahrens et al, 
2008; O'Dwyer et al, 2011).  
In summary audit research in the positivist tradition, although seemingly valid, ‘is very often 
studying correlations between independent (market variables) and proxy measures for a 
dependent audit variable (such as audit quality) or focusing on a fabricated form of audit 
practice that has been generated through a series of audit experiments’ (Humphrey, 2008, p. 
179). In contrast, detailed interviews provide an extensive account of perceptions and 
experiences. By thoroughly documenting results in a fashion that is easy to understand, the 
nature and limitations of the research findings can be readily assessed by the reader, itself a 
form of validity safeguard (Creswell, 2009; IASB, 2010). Where dealing with highly technical 
content (Chapter 4), the correspondence analysis, discussed below, then ensures clarity by 
condensing results into an easily interpreted two-dimensional plot. This combines the 
                                               
52
 The correspondence plot (Figure 5.1) was discussed with several respondents during follow-up sessions to 
add depth to the interview findings. For this purpose, the design and interpretation of the correspondence 
analysis, as per this chapter, was explained to interviewees. At no time did the interviewees indicate that the 
correspondence table or final plot was unclear or difficult to interpret. Questions posed were largely in line with 
those found in Table 3.1 and Appendix B4 and concentrated on analysing the reason for correlations between 
row and column headings (Section 3.4.2). 
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benefits of detailed descriptions from the detailed interviews, with the simplified overview of 
results provided by an easy-to-understand quantitative technique (Bendixen, 1996). The end 
result is simple, clear communication (Merchant, 2008; Creswell, 2009) and articulation 
ideas, opinions, judgements and values (Baxter et al, 2008; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; 
Cooper, 2008; Scapens, 2008; Willmott, 2008; O'Dwyer et al, 2011). 
 
3.4.2: CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS  
 
Upon completion of the detailed interviews, experts were required to complete a 
correspondence table (Table 3.1). This ensured that the nature and purpose of the research 
was fresh in the experts’ minds while respecting their time constraints. In instances where 
experts were not available to be interviewed (Section 3.3.2), the nature and purpose of the 
research was explained in detail to provide respondents with the context of the study. In both 
cases, the design of the correspondence table, per Section 3.2.2, was explained and brief 
instructions on how to complete the table were provided53. Before completing the 
correspondence table, experts were reminded of the need for complete candour and of 
guaranteed anonymity, after which they were left to complete the table in private54. Experts 
marked those cells where row and column headings were regarded as corresponding, with 
the result that the correspondence table was akin to a standard survey instrument that 
recorded the responses of experts on the perceived association between the RI provisions 
and audit quality elements (Section 2.2.4).  
To ensure that the correspondence table was free from technical errors or ambiguities, the 
survey was piloted (Creswell, 2009) with no material issues noted (Appendix B1). All 
correspondence tables were assigned a unique number to ensure confidentiality and 
completeness and accuracy of final results. As a final quality check, the choice and use of 
the correspondence analysis was reviewed by an independent statistician who confirmed the 
appropriateness of the chosen method and its application.  
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 The following example was provided to respondents: if you feel that the fact that RI’s are reportable to the 
IRBA (C1) results in you being more active on the engagement and encourages a culture of leadership (R1), then 
place an ‘X’ in the cell. If you feel that this is not the case, then leave the cell blank. The remainder of the table is 
completed in the same fashion. You may place as many ‘X’s’ as you feel appropriate. After being given this 




 The same approach was used with experts who were unavailable for interview (Section 3.3.2). These 





Responses were manually aggregated and included in a final summary table. Briefly, the 
response rate for each of the rows (i.e. the degree of correspondence with the column 
headings) is translated into a row and column ‘mass’ which is used to interpret or define the 
axes of a two-dimensional space and the positioning of different point-row plots (Table 3.6;  
Table 3.7). The final 7 column x 9 row correspondence plot is presented in Figure 5.1 
(Section 5.1). Table 3.3 summarises the descriptive statistics. Most notably the first (x-axis) 
and second (y-axis) dimension of the plot account for just over 81% of the total inertia (or 
81% to the total Chi-square score of 113) and, thus, for most of the exploratory potential of 
the graphical plot.  The Chi-square value of 113.09 is also well in excess of the minimum 
critical value of approximately 67.5 at the 5% significance level (Appendix C).  
 



















Number of dim. 
 
2 
Expl. inertia (%)   81.13 
 
As discussed above, the row and column profiles and masses were used to calculate the 
inertia (variance) that each cell accounted for in the contingency table. A point-row and 
column plot may be found in Appendix C and was developed using principal component 
analysis as per Bendixen (1996) and adapted from Maroun et al (2011)56 . The bi-plot 
(including Table 3.6 and Table 3.7) was used to define the respective axes of the final plot 




                                               
55
 This is the total number of ‘X’s marked by the 64 experts who completed the correspondence table.  
 
56
 The application of correspondence analysis was tested in a similar interpretive setting thereby adding to the 
quality of the analysis presented here. Special thanks must go to the anonymous reviewers and to the attendees 




TABLE 3.4: LABELLING OF THE AXES  
Axis Label 
Positive x-axis (axis 1) C3: Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal sanction 
Negative x-axis (axis 1) C7: RI’s involve management only 
Positive y-axis (axis 2) C2: Reporting to take place immediately vs. after 30 days under the PAAA 
Negative y-axis (axis 2) C3: Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal sanction 
C6: RI’s include a material breach of trust and fiduciary duty 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the respective axes are based on the ‘elements’ (column 
headings in Table 3.1) of the RI provisions according to the inertial contribution made by 
each column heading, its correlation coefficient with the respective axis and its co-ordinate 
(sign). Only those column headings with an above-average inertial contribution are included 
for ease of analysis (Bendixen, 1996). In this respect, C1, C4 and C5 had low levels of 
inertia and/or only weak correlations with either the x- or y-axis and were thus excluded. The 
positioning of row headings (quality traits in terms of ISQC 1), is determined in a similar 
fashion. R2, R4, R5, R7 and R9 each makes above average inertial contributions compared 
to that which would arise given a purely random distribution of statements over the axes. 
Taking into account the sign of each row-heading coordinate, as well as the respective 
correlation coefficients and inertial loads, allows each point to be plotted along the x- and y-
axes.  In this graphical representation, the further a given point is away from the origin (the 
higher its correlation coefficient and Chi-square value-variance), the greater the association 
with the respective element of the RI provisions (column heading or axis label)57 (Adapted 
from Bendixen, 1996; Maroun et al, 2011).  Appendix C provides additional details.  
 
Consistent with the approach followed by Lee and Bradlow (2011), Maroun et al (2011) and 
Chan at el (2002), correspondence analysis is used to focus on key relationships in an 
otherwise complex set of interconnected variables or traits (Bendixen, 1996) allowing the 
researcher to concentrate on the core aspects of the analysis. Aggregated responses are 
summarised in Figure 5.1 to allow further analysis of only the most relevant associations 
between the RI provisions and audit quality control elements (consider also Humphrey, 
2008; Creswell, 2009). To this end, additional statistical analysis (as done by Lee and 
Bradlow, 2011) is not used to interpret the final correspondence plot. Instead, an interpretive 
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 This influence is measured by reference to inertial contribution. The sum of the contributions gives an 
indication of the quality of the plotted point (row heading) but does not prove causation. A point’s sign is only 
indicative of its positioning relative to different elements of the RI provisions (axes) and does not, in itself, imply a 




approach is employed where the researcher plays an integral role in drawing connections 
between the correspondence plot and prior literature on auditing. The correspondence plot 
(Figure 5.1) was also used to inform further discussion on the role of the RI provisions in 
South African audits during follow-up interviews as discussed in Section 3.4.1.  For this 
purpose Figure 5.1 was made available during follow-up sessions and, after providing a brief 
overview of the correspondence analysis technique, discussed with interviewees. Questions 
dealt with the interpretation of associations between row and column points in Figure 5.1. 
Findings were transcribed and analysed using the same procedure as described in  
Section 3.4.1.   
 
At this point, it should be noted that each correspondence statement per Table 3.1 could 
have been structured to yield a traditional questionnaire with a five-point likert scale. This 
approach was not followed as the questionnaire would have given the impression that the 
research was attempting to ‘measure’ the extent to which the RI provisions impact audit 
quality. Any added validity would have been superficial due to smaller sample sizes and 
inherent subjectivity (consider Humphrey, 2008; Creswell, 2009)58. Finally, the results from 
the questionnaire would not have been as conducive to detailed discussion with a sample of 
experts, especially since respondents are not statisticians. A key advantage of the 
correspondence analysis is that it clearly summarises the views of relatively small samples 
of experts to facilitate additional exploratory analysis without participants having to interpret 
excessively complex statistical results.  
 
In summary, the aim of the correspondence analysis is not to ‘quantify’ the association 
between the RI provisions and ISQC 1 quality elements or to ‘prove’ that the provisions drive 
audit quality. Rather, the bi-plot is used simply to aggregate the perceptions of experts to 
serve a complementary role in Chapter 5 when exploring the detailed case for the RI 
provisions. Although the correspondence analysis is a quantitative technique, it is, therefore, 
still in line with the overall interpretive style of this thesis.  A summary of the row statements 




                                               
58
 Questionnaires also have the disadvantage of low response rates. While piloting the correspondence analysis, 
the researchers asked participants if they preferred completing the correspondence table or a questionnaire 
based on each of the statements included in the correspondence table. The vast majority commented that the 
former was easier and quicker to complete and generated a graphical plot that was easier to understand than 




TABLE 3.5: CORRESPONDENCE TABLE MATRIX  
No. Row statement (including references 
to ISQC 1 where applicable) 
Related research question Corresponding 
discussion 
R1 Development of a culture of leadership 
with more participation by the 
engagement leader (para 9) 
A1: Do the provisions of s45 of the 
APA cause engagement leaders to 
take a greater leadership 
responsibility role on external audits? 
 
 
Section 4.1;  
Chapter 5 
R2 Awareness of the importance of ethical 
compliance (para 14 &18) including client 
acceptance and continuance procedures 
(para 28) 
A2: What implications have s45 of the 
APA had on the perceived relevance 
and importance of adherence to 
ethical principles on external audits? 
 
A3: Does s45 of the APA lead to a 
more robust client acceptance and 
continuance review process and how 
does this relate to the need for risk 
management by audit firms? 
Section 4.2;  
Chapter 5 
R3 Acknowledging the importance of 
resources & competency of engagement 
team (para 36) as well as the need for full 
compliance with ISA (para 46) 
A4: What are the implications of s45 
of the APA on the perceived 
importance of human resource 
practices? 
See also A5 below 
Section 4.3;  
Chapter 5 
R4 Ensuring appropriate consultation on 
contentious matters and resolution of 
differences of opinion (para 51) 
A5: To what extent has s45 of the 
APA impacted on the performance of 
external audits including supervision, 
consultation and review in connection 
with these audits? 
 
Section 4.3;  
Chapter 5 
R5 More attention paid to internal quality 
control and continuous improvement 
processes  including documentation 
standards (para 74) 
A6: Has s45 of the APA led to a more 
comprehensive continuous 
improvement and monitoring process 
at the audit firm level? 
 
Section 4.3;  
Chapter 5 
R6 Enhanced transparency and confidence 
in the audit process and increased 
perceived value for stakeholders 
(including improved reporting quality) 
B: Does, s45 of the APA afford 
perceived legitimacy to South African 
external audit?  
See also Question A: Do the 
provisions of s45 of the APA have a 
perceived impact on the quality 
control systems of audit firms? 
Section 4.1,  
Section 4.3;  
Chapter 5;  
Chapter 6 
R7 Enhanced sustainability for audit firms 
including reduction in overall audit risk 
Question A and Question B Chapter 4; 
Chapter 6;  
Chapter 7 





Chapter 6;  
Chapter 7 
R9 A sense of personal responsibility for 
auditors and auditors being held to 
account 
C: Is s45 of the APA an example of 
surveillance machinery and a 
manifestation of disciplinary power?  
(See also Question B) 
Chapter 4;  
Chapter 5;   





TABLE 3.6: STATISTICS FOR ROW CATEGORIES IN SYMMETRIC NORMALIZATION 
                                
  





Dimension 2   
  
   
Mass Quality %inert 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib   
  R1 
Development of a culture of leadership with more participation 
by the engagement leader (para 9) 
 
0.089 0.895 0.08 
 
0.546 0.775 12% 
 
0.248 0.121 3%   
  R2 
Awareness of the importance of ethical compliance (para 14 
&18) including client acceptance and continuance procedures 
(para 28) 
 
0.159 0.71 0.055 
 
-
0.162 0.177 2% 
 
0.323 0.533 10%   
  R3 
Acknowledging the importance of resources & competency of 
engagement team (para 36) as well as the need for full 
compliance with ISA (para 46) 
 
0.094 0.753 0.019 
 
-
0.221 0.573 2% 
 
0.142 0.18 1%   
  R4 
Ensuring appropriate consultation on contentious matters and 
resolution of differences of opinion (para 51) 
 
0.16 0.81 0.11 
 
-
0.026 0.002 0% 
 
0.559 0.808 30%   
  R5 
More attention paid to internal quality control and continuous 
improvement processes  including documentation standards 
(para 74) 
 
0.064 0.9 0.225 
 
-
0.904 0.544 24% 
 
-0.84 0.356 27%   
  R6 
Enhanced transparency and confidence in the audit process and 
increased perceived value for stakeholders (including improved 
reporting quality) 
 
0.126 0.703 0.151 
 
-
0.589 0.68 20% 
 
-
0.124 0.023 1%   
  R7 
Enhanced sustainability for audit firms including reduction in 
overall audit risk 
 
0.054 0.501 0.085 
 
0.284 0.121 2% 
 
-0.58 0.38 11%   
  R8 A sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the informed public 
 
0.14 0.547 0.03 
 
0.165 0.3 2% 
 
-
0.172 0.247 3%   
  R9 
A sense of personal responsibility for auditors and auditors being 
held to account 
 
0.114 0.936 0.246 
 
0.841 0.768 37% 
 
-
0.453 0.168 14%   
  
              
  
  
         
100% 
   
100%   




TABLE 3.7: STATISTICS COLUMN CATEGORIES IN SYMMETRIC NORMALIZATION 
  
              
  







    
Mass Quality %inert 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib 
 
  C1 RI’s are to be reported to the IRBA 
 
0.193 0.209 0.069 
 
-
0.091 0.053 1% 
 
0.178 0.155 4%   
  C2 
Reporting to take place immediately vs. after 30 days under the 
PAAA 
 
0.119 0.91 0.206 
 
0.298 0.12 5% 
 
0.878 0.79 55%   
  C3 
Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal 
sanction. 
 
0.194 0.971 0.117 
 
0.384 0.57 13% 
 
-0.37 0.401 16%   
  C4 Wrongful reporting could lead to a claim for damages 
 
0.204 0.752 0.063 
 
0.27 0.55 7% 
 
-
0.188 0.202 4%   
  C5 RI’s include fraud, irrespective of materiality level 
 
0.119 0.405 0.092 
 
-
0.284 0.244 4% 
 
0.266 0.162 5%   
  C6 RI’s include a material breach of trust and fiduciary duty 
 
0.09 0.613 0.072 
 
-
0.014 0.001 0% 
 
-
0.525 0.612 15%   
  C7 RI’s involve management only 
 
0.081 0.965 0.38 
 
-
1.379 0.955 70% 
 
-
0.161 0.01 1%   
  
              
  
  
         
100% 
   
100%   








3.5: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH QUALITY  
 
The following is a summary of key threats to research validity and the approach taken to 
mitigate them59.  
TABLE 3.8: VALIDITY RISK SUMMARY AND APPROACH TO MITIGATE THOSE 
RISKS 













































Description of Control 
Weak framework - bias, 
unsubstantiated views or 
misconceptions characterise 
the literature review 
   Articles sourced primarily from peer-
reviewed journals and professional 
publications subject to due process 
 Use of multiple sources 
 Peer debriefing 
 Presentation of aspects of the thesis at 
formal conferences  
Inaccurate or incomplete data 
due to errors or omissions in 
the correspondence analysis 
or interview agenda 
   Independent review of the correspondence 
table and interview agenda 
 Mapping of the agenda and 
correspondence table to the literature and 
research problems (Section 3.4;  
Section 3.5)  
 Electronic recording of detailed interviews 
to extent practical/permitted 
 Pilot study (Appendix B1) and considering 
the appropriateness of the correspondence 
analysis (Appendix B2)  
 Peer debriefing 
Interview responses are 
contrived or not rooted in 
appropriate experience. The 
correspondence analysis is 
misunderstood and/or 
completed incorrectly 
   Participants are recognized industry 
experts  
 Use of defined agendas or interview 
protocols  
 Basic instructions provided on how to 
complete the correspondence table 
(Section 3.4.2) 
 
                                               
59
 See also Table B2 (Appendix B5) 
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TABLE 3.8: VALIDITY RISK SUMMARY AND APPROACH TO MITIGATE THOSE 
RISKS 













































Description of Control 
 Responses are kept confidential and draft 
copies of the report are available on 
request 
 Peer debriefing 
 Pilot study (Appendix B1) and considering 
the appropriateness of the correspondence 
analysis (Appendix B2) 
 Contrast of results from interviews and the 
correspondence analysis with the prior 
literature 
 
Inaccuracies and bias weaken 
data collection and 
interpretation 
   Use of the data analysis spiral to assess, 
review and condense data  
 Detailed descriptions of the findings  
 Use of correspondence analysis to 
complement the insights from the detailed 
interviews and vice versa (Chapter 5) 
 Follow up sessions to investigate identified 
themes and bias (i.e. quasi Delphi 
techniques)  
 Electronic recordings of responses.  
 Defined agendas and interview protocols  
 Use of predefined axial codes coupled with 
open codes developed during the study 
 Confidentiality of responses  
 ‘Triangulation’ of sources  
 Disclosure of limitations and delimitations  
 Peer debriefing 
 
Maturation of participants, 
participant mortality and 
participant bias 
   Purposeful selection of experts at Big Four, 
second tier firms and academic institutions  
 Informed users selected from various 
organizations and regulators  
 Contrast of perspectives as part of data 
analysis   




TABLE 3.8: VALIDITY RISK SUMMARY AND APPROACH TO MITIGATE THOSE 
RISKS 













































Description of Control 
 Data collection carried out over short time 
period mitigates risk of maturation and 
mortality as well as the risk of general 
changes over time (such as cultural or 
political developments)  
 Detailed findings and a presentation of 
arguments and counterarguments  
 
Readers attempt to use the 
study to make inferences due 
to limited sample size 
   Inability to make inferences to large 
populations is an inherent limitation of 
qualitative research and is disclosed in the 
limitations section of the report for 
transparency (Section 1.4.2; Section 8.3).  
 
Logic of conclusions is difficult 
to follow – application to 
related theories may be 
problematic 
   Triangulation of data from three sources as 
discussed above 
 Peer debriefing 
 Presentation of findings at conference 
proceedings and related publications 
 
 
On a final note, this thesis has taken a number of steps to safeguard against ethical problems. 
In the interest of transparency, the methods, assumptions, limitations and delimitations have 
been disclosed while the anonymity of respondents and their respective firms has been 
guaranteed60. While every effort was made to avoid editing interviewees’ commentary, any 
comments that could be used to identify the respondent or his/her place of employment were 
removed with amendments to the quotations indicated. In addition, as recommended by 
Creswell (2009), Holland (1998b) and Holland and Stoner (1996), participants were informed of 
the nature and purpose of the research, of their right to withdraw at any time, and have been 
offered a copy of the final report. As interviews can amount to ‘moral enquiry’ (Creswell, 2009), 
                                               
60
 Interview recordings and transcripts have not been made available to other researchers. Further, as the researcher 
is a member of SAICA, and bound by confidentiality, interview transcripts may not be accessed by third parties.  
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the data collection instruments were reviewed by Ethics Unit at Kings College London 
(Appendix D) and were piloted (Appendix B3) with no material ethical concerns noted. As many 
participants were bound by professional standards or codes of conduct (IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 
2012) the researcher and technical consultant paid special attention to ensuring that engaging 
in the research would not pose ethical problems for interviewees. Finally, digital recordings of 
the interviews and transcripts will be subject to strict access controls and will be retained on file 
for a period of two years after the completion of the study. Due to restrictions on the researcher 
in terms of the IFAC (2006), IRBA (2011) and SAICA (2012) codes of conduct, third parties will 
not be permitted access to this material. These ethical safeguards, coupled with the reliability 
and validity measures discussed above, ultimately provide reasonable assurance on the quality 






FIGURE 3.2: DIAGRAMMATIC OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH APPROACH  
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This study adopts a social constructivist world view. Individuals develop subjective meanings of 
their experiences, implying that phenomena can be studied by exploring multiple perspectives of 
participants (Chua, 1986; Kaplan and Ruland, 1991; Ahrens et al, 2008; Creswell, 2009). As a 
result, the study is a non-positivist one. The intention is not to simplify the research problem; to 
quantify audit quality, legitimacy or perceived disciplinary power; extrapolate findings; or seek a 
unique ‘truth’. Rather, an interpretive methodological approach is followed with detailed 
interviews and, to a limited extent in Chapter 5, a correspondence analysis as data collection 
instruments. This approach allows for multiple perspectives of experts and informed users to be 
examined in detail, shedding light on a specific aspect of auditing systems.  
A highly iterative, flexible data collection process inspired by grounded theory has been 
employed. A qualitative study of this form will not be able to produce a simplified model for 
‘quantification’ of audit quality in a positivist fashion.  This is not a shortcoming as the aim of this 
study is not to present ‘scientific’ fact or the ‘optional solution’ but to shed light on a social 
phenomenon. In doing so, the thesis speaks to the need for practically-inspired research in an 
auditing context, taking into account the insights of those on the ‘front lines’ of the audit 
profession (Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008).  As an added advantage, the thesis produces one 
of the first insights into audit practice, quality control systems and reporting from an African 
perspective and on whistle-blowing by external auditors in general. To this end, Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 discuss the first aspect of the RI provisions: their perceived impact on audit quality 
control systems. This will be followed by considering the association between the RI provisions 
and conceptions of legitimacy (Chapter 6) and notions of disciplinary power (Chapter 7).  
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4: INTERVIEW FINDINGS: AUDIT QUALITY AND S45 OF THE 
APA 
 
This chapter explores the role of s45 with audit quality. As agency costs increase, Section 2.2 
explains that the demand for high quality audit grows (Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Solomon, 
2009) and that additional external regulation may be one means of driving improved audit 
quality. This is especially true in the aftermath of market failures (consider Haigh and de Graaf, 
2009; DeFond and Lennox, 2011). South Africa’s RI provisions may be no exception.  
The APA (2005) does not require the auditor to design audit procedures aimed specifically at 
identifying RI’s (IRBA, 2006) and should not be interpreted as creating a statutory duty for the 
auditor to detect fraud61. Nevertheless, the RI provisions create a reporting duty over and above 
the traditional requirement to express an opinion on a client’s financial statements (IAASB, 
2009c; IAASB, 2009s; IAASB, 2009t) which are backed by sanctions for non-compliance and 
which could expose the auditor to litigation risk (IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006). Accordingly the RI 
provisions may have implications for the level of engagement quality per ISQC 1, especially as, 
practically, whether or not the auditor has made a reasonable effort in complying with the 
whistle-blowing duty would be linked with the adherence to sound quality control principles. In 
this context, this chapter deals with the first research question (Section 1.4; Section 2.2.4):   
A. Do the provisions of s45 of the APA have an impact on the quality control systems 
of audit firms? 
 
This section is organised as follows62: Section 4.1 considers whether or not the provisions of 
s45 of the APA cause engagement leaders to take a greater leadership responsibility role on 
external audits (A1). An overview of the requirements of ISQC 1 is provided, followed by the 
perspectives emerging from the detailed interviews. Section 4.2 follows a similar structure and 
deals with the implications of s45 of the APA for the perceived importance of ethical principles 
                                               
61
 For this reason, the possibility of the reporting duty contributing to an expectation gap, commonly associated with 
the auditor’s perceived duty to both detect and report fraud (Humphrey et al, 1992; Humphrey et al, 1993a; Khalifa et 
al, 2007) is not specifically addressed. Related to this, several critical writers have argued that audit regulatory 
developments, as well as certain audit practices themselves, may form part of complex institutional or political 
processes (Fogarty et al, 1991; Sikka et al, 1998; MacLullich, 2003; Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008). Such lines of 
thought are deferred to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.    
62
 Each of the sub-questions identified in Section 2.2.4 are addressed by this chapter.  
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(A2) and client acceptance and continuance protocols (including risk management) (A3). 
Section 4.3 explores the implications of the RI provisions for the perceived importance of human 
resource practices and engagement performance (A4); consultation, supervision and review 
(A5) and continuous improvement and firm-wide monitoring of quality controls (A6). Section 4.4 
summarises respondents’ comments.  
 
4.1: ENGAGEMENT LEADER PARTICIPATION  
 
4.1.1: REQUIREMENTS OF ISQC 1 
 
ISQC1 follows a conceptual approach to leadership, consistent with that found in King-III 
(IAASB, 2009x; IOD, 2009). It avoids using ‘enclosing controls’ which simply reduce quality 
mechanisms to a set of rules, relying on a more flexible approach aimed at encouraging sound 
professional judgement (see also McMillan, 2004; Messner, 2009; Christopher, 2010). 
Accordingly, the standard requires audit firms to promote an internal culture which 
champions engagement performance quality. A firm’s managing board of partners is, 
therefore, required to assume ultimate responsibility for the firm’s system of quality control 
(IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x). Clear, consistent and frequent ‘actions and communications’ 
by management are needed as well as a performance measurement system which ought to 
emphasise and align key performance indicators with the strategic drive for quality (see 
also Cohen et al, 2002; FRC, 2008a; IAASB, 2009x; Huntly, 2011; Oosthuizen, 2011) . Of 
particular relevance is the establishment of policies and procedures to address 
compensation, promotion, assignment of responsibility and the provision of resources to 
‘demonstrate the overriding commitment to quality’ (IAASB, 2009x, p. 13). In other words - 
echoing the provisions of codes of governance in South Africa, the UK and USA - the 
governance of the firm amounts to very little if the organisation’s leadership and ethos do 
not embrace a commitment to high quality audit (see also Drury, 2005; IOD, 2009; Dillard 





4.1.2: PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIT EXPERTS AND INFORMED USERS 
 
An internal culture of quality, including the need for engagement leader responsibility, has been 
well entrenched at audit firms, prior to s45 of the APA (E1, E3). Experts were unanimous in their 
view that auditing standards were being correctly applied and that the audit reports were 
appropriate. Few changes could be attributed to s45 of the APA barring the reminders given to 
staff of the professional duty associated with the respective legislation at the outset and during 
the course of audits. Similarly, performance evaluation, compensation, promotion, key 
performance indicators and strategic values were seen as audit-quality-orientated with the result 
that, for the firms’ leadership, irrespective of the size of the firms involved in the research, it has 
‘been largely business as usual’ (E4).  
That there has been no change in the leadership role played by partners due to the presence of 
the whistle-blowing duty may be interpreted positively as an indication that South African audit 
firms have, historically, adhered to sound audit quality control principles: 
‘...Audit quality is basically what we are all about. We would actually be very worried if people 
started changing what they do [on an audit] because of an Act....If you could somehow plot audit 
quality on a graph showing [our firm’s] audit quality three years before and after the introduction of 
[s45 of the APA] you would see no related change’ (E2). 
Additional involvement of engagement leaders when an RI is detected or suspected is, 
therefore, often largely procedural:   
‘Part and parcel of the risk assessment and response model embodied by ISA and [the respective 
firm’s] risk management policy’ (E7).   
‘You pretty much do the same as you normally would have, barring the extra paper work if you find 
an RI’ (E5).  
Expert 6, however, goes on to explain that, although few changes have occurred ‘on the 
ground’:  
‘ I think the reality is that there [are] a lot more implications because of [s45 of the APA] and that 
places far more pressure on the partner - but whether that makes a difference in terms of quality of 
the audit opinion or quality of the audit, probably not’ (E6).  
While confirming that audit quality is not directly affected by the legislation, this comment 
highlights an individualising effect on engagement leaders, a sentiment shared by almost all 
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audit experts. Expert 9 for example, explained that while a ‘firm’s quality procedures comply with 
ISA and thus cater for dealing with RI’s’, there is a ‘clear sense that you are the one who’s 
ultimately accountable for the audit and I think that s45 [of the APA] is driving that message 
home’. Under the APA, experts pointed out that an individual registered auditor can be guilty of 
an offence for a failure to report an RI when he ought reasonably to have done so (s44 and 52 
of the APA, 2005), providing an explanation for this sense of greater responsibility. Experts, 
however, describe engagement involvement when an RI is suspected mainly as a demonstrable 
act of compliance. The focus is not only on doing what is required, but being able to 
‘demonstrate that you are doing the right thing’ (E12) potentially pointing to a ‘tick the box 
mentality’ (U11) which was identified by some respondents as a possible reason for s45 of the 
APA not leading to more substantive changes at the engagement level. By virtue of the fact that 
s45 of the APA has a set of rigid prescriptions to be followed in the event of detecting or 
suspecting an RI (IRBA, 2006), it becomes an example of an enclosing control that cultivates an 
attitude of ‘blind compliance’ (E5) and ‘the result is that the auditor blows the whistle when he 
must. He has no enthusiasm or desire to do anything more or less than comply with the [the 
APA]’ (E10).   
Encouraging an attitude of compliance does not, however, mean that ‘ticking the box’ (E12) is 
all that matters. Under King-III (2009), a leadership body should be responsible and accountable 
for the actions and sustainability of the organisation. Section 45 of the APA emphasises this for 
at least some experts who reported a change in their attitude towards risk management: 
 ‘I think that, overall, there is at least some impact on partner leadership – but only because of the 
emphasis that is placed [on reporting]. [Complying with s45 of the APA] is largely an administrative 
issue...but  the fact that [whistle-blowing] is legislated means that it is now more in your face...Just 
look at the number of RI’s...That number has shot through the roof and I think one reason is that 
there is more focus on [reporting]. There is more awareness from partners that they have a 
responsibility for it...’ (E1).  
‘What the legislation has done is make it clear that you are personally responsible for reporting 
shenanigans. You have a moral duty to do it and that leads to a sense of accountability for some 
auditors’ (U15).  
In other words, there is a sense that the legislation ‘internalises’ the reporting duty and that a 
type of social obligation arises to blow the whistle on certain transgressions (a line of thought 
explored in more detail in Chapter 6). Section 45 of the APA, therefore, becomes part of the 
broader social duty of the engagement leader, possibly linked to the idea of audit serving the 
public interest as argued by the legislature at the time of enacting the APA (Nel, 2001). Ethics 
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and a sense of professionalism also, however, have a role to play. Expert 5, refuting the 
argument that s45 of the APA led to more partner participation defended this opinion: 
‘I have a duty to the people that work with me to make sure that we do [the audit] to the best of our 
ability and also a duty to the client and its shareholders. I take my work very personally and having 
a sense of professional duty, I am worried about my own good name and the good name of my 
firm’ (E5). 
In this context, legislation itself had no real bearing. The name of the firm and sense of 
professional commitment were primary drivers of engagement leader participation on audits, 
pointing to ‘personal beliefs’ and professional appearance being a driving force for professionals 
(see also  Edwards, 2001; Carrington, 2010; SAICA, 2012). Being more specific to the individual 
partners, these ‘elements of audit quality’ (E10; E5) were largely independent of the size of the 
audit firms, including the type of clients that different experts were dealing with. Likewise, most 
users – also being professionals – reached largely the same conclusions as experts63. 
Compliance with the legislation is still seen as an important issue that can lead to engagement 
leader participation, but higher levels of practical involvement by audit partners is, for almost all 
experts and users, better explained by a sense of professional duty and the personal values – 
including ethical principles - of the individuals in question.  
 
4.2: ADHERENCE TO ETHICAL PRINCIPLES INCLUDING CLIENT 
ACCEPTANCE AND CONTINUANCE  
 
4.2.1: REQUIREMENTS OF ISQC 1 
 
Carrington (2010) and Wines (2012) argue that the auditor’s professional standing, including 
both independence of fact and appearance (SAICA, 2012; Schmidt, 2012) are critical 
characteristics of high quality audits (Bazerman and Moore, 2011). The sentiment is shared by 
the IFAC (2006) and equivalent quality control standards in the USA (Bedard et al, 2008) which 
see independence of audit staff, and the culture of leadership driving firm-wide ethics, as highly 
                                               
63
 The fact that most users expressed similar views to experts and that no differences were noted between the 
opinions of experts from the Big 4 audit firms and other audit service providers should be read in light of the 
limitations noted in Section 1.4.2. 
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important. A similar message is advanced in codes of corporate governance (IOD, 2009; 
Solomon, 2010).   
In this context, ISQC 1 requires audit firms to promote an ‘internal culture’ which 
champions engagement quality, including the need to ensure the highest standards of 
ethical conduct. Threats to integrity, objectivity, professional competency and due care, 
professional behaviour and confidentiality (the fundamental principles) must, therefore, be 
identified and mitigated (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x, p. 5). In particular, the audit firm’s 
leadership should pay attention to the ethical culture of the firm and promote firm-wide 
policies that stress the importance of ethical behaviour (IAASB, 2009c, p. 14). As discussed 
in Section 4.1, active and responsible leadership should be complemented by a performance 
measurement system which emphasises the relevance of audit quality and aligns it with the 
strategic objectives of the firm (see also Cohen et al, 2002; FRC, 2008a;  
Oosthuizen, 2011).   
A conceptual approach to governance is followed where the audit partners are ultimately 
responsible for the ethical ‘tone’ of the firm and held accountable for ethical transgressions 
(IAASB, 2009x, p. 14). The standard focuses mainly on the need to identify and mitigate threats 
to compliance with the fundamental principles (FRC, 2008a; FRC, 2008b; IAASB, 2009x: 14; 
European Commission, 2010b), in line with the importance of professional standing and 
reputation identified by the prior audit quality literature (examples include Francis, 2004; Lim 
and Tan, 2008; Carrington, 2010).  
While auditor independence is highly relevant in this regard, the clients with whom auditors are 
associated are also an important consideration (consider Carrington, 2010; Bazerman and 
Moore, 2011; Wines, 2012). The high quality audit firm, to ensure independence and sound 
engagement performance, needs to be selective with its prospective clients (Asare et al, 2005; 
IFAC, 2006; SAICA, 2012), a concept also featured in US GAAS (Bedard et al, 2008) and, at 
least to some extent, in codes of governance (IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2010; IRC, 2011). For 
example, ISQC 1 recommends that firms only undertake those engagements which they have 
the necessary resources and skills to execute and to avoid those engagements characterised 
by an unacceptably high level of risk (IAASB, 2009x). In this context, the standard  requires the 
firm to develop client acceptance and continuance procedures designed to ensure that it is 
capable of executing engagements to the highest standards (see also Cohen et al, 2002; Asare 
et al, 2005; Farag and Elias, 2011; SAICA, 2012). Codification of client acceptance and 
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continuance protocols and documentation of the processes followed and conclusions reached 
complement this (see, for example, Cohen et al, 2002; Bedard et al, 2008; FRC, 2008a; IAASB, 
2009x; Owhoso and Weickgenannt, 2009; Farag and Elias, 2011). In other words, sound client 
acceptance and continuance work becomes an integral part of preventing and managing threats 
to ethical requirements (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x; IAASB, 2009e; IAASB, 2009d). 
These principles are largely consistent with King-III which encourages the use of formal codes 
of conduct and effective leadership that cultivate a culture of ethical awareness (IOD, 2009; 
IRC, 2011). Although not directly addressing client acceptance and continuance by audit firms, 
King-III refers to sustainable business practices and effective risk management, which would 
include an assessment of an organisation’s business relations. In this way, the auditor is 
expected to consider, not only the well-being of the firm, but also the client and those to whom 
the audit report is ultimately addressed (see also IFAC, 2006; Bedard et al, 2008; IAASB, 
2009x; IOD, 2009). There is a sense of ‘socialising responsibility’ (Roberts, 1991; McMillan, 
2004) focusing on the good name of the profession and the realisation that audit quality is 
rooted, to some extent, in the ethics and reputation of the audit firm (consider DeAngelo, 1981a; 
DeAngelo, 1981b; Sainty et al, 2002; Fernando et al, 2010).  
 
4.2.2: PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIT EXPERTS AND INFORMED USERS 
 
Experts generally indicated that a responsibility for policies and procedures aimed at ensuring 
compliance with ethical requirements, client acceptance and continuance assessments, driving 
a culture of quality and establishing the ethical consciousness of the firm has little to do with s45 
of the APA: 
‘I don't think that we are more aware of ethical issues because of the reporting obligations. We 
would have all of the independence requirements and regulations that we would otherwise have to 
comply with anyway...irrespective of whether or not section 45 [of the APA] existed’ (E6). 
‘In any event, the independence rules are so hectic that I think [the RI provisions] are covered...’ 
(E7). 
‘[Independence]...that is the hallmark - the cornerstone of our profession: quality and 
independence. Nothing else is really important. So those things: quality and independence cannot 
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be driven by simple regulation. Barring existence of certain admin issues, that means that it’s pretty 
much been business as usual’ (E2). 
Further, on the issue of client acceptance and continuance, s45 of the APA was described by 
most experts as having been ‘discounted’ into the overall risk assessment process, particularly 
as part of the consideration of a client’s adherence to laws and regulations and principles of 
good governance.  One expert, however, took a more critical view:   
‘[When it comes to the firm’s policies on independence] section 45 does not do a single thing, 
whatsoever, for me, regarding any ethical issues. Nothing whatsoever!  If we are independent of 
the client, we are independent of other reasons...I want to comply with [the independence 
requirements] because of what I am as an auditor. There is no rule or section in any Act that will 
make me more ethical than I already am. That is just the way it is. As a professional accountant, 
that is what you do. You do not need a section in an Act to make you more ethical. I don't think it's 
even possible. You are either ethical or you're not’ (E5). 
For several experts, the need to adhere to the fundamental principles was deeply engrained in 
what it meant to be a professional accountant. Most experts stressed that they felt a personal 
and professional duty to both their firms and the shareholders of respective clients to discharge 
their duties to the best of their ability and that s45 of the APA is ‘just an add-on’ (E9). This sense 
of professional duty, particularly towards a client’s shareholders (as opposed to the client 
directly) points to a post-conventional level of moral awareness. Sweeny and Roberts (1997: 
338-240) describe this as a cognitive state characterised by heightened ethical sensitivity and 
decision-making, conforming with organisational values and ‘internally held beliefs.’ For several 
experts a desire to adhere to their respective firms and IFAC (2006) codes, subject to the 
context in which they were operating, suggests ethical reasoning at the post-conventional level. 
As explained, while codes of conduct are important:  
A ‘holistic response to independence is needed’ (E5), taking the surrounding factors and context 
into account (E9), including a ‘personal assessment of what it means to you to be a professional’ 
(E8) with the result that ‘just following the rules without thinking about them isn’t the way to go’ 
(U15).  
Emotive references to the duty to shareholders (rather than the client itself), ‘moral duty’ (E13) 
and ‘holistic responses to independence’ (E5) imply a sense of social commitment and moral 
‘rightness’ (E11). There is more to ethical requirements than just compliance with a code to 
ensure behaviour consistent with ‘referent group norms’. Actions must also be consistent with 
‘internally held beliefs’ and values (Sweeney and Roberts, 1997, p. 339). Prescriptions of the 
APA do not, in themselves, lead these partners to be any more or less aware of the importance 
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of ethics echoing the findings of Sweeny and Roberts (1997) and McMillan (2004) - that rules 
and regulations do not materially affect ethical conduct for all professionals. Analogously, many 
experts are not motivated by prescriptions and sanctions of the APA and a majority of users 
reached a similar conclusion on the limited role of the RI provisions when it comes to auditor 
ethics. Instead, there is a sense of idealism, a notion of public service and sense of duty to 
oneself, one’s firm and society (see also Edwards, 2001; Carrington, 2010; SAICA, 2012). Using 
client acceptance and continuance as an example, experts noted that:  
‘Despite the need to generate a profit you don’t want a client if it the client causes material threats to 
independence’ (E2). 
‘At the end of the day, you are accountable to the whole firm and, in a way, to the profession, and to the 
shareholders of clients and that means that sometimes client fees need to take second place. You have 
a moral duty as a professional accountant – don’t forget that’ (E17). 
‘Besides, if the client is a crook, he will probably always be a crook and you don’t want that person as 
your client....you don’t want his fees’ (E5). ‘And that is not just the textbook answer, because I am 
worried about what you [the researcher] may want to write about. That is the honest to God truth 
about it’ (E4, emphasis added).  
Several experts reiterated these views, defending the decision to reject a client-based personal 
assessment and not by defaulting on professional standards. In each case, there is a sense of 
moral and professional duty that overrides the profit motive. For the majority of experts, codes of 
conduct are described as secondary, being used to corroborate experts’ opinions rather than 
form the basis of those opinions. Organisational standards and norms for client acceptance and 
continuance must be consistent with the internally held beliefs of these professionals, 
irrespective of perceptions, economic incentives and the size of the respective audit firms64. In 
summary: ‘we need to know that we have delivered a proper audit report’ (E5), ‘not just for the 
firm, and because of the quality control procedures, and [s45 of the APA], but also for me, 
personally’ (E14). Consistent with Sweeney and Roberts (1997), the prescriptions of the APA 
are not always material. ‘At the end of the day, it wasn’t as if s45 came out on Monday and 
suddenly there was a mad rush upstairs [to change our firm’s client acceptance policies]’ (E1).  
Experts also confirm the prior findings of, inter alia, Carrington (2010) and  
Guenin-Paracini (2010): that professional appearance is an important ‘element’ of audit quality, 
complemented by brand awareness and reputation of the audit firm:  
                                               
64
 See, however, the delimitations in Section 1.4.2  
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 ‘It comes back to the whole issue of: it’s your name on that file; it’s your name on that audit report. 
Once the client is a criminal, he won’t change...and there is no way that I can [continue to be that 
client’s auditor]’ (E5).  
For all experts there is a need to preserve one’s own name, the good name of the firm and of 
the profession which reaffirms a sense of moral and social duty and preservation of the 
reputation of the individual partner and the firm. This is far more relevant for ethical awareness 
than simple adherence to professional standards and the rules of s45 of the APA.  In particular, 
with external audit processes not being directly observable, professional appearance becomes 
pivotal (Carrington, 2010). This is not just a function of the independence of the auditor but also 
the clients with whom the auditor is associated.  Without being able to ‘calibrate the assurance 
axis’ (Power, 1999, p.28), while expert judgement and technical expertise are important, they 
must be reinforced by professional appearance (Carrington, 2010). As put by Pentland (1993), 
what audit experts strive for is the preservation of faith in the ‘sacred signature’ - a concept 
explored in more detail in Chapter 6 - more than just adherence to s45 of the APA.   As was the 
case with Section 4.1.2, with users being able to identify with the relevance of professionalism, 
including a sense of duty to one’s firm, most shared similar views with experts operating at post-
conventional levels of moral cognition.  
For some auditors, however, ethics and professionalism are frequently expressed in terms of 
compliance with organisational norms or professional codes and these individuals tend to be 
less sensitive to issues not embodied by those codes (E5; U10).  By creating a duty to report 
certain client transgressions, s45 of the APA ‘drives home’ the duty of the auditor to ‘serve as a 
watchdog’ (U2) and, coupled with that, the importance of independence of fact and appearance.  
In addition, several respondents commented that there was a tension between reporting duties 
which depart from the principle of client confidentiality and the business case for managing 
client relationships, a sentiment shared by the prior literature (Wyatt, 2004; IFAC, 2006; 
Wielligh, 2006; Bazerman and Moore, 2011) Section 45 of the APA may have a role to play in 
managing this tension:  
‘In any relationship...between yourself and the client, invariably you are going to get to a point 
where you are in a tight corner. And when you're in that tight corner, you need avenues to get you 
out of there. Almost like an escape hatch. And this legislation might be that escape hatch’ (E3).  
‘It would frustrate me to no end knowing that there is something wrong and not being able to do 
anything about it. It implicates you. You become part of it. At best, all you can do is tell the client to 
go and find another auditor. Ultimately, it would burn me to say, “I know that you have done wrong 
and there’s really nothing I can do about it”. So, the reporting duty has to stay. It gives a level of 
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protection to the audit profession. They have been given an important outlet to sound the 
alarm...and you can always come back and say you did it because of the legislation’ (U10).  
Paradoxically, despite its penalty provisions, s45 of the APA becomes an independence 
safeguard. Firstly, it resolves the dilemma of ‘reporting transgressions when in the public 
interest to do so, even if the audit report is unqualified’ (U1) despite client confidentiality 
requirements (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009g). This would be especially significant for those 
auditors dependent on rules and regulations both to define and resolve ethical dilemmas 
(Sweeney and Roberts, 1997). Reporting guidelines backed by fines and penalties (s52 of the 
APA) - and not based solely on professional judgement (IRBA, 2006) and ‘internally held moral 
conceptions’ (Sweeney and Roberts, 1997) - can influence decisions on reporting of wrongful 
acts for some auditors. In this context, s45 of the APA was seen by several experts as part of 
the broader regulatory machinery driven largely by developments overseas, such as SOX, 
working to reinforce independence of fact and appearance (U13). Litigation risk complements 
this and, per Palmrose (1988; 1997) and Deng et al (2012), can have a bearing on audit quality:  
‘The international firms [which include the Big 4 in South Africa] are always concerned with the risk 
of litigation...perhaps even more so than reputation...and remember that [s45 of the APA] may give 
the client a cause of action....so it [the whistle-blowing duty] capitalises on the whole issue of 
litigation risk and so the audit firms are probably worried about it and make sure they comply with it 
(U3)’.   
Respondents referred to the relative inefficiency of the South African Legal System and the 
absence of matters concerning s45 of the APA being taken before the courts. The general 
sentiment, however, was that the mere existence of mechanisms that could criminalise the 
auditor’s conduct and lead to civil action is probably sufficient to motivate the auditor to report 
transgressions and add to the quality of the reporting process, a line of thought explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 765.    
Secondly, by qualifying the report or blowing the whistle on the client in the absence of the APA 
(2005), several experts stressed client relations could be tarnished, leading to economic 
pressure to circumvent reporting. (This could be particularly pertinent for smaller audit practices 
which are more dependent on any one client and have fewer financial resources (E13), although 
experts agreed that even for larger firms, this would remain a relevant consideration.) By 
requiring acts leading to material financial loss, any fraud (irrespective of perceived significance) 
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 This is not to say that auditors would never consider simply disregarding s45 of the APA. This possibility is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 7.  
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and material breaches of fiduciary duty (a ‘vague catch all’ per User 1) to be reported ‘without 
delay’ – rather than within thirty days (Section 2.1.3) - it becomes difficult to rationalise not 
reporting something, when it is in the public interest to do so, in the name of maintaining the 
client relationship and fees (U1; U2).  
Similarly, from the auditor’s perspective, the legislation becomes an ‘independence shield’. 
Threats to compliance with the fundamental principles can be overcome as ‘when the client 
starts to complain, you fall back on the statutory duty’ (E8): 
‘When they found something wrong, [auditors] wanted to know how to report it without effectively 
“ratting out the client”. So they came at it from the angle of, well, I'm obliged to [report to the 
IRBA]...not just because “I am a good citizen” because, even if I am “a good citizen”, but [I am] not 
obliged to [report an irregularity], then one may ask, “why should I then [report the issue to the 
IRBA]?”But, when I am obliged to do so, at least I can say I was forced into it. So the legislation is a 
nice "escape valve”’ (U1). 
Finally, as explained by Hwang et al (2008), Kaplan and Schultz (2007)  and Schultz et al 
(1993), s45 of the APA may be a means of formalising what was loosely described by 
respondents as a ‘whistle-blowing requirement’, reducing the need to apply professional 
judgement when resolving whether or not to report transgressions. It also appears to lower the 
perceived personal costs of reporting to the IRBA in that the legislation ‘shields’ the auditor from 
client dissatisfaction with the result that transgressions that may have gone unreported, due to 
economic pressure on the auditor or difficulties deciding whether a reporting duty exists, are 
brought into the open.  This may be particularly true for smaller audit firms which could be more 
economically dependent on any one client (E13). From this perspective, users felt that the 
legislation reinforces auditors’ professional reputation and objectivity, aligning the auditor with 
the public image of the ‘watchdog’ (U4) (Chapter 6). Users generally confirmed the suspicions of 
Sikka et al (2009) McMillan (2004) and Pesqueux (2005): that capitalistic pressures at work on 
the audit firm could lead to compromised independence standards and a failure to report 
faithfully the findings of the audit. Section 45 of the APA was interpreted by these users as 






4.3: HUMAN RESOURCES, ENGAGEMENT PERFORMANCE AND 
MONITORING 
 
4.3.1: REQUIREMENTS OF ISQC 1 
 
Professional appearance and independence alone are not adequate. If the ‘rituals of verification’ 
(Humphrey et al, 1992) do not measure up to expectation, the professional image is eroded and 
notions of high quality audit may be lost (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al, 1992; 
Carrington, 2010).  For this reason, both ISA (IAASB, 2009x) and US GAAS (Bedard et al, 
2008) stress the need for sound human resource practices, engagement performance and 
continuous quality control improvement.  
Under ISQC 1, audit engagements ought to be executed to the highest standards in accordance 
with ISA and relevant regulatory requirements (IAASB, 2009x; PwC, 2010). The objective is to 
execute an engagement with a mind to reducing audit risk to an acceptable level, allowing the 
auditor to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in a client’s financial statements 
(IAASB, 2009c) To achieve this, engagement teams require appropriate skills, resources and 
ethical standing to discharge their professional duties (IFAC, 2006; IAASB, 2009x).  
Concurrently, audit staff must be held accountable for compliance with the firm’s system of 
quality control, which should be clearly documented and communicated to all levels of the audit 
firm (FRC, 2008a; IAASB, 2009x).  An audit partner with adequate time and expertise should be 
identified as responsible for each engagement to ensure maximum quality at the engagement 
level (IAASB, 2009e). Ultimately, the skill-sets of the engagement team, including the partner, 
must reflect the nature of and risk associated with the client (IAASB, 2009x), a requirement 
reinforced by s44 of the APA. The aim is to ensure that the audit firm only undertakes those 
engagements which it is competent to perform (IFAC, 2006) consistent with the essence of 
codes of corporate governance (Christopher, 2010). This does not mean that every team 
member is expected to be an expert but it does necessitate supervision, monitoring and review 
by more experienced team members (IAASB, 2009x). 
‘Review’ is the formal examination of the work of junior staff by those with more experience to 
evaluate its adequacy (IAASB, 2009x). To ensure that the time, experience, expertise and 
judgement of junior staff is assessed as facts and circumstances change, supervision caters for 
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monitoring and mentoring by experienced team members. Supervision and review are 
interconnected processes with review frequently driving additional testing based on an 
assessment of the sufficiency and appropriateness of the audit evidence gathered to date. It 
allows for senior members of the audit team to assess whether or not testing meets the 
objectives of the engagement and affords them an opportunity to immerse themselves in the 
details of the audit work performed. In turn, this allows for a continuous examination of audit risk 
and evaluation of the nature, timing and extent of required audit procedures (IAASB, 2009g; 
IAASB, 2009l; IAASB, 2009m; IAASB, 2009x; Owhoso and Weickgenannt, 2009).  
Supervision and review may also trigger the need for consultation. As auditing requires 
professional judgement (Bedard et al, 2008; IAASB, 2009a) consultation on difficult and 
contentious matters serves as a quality safeguard (see also: Bedard et al, 2008; Owhoso and 
Weickgenannt, 2009; Nagy, 2012). By calling on the ‘collective experience and technical 
expertise of the firm’ (IAASB, 2009x, pp. 19-20; IAASB, 2009c) complex and subjective issues 
are more thoroughly assessed; differences of opinions can be explored and resolved; and 
conclusions are more consistent. Formal documentation then ensures the posterity and 
transparency of the consultation process. In this way, consultation, monitoring and review speak 
to the need for ‘risk governance and management’, per King-III, by the firm’s leadership.  
Continuous assessment and improvement complements the ‘risk governance’ processes.  
ISQC 1 requires audit firms continually to assess the design, operation and effectiveness of 
their quality control systems, including reviews of each engagement leader’s audits (IAASB, 
2009x). This should be vested in the hands of suitably experienced individuals to drive the need 
for improvement; reinforce existing capabilities (consider, for example, Drury, 2005; Botten, 
2009; Grafton et al, 2010); and prompt remedial action as needed (FRC, 2008a; IAASB, 2009x). 
The results of these quality reviews should be communicated at a firm-wide level to drive a 
culture of continuous improvement (see also Merchant, 2008; Botten, 2009; IOD, 2009). 
For the benefits of consultation, monitoring, review and quality assessment to be realised 
appropriate documentation is paramount. It allows for a formal record of the activity over the 
course of the audit to be tracked and assessed, facilitating improvement, supervision, third party 
review, staff accountability and transparency (from the perspective of the audit team). 
Documentation also provides evidence of compliance with ISA, ethical standards and statutory 




4.3.2: PERCEPTIONS OF EXPERTS AND USERS: EXECUTION OF 
ENGAGEMENTS 
 
Experts reported little impact from the RI provisions on audit firms’ human resources, 
engagement performance, monitoring, review and continuous improvement processes, 
irrespective of the size of the respective audit firms:  
‘I would not say that the legislation has a direct effect. Every year you strive to improve quality 
because you acknowledge that your [audit] file is never perfect. I think the focus has been more on 
the ISA clarity project and changes in accounting and auditing in general. At the end of the day, the 
Act has been around for a while’ (E7).  
This view is largely consistent with the fact that the objective of an audit is to express an opinion 
on the financial statements (IAASB, 2009c; IAASB, 2009s). While s45 of the APA creates a duty 
to report certain transgressions to the IRBA, it does not require the auditor actively to seek out 
RI’s (IRBA, 2006). The RI provisions are seen simply as a part of the audit process - particularly 
considering a client’s compliance with laws and regulations (IAASB, 2009h).   
Where the legislation appears to have most relevance is for consultation, with the majority of 
experts indicating that the decision to report would require considerable discussion with peers, 
irrespective of the size of the audit firm. On the one hand, this is driven largely by the desire for 
accurate and correct reporting (E6; E1); avoiding unnecessarily upsetting client relations (E3; 
E9); and preserving professional appearance (E6; E7). On the other hand:  
‘[Consulting on an RI] is purely to make sure that we are complying with the Act....It’s about making 
sure you tick the box’ (E5).  
‘The idea is that [the audit team] will at least talk about [RI’s] so that they at least have reportable 
irregularities at the back of their minds...We need to be able to say to a regulator that we are 
thinking about reportable irregularities at the appropriate point in the audit’ (E8).  
 ‘We have the standard agenda for our [planning meetings]. It’s the same – you tell the team what 
an RI is and what to do if you find it’ (E2). 
‘There might be a generic risk that causes us to put out an alert [to our staff]...but I don’t think that 
the reporting duty has been a trigger for anything that we have done’ (E8). 
‘....and there are the standard [requirements] on the audit file where you have to consider if you 
have discussed the legislation with the team and have documented your rationale for reporting or 
not reporting something (if necessary). And after that, you sign it off and it’s done’ (E7).   
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To an extent, standardised documentation for RI considerations and review thereof is designed 
to ensure that reporting decisions are consistent and appropriate, as per Ashton (1992) who 
argues that mechanical aids can improve judgement performance. This may be especially 
important in an auditing context given a heuristic approach rooted in reliance on professional 
judgement (Owhoso and Weickgenannt, 2009; Hardies et al, 2011). Litigation risk is also 
relevant. Bona fide reporting to the IRBA when, in fact, no irregularity has taken place, may lead 
to civil action against the auditor (IRBA, 2006; Maroun and Gowar, 2013). Conversely, a failure 
to report when one ought reasonably to have done so may result in fines or imprisonment (s52 
of the APA).  Consistency and accuracy of the judgement process, rather than being related to 
the drive for audit quality, is more about ‘making sure that we are covering the firm’ (E5) and, 
due to the consequences for the reputation of the individual partner, ‘covering your own arse’ 
(E7). Documentation is inextricably linked to this, providing a formal record of the auditor’s 
considerations to justify the act of reporting or not reporting to the IRBA (E5; E6).  
On the matter of engagement execution, changes to ‘consultations, staffing, skills and resource 
assessment and monitoring’ and ‘audit ground work’ are ‘simply part and parcel of quality 
developments in general’ (E1). While having to comply with the APA, firms have also been 
required to comply with, inter alia, SOX, changes to the professional standards and resulting 
internal quality requirements making it practically impossible to attribute specific changes in 
engagement performance to s45 of the APA. Accordingly, the reporting duty seems to be 
correlated more with a sense of self-preservation and protection of both the firm and individual 
partner from a risk of litigation or professional sanctions than with a valuable driver of audit 
quality.  An exception is the issue of audit reporting where s45 of the APA appears to have a 
material impact.  
 
4.3.3: PERCEPTIONS OF EXPERTS AND USERS: REPORTING   
 
For the CESR (2007), European Commission (2010b; 2010a), and the IAASB (2012), of 
particular relevance is the extent and quality of information being made available by auditors to 
stakeholders. When it comes to the quality of information reported by the auditor in the context 
of the RI provisions:  
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‘At the end of the day, it’s only really the auditor who understands the [audit] 
report...which has been crafted to cover the auditor...[At least s45 of the APA] gives 
flavour to what the auditor is reporting’ (U3).  
‘The auditor report doesn’t report on everything that the auditor finds...There is also a lot 
of judgement [in deciding whether or not and on what basis to qualify the audit report]. 
So, there will always be different interpretations’ (U7).  
Humphrey et al (1993b), Chandler et al (1993), Hassink et al (2010) and Edwards (2001) point 
to an ‘expectation gap’ when it comes to the duty of auditors not only to report on fraud (an 
example of an RI) but also to detect it. The RI provisions do not resolve the latter problem with 
the ‘nuts and bolts of audit’ not changed by the legislation (U2). Respondents, pointing to the 
practical difficulties, cost restrictions, and time constraints of including fraud detection in the 
auditor’s mandate, agreed with s45 of the APA stopping short of requiring the active detection of 
RI’s.66 Where, however, an ‘expectation gap’ is practically addressed is with the nature of what 
is reported. Examining the nature and extent of the audit expectation gap in the UK and New 
Zealand, Porter (2012), for instance, finds that many perceived deficiencies associated with 
differences between reasonably expected audit functions and those required by professional 
standards could be ascribed to inadequate reporting of information which could be readily 
accessed by the auditor without undue cost or effort (see also Humphrey et al, 1993a). From 
this perspective, in the absence of s45 of the APA,   
‘one [would] not normally see [various transgressions] coming through in the emphasis of matters 
paragraphs
67
 [of the audit report]. Normally, the emphasis of matter is only about a going concern 
[problem]...so in many respects the quality of the audit report that is issued, including in the 
absence of legislation, is inadequate....What s45 of the APA does is expand on what is required 
from the auditor’ (U3).  
‘What we are reporting for the purpose of the legislation is factors that may impact the risk 
environment that we are auditing but which do not necessarily impact the financial statements...so I 
think the legislation serves a complementary purpose. It can alert users to the issues around 
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 Experts and users were unanimous in this view. This does not imply that an expectation gap does not exist. What 
is more likely is that users, being highly informed of the audit process (Section 3.3), do not have the same varied 
expectations as, for example, a general investor. Further consideration of the auditor’s duty actively to detect fraud, 
and its contribution to an audit expectation gap, is beyond the scope of this research (Section 1.4.2; Section 8.3).  
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corporate governance – and some of that might not normally have come through the audit opinion’ 
(E8). 
Interviewees explained that the traditional reporting duty of the auditor could, to some extent, be 
seen as passive or too generic (European Commission, 2010a; IAASB, 2012). The RI 
provisions can be interpreted as complementing the auditor’s standard reporting requirements 
with a more proactive approach (Section 4.3; Section 6.1) that requires the auditor to report 
transgressions and effectively demonstrate a commitment to the public interest (Nel, 2001; 
Opperman, 2009). A similar sentiment was shared by the Minister of Finance commenting on 
the promulgation of the PAAA (1951) and genesis of the auditor’s whistle-blowing duty (Section 
2.1.4):  
‘A most important aspect of this piece of legislation is Parliament’s recognition of the principle that 
an auditor owes a duty not only to his client but also to the public. For many years auditors have 
been in doubt as to their responsibility to the public. Parliament has now given a clear and 
unequivocal answer’ (Minister of Finance of the Republic of South Africa cited in Nel, 2001: 318).  
 
Clarifying this view:  
 
‘So, to sum up, basically, what s45 [of the APA] is saying is that the auditor cannot just give a 
generic audit opinion any more. He is expected to blow the whistle on shenanigans because, as a 
professional in a position of trust, he owes this duty to the users of the audit reports’ (E16). 
 
Respondents pointed to the possibility of RI’s being useful for investors even though they may 
have no material bearing on the financial statements or traditional audit report. For this reason, 
simply legislating compliance with professional standards is not enough as ‘you can comply 
perfectly with ISQC 1 and still not report [an RI]’ (U1). For example a failure to pay certain taxes 
may have no material impact on the financials but could be relevant for the investor wanting to 
assess the ‘moral status’ of the firm or its inherent risk (E3). The South African Revenue 
Services may be extremely interested, even if the amounts are below the auditor’s materiality 
levels (E4). The companies’ regulator may want to know if annual general meetings are taking 
place or the relevant statutory returns are up-to-date (U7). Similarly, trade unions, 
environmentalists, or lobbyists could find an RI telling, depending on its nature and irrespective 
of the effect on the financial statements (E14). The end result is that ‘we have an independent 
and external way of reporting these problems’ (U7) and ‘by airing the dirty laundry...there are 
fewer unpleasant surprises’ (E17).   
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Accordingly, s45 of the APA becomes an important part of the corporate governance landscape. 
Respondents pointed to how the whistle-blowing duty enhances stakeholder decision-making by 
virtue of the fact that improprieties - not otherwise divulged in the audit report – are effectively 
brought into the public domain. As such, most respondents agreed that, to at least some extent, 
the RI provisions were important for improving corporate governance compliance and 
enhancing a sense of transparency and accountability on the part of auditees (Section 6.1; 
Section 7.1).  This thinking is confirmed by the views on whistle-blowing in general as a 
communication and transparency enhancing mechanism (examples include Vinten, 2000; Nel, 
2001; Vinten, 2003; PwC, 2011b). The fact that irregularities can be brought into the open 
effectively enhances decision-making processes concurrently adding to corporate transparency 
and encouraging compliance with existing governance standards (Vinten, 2000; Vinten, 2003; 
Kaplan and Schultz, 2007; Opperman, 2009; ICAS, 2010; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010).  
The prior literature on whistle-blowing identifies two primary reporting impediments: the fear of 
retaliation and uncertainty as to when a reporting duty exists and who ought to report (Staub, 
1978; Near and Miceli, 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001; Seifert et al, 2010). For informed 
users, both limitations are addressed by the RI provisions which are embodied in law and define 
when one should report, complemented by the IRBA’s guide (2006). As explained by User 1:  
‘I don’t think that s45 has changed anything [in terms of how audits are done] but when [the auditor] 
stumbles upon [an RI] that is where the difference lies. Now, there is no longer the quandary of 
should I report because I am a good citizen or because of some common law ideal...In some cases, 
reporting is very easy. Consider the ludicrous situation where the client is dealing in drugs. Nobody 
would have a problem reporting that. But when you look at more difficult cases, like tax fraud, why 
should I report that? It’s very easy when its drugs or arms or outright theft...but when it’s not the 
easy cases? It’s much more difficult to reach the conclusion: yes, I must report’ (U1). 
As discussed in Section 4.2, respondents also felt that the legislation provided a ‘shield’ for the 
auditor, allowing him to justify reporting to a disgruntled client on legal grounds, with fines and 
penalties increasing the cost of non-reporting as an added incentive (Chapter 7). The result is 
that, ‘in the absence of the legislation, there might never have been an obligation or incentive to 
tell anyone’ (U3).  Concurrently, some respondents pointed to the external auditor as offering a 
confidential and secure whistle-blowing mechanism for staff at a client who, in the absence of 
the RI provisions may have been required to blow the whistle themselves with the result that 
perceived fear of retaliation would undermine effective reporting (see, for example, Hwang et al, 
2008; Seifert et al, 2010).  
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This is not to say that every reportable irregularity is useful. A major criticism of s45 of the APA 
is that, unlike its predecessor, the APA requires any act of fraud, even if otherwise immaterial, to 
be reported (PwC, 2006; Wielligh, 2006).  
‘An unintended consequence may indeed be over-reporting and a dilution of the usefulness of 
reports. It’s almost like a spam attack’ (U3). 
 ‘I can’t, [therefore], help wonder if we won’t end up crying “wolf” so many times that the people 
stop paying attention to what we are saying’ (E17).  
Having to report ‘without delay’ (IRBA, 2006) rather than being afforded a 30-day period to 
discuss and resolve the matter with the client first (Section 2.1) is arguably compounding the 
problem by leading to premature reporting (U1; E5: U10). Some experts even went so far as to 
argue that the reporting timelines could lead to disclosure of incorrect facts, itself a threat to 
auditor integrity and objectivity (E5; U10).  On the whole, however, the majority of users and 
experts were in favour of the RI provisions. In particular, users were of the opinion that the 
reporting process needs to cater for the information needs of a broad group of users, a concept 
fully consistent with a stakeholder-centric view on corporate governance (Christopher, 2010; 
Solomon, 2010) and the approach adopted by the IASB (2010) with respect to financial 
reporting68. For example,  
‘You can’t be biased and say that because you found XYZ inconsequential that someone else 
won’t. Look at the [South African Revenue Services] – they don’t care if it was a R10 fraud or a R10 
million fraud. For that particular user, that is material and it should be reportable...and in that light 
because the user group is so broad it makes sense to get rid of the “materiality requirements” [per 
s20(5) of the PAAA]’ (U3).  
From a slightly different perspective, the refinement of the reporting duty can be explained as 
narrowing a type of ‘whistle-blowing expectation gap’. 
‘When we had material irregularities, hardly any got reported. Clearly we had the auditor setting the 
materiality thresholds and [regulators] were thinking about materiality in their own way....and the 
two just weren’t aligned’ (U2). 
User 10 elaborates on this, explaining the increase in the number of RI’s reported compared to 
MI’s before the enactment of the APA:  
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‘One of the reasons why there were so few material irregularities reported was [due to the 
application of professional judgement]...Relying on professional judgement may be the best 
approach, theoretically...but what does that actually mean? How would you interpret that?...The 
number of irregularities reported have definitely gone up because the legislation acts like a catch-
all.  If you are the auditor of the company, now also auditing the integrated report, and [an 
irregularity] comes to your attention, you have to report...[and] that resolves a type of expectation 
gap between what the auditor actually reports and what the general user would expect him to 
report’ (U10).   
In other words, the RI provisions are addressing the issue of the application of professional 
judgement leading to inconsistent conclusions regarding whether or not an irregularity ought to 
be reported. This, together with a type of independence safeguard – as discussed above – 
implies that the legislation is promoting a ‘culture of reporting which is critical for sound 
functioning of our capital market, even if the cost of this has been that some trivial mattes have 
been reported’ (U2)69. Added reporting by the auditor also addresses the expectation that 
auditors do more than just issue a standard report lacking in depth (E18). This allows the attest 
function to be akin to ‘a public watchdog’ (U2; E10) (Section 6.1), thereby adding to the image of 
auditor independence. Further audit experts suggested that the RI provisions create an 
independence safeguard, allowing auditors to report transgressions using the legislation as a 
‘buffer’ with the client (Section 4.2). The change from the PAAA (1951) to the APA (2005) 
whereby any instance of fraud is reported, even if perceived as immaterial, contributes to this by 
creating ‘layers of independence’ (U2; U5). The decision on whether or not an irregularity is 
sufficiently material to inform a relevant third party is vested with an independent body, the IRBA 
(IRBA, 2006). Several respondents, therefore, felt that the issue of clients using materiality 
levels to pressurise the auditor to refrain from reporting is rendered moot (E3; U7). The same 
may apply to the removal of the 30-day window period (U7; U3) which could have been relied 
upon to circumvent the reporting duty (Nel, 2001) thereby ensuring more active and effective 
reporting by auditors.  
While most experts were unanimous that complacency did not lead to irregularities being 
ignored, acceleration of reporting duty was, nevertheless, important for the perception of auditor 
reporting, according to both users and experts (Chapter 5; Chapter 6):  
‘[Under the PAAA or the absence of s45 of the APA] the auditor would actively help the client to fix 
the problem because it has created a problem for the auditor as well....but at least the legislation 
now crystallises [the reporting duty]...[The problem] doesn’t just get hushed up’ (E1). 
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 The relevance of requiring matters that would otherwise be regarded as ‘trivial’ (U2) to be reported is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7.  
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‘Is there a possibility that if we revert to the 30-day window period or requirement to report only 
“material” fraud that the auditor might be talked out of reporting or might try to avoid reporting? I 
think that that is part of the risk that the legislature is trying to deal with. And it’s difficult to say that 
that didn’t happen’ (U10).  
Returning to the whistle-blowing literature, uncertainty over what and when to report can stifle 
effective reporting (Leeds, 1963; Near and Miceli, 1995). The requirement to report any act of 
fraud, material financial loss and material breaches of fiduciary duty (Section 2.1; Appendix A1), 
while creating a problem as to precise meaning (E1; U10; IRBA, 2006), paradoxically 
overcomes threats to non-reporting. By creating a ‘general catch all that can trigger a report 
being sent to the IRBA’ (U1), the RI provisions resolve the technical problem identified by, inter 
alia, Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) and Near and Miceli (1995), of when a reporting duty 
results, albeit by simply increasing the scope of the reporting duty (Nel, 2001; Wielligh, 2006). 
Concurrently, by erring on the requirement to report rather than refraining from doing so, several 
respondents argued that the auditor is protected because: 
‘It cannot later be said that [the auditor] should have reported an irregularity and that he failed to do 
so because of a failure of professional judgement or independence standards’ (U13).  
Instead, a conservative approach is taken with an independent regulator left to decide which 
reports are escalated (IRBA, 2006). Together with sanctions under s52 of the APA, both experts 
and users70 generally agreed that clearly defined reporting duties promote additional disclosure 
of the auditor findings, addressing the concerns of, inter alia, the CESR (2007) and European 




There appears to be only a limited impact on audit practice as a result of the operation of the RI 
provisions. Considering ISQC 1’s emphasis on ethical business practice, including client 
acceptance and continuance decisions, many respondents reported that the RI provisions had 
little relevance, irrespective of the nature of the firm’s clients or the size of the respective 
experts’ audit firm. The same was true for engagement performance and human resource 
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practices with s45 of the APA altering neither the ‘nuts and bolts of audit’ (E9) nor the scope of 
the attest function. More significant for both experts and users was a belief in professional duty, 
professional appearance, and a sense of personal duty to the respective firm.  This is not to say, 
however, that the RI provisions are irrelevant when thinking about audit quality.  
Respondents were quick to note that the whistle-blowing duty led to enhanced reporting by 
auditors resolving a tension between owing a public duty to bring transgressions into the open 
and the need to ensure confidentiality of client information. In the context of on-going debates 
on the extent of information being made available to stakeholders (European Commission, 
2010b; IAASB, 2012), these findings suggest that the RI provisions are one means of adding to 
the auditor reporting framework without necessitating a drastic change to existing audit practice 
by, for example, requiring auditors actively to seek out fraud.  In addition, the RI provisions 
could contribute to safeguarding auditor independence. The prior literature points to a growing 
concern of independence failures detracting from the credibility of the attest function (Section 
2.2; Section 2.3). Section 45 of the APA indirectly serves as an independence safeguard by 
offering a means of resisting client pressures to refrain from reporting even when reporting was 
perceived as being in the public interest. (This may be especially relevant for those auditors 
more economically dependent on their clients)71. Integral to this is the move to reduce the 
application of professional judgement by requiring any act of fraud to be reported, even if 
immaterial, and for whistle-blowing to take place ‘without delay’ (IRBA, 2006). At the extreme, 
this approach may save the profession from allegations of impropriety.  Paradoxically, despite 
the presence of penalties for non-compliance, the RI provisions were interpreted as affording a 
measure of protection for auditors. The statutory provisions increase the likelihood of reporting 
transgressions by providing a formal reporting mechanism that clarifies when and how one 
ought to blow the whistle. Complementing this is the fact that it is an independent regulator, 
rather than the auditor, who decides whether or not an RI is brought to the attention of the 
relevant third parties, effectively adding additional ‘layers of independence’.    
Finally, although the RI provisions do not alter the scope of an audit it has the potential to 
complement traditional audit reporting, thereby reducing a perceived expectation gap 
concerning the scope and detail of information made available by auditors to stakeholders. By 
bringing issues that would otherwise have gone unreported to the attention of the IRBA, the 
whistle-blowing duty also contributes to corporate transparency and a culture of governance-
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related compliance (Chapter 7), benefits accentuated by more active reporting under the APA 
than was the case with the MI provisions (Section 2.1). In turn, this was cited as improving the 
perceived value of the attest function, simultaneously adding to the credibility of the audit 
profession (Section 6.1).   
To explore the relevance of s45 of the APA in more detail, Chapter 5 uses a correspondence 
analysis to aggregate and complement the main arguments identified in this chapter. Before 
proceeding, a final note on the respondents’ opinions is, however, necessary. In particular, there 
were no material instances when users and experts, in general, had significantly different views 
on the role of the RI provisions for adherence to sound quality control principles. This should not 
be interpreted as implying that s45 of the APA has resolved the long-standing expectations gap. 
Instead, the findings are consistent with the fact that users are well informed of the audit 
process. This is not a shortcoming. The aim of Chapter 4 was to shed light on the 
interconnection between the RI provisions and audit quality control systems and not to discern 
the extent of any expectation gap by surveying large groups of stakeholders. Similarly, this 
chapter has not presented a detailed discussion on the size of the audit firm as a quality 
surrogate. 
Evaluating the appropriateness of firm size as a quality surrogate in a South African context is 
best suited to a more positivist study, relying on large sample sizes. Accordingly, further 
evaluation of the audit expectation gap and relationship between audit firm size and 












5: SECTION 45 OF THE APA AND ISQC 1: A 
CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the results of the correspondence analysis72. As discussed in Section 
3.2.2, the final correspondence plot is used to aggregate perceptions on the association or 
correlation between quality elements (as defined by ISQC and discussed in detail in Section 
2.2.4) and the RI provisions. Using principal component analysis, the views of a sample of 
experts were reduced to an easy-to-interpret two-dimensional plot (Figure 5.1). This plot is 
interpreted by the researcher to shed additional light on the role of s45 of the APA in South 
African audits. Effectively constituting a summary of the opinions of a sample of experts, the plot 
was also discussed during follow-up sessions73. It allowed experts and users an opportunity to 
reflect on the collective views of their peers and provide additional commentary on the 
perceived impact of the RI provisions on quality control systems (Section 3.4).   
Figure 5.1 below neither ‘quantifies’ audit quality nor proves (in a positivist sense) that the RI 
provisions cause measurable change in audit quality. Instead, the correspondence analysis is 
used solely in an illustrative role (Section 3.2.2). Interpretive research is able to provide detailed 
accounts that are useful for examining relatively understudied aspects of corporate governance 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008). A disadvantage of qualitative studies, however, is that added 
detail frequently goes hand-in-hand with technicality, detracting from the clarity of the study 
(Merchant, 2008; Creswell, 2009). In this context, a correspondence analysis is a useful 
technique for summarising major themes identified during the carrying out of detailed interviews 
both for the purpose of the clear communication of findings to readers and for use by the 
researcher when carrying out follow-up sessions with interviewees (Section 3.4).  
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 presents the results of the 
correspondence analysis and briefly explains the derivation of Figure 5.1. Section 5.2 interprets 
the plot. As part of this process, the respondents’ opinions on the correspondence plot are 
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 Chapter 5 should be read in the light of the findings from Chapter 4. It should also be noted that, as the 
correspondence analysis is simply a complementary part of the thesis, this chapter is relatively short. It has been 
included in a separate chapter due to the use of a different method at the recommendation of participants from the 
Africa Leads Conference (2012) and King’s College London Doctoral Colloquium (2012).   
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 As the plot examines the operational aspects of ISQC 1 in detail, it was completed only by experts (Section 3.2.2) 




considered to add to the commentary in Chapter 4. Section 5.3 summarises results and 
introduces the need for an institutional perspective on audit quality. 
 
5.1: THE CORRESPONDENCE PLOT 
 
The bi-plot summarising the perceptions of experts on the association between the RI 
provisions and quality elements is presented in Figure 5.1 (Appendix C). As discussed in 
Section 3.4.2 only those row and column headings that contribute materially to the total inertia 
of the analysis are included in the plot (Section 3.4.2: Table 3.6; Table 3.7).  
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FIGURE 5.1: FINAL CORRESPONDENCE PLOT 
 
Notes 
1. Column headings (elements of the RI provisions) define the x- and y-axis and are shaded in blue.  
2. Row headings (quality traits per ISQC 1) are plotted on the respective axis and are shaded in yellow. The squared 
correlation coefficient is quoted for each row-plot.  
 
TABLE 5.1: ROW AND COLUMN LABELS  
Axis labels (column headings) 
C2 Reporting to take place immediately vs. after 30 days under the PAAA 
C3 Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal sanction 
C6 RI’s include a material breach of trust and fiduciary duty 
C7 RI’s involve management only 
Statements (row headings) 
R1 Development of a culture of leadership with more participation by the engagement leader  
R2 Awareness of the importance of ethical compliance including client acceptance and 
continuance procedures  
R4 Ensuring appropriate consultation on contentious matters and resolution of differences of 
opinion  
R5 More attention paid to internal quality control and continuous improvement processes,  
including documentation standards  
R6 Enhanced transparency and confidence in the audit process and increased perceived 
value for stakeholders (including improved reporting quality) 
R7 Enhanced sustainability for audit firms, including reduction in overall audit risk 






The RI provisions serve as columns (column-points) and audit quality elements (Section 2.2.4) 
constitute the rows (row-points) in the final correspondence table (Table 3.1). Using principal 
component analysis, row- and column-points are plotted in a two-dimensional space74. Based 
on the coordinates of each column point, its correlation coefficients and its inertial contribution 
(Table 3.7), the column points are ‘assigned’ to each dimension in the two-dimensional space, 
effectively defining the positive and negative x- and y-axes in Figure 5.1. Only the column points 
with a material inertial contribution have been included in Figure 5.1 to ensure ease of 
interpretation. Similarly, based using the sign of each row-point coordinate (as well as its 
correlation coefficient and inertia), row-points can be positioned in the two-dimensional space 
effectively depicting their association (or correlation) with each plot axis. Those row points with a 
material inertial contribution are included in Figure 5.1 according to which of the axes they have 
the strongest association with (adapted from Bendixen, 1996; Mimmack et al, 2001). The result 
is a two-dimensional plot that summarises the opinions of a sample of experts on the 
association between the RI provisions and audit quality elements.  
Consistent with the approach followed by Bendixen (1996) and Maroun et al (2011), Figure 5.1 
is used to focus on key relationships in an otherwise complex set of interconnected variables or 
traits (Section 3.2.2; Section 3.4.2). Figure 5.1 was then subject to initial interpretation by the 
researcher using the prior literature as a basis of analysis, consistent with most interpretive 
studies (see Humphrey, 2008; Creswell, 2009). Due to ease of interpretation, the plot was also 
used during follow-up sessions with interviewees, providing a basis for further discussion on the 




Confirming the arguments raised in Section 4.1, the RI provisions have at least some relevance 
for an awareness of ethical concerns, including client acceptance and continuance decisions 
(R2). This is evidenced by the high correlation between the quality trait and the fact that, under 
s45 of the APA, RI’s are reported ‘without delay’ (C2).  
                                               
74
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‘My first reaction is that “reporting without delay” is a bad thing. It puts pressure on the auditor and can 
damage client relationships. But, with hindsight, I can say that the when you had 30 days to report, 
that led to a lot of things being swept under the carpet. The legislation now crystallises the reporting 
requirement’ (E2).   
In addition to mitigating client pressures that may detract from active reporting (E2; U3), the fact 
that the auditor reports an RI to the IRBA ‘without delay’, rather than first discussing the matter 
with the client and reporting only if the RI went unremedied  (Section 2.1), was cited by several 
users and experts as important for independence of appearance.  In particular – and consistent 
with the arguments raised in Section 4.3.3 – ‘reporting without delay’ was especially relevant for 
the perceived effectiveness of audit reporting:  
 ‘Just having the reporting duty does not mean much
75
. What’s more relevant is that you have to report 
without delay. It’s that particular change that makes partners more aware of the duty to report...and 
which gives people the confidence that things do get reported when they need to’ (E13).  
‘So, what the correspondence table says to me is that immediate reporting has helped overcome the 
issue of auditors circumventing reporting which may have been the case with the old MI’s. We now 
have more active reporting. Auditors are better at informing the IRBA about things and that improves 
governance in general. Faster reporting also stresses to clients that auditors have this duty and that the 
auditor is going to report RI’s. This is significant for independence in both fact and appearance and I 
think that reporting without delay is adding to both’ (E5).  
The prior literature points to the possibility of economic dependence on the client eroding 
auditor independence and detracting from the quality of the audit report (IFAC, 2006; Blay and 
Geiger, 2013; Wines, 2012). What the correspondence plot and expert commentary imply is that 
reporting without delay per s45 of the APA partially mitigates this (Nel, 2001), addressing the 
concern that a lack of auditor independence resulted in historically low levels of MI’s being 
reported (Section 2.1): 
‘What s45 [of the APA] does is create a quick reporting mechanism that compels the auditor to report. 
This resolves the problem of a sense of loyalty to the client and owing the client a duty of 
confidentiality’ (E10).  
‘You are going to get a lot of pressure from the client and compliance with the legislation is going to 
come down to how independent you are – to how well you can resist those client pressures and serve 
the public interest’ (E1). 
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 The general requirement for RI’s to be reported to the IRBA (C1) had a low inertial contribution and was excluded 
from the plot.  
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‘...Having to report quickly to the IRBA is an important part of this. It means that there is no time for 
uncertainty to set in and for the client to start working on changing the auditor’s conclusion on having 
to report which may have been the case with the MI requirements’ (U13).  
‘It also creates an escape hatch. You can justify reporting to the IRBA on the basis that the legislation 
compels you to do so. Without the duty to report RI’s without delay, you may be divided. Do you report 
and risk losing the client or being sued or do you adhere to the old principle of client confidentiality?’ 
(E3) 
In effect, s45 of the APA formalises the requirement for auditors to blow the whistle on 
irregularities. Together with the regulator’s guidelines (IRBA, 2006), the legislation defines both 
when and how the auditor ought to engage in whistle-blowing (E2; E4), thereby promoting more 
active reporting of improprieties (see also Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010; Seifert et al, 2010). 
The result is an added sense of accountability and transparency on the part of the audit client 
and a contribution to culture of corporate governance compliance that resonates with the ideal 
of auditors serving as a ‘watchdog’ (Section 6.1). Complementing this is the fact that the RI 
provisions allow the auditor to rationalise the act of reporting to clients, allowing the auditor to 
overcome a duty of confidentiality or sense of client loyalty that might otherwise have stifled 
reporting, even if contrary to the public interest.  
Concurrently, the accelerated reporting duty accentuates the risk of litigation for the auditor who, 
acting in good faith, erroneously reports an RI (IRBA, 2006; Maroun and Gowar, 2013). Coupled 
with a possible threat to reputation (E6; E9; E10); damage to the client relationships (E1; U10; 
E5); and the implication of a criminal sanction for non-compliance with the APA (C3), the RI 
provisions (C2) emphasise the relevance of auditor ethics (R2). This is complemented by a 
sharpened focus on consultation (R4); encouragement of engagement leader participation (R1) 
and a sense of personal responsibility and accountability (R9) as was found in Section 4.3 and 
Section 4.1.  
 ‘What [Figure 5.1] highlights is that you, as the partner, are responsible for the audit. It comes as no 
surprise that people are more inclined to consult and get more involved in the audit when they think 
there is an RI and that the partner feels personally responsible. It’s a combination of the statutory 
duty, the consequences for messing it up, and the damage to your professional reputation. It’s also 
because of the consequences for the client (of saying there is an RI when there isn’t) and risk to the 
auditor if you get the report wrong’ (E9).  
‘What makes it worse is that you can’t take forever to decide if you are going to report. To be in line 
with the Act, you’ve got to report within a reasonable amount of time’ (E10). 
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‘So the end result is that...the legislation has made partners more aware of the role they need to play 
on the audit’ (E1). 
These comments are consistent with the correlation between consequences for not reporting 
(C3) and a sense of personal responsibility and accountability (R9) as well as the importance of 
effective leadership (R1). As theorised by, inter alia, Roberts (2006; 2009) and McMillan (2004), 
for at least some experts, the added reporting duty - backed by penalties - gives rise to an 
individualising effect. Further, the association between R9 and R1 respectively with C3 echoes 
the importance of being responsible for one’s own reputation (E1; E5), the good name of the 
firm (E2; E4) and of the profession (E1; E2; E4), reminiscent of a type of moral or social duty on 
the part of individual partners, as discussed in Section 4.2.  
Figure 5.1 also highlights a correlation between reporting requirements (C6; C7) and internal 
quality control (including continuous improvement and documentation standards) (R6) and a 
sense of enhanced transparency, confidence or value in the audit process (R6).  Initially, these 
findings seem inconsistent with Section 4.3 which noted that engagement execution has not 
been materially impacted by the RI provisions. While R3 (addressing the resources of 
engagement teams) did have a low inertial contribution (Table 3.6), follow up-discussions 
provided further insight. In line with the opinions of most users (Section 4.3.3) the additional 
reporting requirement is seen by some experts as adding to corporate transparency. It also 
appears to bolster confidence in the audit process by providing at least some assurance that 
irregularities, if detected, are brought to the IRBA’s attention (Chapter 7).  
 ‘What we have is an indication of how s45 of the APA may be about serving the public interest. The 
expectation of the public is that we act properly and that - being regulated - together with the position 
of trust that we hold, means that auditors don’t hesitate to blow the whistle (E1). 
‘The RI’s definitely add value. Whenever you bring shenanigans into the public domain, that’s in the 
public interest. Knowing that this duty is there and that we do more than just comment on the 
financials reassures at least some people and probably adds to the overall image of auditors, even if 
just a little’ (E10).  
‘In a way, the RI’s are about whistle-blowing. There has been a lot of emphasis on that because of the 
value that it adds to corporate governance. RI’s are part and parcel of that’ (E3).   
‘With all of the criticism levelled at auditors over the recent years and the debates going on about what 
the audit report should look like, it’s important that we have already been doing more than other 
auditors. We have been making a valuable contribution to corporate governance by blowing the 
whistle on RI’s. This has added to our professional [standing] and the quality of the whole reporting 
exercise. I can’t say that is a massive value-add but RI’s have added something’ (E2).  
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For whistle-blowing to be ‘value-adding’ (E2), reports issued to the IRBA need to be factually 
correct, necessitating sound quality control in connection with reporting (E3; E5). In other words, 
while the RI provisions do not alter standard audit practice (Section 4.3.2), firms take a number 
of measures to ensure that reporting to the IRBA is backed by sufficient evidence while 
remaining with the ambit of the ‘report without delay’ requirements of the APA76 (E1; E6). Civil 
claims for incorrect reporting are part of the reason for this (Maroun and Gowar, 2013). At a 
personal level, we see the need to preserve the good name of the profession (E6; E7), as well 
as individual and firm reputation. Also relevant is safeguarding the continued existence of the 
firm (R7) by mitigating exposure to risk associated with reporting RI’s (E3; E9). Accordingly, we 
see a correlation between the sustainability of audit firms, internal quality control (R5) and a 
sense of individual responsibility and accountability by partners (R9) in connection with the RI 
provisions (C3; C6; C7).  An exception is the requirement to report fraud (C5). Further 
discussion with experts revealed that, while reporting fraud was an important part of s45 of the 
APA, most instances when partners had been required to report involved fairly inconsequential 
accounts. Experts noted that the legislation mandates reporting, irrespective of its perceived 
materiality (Appendix A1). They also explained that, in some cases, fraud – actually detected by 
the client and already remedied – was still reportable, in spite of its negligible impact for 
stakeholders. For this reason, few experts felt that this aspect of the APA had a material bearing 
on the row statements, a sentiment shared by most users.  
 
5.3: SUMMARY  
 
Ultimately, the results of the correspondence analysis provide additional insight into the 
relationship between the RI provisions and audit quality control systems. (The findings are also 
in line with those presented in Chapter 4.) The correspondence analysis should not, however, 
be construed as ‘quantifying’ the effect of the RI provisions on audit quality control systems in 
any positivist sense. Figure 5.1 should also not be misunderstood as ‘representing’ a 
consensus. For several experts, the RI provisions were cited as having little relevance for audit 
quality practices. This is seen in the fact that, while some quality elements may be correlated 
                                               
76
 What experts are referring to is the ‘reasonable auditor test’ (IRBA, 2006). Under the APA the auditor may not 
report frivolously. He reports ‘without delay’ if a reasonable auditor, having gathered the necessary evidence to reach 
an informed conclusion that he ought to report, would have taken a comparable amount of time to send the 1
st
 report 
to the IRBA (IRBA, 2006).  
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with certain elements of the RI provisions, the correlations are not perfect. Several of the quality 
elements also had low inertial contributions. For example R3 (resources and competency of 
engagement teams) was well correlated with requirement to report RI’s concerning 
management (C7) but contributed less than 5% to the total inertia of the plot. Likewise, R8 (a 
sense of legitimacy) was fairly correlated with the positive x- (C3) and negative y-axis (C3; C6) 
but failed to weigh heavily on the minds of participants (inertia less than 5%). A lack of complete 
correlation between all elements of the RI provisions and quality traits should also be noted. As 
explained by several respondents, with the fundamentals of audit practice left unaltered, it was 
difficult always to associate the RI provisions with material improvements to audit quality control 
principles. For example, the auditor is not obligated to execute additional audit procedures and 
would, theoretically, detect no more or less than in the absence of regulatory requirement. It is 
only if the auditor happens upon an RI that a reporting duty is triggered. In addition, there is the 
risk of superfluous reporting or a simple compliance-based attitude towards whistle-blowing that 
detracts from the functionality of the RI provisions.   
Paradoxically, however, respondents almost unanimously concluded that s45 of the APA should 
not be repealed77. That the reporting duty had been in place for several years; was codified in 
professional standards; and was enshrined in statute were among the reasons for it being 
retained. Initial commentary also suggested that the mere fact that this formal, rational whistle-
blowing mechanism exists and that an independence safeguard is theoretically available was 
sufficient to justify its existence, especially from the point of users. Although, practically, audit 
remains the ‘black box’ described by Power (1994), the reporting duty complements notions of 
the ‘independent auditor’ (U9) creating images of the proverbial ‘watchdog’ (U3) sounding the 
alarm when transgressions are noted. In other words, the value of external regulation may be 
derived, not only from changes at the operational level which enhance efficiency or quality (see 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977), but from representations that reassure users of audit reports that 
belief in the attest function remains justifiable (see Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011). This is especially true given the lengthening chorus for reform in the aftermath 
of recent audit scandals (Tremblay and Gendron, 2011) and ever more common use of external 
regulation in leading economies (Malsch and Gendron, 2011). In this context, Chapter 6 
considers the RI provisions, not as an instrument for improving audit quality control systems, but 
as part of a complex institutional environment aimed at securing legitimacy for the attest 
function.  
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 The closing comment in Section 4.4 regarding differences in opinions between users and experts and among 
experts dependent on their firm-affiliation applies equally to Chapter 5.   
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6: SECTION 45 OF THE APA: PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY  
 
In this chapter, findings from interviews with experts and users are presented in relation to the 
interviewees’ perceptions of legitimacy. As discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, external 
regulation may be enacted with an aim to improving audit practice. Considering South Africa’s 
RI provisions, Chapter 4 noted that, while some changes to perceived independence and 
reporting quality may have resulted from the mandatory duty to blow the whistle (Section 2.1), 
the ‘nuts and bolts’ (U2) of audit have not been fundamentally altered by s45 of the APA. 
Despite this, respondents unanimously agreed that the RI provisions formed an important part 
of the auditor regulatory paradigm.  One reason for this apparent contradiction is that, although 
s45 of the APA may not yield material quality gains, it forms an integral part of processes of 
auditor legitimisation. This may be especially relevant in the context of a host of corporate 
scandals and an on-going financial crisis which Section 2.3 has argued has undermined the 
potential of self-regulation to offer material legitimacy benefits.  In this context, the second 
research question is considered:  
B: Does s45 of the APA afford legitimacy to South African external audit? 
This section is organised as follows: Section 6.1 explores how the RI provisions may confer a 
sense of moral, pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy on the South African external auditor. This 
builds largely on Section 2.3 and the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) and Suchman (1995). Section 6.2 offers a more critical perspective, highlighting the 
views of those respondents who point to the reporting duty being part of a carefully cultivated 
‘institutional myth’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) that simply creates the impression of regulatory 
reform while leaving audit practice largely unaltered. Section 6.3 summarises the findings and 
introduces s45 of the APA through the lens of Foucauldian power and control.  
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6.1: PRAGMATIC, MORAL AND COGNITIVE LEGITIMACY 
 
 
6.1.1: PRAGMATIC LEGITIMACY: AUDIT AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHISTLE-
BLOWING78 
 
As a means of adding to the information available to users, several respondents felt that the RI 
provisions added value for stakeholders, simultaneously recognising the need for auditors do to 
more than just issue generic audit reports. In this way, the reporting duty becomes an important 
source of pragmatic legitimacy: 
‘The big issue with audit has always been whether or not it adds value. For the big listed 
companies the theoretical argument is that audit does add value because the auditor reports to the 
shareholders on the reliability of the financial statements but...I guess for a lot of people...audit is 
really a grudge purchase. Adding RI’s on top of that at least gives a bit more. I am not sure that 
significant value has been added but [the auditor] has at least added something’ (U2). 
As with Chapter 4, users noted that the legislation did not resolve the debate on whether or not 
the auditor has a duty to detect fraud and has not materially altered audit practice. What is, 
however, achieved is added ‘depth’ (E13; U7; U8; U9) to what is reported (Section 4.3), which is 
interpreted as improving transparency and being responsive to the information needs of varied 
user-groups (consider also Solomon, 2009; Solomon, 2010; Georgiou and Jack, 2011).  
‘At the end of the day, shareholders – and I suppose other people as well – have a right to know. If 
you have invested money in a company or are doing business with them or even if you just rely on 
that particular company, you have a right to know if there are any anomalies. That’s one of the 
main themes coming out of the codes of governance and the whole integrated reporting project. 
Now what the RI’s are doing is creating a duty on the auditor to do more than just issue a generic 
audit report. The legislature is taking cognizance of the needs of different parties to be made aware 
– through the functioning of the IRBA – of irregularities. So, in that way, s45 [of the APA] is 
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 Section 45 of the APA may be loosely described as an example of ‘whistle-blowing’ (Section 2.1).  Whether or not 
the RI provisions are aligned with technical constructs of ‘whistle-blowing’ as advanced by Jubb (1999) and Near and 
Miceli (1984;1985) is not the focus of this research. What is more important is resulting connotations and perceptions 





basically a type of whistle-blowing platform that is responding to the demands for better audit 
reports and for enhanced transparency and accountability on the part of corporates’  (U13). 
‘For example, you might go to a client where there is a delinquent board of directors and material 
breach of fiduciary duty. It might also happen that the financial statements are prepared mainly by 
the financial accountant and the financial statements are accurate. In that case, the audit opinion is 
clean. But stakeholders have a right to know that the board of directors is delinquent...the 
auditor...cannot blow the whistle [because of the duty of confidentiality] but through the guise of the 
RI’s, he is able to get this information to the regulator and hence to the public’ (U7).  
‘Section 45 [of the APA] may not be perfect... [but], there is at least a perception that the auditor 
has a duty to report... And it's not limited to just financial statements
79
’ (U2). 
The RI provisions’ legitimising potential is derived from the production of reports offering specific 
details on irregularities that would otherwise not have been in the respective regulatory or public 
domain. This was cited as especially relevant given the recent criticisms of audit reports lacking 
sufficient ‘depth’ (U2).  The whistle-blowing duty found in s45 of the APA, by virtue of its 
potential to bring transgressions into the open is perceived as positively contributing to existing 
corporate governance systems. The RI provisions effectively constitute a type of ‘whistle-
blowing discourse’ (E16), which forms part of a broader social milieu where almost all 
respondents pointed to enhanced reporting as a favourable requirement. In other words, the 
whistle-blowing duty reflects normative values and perceived social interests that associate the 
act of reporting with enhanced transparency and accountability (U2; U12; E16), improved 
financial reporting (E9; E17; U13), a sense of value for stakeholders, and ultimately exchange 
legitimacy80 (see Khalifa et al, 2007; Georgiou and Jack, 2011). For example, RI’s could, 
depending on their nature, be useful for the JSE in monitoring compliance with its listing 
requirements and, thus, protecting investors (U3; E7). They could also be used by both the 
taxation and company regulatory authorities to monitor and enforce compliance with respective 
legislation (U5; E10). More generally, respondents cited the whistle-blowing duty as contributing 
to a culture of compliance with existing governance standards and a sense of accountability on 
the part of audit clients that ultimately serve the public interest. The result of a perceived 
responsiveness to the interests of stakeholders, coupled with an added sense of value derived 
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 By way of example, consider Georgiou and Jack’s (2011) account of fair value accounting practices. The 
researchers argue that fair value accounting practices incorporated in certain IFRS ‘link with current discourses of 
shareholder and economic value’ and, thus, become a source of pragmatic legitimacy. Also relevant are the findings 
of Near and Miceli (1995), Hwang et al (2008), PwC (2011b) and KPMG (2011) which highlight an association 
between whistle-blowing, sustainability and improved value for stakeholders through gains in transparency (Vinten, 
2000; Seifert el al, 2010).  
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from additional disclosure, gives rise to notions of pragmatic legitimacy.  This is especially true 
given that the RI provisions entrench a reporting duty for auditors at a time when the adequacy 
of generic audit reports is under question (European Commission, 2010b; IAASB, 2012).  
Although some experts highlighted the possibility of the RI provisions leading to over-reporting 
because of the duty to report any act of fraud and other defined irregularities ‘without delay’ 
(Section 4.3; Section 2.1), that the legislation favours prompt reporting, and that only a fraction 
of RI’s may be highly relevant, was perceived as having confirmatory value and, thus, being a 
source of exchange legitimacy. In addition: 
‘Far better to leave the legislation as is and have a hundred minor issues get reported with just one 
big one than to tone [the reporting duty] down and run the risk that the next significant issue does 
not get reported’ (E16).  
‘[Broadening the reporting duty] lets the clients know that things get reported, even if otherwise 
immaterial, and that definitely keeps them on their toes...  and [that] almost pushes [audit clients] to 
do a little bit more because they do not want to get themselves in trouble - they don't want an RI to 
be reported’ (U2).  
‘And finally, just remember that because you think something is immaterial does not mean that 
other people will. You set a precedent by doing that and before long, who knows what ends up not 
being reported’ (E17).  
‘The marginal benefits of the legislation are, therefore, probably exceeding the marginal costs’ 
(U2). By erring on the side of prudence, and requiring more active whistle-blowing (Nel, 2001), 
the legislation was perceived as adding to a culture of reporting and addressing the risk that the 
professional judgement of the auditor could lead to an irregularity, significant from the 
perspective of different stakeholders, going unreported (E14; E17; U2; U10).   
‘I think that there was a gap in [the sense that] if you have done an audit, and there was a problem 
on the audit, there wasn’t necessarily any specific way that you could report this other than to 
shareholders
81
. So, I think that the [RI provisions] addressed [this]’ (U7).  
‘There is a hell of a lot of judgement. What one auditor [decides to qualify his report for], another 
auditor may not necessarily have done. So, there will always be different interpretations. The audit 
report is also generic and doesn’t always report things - like things that got fixed. Maybe 
shareholders would like to know about that, but it does not get reported because the audit report 
is...very much like a template. Consider a situation where tax has not been paid. Even if this is 
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sitting in the audit report – and there is no guarantee that it is – that would probably just go to a 
select [number] of people. The audit report does not necessarily go the [relevant] regulator. So, 
you might, for example, have a trust with donor money that has gone missing. That audit report 
may not necessarily go to the donor. [With the RI provisions auditors] at least now we have an 
independent and external way of reporting these problems’ (U7).  
In other words, several respondents felt that the RI provisions took cognisance of the needs of 
diverse stakeholder groups, each of whom may have different views on the value of what is 
reported and on what ought to be reportable in the first place. With the audit report being 
relatively generic (U7; E1) and not necessarily available to all interested parties, s45 of the APA 
becomes an important whistle-blowing mechanism that adds to the pragmatic legitimacy of the 
attest function in the eyes of several respondents.  
That the RI provisions are formalised adds to the sense of exchange and influence legitimacy by 
achieving an ‘ordered’ (E9) and ‘rational’ (U2) approach for discharging the whistle-blowing 
duty. The APA defines ‘irregularities’ and prescribes the reporting process, complemented by 
additional formal guidance made available by the IRBA (2006). The result is that users feel that 
the reporting duty is a bona fide one, allowing the auditor to add real value by enhancing the 
quality of what is reported (U12; U13). The legislation, coupled with the IRBA’s (2006) guide on 
RI’s, was cited as providing ‘added certainty on when and how to report’ (U12), highlighting that 
the reporting requirement was ‘capable of practical implementation’ and, accordingly, was also a 
means of adding to the ‘credibility’ or ‘reporting value’ of the audit process (U13). This is 
bolstered by the RI provisions serving as an independence safeguard as discussed in  
Chapter 4: 
‘The reality is that in any business, you've got relationships with your different stakeholders. One of 
those relationships is with your customer. Now...what you try to do all the time... is protect that 
relationship. You need to make sure that that relationship is protected, whatever the cost, right? 
Now, we've got a set of regulations that require us to do something which is quite unnatural in the 
normal business relationship.  In a normal business relationship, where you find that there is 
something which is wrong, you go and speak to the customer and [come up] with some sort of 
agreement and you sort it out. Now this is not the case. However, our job is [to be the] auditors and 
the basis of everything that we do is ethics. So what the legislation has done is that it's made us 
more aware of what “ethics” means and what it means “to be ethical”’ (E3).  
‘By creating a duty to report certain client transgressions, s45 of the APA drives home the duty of 
the auditor to ‘serve as a watchdog’ (U2) and, coupled with that,’ the importance of independence 
of fact and appearance’ (U12).  
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‘When they found something wrong, [auditors] wanted to know how to report it without effectively 
“ratting out the client”.... when I am obliged to [report] at least I can say I was forced into it. So the 
legislation is a nice "escape valve”’ (U1). 
‘To a large extent, I think auditors were getting talked out of [reporting MI’s]. They were getting an 
enormous amount of pressure from clients....If you go to the client first [with a suspected MI] they 
will probably talk [the auditor] out of [reporting] it...Now, the minute [the auditors] pick up [an RI] - 
and obviously the auditor is going to have to be reasonable and ask one or two questions – now 
the auditor has to report. And, I suppose that that protects the auditor as well, because if the client 
comes along and says: “look, this is our interpretation”, the auditor can still speak to the client and 
do the investigations...but overcoming the first hurdle of actually reporting to [the IRBA] is already 
behind the auditor...What the legislation does is [therefore] help the auditor. It protects him by 
giving him a legal duty to report to overcome client pressures. It encourages reporting rather than 
potentially sweeping things under the carpet’ (U7).    
Although not all respondents shared these views, most agreed that, at the very least, the RI 
provisions can aid in resolving a tension between owing a professional duty of confidentiality to 
the client and being obliged to serve the public interest by bringing potentially material 
transgressions into the open. Related to this, the RI provisions provide a means of justifying 
reporting a client’s transgressions to third parties: 
‘If the client comes back [after reporting to the IRBA] and asks: “How can you do this to us”, the 
auditor can refer them to the statutory requirement and also the engagement letter
82
. The client 
must know, upfront, that if there are any problems and the auditor picks them up, the he is going 
to report it’ (U7).  
For users, this has provided further evidence that the reporting duty is a viable one, able to 
improve the scope and value of the audit process and, hence, its pragmatic legitimacy. 
Concurrently, several users felt that necessitating that any act of fraud be reported ‘without 
delay’, addressed the concern that heuristics (Ashton, 1992; Owhoso and Weickgenannt, 2009), 
self-interest threats or pressure from clients (Wyatt, 2004; Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen, 
2009; SAICA, 2012) could lead to auditors avoiding reporting even if contrary to the public 
interest. Favouring broad reporting was thus seen as a type of preventive measure to safeguard 
effective whistle-blowing, reinforcing respondents’ notions of a policy in line with broader 
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interests of diverse stakeholder groups (E17; U12)83. Complementing this is the move to couch 
the whistle-blowing duty in legislation, rather than as a professional requirement, which signals 
an awareness of constituents’ concerns with the traditional self-regulatory model (E4, E8, E17). 
‘The whole concept of self-regulation I never quite understood because you end up with a situation 
where people just get together and form these rules which they can easily amend now and again 
when they feel like it. I don't think that that is necessarily the right answer. I think we need to strike 
a balance between self-regulation and demonstrating a commitment to users of the audit reports. 
On top of that, I think it's nice to have a separate body which we report [RI’s] to  because when you 
get difficult questions that you need to answer, you need somebody who is independent - who is 
going to be out of the situation -  making a decision. So for that reason, I think it is good that we 
have an independent body’ (E3).  
‘That not only assists with resolving technical difficulties with regards to s45 [of the APA] and with 
ensuring that conclusions are both in line with the legislation and not affected by relationships 
between the auditor and the client. It also shows users that we have been listening. After Enron 
and everything else that has been going on, people want auditors to be more regulated and to 
defer some of the difficult decisions to an independent regulator. By following these requirements, 
we are demonstrating that we don’t just put our heads in the sand and hope people will think better 
of audit in the future. We now have the IRBA, which is much more independent of the profession 
than the PAAB was, that is involved in deciding what issues auditors have reported get escalated to 
the relevant people’ (E17).   
In this case, authority under a traditional self-regulatory approach (Odendaal and De Jager, 
2008) is partially relinquished to regulation under the banner of the independent IRBA. 
Complying with s45 of the APA, signals the continuing commitment to secure the confidence of 
stakeholders, including clients (E1; E3). In other words, by adopting a type of conformist 
strategy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), whereby auditors are seen to comply with 
the RI provisions - regarded by constituents as a means of enhancing the financial reporting 
process (U12; E6) - a sense of legitimacy results84. Integral to this is the need to meet 
expectations of ever more powerful stakeholders:  
‘I think you need to have the reporting requirement because the market clearly wanted to have 
something in place’ (E3) and ‘at the end of the day, [when talking about blowing the whistle] that is 
the purpose of the auditor...Shareholders are looking to you to play a certain role’ (E7).  
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 Although respondents did not cite specific examples of how whistle-blowing is practically able to add value for 
constituents, what may be important to achieve pragmatic legitimacy is the absence of negative experiences rather 
than ‘the presence of positive achievements’ (Georgiou and Jack, 2011, p. 321). 
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 Compliance with the RI provisions may also signal the entrenchment of a legalistic culture or emerging attitude of 
self-preservation (McMillan, 2004; Roberts, 2009) as discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Accordingly, the findings of Chapter 4, together with references by experts to maintaining 
professional standards (E4; E5; E10); the good name of the profession (E4; E7); the image of 
the firm (E5; E9); and the trust of shareholders (E5; E8: E12) highlights an awareness of the 
importance of auditor legitimacy. Although sanctions under the APA probably serve as a 
deterrent (E5; E11; U1; U7) also relevant is conforming with the expectation that the auditor ‘is a 
watchdog’ (U2), allowing the auditor to internalise pragmatic legitimacy associated with the RI 
provisions.   
‘I think you need to have the reporting requirement because the market clearly wanted to have 
something in place’ (E3).   
‘I don’t think that [auditors] would wilfully [circumvent their reporting duty]. I don’t think that that 
occurs to them. The IRBA would never know but there is a general risk from outsiders’ (U1). ‘They 
have a piece of legislation that tells them what society expects and they seem to be aware of the 
importance, as professionals in whom we place our confidence, of meeting these expectations - of 
conforming with society’s regulations and, hence, its desires’ (U13).   
 ‘If [the failure to comply with the whistle-blowing duty] gets out, that auditor is finished’ (E3). ‘Yes, 
they might get sued by someone but whether that happens or not, he did not live up to expectations 
and he has zero chance of being trusted. That auditor has lost all credibility. He has zero standing 
because he has ignored the duty he owes to people other than himself’ (E16).  
With the whistle-blowing duty regarded as a valuable part of the corporate governance 
paradigm, and synonymous with pragmatic legitimacy, audit firms are implicitly encouraged to 
comply with the RI provisions to win favour and secure their credibility. This is especially the 
case given current trends favouring more extensive disclosure of audit findings85 (consider  Nel, 
2001; Manuel, 2002; European Commission, 2010b). In other words, conformance with the 
reporting duty is a means of meeting users’ expectations; of signalling professional behaviour, 
trustworthiness and value-adding conduct; and hence adding to perceptions of pragmatic 
legitimacy. Respondents, therefore, confirm the findings of Suchman (1995, p. 587): to achieve 
pragmatic legitimacy, the perceived needs of constituencies must be met.  
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6.1.2: WHISTLE-BLOWING GIVING RISE TO MORAL LEGITIMACY  
 
There may be more to whistle-blowing by external auditors than simply material benefits for 
constituents. For most interviewees, the RI provisions echoed a need to ensure enhanced levels 
of transparency and attitude of compliance that quickly translated into the RI provisions being 
seen as an accountability mechanism that resonates with the value systems of users:  
‘I think whistle-blowing is very important...Generally, any responsible citizen has got a duty to flag 
something that they think is wrong...and if you don’t have that in society, then morally, things begin 
to degenerate. [That means that] any person in a company set-up has got a moral duty to report 
[irregularities]’ (U2).  
‘I think that people have a right to know what is going on and to make their own minds up’ (U3).  
‘We can also take [the RI provisions] to a moral type of duty [sic]. There are certain cases where 
the auditor should be airing the dirty laundry because of the public perception of the auditor as a 
watchdog’ (E10).  
Whistle-blowing becomes part of a sound corporate governance culture and a type of moral 
imperative in the name of transparency86 (U2; U9; U6) and serving the public interest (U2; U5; 
U13).  The RI provisions are no exception with past scandals, whether in South Africa or 
abroad, offered as examples of how s45 of the APA can contribute to local governance 
standards, ‘improved transparency’ and ‘social good’ (U2; U10; E9; E11).  Reinforcing this is the 
position that certain stakeholders have a ‘right’ to expect enhanced reporting:  
‘Because auditors have been awarded a protected industry, and because the role they play as a 
type of control over companies is not challenged, the [RI provisions]... are a type of payback. So 
the legislation says that every company has to have an audit and now, because of that, you have 
to report when things have not happened properly....It’s a way of showing that [the audit 
profession] take society’s confidence in [it] seriously; that [it] give[s] something back; and that [its] 
protected position is justified’ (U10). 
‘And maybe we hold the auditor to a higher standard. We do that, don’t we? And that’s because 
the auditor is a watchdog. We expect them to report because of their role and position’ (U3). 
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Audit has come to occupy an almost ‘revered’ position in society culminating in a monopoly over 
the financial assurance market (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1994). What interviewees 
referred to is a type of quid pro quo: that in exchange for this position of trust and confidence, 
conceding to additional reporting duties under the APA becomes a means of signalling a 
commitment to broader societal welfare. It shows that the audit profession acknowledges its 
collective societal responsibility, an act intertwined with notions of moral legitimacy87 (see also 
Suchman, 1995). This goes hand-in-hand with the view that auditors being obligated to report 
certain client transgressions without delay and irrespective of materiality is ‘wise’ (E17; U3), 
‘prudent’ (U1; U13), ‘empathetic’ (U4), and ‘accepting’ (U1; U10) of the role that auditors ‘ought 
to play in reporting transgressions’ (E17). Similar sentiments were expressed by some 
respondents on the need to ‘report without delay’ rather than relying on the 30-day window 
period. Reiterating the arguments raised in Section 4.3, respondents felt that each of these 
provisions of the whistle-blowing duty entrenched a culture of accountability and transparency. 
In each instance, ‘wisdom’, ‘openness’, ‘prudence’, ‘credibility’ and ‘empathy’, examples of 
dispositional attributes (Suchman, 1995), leads to positive evaluations of the act of reporting by 
audit firms and, thus, affords at least some measure of ‘personified’ legitimacy (E3; U2).  
Adding to this thinking is procedural rigour, particularly the fact that the reporting duty is 
enshrined in statute. Legal requirements effectively constitute rational, generally accepted 
methodologies or prescriptions strengthened by due process that ‘back’ the respective policy 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Power, 2003). The RI provisions may, therefore, 
confer on auditors  a measure of legitimacy, not only by virtue of aligning audit with acts of 
whistle-blowing perceived as morally and socially appropriate (U2; U12). The requirement to 
blow the whistle may partially confer legitimacy precisely because it has been formalised in 
statute88 (E1; E5; E15). Users, for instance, reported that the fact that the reporting duty was a 
legal, rather than simply a professional one, enhanced its perceived worth. Whistle-blowing 
requirements were described as ‘crystalised’ (U1) and not subject to the changing whims of the 
profession (E3; E7; E16) which almost all users felt reinforced notions of moral standing. 
Similarly, the need to send formal reports to the IRBA, coupled with ‘layers of independence’ 
(E6) in terms of which final decisions to escalate reports rest with the regulator rather than the 
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 Georgiou and Jack (2011), for instance, argue that judicial process and legal mandate are possible sources of 
moral and cognitive legitimacy for early accounting practices (see also Sikka et al, 1998; Edwards, 2001). Similar 




auditor, demonstrated ‘procedural rigour’ and ‘objectivity’ (E17; U7; U10; U11). As theorised by 
Suchman (1995), users reported that clearly defined legal protocols enhanced the perceived 
value of the reporting duty (influential and exchange legitimacy) as well as the conviction that, 
on average, the reporting duty is consistent with various stakeholder interests. 
Strengthening specific reporting procedures is the fact that the auditor is ‘perfectly placed’ to 
discharge those duties (U2). The technical expertise of the audit firm, coupled with its 
commitment to ethical standards and professional duty (E1; E2; E8; E9), reinforces the practical 
ability of the auditor to blow the whistle on the client when required by the legislation, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 (E3; U2). In the absence of this practical ability, it would 
be doubtful that sustained consequential and pragmatic legitimacy could result. Just as 
Suchman (1995, p. 581), asks: does the manufacturing concern have a quality control 
department to support the claim to structural legitimacy, the fact that the auditor has the 
necessary resources at his disposal, including access to the client, has a similar effect. 
Stakeholders,   
‘can believe in the consequential effects of whistle-blowing, because it is conceivable that the 
auditor can comply with the reporting duty allowing the act of reporting transgressions to afford a 
sense of legitimacy’ (U13).   
Brand awareness, risk of litigation, a sense of professional commitment and internally held 
values and beliefs complement this. Each ‘element’ forms an integral part of the audit quality 
framework, discussed in Chapter 4, and, in the context of structural legitimacy, reassures users 
of the practicality of the auditor’s reporting duty and propensity for whistle-blowing. This is 
particularly important for securing trust in the ‘black box’ (Power, 1994) that is the audit process:  
‘So, how do we know if the auditor finds an RI, he really reports it and doesn’t just ignore it? I don’t 
think that that is very likely because of the very nature of auditing. The auditor would, in effect, be 
putting his personal position at risk...not only because of the financial consequences but the clear 
reputational and professional consequences as well. So the stakes are too high and this is not just 
about the money or possibly going to jail. The stakes are high because [the consequences of not 
reporting] are so personal and so inconsistent with the very nature of the audit firms’ (U1). In other 
words, ‘the ramifications are so severe...that I don’t think we need to be worried [about the 
auditor]...sweeping [irregularities] under the carpet’ (U3).    
‘From a practical point of view, we are well placed. We have the integrity and the resources and the 
reporting duty ties in with what we do as part of an audit anyway’ (E8) and ‘at the end of the day, 
we have a professional and moral obligation to tackle irregularities appropriately as part of the 
professional standards, our commitment to the brand, and for yourself, as a professional 
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accountant’ (E5). ‘You don’t just study seven years and work your arse off to become a partner at a 
respectable audit firm to just forget about these duties’ (E7).  
In this way, procedural, structural and consequential legitimacy are interconnected  
(Suchman, 1995). That the South African auditor’s duty to report is enshrined in law; that the 
auditor is practically capable of discharging the duty; that there are ramifications for not 
complying; and that users feel that the reporting requirement is the ‘right thing to do’ (U3), leads 
to the conclusion by most users that the RI provisions result in a socially desirable output89: 
 ‘While s45 of the APA does not change audit on the ground, it is definitely in the public interest. 
Whenever you bring in an additional requirement to report companies to keep them honest....that is 
certainly in the public interest; it is certainly the moral thing to do; and it is definitely an important 
means of conferring legitimacy on the audit profession’ (U2) .  
‘In a way, s45 of the APA gives users a sense of comfort and formalises a willingness by the 
profession to blow the whistle’ (E1). ‘It is a demonstrable commitment to meeting market 
expectations and the expectations of users that, when an irregularity is found, there is at least a 
formal process for bringing this into the public domain’ (E13).  
 ‘So, in conclusion, I think that it [complying with s45 of the APA] is the right thing to do and does 
offer the audit profession a sense of moral standing or legitimacy - definitely’ (E8). 
What should also be noted is that the same outcome which is being perceived as morally 
legitimate is also (as discussed in Section 4.1) associated with being in the self-interest of 
different constituencies and, thus, a source of pragmatic legitimacy. This is not a contradiction. 
In a complex social setting, both forms of legitimacy often coexist (Suchman, 1995; Georgiou 
and Jack, 2011; O'Dwyer et al, 2011). A key difference, however, is that moral legitimacy does 
not depend on the perceived self-interest or utility of whistle-blowing but is rather a product of 
social and cultural evaluations leading to a favourable, but still normative, view of whistle-
blowing, under s45 of the APA (Suchman, 1995).   
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 These comments, together with the findings in Section 5.2, should be also be seen in the context of the prior 
literature on whistle-blowing (Hwang et al, 2008; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010) and the financial press (ICSA, 
2011; KPMG, 2011; PwC, 2011b) which highlight the conviction that whistle-blowing is pro-social in nature (Staub, 
1978) and morally and socially justifiable (U12; E16; U2). The RI provisions are an extension of this, capitalising on 
the moral ‘acceptability’ of whistle-blowing and expanding it into the auditor’s domain. Concurrently, laws and public 
opinion make it desirable for auditors to adhere to the whistle-blowing duty, gaining moral legitimacy in the process 




6.1.3: ON THE ROAD TO COGNITIVE LEGITIMACY  
 
Virtually all respondents accepted the act of reporting irregularities as a logical part of the South 
African corporate governance landscape. The duty for auditors to report under s45 of the APA is 
akin to a ‘watchdog’ (U2; E9; E14), a readily comprehensible part of daily life, and with whistle-
blowing which is increasingly accepted as a ‘natural’ part of the corporate governance 
machinery (IOD, 2009; PwC, 2009; Solomon, 2009; Solomon, 2010; PwC, 2011b). In other 
words, a sense of innate comprehensibility complements the mutual reinforcing ‘taken-for-
granted-ness’ of audit and whistle-blowing (Suchman, 1995; Llewelyn, 2003) as seen in the 
following:   
‘Why do you want to talk about s45 of the APA and whistle-blowing? Surely that stuff is obvious? 
The auditor has the duty to report RI’s to the IRBA – it’s part and parcel of what the auditor does. 
It’s both a logical and inevitable part of corporate governance in South Africa. Whistle-blowing is to 
corporate governance what debits and credits are to accountancy’ (E17). 
Although blowing the whistle is not be the primary objective of an audit (IRBA, 2006; PwC, 
2006), the reporting duty has been generally accepted – as part of the broader accountability 
and transparency paradigm – by several respondents as a logical part of local audit practice. To 
paraphrase Suchman (1995, p. 582), with the role of whistle-blowing ‘meshed’ with the larger 
belief system or accepted reality of stakeholders’ daily lives (consider Crotty, 2007; PwC, 
2011b; PwC, 2011a; King, 2012), the RI provisions achieve a sense of legitimacy based on 
comprehensibility and the assumption that s45 of the APA is a technical rational means of 
serving the public interest (Nel, 2001; Opperman, 2009). A comparable outcome was achieved 
by Robert Noyce, founder of Intel, who was able to draw analogies between paper clips – a 
common office consumable – and the utility of then-theorised microprocessor which would have 
enormous potential despite its small size (Rogers and Larsen, 1984 cited in Suchman, 1995, p. 
582). From the perspective of external audit, the auditor was originally able to garner public trust 
by drawing parallels between the practitioner and the Victorian ideals of the ‘gentleman’ who 
was above working for a wage and always acted appropriately (Edwards, 2001; McMillan, 
2004). When it then comes to auditors reporting under s45 of the APA, the duty is juxtaposed 
with a ‘watchdog’, a readily comprehensible part of daily life, and with whistle-blowing which is 
increasingly accepted as an inevitable part of the corporate governance machinery.  
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Legitimacy resulting from ‘comprehensibility’ can also be achieved by mimetic isomorphism 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).  Several interviewees felt that the appropriateness 
of and logic behind the whistle-blowing duty was reinforced by the fact that s45 of the APA 
forms part of the move towards more arms-length control of the profession in line with 
developments in other jurisdictions:   
‘With the increased fraud, and Enron and everything else that was happening, it was necessary to 
change. To an extent, this was a response to changes overseas but it was also about addressing 
shareholders’ concerns and reassuring them that when [RI’s are detected] they get reported’ (E7).  
‘We need to strike a balance between self-regulation and legal requirements. You can’t cater for 
everyone but I don’t think that it would have been wise to just continue the way we were with 
regulations coming only from within the profession’ (E3). 
‘For a very long time, the audit and accounting professions in South Africa regulated themselves. I 
think that there was a conscious decision to move away from a system of self-regulation to follow 
the trend in the rest of the world which relies on laws backed by penalties’ (U2).  
In this light, the ‘whole Enron-SOX mess definitely had ripple effects for South Africa’ (U1) with 
the result that it would have been unwise for the South African Government to fail to consider 
regulatory developments abroad for fear of being perceived as ineffective  (U1; U4). This is not 
because the RI provisions resulted in a paradigm shift in the way audits are executed (Chapter 
4) but because they signal a reaction to emerging challenges from abroad that may have begun 
to undermine the effectiveness of the self-regulatory ethos as the traditional source of auditor 
legitimacy. Based on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) model of mimetic isomorphism, replicating, 
at least in part, the move to more arms-length regulation taking hold in developed economies 
(Canada et al, 2008; European Commission, 2010b; Bazerman and Moore, 2011) becomes a 
powerful means of securing the legitimacy of the South African audit profession.  
As summarised by Konar et al (2003, p. 28), when it comes to the legitimacy of the South 
African capital market system, including the audit process, ‘it is important that South Africa be 
seen to be in step with international developments regarding corporate governance’. In both the 
European Community and the USA, for instance, there is a conscious move towards additonal 
regulation following a host of well documented corporate failures (E17; U7) (see also Nel, 2001; 
Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). In South Africa, a similar modus is 
at work. The country, inter alia, refines its codes of corporate governance (IOD, 2009; Solomon, 
2010); begins work on a new Companies Act, which includes certain mandatory auditor 
independence provisions (Konar et al, 2003) and, as discussed in Section 2.1, entrenches a 
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mandatory reporting duty for external auditors (Nel, 2001). What these developments highlight 
is how, in the aftermath of Enron et al, ‘it is necessary for the [South African] Government to be 
seen to be taking action to assist in the restoration of public confidence and trust in financial 
reporting and auditing’ by more actively regulating the audit profession (Konar et al, 2003, p. 
69). At the same time, by achieving a sense of parity with regulatory developments in other 
jurisdictions, s45 of the APA inspires confidence rooted in the fact that South Africa has not 
simply maintained a self-regulatory status quo while, internationally, external regulation is 
championed90.   
As a result, almost all users and experts pointed to the fact that formalising the duty to blow the 
whistle when MI’s were replaced with RI’s; broadening the reporting duties; clarifying that the RI 
provisions are under official control of an independent regulator; and reminding constituents of 
the existence of this legal duty capitalises on a sense of mimetic isomorphism that fortifies the 
sense of comprehensibility and generally accepted ‘correctness’ of the auditor’s duties. 
Complementing this is the fact that RI provisions have been indirectly endorsed by external 
assessment criteria (U2; E8; E9). The ‘appropriateness’ and ‘plausibility’ of the reporting duty is 
justified by South Africa’s audit and accounting practices having been independently ranked first 
on the international stage (IRBA, 2010b; IRBA, 2012c). These ‘ceremonial’ tokens of worth 
enhance the meaning of an act or organisation and reinforce its presumed appropriateness. 
They confirm that it is based on the latest thinking or is a respected ‘first of its kind, adding to 
perceived credibility (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 350-351). 
Isomorphism, formalisation of the whistle-blowing process and its control by an independent 
regulator are a relatively subtle means of achieving legitimacy for the audit profession. Unlike a 
direct link between audit and  utility for constituents or between audit and the morally sound 
action of blowing the whistle, the preceding techniques appeal to common knowledge, taken for 
granted ‘truths’ and the belief in formalised processes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 
1995). Ironically, the very power of cognitive legitimacy is that it is rooted in the abstract 
(Suchman, 1995).  
 
                                               
90
 Fogarty (1992) provides an interesting analogy to clarify this point. He argues that an employing organisation is the 
most important environment for a professional’s career. As a result, the professional has an incentive to behave in a 
fashion that is consistent with the organization’s culture, expectations and norms (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007). By 
analogy, as a developing economy, South Africa has incentives to ensure that regulation of the audit system appears 
in line with a move towards more exogenous control over the audit community (Nel, 2001; Konar, 2003). What both 
examples confirm is that processes of isomorphism are powerful means of securing a growing sense of cognitive 
legitimacy as postulated by Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powel (1983) and Suchman (1995). 
177 
 
6.2:  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE AUDITOR’S WHISTLE-BLOWING 
DUTY 
 
Respondents agreed that, theoretically, compliance with s45 of the APA is not technically 
onerous. The audit firms are under no obligation actively to seek out an RI (IRBA, 2006) and, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the reporting duty has not resulted in a material change to engagement 
practice. For these reasons, the RI provisions have not materially contributed to the 
transparency of the audit process. Related to this, and as discussed previously, there is no 
effort to establish a fraud detection duty for the South African auditor, implying that the RI 
provisions would not practically address a material perceived expectation gap (see, for example, 
Humphrey et al, 1993a; Sikka et al, 1998; Porter et al, 2012). There is also no generally 
accepted means of demonstrating that the whistle-blowing duty has actually generated actual 
gains for stakeholders and ultimately served the public interest91. Nevertheless, the act of 
preparing a report to an independent regulator was perceived by most respondents as a source 
of legitimacy for the audit profession. This begs the question: why are the legitimacy demands 
not more stringent? Why is it that simply preparing a report not more than a few pages in length 
(Appendix A6-A8) may allow audit firms to attain a heightened sense of moral, pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy? 
One explanation is that only passive support is required. Respondents reported a general sense 
of confidence in the South African Audit Profession, views corroborated by the fact that the 
country has been ranked first globally for the quality of its accounting and auditing practices 
(IRBA, 2010b; IRBA, 2012c). As explained by Suchman (1995) and DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), if an organisation seeks simply to retain its status as a trusted independence assurance 
provider, the ‘legitimacy hurdles’ that need to be overcome are relatively low. A more critical 
perspective is, however, also possible.  
As noted in Section 2.3, the audit profession has frequently been likened with a ‘black box’, into 
which regulators seldom wish to peer, questioning developments purporting to improve audit 
practice or its perceived legitimacy (Power, 1994; Sikka et al, 1998). At the same time, the 
relevance of political self-interest (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Humphrey, 2008), as well as 
the possibility of arms-length regulation being too ‘enclosing’ to yield material benefits 
(McMillan, 2004) should not be overlooked. It may also be the case that the exogenous control 
                                               
91
 The IRBA simply discloses the number of RI’s, categorised very broadly according to their nature (IRBA, 2012b). 
Access to specific information is restricted.  
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over the audit profession amounts to what Suchman (1995), Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) describe as a ceremonial legitimisation tactic. The legitimisation 
potential of new laws and regulations may be rooted in simple perceptions of producing value 
for constituencies or by superficially drawing parallels between aspects of auditing and the 
ideals of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy.   
 
6.2.1:  LEGITIMACY AS A BY-PRODUCT OF THE REPORTABLE IRREGULARITY 
PROVISIONS 
 
As discussed in Section 6.1.2, the institutionalisation of an external regulatory paradigm 
overseas (Malsch and Gendron, 2011), coupled with the need to reassure stakeholders of the 
continued credibility of local corporate governance systems (Nel, 2001; Manuel, 2002; Konar et 
al, 2003) has led to a number of regulatory reforms including the entrenchment of the auditor’s 
whistle-blowing duties. This not only reaffirms the relevance of isomorphic forces described in 
Section 2.3 (Suchman, 1995) but also substantiates the views of Power (1994; 2003) and 
Humphrey (2008; 1990): that a sense of credibility is critical for the audit profession given that 
its processes and, for the most part, outputs are not directly observed and evaluated. Several 
respondents, however, questioned if any claims to legitimacy were substantive:    
‘Government didn’t spend a lot of time thinking about the APA. They saw that there were problems 
in the USA [referring to the collapse of Enron and Author Anderson]. They also knew that 
maintaining South Africa’s reputation as a thought leader in accountancy and corporate 
governance was very important for the economy and their own reputation and position. So they 
appointed a number of different people to investigate how auditor regulations could be improved. 
(The Nel Commission was part of that.) In fact, the guy who actually wrote s45 [of the APA] was not 
a South African. He was also not specifically asked by Government to fix up the old reporting duty 
[per s20(5) of the PAAA] but he made the recommendation and [the Minister of Finance], eager to 
show that we were doing something about this international issue of the profession regulating itself, 
just agreed with it’ (U14).   
 
‘My sense of it is that the Government loves form and ignores the substance [of its regulatory 
developments]. They had dozens of meetings to [discuss the APA and RI provisions] that led to 
absolutely nowhere. I think that Government loves to be seen as doing things but doesn’t actually 




‘You know how it goes: whoever pays the piper chooses the tune. That was the perception issue 
that they wanted to address (E4). ‘The whole change to the whistle-blowing duty that you [the 
researcher] refer to was about perceptions of the audit profession not being able to regulate itself’ 
(U11). ‘They did not have conclusive evidence that this was the case, but it didn’t matter – what 
was important was perception management. They had to show that, even though we are a young 
democracy, we were on top of the game and were doing something (or at least seemed to be doing 
something) about the legitimacy of the audit profession in South Africa’ (U14).  
 
Rather than being specifically designed to improve audit quality, enhance corporate 
transparency, foster a sense of accountability, and add to the legitimacy of the audit profession, 
the RI provisions are regarded by some respondents as more concerned with managing 
perceptions (U1) and introducing a ‘quick fix’ (U14; E1; E5) in reply to a perceived crisis of 
confidence in the audit profession’s self-regulatory franchise: 
 
‘The Government wanted to show that it was also bringing in laws backed by steep fines and 
promoting whistle-blowing, just like the USA was doing with SOX...but they had no idea about what 
auditing actually is’ (U11) and ‘no idea about how this legislation would work in the real world’ (E14) 
but ‘[s45 of the APA] requires Government to do very little; it looks good on paper; and it gives the 
Government something to show the World Bank when they ask about the controls we have in place 
over the capital markets’ (U14).  
 
‘Obviously, however, we should have more than just imagery. Unfortunately [Section 45 of the 
APA] could be an example of a check the box exercise...of something with form but without 
substance. To some extent it may be a case of Government not having the resources or the know-
how and it is now creating this legislation to make things look good from the outside’ (U4).  
 
Per Power (1994, p. 23), corporate failures tend to be followed by additional regulation and 
codification of the audit profession with an aim to creating the impression that the audit process 
is ‘immunised’ from failure, something which ‘requires a good deal of cosmetics’ (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Carruthers, 1995; Suchman, 1995). As argued in Section 2.3, audit remains a 
‘black box’ (Power, 1994) which regulators, either due to a lack of expertise or resources (E1; 
U4), are incapable (or unwilling) to ‘unpack’ (U4). The result is hastily enacted legislation (U11; 
U14) which may not lead to material positive changes to audit practice (Chapter 4) but which  
makes it appear as if additional controls have been put in place to ‘beef up’ (U14) the audit 
process and ‘make the Government look proactive’ (E14). For example, several writers have 
argued that threats to independence and underlying capitalistic pressures may be eroding the 
cognitive legitimacy of the audit profession (Section 2.3). In response, governments may rely on 
external regulation to preserve a measure of credibility (Power, 1994; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 
180 
 
2004; Malsch and Gendron, 2011) but these measures, being largely superficial, may have 
done little to tackle erosive capitalistic pressures:  
 
‘What does the legislation do to deal with the rogue auditor? The legislation doesn’t necessarily call 
that person to become ethical. At the end of the day, all that you’ve done is make life more difficult 
for the honest. It’s similar to the issue of trying to lower the speed limit in order to reduce carnage on 
the road. The answer is quite simple: take on the taxi industry
92
. But Government doesn’t want to do 
that because it’s politically difficult. Politically, it’s inconvenient. So they don’t do it’ (U4). 
 
 ‘The “correct” answer is that s45 [of the APA] makes auditors more ethical. Practically, however, it 
does bugger all. Why is it like this? It’s far simpler to create a piece of legislation to make it seem like 
you are doing something than to actively tackle the problem [of a possible decline in auditor 
independence] – to get your hands dirty, so as to speak. Government still gets the political points but 
with half the fuss’ (U14).  
 
‘The conclusion: ‘self-regulation is not, in itself, the cause of scandals. It does not explain why 
people don’t do what they ought to....Self-regulation can actually work perfectly well if people are 
honest. The real issue is integrity of the people involved. We need to tackle the problem with 
integrity and independence, and greed and the Government’s [rules and regulations] just aren’t 
doing that – probably because the politicians don’t know how to fix this. So they make things look 
good on paper’ (U5). 
 
For several respondents, the reporting protocols per s45 of the APA – coupled with the 
associated disciplinary consequences for non-compliance – are merely claims to protecting the 
public while, in a practical sense, few changes are introduced, leaving notions of legitimacy 
illusionary (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Carruthers, 1995; Paisey and Paisey, 2012).  In line with 
the arguments of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004) and Power (1994), one reason for this modus is 
the role of the attest function in ensuring the sound functioning of investment markets, coupled 
with the self-interest of the regulators and politicians who are dependent on the sound 
functioning of the capital market system for the support of constituents (Section 2.3):  
 
‘Considering the concerns raised over self-regulation after Enron and a number of domestic 
corporate failures, ‘the legislation was motivated by two things. Firstly, they wanted to show the rest 
of the world that we were also moving towards more external regulation and that we weren’t just 
letting our auditors regulate themselves...Secondly [and more importantly], the legislation is about 
                                               
92
 The respondent is referring to the large number of road accidents usually involving the country’s different taxi 
associations and which, over time, have become synonymous with reckless driving. The respondent explained that, 
due to the fact that a large number of South Africa’s working class depend on the industry for transport to and from 
work, there is the perception that Government deliberately chooses to avoid upsetting the industry with additional 
laws and regulations aimed at improving transport standards for political and/or economic reasons.   
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marketing. By creating this reporting function, we can demonstrate this great thing that we make 
the auditors do. That it’s all really bullshit is not the issue. What’s important is making our otherwise 
inefficient Government look likes it getting up off its arse when the you-know-what looks like its 
starting to hit the fan’ (U10).  
 
‘Basically, they [regulators] are making us jump through 101 hoops. They want to make it  seem 
like they are in control by making us comply with these reporting duties...Whenever there is a 
failure, somebody needs to be blamed and first one that they chose to blame was the auditing 
profession. The Government was desperate to make it seem like they weren’t falling asleep 
behind the wheel, especially since they have [only been in power since 1994]...So you end up with 
a person like Trevor Manuel
93
, getting involved. He’s got no clue. He has no background in 
accounting and auditing. He actually used to be a quantity surveyor...but he gets involved and we 
end up with RI’s’ (E5).  
 
What these comments highlight is a paradox. On the one hand, Guenin-Paracini and Gendron 
(2010) theorise that auditors frequently serve as scapegoats in the aftermath of corporate 
scandals allowing the credibility of the capital system to be preserved in the process. By 
introducing reforms to address shortcomings that are perceived as the ‘cause’ of audit failures, 
a ‘firewall’ is created between past actions and experiences and current assessments by key 
constituents (Suchman, 1995). Arms-length regulation becomes an important means of 
reassuring stakeholders that governments are dealing with the underlying problem, taking 
proactive steps to address the fault and reduce the likelihood of its re-occurrence, securing  
continued support in the process (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Malsch and Gendron, 2011; 
Tremblay and Gendron, 2011; Humphrey, 2012). In the meantime, the audit system remains a 
complex one, its processes and outputs frequently incapable of direct observation and objective 
assessment (Chapter 2). Consequently, regulation aimed at ‘correcting’ perceived weakness in 
the audit system tend to be ‘poorly thought out’ (U8), ‘superficial’ (U10),  ‘window-dressing’ (E5) 
and more about perception management on the part of regulators than an example of bona fide 
change to audit practice in the name of improved audit quality (E5; U1):   
 
‘Government just wanted to make it seem like it was doing something....that it had power over the 
profession
94
...[and, therefore] I don’t think that [s45 of the APA] truly legitimises audit to the users 
of the audit reports.... I think it ends up just being a reporting requirement and anything extra is 
smoke and mirrors’ (E5).  
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 Trevor Manuel was the South African Minister of Finance at the time when the Drat Accountancy Profession Bill 
(2001) was tabled. The Bill gave rise to the APA and, with that, the replacement of MI’s with RI’s (Section 2.1).  
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‘In a way, Government suffers from a type of Third-World inferiority complex’ (E5). ‘So it wants to 
come across as being proactive. That’s very much part of the South African regulatory 
culture...But it’s ultimately a big a perception game. What happens to those reports? Who follows 
up on them? Do any improvements actually transpire?’ (U2).    
 
Adding to the interviewees’ argument that legitimacy gains associated with the RI provisions are 
superficial is the possibility of the external regulation being akin to a set of rigidly defined rules 
and tantamount to an ‘enclosing control’ over the profession (Section 7.2). For several 
respondents, a legalistic culture results.  ‘Professional conduct’ is reduced to adherence to the 
parameters of an act rather than truly about societal interests (see also Roberts, 1991; Roberts, 
2001; McMillan, 2004; Vakkur et al, 2010). Any perceived legitimacy inherent in ‘professional 
conduct’ is then not substantive. Instead, resulting legitimacy is simply a by-product of 
mandatory conformance (E17) in direct contrast to seeking to control the profession by 
‘expounding its ideals’ and fostering ‘prudential professional judgment’ (McMillan, 2004, p. 946). 
For example:  
 
‘The [whistle-blowing duty] may be a senseless thing. There is a very real risk that all that happens 
is just mindless compliance with the rules. All that may happen is that [auditors] finds an RI and 
report it, not because they feel morally obligated or believe that they will add value for 
shareholders, but because the [APA] told them to. What would happen if the same act told them to 
jump off a bridge? The sad thing is that some of them probably would’ (E5).  
 
‘So the real problem is that people do not question what they are doing. They just come and do it. 
There is no thought process.....We now have an overregulated situation where everyone is focused 
on doing something because that’s the way it is – and once you do that, you can never [add value] 
because all you are trying to do is tick the boxes’ (U5).  
 
‘Compliance’ may not, therefore, be indicative only of a conformance strategy aimed at 
genuinely securing added legitimacy as was argued in Section 6.1. Value derived from reporting 
- or parallels with moral or other societal duties - are a by-product of a legalistic culture 
concerned only with the letter of the law. In other words, there is a risk that superficiality (U12) 
may taint claims to moral and pragmatic legitimacy. The findings from Chapter 4 may lend 
weight to this argument. For example, on the matter of engagement performance:  
 
‘We have the standard agenda for our [planning meetings]. It’s the same – you tell the team what 
an RI is and what to do if you find it’ (E2, emphasis added). 
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‘....and there are the standard [requirements] on the audit file where you have to consider if you 
have discussed the legislation with the team and have documented your rationale for reporting or 
not reporting something (if necessary). And after that, you sign it off and it’s done’ (E7, emphasis 
added).   
‘Standardisation’ and clearly defined protocols may be a means of improving performance 
judgement (Ashton, 1992) in the context of managing audit risk resulting from heuristics and 
reliance on conceptual auditing standards (Owhoso and Weickgenannt, 2009; Hardies et al, 
2011). ‘Mechanisation’ of the reporting duties enshrined in the RI provisions may, however, 
point to a possible migration from applying professional judgement in favour of simple 
consideration of how to apply the law. Rather than adding value for stakeholders, including an 
improvement to the whistle-blowing machinery, ‘detailed implementation to the letter of the law 
[becomes]....the sole skill’ at work (McMillan, 2004, p. 946) making it difficult for several users 
and experts to accept the RI provisions as a real source of  pragmatic and moral legitimacy for 
the audit profession.  
 
These views should not be construed as implying that s45 of the APA has no bearing on the 
legitimacy of the audit profession. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 highlighted instances when 
respondents felt that that the RI provisions played a relevant role in positively impacting audit 
practice. As discussed in Section 6.1, some respondents also conveyed a belief that reporting 
transgressions allowed auditors to meet the expectations of different stakeholders and align the 
profession with societal ideals in favour of whistle-blowing. It cannot, however, be said that this 
is exclusively the case. At least some element of legitimacy appears to be a by-product of a 
legalistic mindset and the result of powerful symbolic displays and institutional processes (as 
alluded to by Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004).  
 
6.2.2: SYMBOLIC DISPLAYS TO GAIN LEGITIMACY?  
 
Although a paradigm shift in audit practice has not resulted from the RI provisions (Chapter 4; 
Chapter 5), the relevance of the whistle-blowing duty may rest not in ‘detailed matters of 
practice’ but ‘in the potential power of the image it created’ (Humphrey et al, 1993b, p. 43). 
While Section 6.1 argued that the reporting duty could be seen as a genuine source of auditor 
legitimacy, an alternate interpretation is that legitimacy is a product of clever symbolism. 
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‘Outputs, procedures and structures...can all signal that the organisation [is legitimate]...even if 
these supposed indicators amount to little more than face work’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 588).  
 
In this context, despite the RI provisions not leading to a radical change in audit practice; 
resolving the expectation gap; or even culminating in confirmed quality and reporting gains 
(Chapter 4), for several respondents, all that was relevant was simply that a formal reporting 
duty, existed95. This is not a repetition of Section 6.1: that formal reporting standards reinforce a 
sense of pragmatic and moral legitimacy. On the contrary, what this almost ‘blind trust’ (E14), 
highlights is how simply the potential for whistle-blowing becomes an important source of 
assumed moral and pragmatic legitimacy. In other words, conceptions of legitimacy are 
interconnected with the use of clever symbolic gestures that may even negate the need for 
tangible and substantive reform (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Unerman and 
O'Dwyer, 2004). As part of this process, efficiency is no longer paramount. Paradoxically, it may 
actually ‘undermine...ceremonial conformity’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 341) as formal 
structures that ‘celebrate myth’ are often different from those required for efficiency (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al, 1992; Power, 2003).  
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) provide a bus company, expected to service a particular route even if 
it has no passengers, as an example. By analogy, a reporting institution under the APA that 
requires the IRBA to be informed of irregularities, even if they are not highly consequential 
(Wielligh, 2006), may be another. Several respondents noted that one explanation for otherwise 
immaterial irregularities being reported could be sanctions for non-compliance (Chapter 7) 
causing auditors to be conservative when deciding whether or not to report an irregularity. 
Similarly, the APA uses terms - such as ‘material’ and ‘fiduciary duty’ – that need to be 
interpreted by auditors and applied to each context. Respondents noted that this could lead to a 
degree of uncertainty as to whether or not an ‘RI’ had indeed resulted and ought to be reported. 
In the context of a professional and statutory duty, auditors may again choose to inform the 
IRBA, rather than refrain from reporting. As a result, the reporting of immaterial issues to the 
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 This cannot be attributed solely to the classic expectation gap synonymous with misinformed stakeholders 
(Humphrey et al, 1992; Porter, 1993; Dennis, 2010). Users have several years’ experience dealing with auditors and 
operate exclusively in a financial or regulatory role (Section 3.3). Experts are also senior members of established 
South African audit firms, well versed in the requirements of ISA and auditor regulation.  
 
Furthermore, the findings to this point have not given any indication that respondents have been unwilling to discuss 
the case for s45 of the APA openly with the researcher, frequently providing detailed, emotive and, in some cases, 




regulator could be attributed simply as an unintended consequence of the wording and 
operation of the RI provisions (SAICA, 2001 cited in Nel, 2001; Wielligh, 2006). Alternately, a 
broad reporting duty could serve as a type of check and balance that could reinforce the 
perceived value of the RI provisions as touched on in Section 4.3:   
 
‘Why not just rely on professional judgement to decide when to report? Maybe because that is too 
vague...As soon as you start to interpret stuff in a more relaxed way, that is when ambiguity sets 
in and you start to get competitiveness...Suddenly an audit firm may start to get a reputation for 
being more relaxed about RI’s and use this to attract clients and that would just defeat the whole 
point of the legislation’ (E6).  
 
It is, however, possible that an increase in reporting is an important, and ironically subtle, means 
of legitimising audit. The RI provisions – which, purportedly, took cognisance of the fact that the 
preceding reporting duty was characterised by a lack of disclosures (Section 2.1) – have led to 
an increase in the number of reports issued to the IRBA. The assumption, especially from the 
perspective of non-expert users, is that because the physical number of reports issued to the 
regulator has increased under s45 of the APA – as compared to s20(5) of the PAAA – the 
reporting duty makes a material impact on the governance landscape (U1; E5; E14)96. ‘That 
[very few people] ever see the detailed statistics on the RI’s kept by the IRBA does not seem to 
have crossed most people’s minds’ (U14). Consistent with the work of Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), ceremonial processes come to be divorced from underlying technical activities in the 
quest for legitimacy (Section 7.2):  
 
‘It’s all smoke and mirrors. The whole point is to increase the number of reports because they 
[regulators] want to make it seem as if they are doing something. They can turn around and tell 
everyone: “look, the number of cases of whistle-blowing has increased” and because people 
assume that whistle-blowing is good [Section 6.1], they automatically assume that the APA is 
working and so that legitimises audit’ (E5).  
 
‘It really does not matter what is reported. When the APA was being discussed there was a lot of 
criticism that trivial things would be sent up to the regulator
97
. But it never mattered. What was 
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 The IRBA (2012b) confirmed that approximately 3000 RI’s have been reported, representing a significant increase 
above the number of irregularities reported under the PAAA.  
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 Several respondents raised the issue of trivial matters being reported to the IRBA (Wiellgh, 2006). For some, this is 
an unintended consequence of the legislation or the result of wanting to avoid otherwise relevant issues not being 
reported due to misapplication of professional judgment, as touched on in Section 6.1 and Section 4.3. That such a 
consequence may be reminiscent of entrenching a sense of surveillance or an act of ‘dressage’ aimed at addressing 
the subjectivity inherent in audit-decision making is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.   
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important was not adding real value, it was about impression – making it seem like we had done 
something and the broader reporting duty [Section 2.1] and the increase in reports was the “proof”’ 
(E14).   
 
What is, therefore, important for stakeholders is simply the appearance of a rational and 
effective formal reporting protocol included in South African legislation. The technicalities 
concerning the practical implementation of the whistle-blowing duty are largely overlooked.  
Consequently, it does not matter that the benefits associated with the RI provisions cannot be 
quantified (U2; E5); that IRBA may not be able to deal with every report (E5; U10); or that some 
auditors may, despite the threat of sanctions98, disregard their reporting duty (E9; U5). 
Legitimacy is a product ‘of maintaining the appearance that the [whistle-blowing] myth works’ 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 356) something also highlighted by the ‘broad catch all’ (U2; U10) 
designed to encourage reporting and improve transparency (Section 2.1):     
 
‘It does not really matter that the finer details of the APA have not been worked out. For example, 
there is uncertainty about what some of the terms [in the APA] actually mean. I’m thinking about 
terms like “management board” and “breach of fiduciary duty”. We don’t have a clearly defined 
meaning for these terms and we don’t apply them consistently as a result. Now I know that the 
IRBA has been talking about bringing out some extra guidance.  We already have a 100 page 
manual but all it basically says that “it’s all very legal and complicated and for a Court or a group 
of lawyers to decide what the RI’s actually mean”. In any event, who knows when this new 
guidance is going to come out? They have been talking about the problems with the meaning of 
the legislation since they were writing the thing. I think that the biggest issue was not the nitty 
gritty details – for them [the regulators] it was about getting the RI’s up and running in response to 
audit failures at home and overseas’ (E14).  
 
Paraphrasing Expert 14, what is relevant is not the technical efficiency of the RI provisions, but 
simply the ability to assume rationally that the RI provisions are effective (E5; E1; U1; U2). 
Ambiguity in the APA and IRBA’s guide may simply be an unforeseen consequence of the 
operationalisation of the reporting duty (U7; E1). The disconnect between the absence of a 
robust conceptual approach for dealing with RI’s and elements of pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy, however, reaffirm the theorisations of Meyer and Rowan (1977). The RI provisions 
are tantamount to an institutionalised reporting mechanism which must be adopted 
‘ceremonially’ to cultivate a sense of legitimacy (Hopwood, 1990). Any uncertainty in the 
application of the RI provisions, thus, plays an important part in ensuring continued confidence 
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 This is discussed in more detail in Section 7.3. 
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in the whistle-blowing process (see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fogarty et al, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995). Any technical inconsistencies or ambiguities must, thus, be decoupled from 
the image of the s45 of the APA as conceived by the State and its regulators to improve the 
audit reporting process and its perceived public standing. The result is that while audit practice 
may not have changed (Section 4.1; Section 4.2) and that any gains in terms of the quality of 
audit reporting are not guaranteed (Section 4.3), comments such as the following were 
common:    
 
‘Yes, it’s true – [we] don’t ask the IRBA for detailed statistics on the RI’s or about the value that 
has been added specifically [by the RI provisions]. I don’t think that anybody has ever asked the 
IRBA for a list of people or companies that have been reported.....But I think that the legislation 
is a good thing’ (U7). ‘It definitely adds something’ (U3) (emphasis added).  
 
‘When I say that people are complying with the legislation, it’s certainly a “gut feel”...but the 
auditor is reporting something and I think it’s being done properly (U7) (emphasis added).   
 
 ‘Look, we have no real way of knowing if auditors are doing what they are supposed to......but I 
would not delete s45[of the APA]. It’s a good piece of legislation that says “look, if you find 
something...you need to report”’ (E9) (emphasis added).  
 
Prima facie, the RI provisions are regarded as a reporting mechanism that meets the 
information needs of stakeholders; addresses calls for more active reporting by auditors; and 
purportedly serves the public interest. What the above comments highlight is that RI provisions 
also have an important marketing role to play (see also Hopwood, 1990; Humphrey and Moizer, 
1990). By creating a reporting duty which appears broad and grounded in the desire to bring, 
inter alia, ‘material breaches of fiduciary duty’ to the attention of independent regulators, the 
whistle-blowing duty appears rationally effective. As argued by Khalifa et al (2007) and  
Humphrey and Moizer (1990), the RI provisions cultivate a reporting discourse which Section 
4.3 and Section 6.1 argue appeals to the desire to improve audit reporting quality and serve the 
public interest. The whistle-blowing duty becomes a powerful symbolic display of how external 
regulation is adding to the audit process, legitimising it in the eyes of constituents. There is, 
however, a clear tension. We have legislation that is difficult to apply in a practical sense and an 
apparent absence of conclusive evidence that s45 of the APA has materially altered audit. 
Juxtaposed with this is the general assumption that the RI provisions are an important 
component of the rituals of the attest function, especially from the perspective of non-expert 
users who are unable to observe directly the audit process and handling of RI’s (E1; U9).  
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This tension is, however, largely overlooked. (see alo Fogarty et al, 1991; Power, 1994). 
Instead, an assumed confidence sets in. This is a product of the existing legitimacy reserves of 
the audit profession, implying that the RI provisions and cumulative standing of the audit 
profession, become mutually reinforcing, each bolstering the other and strengthening the 
profession’s claims to legitimacy (Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Power, 2003). Simultaneously, a 
sense of good faith is rooted in the ambiguity of the RI provisions and, paradoxically, in the fact 
that there is a clear lack of visible, measurable output that would allow any inconsistencies 
between the technicalities of the APA to be in contrast with perceptions of constituents (see 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fogarty et al, 1991; Suchman, 1995). The result is the ‘absorption of 
uncertainty’ and a ‘contribution to a general aura of confidence’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 
358) in the reporting mechanisms and, by inference, the audit process.  
 
Formalisation of the reporting may be integral to this. Formal structures and processes provide 
a rational explanation for how and to what end activities are carried out and interconnected 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Molm, 1986; Power, 1992). Through the lens of legitimacy theory 
they become ‘manifestations of powerful institutional rules which function as highly rationalised 
myths that are binding on particular organisations’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 343). In this 
light, several users felt that the fact that the reporting duty is a statutory one backed by step-by-
step processes is itself a source of legitimacy. Explaining why, for example, in the absence of 
irrefutable published evidence that the RI provisions were making a positive contribution to 
society, the provisions were still perceived as value-adding, respondents felt that:  
 
‘People are reassured by the reporting duty ‘partially because formal protocols exist. There is a 
clearly defined mechanism for reporting that is backed by legislation’ (U2, emphasis added).  
 
‘And the fact that [auditors] are required to prepare a formal letter to the IRBA which triggers a 
formal process of informing regulatory authorities shows that [s45 of the APA] means something’ 
(E16, emphasis added).  
 
The requirement to report formally ‘demonstrates conviction and seriousness’ (E7) and definitely 
‘leads to more emphasis [on the reporting duty] from the IRBA (E1, emphasis added). 
 
The reporting duty is interpreted by users as a source of consequential legitimacy. It is 
consistent with moral convictions about whistle-blowing and the ideological role of auditors in 
identifying and reporting irregularities (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Sikka and Willmott, 1995; 
Power, 2003). Respondents went on to explain that creating a homogenous response for 
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dealing with irregularities reiterates a sense of legitimacy resulting from statutory reporting 
protocols (see, for example, Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1992; Power, 2003).  Experts, 
for example, often relied on the need for consistent reporting as a means of justifying whistle-
blowing to clients (Chapter 4; Chapter 5). Simultaneously, users attributed the assumed 
consistent reporting standards as one reason for valuing the RI provisions, a move largely in 
line with the prior work on whistle-blowing (consider Read and Rama, 2003; Nam and Lemak, 
2007; Hwang et al, 2008; Seifert et al, 2010). Reinforcing these views are the procedural 
requirements of s45 of the APA (PwC, 2006); a formal guide to interpret the legislation and how 
and when to report (IRBA, 2006); the development of official templates for reporting (Appendix 
A6-A8); and the creation of an independent, professional complaint recipient (Nel, 2001; Konar 
et al, 2003). Each becomes part of the ‘ceremony’ of reporting. Legitimacy is derived from this 
‘ceremony’ and the preconceived belief in the apparently rational, legal, and formal reporting 
process.  
 
For these reasons, when explaining why the act of whistle-blowing by external auditors was 
perceived as socially desirable and in the public interest (Section 6.1), respondents seldom 
cited specific detailed examples of the RI provisions in action. Instead, ‘technical 
procedures...become taken for granted means to accomplish organisational ends’ (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, p. 344), especially in the context of external audit given the opacity of underlying 
processes (Power, 1991; Power, 1994). If one then considers the general market participant, 
not fully cognisant of the audit’s role and functions, legitimacy is easily achieved without the 
need to engage in costly - and potentially difficult - exercise to reform audit fundamentally (Zeff, 
2003a; Zeff, 2003b; Wyatt, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005). It is possible to espouse socially desirable 
practices, in this case whistle-blowing (Section 6.1; Section 2.1), by appealing to readily 
accepted ‘truths’ or ‘beliefs’ while technical difficulties, such as threats to independence or 
impracticalities encountered when policing s45 of the APA (Section 7.2), are marginalised:   
 
‘The public would not know about [s45 of the APA] and so they cannot have perceptions about it. 
They cannot internalise any direct benefits and since nothing has changed on the ground there 
may be nothing to internalise anyway. So why then do we have this regulatory requirement? For 
the same reason that you regulate doctors and nurses and lawyers: it reassures the public to know 
that there is some [formal regulatory requirement] even though the public has no idea of the nitty-
gritty details. They just know that because these people are all important parts of society (doctors, 




‘On the one hand, you make a show of reporting wrong-doing; of blowing the whistle on improper 
conduct that plays to the belief of what the auditor ought to be doing in terms of this picture in our 
heads of the “watchdog”. At the end of the day, there is a general assumption of whistle-blowing 
being an invaluable part of corporate governance and what the auditor is doing ties in nicely with 
that. What s45 of the APA does is basically “marry” auditing and whistle-blowing by solving the 
problem of not being able to tell someone because of a duty of confidentiality. In the meantime, 
there could be a profit motive that makes some auditors cut corners. There could be a need to keep 
the client happy that means that some important things don’t get reported and that is how business 
is then done on the ground. The man on the street has no idea about this and just assumes that 
there are all of these new regulations and all this extra reporting, so everything must be all right’ 
(U14).  
 
Adding to this assumed confidence is the institutionalisation of external regulation going-hand-in 
hand with its proliferation in international jurisdictions (Malsch and Gendron, 2011; Tremblay 
and Gendron, 2011).  The growing legitimacy of arms-length regulation as a means of restoring 
confidence in the audit profession means that enacting s45 of the APA can add to the credibility 
of the audit process, even if the reporting duty leads to few significant changes. The 
effectiveness of new laws and regulations may be effectively side-lined by simply mirroring 
apparently successful regulatory bodies abroad. In other words, the processes of mimetic 
isomorphism discussed in Section 6.1.3, may allow politicians simply to create the perception of 
active change that reassures constituents of the sound functioning of corporate governance 
systems (E5; U5). In other words, it does not matter that s45 of the APA does not produce 
radical changes ‘on the ground’ (U1) or that external regulation, in general, may not be effective 
in improving audit quality (see Bronson et al, 2011). The reporting duty is afforded legitimacy 
simply by inference or assumption:   
 
 ‘S45 of the APA is a bona fide effort at regulating the profession. It is backed by legal process and 
mirrors changes abroad’ (U6).  
 
‘One of the major sources of legitimacy is about the perception of “keeping up with Joneses” (U5). 
‘After all, if the USA has SOX – and it creates a duty to report on certain control problems – well, 
then our RI’s must also be a good idea. That is the attitude that some people have’ (U14).   
 
‘We place a lot of hope in a small piece of legislation (and in legislation in general) to fix our 
problems and that’s often just because other people are doing something similar’ (U2). 
 
‘The reality, however, is that it’s much easier for Government to introduce an Act than it is to tackle 
the issue head on. They can turn around and say: “We have legislated against this and that and we 
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have given the auditor these extra duties”. All of this makes it look like they are doing a great job 
and creates the impression, and I think it’s a false impression, that they have added something 
significant to the governance landscape’ (U8).    
 
That the s45 of the APA was part of an impression management exercise is supported by South 
Africa’s most recent regulatory developments. The Companies Act (2008) (effective from 1 May 
2011), potentially expands the reporting duty embodied by s45 of the APA by creating a largely 
equivalent duty for independent review engagements (Regulation 29, Companies Regulations, 
2011). Initially, this seems consistent with the argument presented in Section 6.1. Per several 
experts, having recognised the value for constituents and moral capital inherent in the whistle-
blowing duty under the APA, the scope of this reporting duty ought to be expanded. Experts, 
however, pointed out a key contradiction. As opposed to its predecessor, the Companies Act 
(2008) effectively allows the vast majority of registered companies, to be neither audited nor 
reviewed. In such instances s45 of the APA and Regulation 29 would be rendered inoperative. 
According to respondents, the majority of reportable irregularities pertain to unlisted entities 
which, under current regulations, would now be exempt from independent assurance 
requirements (Maroun and Wainer, 2013)99. This is in direct contrast with the view of s45 of the 
APA being a source of pragmatic legitimacy. Private companies, unlike their listed counterparts, 
are under no obligation to disclose information, including issuing financial statements, to the 
general public (U10; E1). One of the primary means by which irregularities would thus be 
brought into the open would be via the RI mechanism now rendered inoperative (Maroun and 
Wainer, 2013; E1; U10). 
 
Respondents were split on their interpretation of this. Some suggested that, despite changes to 
the Company Law, independent reviews would still fall within the scope of either the RI 
provisions or the equivalent Regulation 29. That some companies would be neither audited nor 
reviewed was seen as allowing audit – and the IRBA – to focus its attention on more material 
organisations where the public interest would be better served. Others offered the tension 
between the APA and Companies Act an example of an ‘unintended consequence’ (U9; U1) of 
regulatory developments. This has the potential to detract from the utility of legislation in the 
eyes of constituents, thereby eroding pragmatic legitimacy (E1; U10).  A more critical 
interpretation is that if s45 of the APA had been bona fide enacted with an aim to adding value 
for stakeholders and aligning the audit profession with societal expectations and moral ideals 
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  Bear in mind that unlisted entities are not subject to the same extent of scrutiny by capital providers and 
regulators, most notably the JSE (U6; U9).  
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inherent in whistle-blowing in general, it is unlikely that the legislature would overlook a tension 
between the s45 of the APA and the Companies Act (2008) (E1; E2; U9; U8). It may be possible 
that the decision to exclude the majority of companies from the requirement to be subject to 
either an independent audit or independent review is an indicator that policy-makers never 
intended the RI provisions to be anything more than a superficial means of reassuring the local 
public and international investors that South Africa was not relying exclusively on a self- 
regulatory framework for the audit profession.  
 
 
6.3: SUMMARY  
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explored whether or not the RI provisions are an example of external 
regulation designed to address agency risk by improving audit quality. Some evidence was 
found in support of this claim. The reporting duty did have relevance for perceptions of auditor 
independence and the quality of information being reported. It did not, however, have a material 
impact on the ‘nuts and bolts of audit’. In addition, that it offered material benefits in terms of 
enhanced auditor independence was not universally accepted. Despite this, respondents largely 
supported the whistle-blowing duty and almost unanimously agreed that the RI provisions 
should not be dispensed with. A reason for this is that the reporting requirement is a source of 
legitimacy.  
The obligation to blow the whistle on transgressions can yield benefits for different stakeholders, 
implying a source of pragmatic legitimacy. Contemporaneously, several respondents cited the 
act of reporting irregularities as socially desirable, improving the quality of the audit report; 
enhancing corporate transparency; and ultimately being an act in the public interest resulting in 
claims to pragmatic and moral legitimacy100. With the prior literature and financial press pointing 
to the growing acceptance of whistle-blowing as part of the corporate governance landscape, a 
sense of cognitive legitimacy may also result. This is reinforced by a growing move in favour of 
arms-length regulation of the audit profession after it has been beset by numerous challenges to 
its credibility. By entrenching a duty to bring certain transgressions to the attention of an 
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independent regulator, the RI provisions may serve as an example of mimetic isomorphism at 
work as South African regulators seek to demonstrate the soundness of local capital market 
systems, including the audit process.  
Not all respondents, however, shared these views. Some argued that the RI provisions simply 
encourage an attitude of compliance. In a legalistic setting, any resulting perception of 
pragmatic or moral legitimacy is simply a by-product of ‘following the rules’ (E5) and ‘ticking the 
boxes’ (E8), a concern raised by both users and experts101. From a slightly different perspective, 
s45 of the APA may be an example of ‘carefully chosen displays of symbolism [that] may 
circumvent the need for substantive change entirely’ (Suchman, 1995, p.: 598). Implementing 
formal reporting protocols; backing these with legal requirements; and relying on an 
independent regulator to coordinate the reporting process are used to rationalise the reporting 
duty. Legitimacy results, not from substantial value for exchange participants or alignment with 
societal ideals, but rather from the belief in the act of reporting itself. Consequently, most 
important is the mere existence of the reporting duty which mirrors the institutionalisation of 
regulation in other jurisdictions. Processes of decoupling and ‘logic of confidence’ are at work 
allowing concerns about the practical implementation of the RI provisions and their efficiency to 
be separated from the image of active whistle-blowing leading to material corporate governance 
improvements.  
Claims to legitimacy – whether substantive or symbolic – may not, however, be the only 
processes at work. Several respondents alluded to the possible presence of disciplinary power. 
Fines and imprisonment, for example, become ‘punishments’ for non-conformance; the 
procedural nature of the APA may be regarded as ‘enclosing’ in nature; and there may be a 
sense of rendering both the auditor and the audited ‘visible’ by virtue of the operation of a piece 
of legislation that effectively mandates whistle-blowing. Similar to the change impetus of 
industrialisation that Foucault (1977) identifies as underlying the move towards forms of 
disciplinary power,  the need for a perceived sense of ‘visibility’ or ‘control’ over the audit 
profession after it is beset by a crisis of trust gives rise to Panoptic-like attributes of recently 
enacted external regulation. In other words, one reason for demands for arms-length regulation 
to supplant the self-regulatory framework for the audit profession may be attributed to notions of 
disciplinary power. Motifs of surveillance, examination and normalising sanction may be at work 
in external regulatory developments reassuring users of audit reports that practical and socially 
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are subject experts means that we cannot exclude the possibility of an expectation gap between auditors and users in 
general (Section 8.3). 
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desirable change at both the audit client and audit firm is taking place. In this context, Chapter 7 
explores whether or not aspects of the RI provisions may be reminiscent of Foucauldian power 
and control. The Chapter also considers how motifs of disciplinary power may be closely related 
to notions of legitimacy, whether bona fide, or part of the institutional processes of decoupling.  
 
7: SECTION 45 OF THE APA: NOTIONS OF DISCIPLINARY 
POWER 
 
This chapter adds to the debate on the role of the RI provisions in South Africa by examining the 
operation of elements of Foucauldian power and control in the whistle-blowing duty. As 
explained in Section 2.4, the move from self- to arms-length regulation of auditing signals a slide 
along a social continuum from trust vested in financial reporting and auditing to one where, 
increasingly, stakeholders come to distrust these processes (Power, 1994; Pentland, 2000). In 
examining the role of s45 of the APA in connection with audit quality (Chapter 4; Chapter 5) or 
as a means of legitimising the audit profession (Chapter 6), what has not, however, been fully 
dealt with are the characteristics of external regulation that allow it to win the confidence of 
stakeholders in the aftermath of corporate debacles and to gain institutional status (Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011). To this end, this chapter concentrates on how, in addition to making tangible 
changes to audit practice (Chapter 4; Chapter 5), integral to RI provisions’ ability to serve as an 
alternate source of legitimacy for the profession (Chapter 6) are elements of enclosure, power, 
control and sanction that reassure users of audit reports that regulators are responding to the 
most recent crisis of confidence (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Black, 2008; Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011). Accordingly, the final research question asks:  
C: Is s45 of the APA an example of surveillance machinery and a manifestation of 
disciplinary power?  
Section 7.1 commences by exploring interviewees’ perceptions, pointing to parallels between 
the RI provisions and: principles of enclosure and the efficient body, disciplinary power and a 
sense of surveillance. This is followed by Section 7.2 which builds on Section 7.1 and Section 
6.1 by drawing links between conceptions of disciplinary power inherent in the reporting duty 
and notions of legitimacy. Section 7.3 provides a critical perspective, examining limitations of a 
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panoptic metaphor for exploring the role of the RI provisions and drawing connections between 
notions of Foucauldian power and control and symbolic displays of legitimacy per Section 6.2. 
Section 7.4 summarises.  
 
7.1: DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: A CASE FOR THE RI PROVISIONS? 
 
7.1.1: ON PRINCIPLES OF ENCLOSURE AND THE EFFICIENT BODY  
 
Interviewees pointed out that the RI provisions, reinforced by the IRBA’s guide on reportable 
irregularities, have, to some extent, changed what it means to be an auditor (Section 6.1). In 
terms of ISA (IAASB, 2009x; IAASB, 2009e) and codes of professional conduct (IFAC, 2006; 
IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 2012), confidentiality of client information is of paramount importance. The 
RI provisions provide an exception to the principle of confidentiality whereby the auditor is 
obliged to disclose client information under certain circumstances to the IRBA without being 
compelled by a court of law to do so (see also  IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 2009h). Experts explain 
how the RI provisions augment the professional duty of the auditor to express an opinion on a 
client’s financial statements (IAASB, 2009c; IAASB, 2009s) by effectively establishing a whistle-
blowing duty (Section 2.1; Section 2.3; Section 6.1), widening the reporting obligations of the 
auditor (Section 4.3) and altering the relationship between auditors and users of audit reports in 
the process:  
‘One [would] not normally see [various irregularities] coming through in the emphasis of matters 
paragraphs 
102
[of the audit report]. Normally, the emphasis of matter is only about a going concern 
[problem]...so in many respects the quality of the audit report that is issued, including in the 
absence of legislation, is inadequate....What s45 of the APA does is expand on what is required 
from the auditor... The auditor is meant to be a watchdog and that is the message that comes from 
this piece of legislation’ (U3).  
 
Audit is not solely about reporting on compliance of financial statements with IFRS. It 
incorporates a more active form of monitoring and surveillance which stresses that companies 
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 An emphasis of matter paragraph is included in an audit report to draw a user’s attention to certain facts or 
circumstances without modifying the audit opinion (IAASB, 2009t).  
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‘are expected to be good corporate citizens and that there is somebody standing behind them 
and watching’ (U10). While stressing that the reporting duty has not changed the fundamentals 
of audit practices and detracted from the professional duty to express an opinion on the financial 
statements (Chapter 4), several experts confirmed that there was a recognised need to provide 
more than just a standard audit report when certain transgressions came to their attention.  
 
‘I don’t think that the legislation has anything to do with the [technicalities] of audit but I do think that 
it, in general, gives informed users some comfort over management integrity...It has become an 
addendum, in a way, to the audit report. It plays a complementary role providing information over 
and above the audit opinion’ (E8).  
‘So, from that perspective, it makes us realise that – in certain cases – we have a duty to do more 
than just issue a generic audit report’ (E4).  
‘[and], as a result, I think that [s45 of the APA] certainly [does] have an impact [on what it means to 
be an auditor]. It emphasis the role of the auditor- it has placed the onus on the partner to make 
sure that he is aware [of his public duties]’ (E1).  
Coupled with an added duty altering the role of the auditor from one who reports on the financial 
statements to possibly an agent of the public interest acting as a ‘watchdog’ (Section 6.1), the 
RI provisions create clear ‘enclosures’ in turn ‘partitioned’ by both the legislation, the IRBA’s 
guide (IRBA, 2006) and the hierarchical structures of the audit firms. As explained by several 
experts, the legislation defines what constitutes a ‘reportable irregularity’ (s1 of the APA, 2005), 
coupled with the IRBA’s guide (2006) which elaborates on the definition, providing examples of 
instances where the auditor would be expected to report.  In particular, the APA requires any act 
of fraud, irrespective of its perceived materiality, involving a client’s management board, to be 
reported to the IRBA (PwC, 2006; Wielligh, 2006). This was designed specifically to widen the 
reporting net and prevent the application of professional judgement leading to reduced 
reporting103 (Nel, 2001; Wielligh, 2006).  
 
For this reason, the RI provisions were described by several experts as materially contributing 
to the ‘vocabulary’ of audit partners when it comes to defining their reporting duties. Similar to 
the arguments of Khalifa et al (2007) and Boland (1987), the prescriptions of the APA and the 
IRBA’s (2006) guide constitute the acceptable way of describing and thinking about a particular 
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 The RI provisions were also construed as ‘defining’ what constitutes conduct contrary to public interest and worthy 
of whistle-blowing. Miceli and Near (1984), Hwang et al (2008), and Nam and Lemak (2007) are examples of the prior 
literature pointing to a multitude of factors that influence the decision to blow the whistle. In the RI provisions many 
respondents find an attempt to clarify an otherwise subjective decision-making process. 
197 
 
part of audit practice, effectively ‘objectifying’ the reporting duty. In the words of Miller and 
O’Leary (1987, p. 239), the reporting duty may, thus, be an integral part of the ‘range of 
calculative programmes and techniques which come to regulate the lives of individuals’. 
Although this duty does not totally describe the auditor’s function (IRBA, 2006), it certainly 
contributes to the ‘discourse’ on the role and to the purpose of audit and the way in which 
auditors think about their duties (E3; E10; U10). 
 
The regulation also concentrates on the physical act of reporting itself, as an example of the 
‘roles’ or ‘tasks’ at the centre of panoptic control. Firstly, the RI provisions, read with s1 and s44 
of the APA, define the individual responsible for the act of reporting to the IRBA, namely the 
individual registered auditor responsible for the engagement. This is most likely the engagement 
partner (IRBA, 2006). While experts pointed out that it is usually an audit team member who will 
first detect an RI, each of the participating audit firms had established policies explaining the 
responsibility of the junior auditor and the audit partner, thereby ensuring that roles are clear 
and partitioned: 
 
‘When it comes to reporting, there is a very clear hierarchy. The clerks know that if they suspect 
that there may be an RI, they need to discuss this with the audit manager as the starting point. 
From there, the engagement partner will have to be involved. He absolutely will have to comply 
with firm policy on how to deal with the RI and that will involve having to discuss the whole case 
with the [senior partners responsible for risk-management at the audit firm level]’ (E10). 
‘If you find an RI, it really affects the documentation. When you pick up something at a client - and 
because your file is also going to be reviewed and exposed to other parties and so forth - it 
becomes important for you, as the partner, to show that you followed a set of guidelines. And once 
you are satisfied that you do indeed have an RI, there is very prescriptive, scheduled reporting 
time-table that you stick to’ (E17).   
 
The establishment of specific reporting duties backed by defined roles and notions of 
accountability effectively compels the individual to behave in a certain, almost rehearsed, 
fashion reminiscent of the ‘temporal elaboration of acts’ and ‘dressage’ which form part of 
Foucauldian notions of power and control (see Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980;  
Hopper and Macintosh, 1993). In other words, the RI provisions, backed by the IRBA’s guide 
(2006), make it theoretically possible to ‘attach to every individual within the [firm] norms and 
standards of behaviour’ (Miller and O'Leary, 1987, p. 242) concerning the reporting duty. The 
creation of formal structures, contributes to defining the role and purpose of the individual 
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tantamount to a form of ‘bureaucratic coercion’ (Fogarty, 1992). Reinforcing this view is the fact 
that, although junior team members may be involved in the reporting process, this does not 
detract from the ultimate responsibility of the engagement leader in connection with an RI (E10; 
E2): 
 ‘At the end of the day...the responsibility does not lie with a team member or the manager. It starts 
with you as the partner because you are the one signing off’ (E8).  
‘The way the system works is that the clerk has to record something on the file. The partner has got 
to deal with that. Even if it was bullshit...you can’t tell them to write it again or write it properly. It’s 
there – it’s embedded in the file. And the quality reviewers read that stuff. If you fob something off, 
you are in big trouble’ (E9).  
‘You will probably document the RI [on] on the audit file yourself. You will review it several 
times...you make sure it’s 100% and you definitely don’t delegate this to someone else to do’ (E3).  
These comments highlight a system of hierarchical accountability established by the operation 
of the APA, together with the respective audit firm’s own policies and procedures for complying 
with the reporting requirements. Although more junior team members are expected to play their 
part, it is ultimately the engagement leader who is responsible for how suspected RI’s are dealt 
with. Concurrently, notions of enclosure and partitioning are reinforced by s45(1)(a) of the APA 
which mandates reporting to IRBA, complemented by s44(1)(4) of the APA which defines the 
responsibility of the IRBA to inform appropriate regulators, a duty elaborated on by the IRBA’s 
guide (IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006). The guide provides examples of the types of regulators 
concerned and certain of the legal processes that would be followed. In this way, there are 
clearly defined roles or functions which fall to specified individuals. Each of these tasks is 
segregated such that each individual is responsible for a specific ‘part’ of the reporting duty, 
whether due to the legislation (directly or indirectly) or the application of those legal 
requirements within the structures of the audit firms. The reporting protocols are reminiscent of 
the proverb: ‘a place for everything and everything in its place’ (E17).  
 
Secondly, the APA achieves a ‘temporal elaboration of the act’ of reporting (Hopper and 
Macintosh, 1993, p. 195) aimed at creating a sense of order and control. The auditor must 
initially and ‘without delay’ inform the IRBA (s45(1)(a) of the APA, 2005). Following this – and no 
later than three days after the first report to the IRBA - the auditor must notify the client’s 
management board in writing of the first report (s45(2)(a) of the APA, 2005). Thereafter the 
auditor must, no later than 30 days after the first report is issued, take reasonable steps to 
discuss it with the client’s management board  (s45(3)(a&b) of the APA, 2005) where after a 
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second report is issued to the IRBA to the effect that either: no irregularity has taken place; that 
the suspected irregularity is no longer taking place and that adequate remedial action is being 
taken; or that the irregularity is continuing (s45(3)(c) of the APA, 2005). Appropriate details 
ought to accompany the reports, a process ‘simplified’ and guided by ‘templates’ made available 
by the SAICA (2007) and developed in consultation with the regulator104. In the interim:  
 
‘You will have loads of documentation when you find an RI...It’s very important to document our thought 
process step by step to say [sic] how you reached your conclusions’ (E6).  
‘Our audit file is set up to take you through the process step by step. There are specific enquires 
that you have to make and put on the file first. Then, you look at the facts and make your own 
conclusion. Following that, there are formal consultation rules that have to be followed. You make 
sure [that this part of the file] is 100%’ (E3). 
In each instance, a clearly defined reporting protocol is designed to add to the procedural rigour 
of the whistle-blowing duty, promoting confidence in the process and ensuring official, clear and 
accurate reporting  (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006; SAICA, 2007). What this ultimately achieves is a 
more ‘general rendering’ of whistle-blowing in a manner that most experts and users described 
as procedural, well-structured and rational and appealing to a sense of direction, control and 
efficiency. Interconnected with this is a ‘rendering visible of certain activities in a way which is 
intelligible by virtue of certain general categories’ (Miller and O'Leary, 1987, p. 240), in this 
case, the prescriptions of an Act of Parliament and guides provided by the regulator.  
 
7.1.2: ON PRINCIPLES OF DISCIPLINARY POWER  
 
Commenting on the rationale behind the RI provisions, interviewees referred to the relevance of 
surveillance, in line with the prior corporate governance literature stressing the importance of 
transparency and accountability (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Roberts, 2009):  
 ‘I think that [s45 of the APA] is there to protect the public interest in that there is a monitoring 
mechanism overseen [by an independent regulator]’ (U8).  
                                               
104
 For details on the procedures followed when an RI is suspected or detected, refer to Section 2.1. An example of 
common RI’s may be found in Appendix A4 and template reports that would be sent to the client and the IRBA are 
available in Appendix A6 to Appendix A8. 
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‘From that perspective one could also say that there is definitely a policing element to [s45 of the 
APA]. In fact, I would go so far as to say that wanting to create a policing function was a key driver 
of the APA and its predecessor’ (U9). 
‘If a company knows that there is a legal duty on someone...to check on them and to report if 
something goes wrong, they tend to be more responsible....they make sure that they dot the “i’s” 
and cross the “t’s”, not because in the past they did not pay attention, but because they know that 
somebody is watching’ (U3).  
Users in particular reiterated how the traditional audit report is relatively generic, simply 
expressing an opinion on whether or not financial statements are in compliance with IFRS 
(Chapter 4):  
‘Section 45 of the APA may not necessarily have changed the way audit firms actually do the 
audit but it does at least give them a reporting duty which did not exist before...and that is good 
thing because although you are [an important stakeholder] you don’t necessarily know what’s 
going on detail by detail [sic]...Now the auditor not only has a duty to report on financial 
statements but to tell the audit committees and regulators that there are other issues as well’ 
(U2).  
 
The experts similarly suggested that the RI provisions expand the auditors’ reporting duty, 
adding an additional monitoring function. In particular, descriptions of the RI provisions were 
reminiscent of a ‘panoptic tower of experts’ (see Hopper and Macintosh, 1993):  
 
‘From the perspective of the audit firms, there is definitely a surveillance element [to the RI 
provisions]. The State is expanding, or perhaps outsourcing, parts of its policing function. From 
their perspective, that makes sense: the auditor is very nicely placed to carry out the surveillance 
function’ (E9).  
 
‘I think Government wanted to know. It’s almost like they’re making auditors their 
agents...because that is the only mechanism available to them...It creates a watchdog 
mechanism that gives more power. But then part of that is that you get information...so that you 
can hopefully avoid some of these spectacular failures’ (U3). 
‘After all, who else is able to access all of the client’s information without even having to get a 
Court order! The State could try and create another surveillance mechanism, but it would not be 
nearly as cost effective or efficient. So, what they have in audit is a very nice, efficient and free 




‘Especially since Government does not have the expertise, competency or capacity to carry out a 
detailed review. So they created this legislation [s45 of the APA] where [auditors] have to report 
just about everything’ (E5). 
 
Elaborating on exactly how auditors are ‘nicely placed’ (E9) to offer a window into the client:  
‘At the end of the day, the auditor is able to access any part of the organisation. This is something 
he is afforded in terms of the law. Notwithstanding the legal issues, the auditor can ask questions; 
examine the records; access all parts of the business; corroborate whatever he likes. [This] is 
basically what audit is all about. You don’t even notice them [auditors] anymore’ (U13).  
 
‘And then, when they [auditors] find something interesting, the different regulators [having been 
informed by the IRBA under s45(4) of the APA] can then send in their teams as necessary. And 
that is precisely what they do! The South African Revenue Services are a perfect example of this. 
They have been using s45 [of the APA] to their advantage very effectively’ (U9).  
 
In this light, the APA derives its value not by virtue of imposing awful physical or severe 
monetary sanctions on a client’s senior management. Instead, it affords a means for regulators 
to ‘gaze’ into the organisation at a moment’s notice and at considerably little cost to them. The 
interviewees did not describe actual surveillance or observation. The auditors do not enjoy the 
physical optical advantage envisaged by the Panopticon. Instead, monitoring becomes more 
subtle, involving written accounts in working papers and the auditor’s information systems, 
capable of analysing information and producing reports on each financial aspect of the 
organisation. Resulting visibility is not derived from calculative approaches evaluating deviations 
from the norm statistically but rather from normative assessment in terms of the discourse of 
auditing, now including the RI provisions.   
 
The auditor’s ability to access any part of the organisation for the purpose of collecting audit 
‘evidence’ for review by an experienced audit partner heightens the sense of visibility. Further, 
the underlying audit process is regarded as a natural and inevitable part of everyday business 
life (see also: Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Power, 1994) such that the auditor’s activities go 
virtually unnoticed (U13).  In this way it becomes difficult for the observed to determine whether 
or not he is subject to actual surveillance. In contrast, by virtue of the RI provisions, regulators 
gain a window into the organisation and an ability to act on reports released to them by the 
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IRBA as they deem fit, making the auditor part of a complex surveillance system at least similar 
to a ‘panoptic gaze’105.   
 
In addition the ISA specifies the use of appropriate sampling techniques (IAASB, 2009p) 
incorporating a degree of unpredictability in the planned audit approach (IAASB, 2009g; IAASB, 
2009m). This ensures that testing is, to some extent, random and unexpected. When it comes 
to RI’s, although the auditor is not required specifically to perform procedures to detect them 
(IRBA, 2006), whether or not a reporting duty is triggered is inextricably dependent on the extent 
to which auditors comply with ISA (PAAB, 2003; IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 2009h). In addition, when 
the auditor does suspect or detect the RI, he is required to inform the IRBA of the fact before 
discussing the matter in detail with the client (s45(2&3) of the APA, 2005; IRBA, 2006). Although 
the client may suspect that a report to the IRBA is imminent, once the report is issued to the 
IRBA, most respondents agreed that the client’s management is neither aware of which 
regulator the report has been passed to nor the planned response (if any) by third parties. 
Several interviewees suggested this was a source of anxiety.  
 
In this way the RI provisions are akin to a ‘cadre of technical staff and product managers in... 
central headquarters’ used by a CEO to complement a system of hierarchical surveillance 
outlined by Hopper and Macintosh (1993). In the respective audit firms, the relevant regulator 
has a single, contained unit (the audit team) that has the relevant skills and competency to 
process and evaluate a client’s financial information, controls and financial statements. Just as 
Hopper and Macintosh’s (1993, p. 204) team of senior managers may, ‘without an invitation’, 
‘investigate anything within their area of expertise’, so the audit team also enjoys carte blanche.  
The result in a management control context is close association between hierarchal surveillance 
and ‘normalization’ of behaviour reinforced by processes of ‘examination’ (Walsh and Stewart, 
1993; Cowton and Dopson, 2002). A similar situation may hold in the context of the RI 
provisions where surveillance - reminiscent of a ‘panoptic gaze’, may be working on the minds 
of an audit client’s senior management. Interviewees explored this possibility from the 
perspective of a company’s board of directors. They explain how the legislation may be focusing 
specifically on senior officers of an audit client with an aim to stressing accountability, in line 
                                               
105
 What makes panoptic metaphor particularly powerful is that the motives of the ‘watchers’, as well as their 
identities, are not known to the observed (Gordon, 1980; Smart, 2002). Panopticism relies heavily on ‘temporary, 
anonymous observers’ which naturally piques anxiety and further motivates the desire to ‘normalise’ behaviour 
(Hopper and Macintosh, 2993, p. 203).  
203 
 
with the prior literature on management control systems (see, for example, Walsh and Stewart, 
1993; Cowton and Dopson, 2002): 
 
 ‘The directors....are effectively being policed. I don’t want to get into the technical details, but [s45 
of the APA] is really being aimed at the senior management of the company. Those are the people 
who are ultimately responsible for the governance of companies and so, stakeholders might need 
to be made aware that [their governance-related actions] [Section 45 of the APA] is one 
mechanism by which that is done [sic]’ (U9). 
 
Elaborating on the issue of enhanced transparency in the name of stakeholder engagement 
being in the public interest (IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2010; IRC, 2011),   
 
‘One reason for the [reporting duty] being in the public interest is because the affected companies 
are subject to monitoring. At very least the senior individuals of the company are being monitored’ 
(U10). 
‘In an ever more complicated and integrated world, regulation becomes unavoidable’ (U6).  
‘The RI provisions are one of the mechanisms that is there to protect the public interest....At least 
the Government has a way of finding out what’s going on in companies and letting people know 
that they had better be aware that someone is monitoring them. Part of this is probably about 
preventing new failures by tightening people up [sic]’ (U8) 
Another interviewee highlighted the effect of this monitoring: 
 
‘I know that [the reporting duty is there] and it would worry me’ (U2). 
 
Anxiety and worry featured heavily in the interviewees’ views of the RI provisions which would 
‘work on the minds’ (E3, E6) of a company’s senior managers and directors, thus engendering 
self-discipline (Roberts et al., 2006): 
 
 ‘...First we have the machinery that allows for [disciplinary sanctions]. Second, this is being run 
properly and that this works on them to put in their energy and commitment [sic]’ (U6) 
‘You need...to be a good corporate citizen, and if you don’t, there is someone who is going to come 
in and have a look and might report you. I think that is the sort of reasoning. You return to the fact 
of people have to have an audit and now [the auditor] is reporting if these people are doing 
something illegal. And that probably makes people more cautious. They are more concerned about 
being in compliance and getting things right the first time’ (U10).  
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‘When the auditor submits his documents, including the letters and explanations that have been 
given to him to the IRBA, that can make people nervous - the directors, for example. I think that 
audit clients definitely feel the effect of having this thing [the reporting duty] hanging over their 
heads’ (U7).  
Elaborating on the idea of ‘having something over their heads’, interviewees explained how 
audit becomes akin to an examination process (consider Hoskin and Macve, 1986). Audit, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, has been accepted as a natural and necessary form of policing or 
monitoring (Power, 1994; Humphrey, 2012). In its traditional sense, audit includes a host of 
procedures performed to evaluate defined subject matter, usually a set of financial statements, 
against a ‘suitable’ framework, often IFRS (IAASB, 2009c; IAASB, 2009l; IAASB, 2009k; IAASB, 
2009m). Section 45 of the APA complements this. In addition to the audit report on financial 
statements, the auditor becomes obliged to report certain acts regarded as inconsistent with 
societal norms, and effectively contrary to the public interest (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006), to an 
independent regulator. In this way, the RI provisions becomes part of moral assessment (U2; 
U10; Nel, 2001) of the client’s management board with the auditor considering whether ‘acts’ or 
‘omissions’ result in material loss to third parties; are indicative of a material breach of fiduciary 
duty; or amount to fraud (s1 of the APA, 2005; IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006). In each case, the 
client’s management board is open to sanction from the relevant regulator.  
 
The risk of sanction dependent on the outcome of the auditor’s ‘procedures’, is described by 
users as a ‘weight’ hanging above the individual director’s head.  By virtue of application of 
technical procedures (Power, 2003; IAASB, 2009c) by independent and competent 
professionals (Edwards, 2001; Carrington, 2010), several respondents explained that any report 
issued to the IRBA becomes tantamount to an expression of opinion on the client’s 
management board or the reduction to writing of a fundamental, and potentially damaging, 
‘truth’ which could be used at a later stage by a regulator wanting to take corrective action. 
Foucault (1977) explains that one outcome of subjection to examination and hierarchical 
surveillance may be normalization106. Considering the reporting protocols of the APA, a similar 
view emerges. After the first  report is issued to the IRBA, the auditor is obliged to take 
reasonable measures to discuss the report with the client’s management board before a second 
report is issued to the regulator (s45 (2&3) of the APA, 2005; IRBA, 2006). When this second 
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 In Discipline and Punishment: the Birth of the Prison, Foucault does not conclude that examination, hierarchical 
surveillance or disciplinary power results in rehabilitation of the ‘criminal’. He simply points out that this is a commonly 




report is sent, and assuming that an RI has been detected, the auditor is specifically required to 
comment on whether or not the RI is continuing and if ‘adequate steps have been taken for the 
prevention or recovery of any loss as a result thereof’107 (s45(3) of the APA, 2005).  
 
Interviewees concluded that where an RI was detected, it was clearly the intention of the 
legislature that there be an ‘incentive’ to remedy the RI. The auditor is not at liberty to report 
unless the RI is not corrected (Wielligh, 2006) and may not allow the client the opportunity to 
take remedial action to avoid at least notifying the IRBA (IRBA, 2006). Nevertheless, the client is 
informed of the first report having been sent to the IRBA and is effectively given a 30-day 
‘deadline’ (E13) to deal with the issue to ensure that the second report concludes that either 
there is no RI or that it has been corrected in order to avoid the report being escalated to the 
relevant regulator (E12, E11). In this way, ‘visibility’ achieved by immediate reporting by the 
auditor to IRBA works hand-in-hand with the potential imposition of sanctions to achieve 
‘normalising behaviour’.  Further, commenting on the nature of issues reported to the IRBA, 
audit experts in particular, highlight that the frequency of relatively administrative issues being 
reported to the IRBA has reduced considerably as companies respond to the risk of non-
compliance being reported to the relevant regulators. For instance:  
 
‘Not having a fixed asset register is a common example of the sort of administrative (and relatively 
trivial) issue that was traditionally being reported to the IRBA. As far as I am aware they [the IRBA] 
have not seen one of those for a long time. Obviously, companies are now preparing fixed asset 
registers. Companies have been made aware of the fact that they need to move things along – that 
they need to comply with the basics’ (U3).  
 
From this perspective, the issue of reputation is also relevant. Echoing the work of Brivot and 
Gendron (2011) and Walsh and Stewart (1993), the risk of being branded delinquent for non-
compliance is an important part of the reward and punishment system underpinning disciplinary 
power (Gordon, 1980; Moore, 1991; Hopper and Macintosh, 1993). An RI could be tantamount 
to a ‘scarlet letter’ (U11), highlighting the company as non-conformist in the eyes of regulators 
and other stakeholders. Even when reported issues would not otherwise have been regarded as 
material, interviewees suggested, ‘If they can’t get the basics right, what else could be going 
wrong?’ (U3) 
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 This line of thought is common in a management accounting context where Hopper and Macintosh (1983) Cowton 
and Dopson (2002), Miller and O’Leary (1987) and Drury (2005) point to the potential of management control systems 
to define ‘calculative norms’ or standards to which individuals are expected to strive. 
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Just as the use of coloured markers - which rendered the performance of individual factory 
workers visible to managers and peers - was used to motivate improved productivity in the 18th 
century factory (Walsh and Stewart, 1993), the concern about being ‘identified’ as ‘getting even 
the basics wrong’ (E16) or being ‘branded’ as non-compliant has a disciplining effect on at least 
some senior managers. Contemporaneously, disciplinary power manifests itself subtly, often 
working on those areas of life otherwise ignored or undefined (Foucault, 1977; Miller and 
O'Leary, 1987; Moore, 1991). Section 45 of the APA, was described by almost all respondents 
as an example of whistle-blowing that could bring material transgressions into the open (Nel, 
2001) and creating a sense of improved transparency (Chapter 6.1). This move is fully 
consistent with the stated objectives of the regulator (Nel, 2001) and the essence of codes of 
corporate governance (see IOD, 2009; Solomon, 2010). The legislation, however, also results in 
the divulgence of what may be termed ‘housekeeping issues’ (E1)108. Whether intentional or 
otherwise, respondents noted that: the requirement for any act of fraud to be reported; a failure 
to define clearly what ‘breaches of fiduciary duty’ actually means; and the examples of 
‘reportable acts’ provided by the IRBA’s guidelines (IRBA, 2006), results in a plethora of reports 
issued to the IRBA, many of which may not deal with highly material incidents109 (Wielligh, 
2006). The result is that ‘housekeeping issues’- otherwise ‘beyond the interest of regulators and 
the prosecuting authorities’ (E16) - become a focal point for the whistle-blowing duty, together 
with ‘irregularities’ which would have material implications for different stakeholders (E1, E3, 
U3). What is important from the perspective of disciplinary power is that ‘a new layer of 
supervision develop a system of “normalising sanctions” which move into spaces of indifference’ 
and not generally focused on by the State (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993, p. 200).  
.  
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  ‘Housekeeping issue’ is a colloquial term frequently used by auditors to describe an issue noted during the course 
of the engagement which does not have a material effect on the financial statements, a client’s internal controls, or its 
annual report. These are often administrative or immaterial compliance issues.  
 
109 Unlike its predecessor - which placed emphasis on irregularities being material - the RI provisions are broader, 
particularly when it comes to the issue of fraud (Gawith, 2006; Wielligh, 2006). This ‘improvement’, as discussed in 
Section 2.1, marked an effort to address the risk of inconsistent application of the reporting duty due to the application 
of professional judgement and of circumvented reporting by rogue auditors (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2012b). Whether 
intentional or otherwise, the effect was, as described by most experts and users, an increase in the number of reports 




 7.1.3: AN EXPANDED SENSE OF SURVEILLANCE 
 
The ‘disciplinary potential’ of the RI provisions may work concurrently on both the client’s senior 
management as well as the auditors. User 6 explains: 
‘The rules probably help [the IRBA] and the auditor because it’s structured in a certain way. You 
know what the serious issues are; you know what’s expected and when; and you end up with 
consistent reporting that avoids a million different interpretations...you can also deal with people 
who just don’t want to report and with those who have reported but needed guidelines so that they 
know when they have to report’ (U2). 
‘....does section 45 of the APA amount to creating a watchdog for the watchdog? That is exactly 
what it is aimed at! Who will watch the guards? So, [in that light] it is absolutely necessary, and as I 
say, I might sound like a disciplinarian, but I have seen just too often that there are some 
professionals who, funny enough, just done take their work seriously’ (U6).  
Just as the preceding section argued that s45 of the APA achieved a sense of hierarchical 
surveillance over an audit client’s senior management, a similar situation appears to hold when 
it comes to auditors themselves:   
‘Section 45 [of the APA] may not be changing the way that we do our audits but there will be 
instances when it focuses the mind’ (E5).  
‘One thing that we have is a very strong consultation culture....you can’t makes calls on your own or 
decisions on your own any more’ (E6).   
‘And so I think the legislation does have an impact. It definitely emphasises the role of the partner 
and makes you more aware... even if you would not have changed the way you do your audits’ 
(E17).  
There may also be sanctions for non-compliance with the RI provisions:   
‘Look, it [the possibility of a penalty for non-conformance] does focus the mind. Whether they are 
the right penalties or not is a different issue but they certainly focus the mind. So, if you are sitting 
and thinking: “nobody will ever know” [if you do not report an RI], you kind of have to think a bit 
more clearly [sic]. At the very least it creates a consultation even if it was just with a couple of 
partners’ (U5). 
When there is an RI, ‘you have sleepless nights. At the end of the day, you have to report. You 
can’t go on the fact that you might lose the audit. It’s a real issue. A lot of people criticise audit 
because they perceive us as placing profits ahead of quality and that we want to keep the client 
happy. That’s wrong – that’s not how it works’ (E7).   
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Importantly, the IRBA is not constantly observing the auditor but merely has the ability to make 
relevant enquiries by virtue of: powers of inspection (s47 of the APA, 2005); the requirements 
pertaining to investigations of improper conduct (s48 of the APA, 2005); and the mechanisms 
for holding disciplinary proceedings (s50 of the APA, 2005). For experts, it is the surveillance-
potential of the APA which works on the mind of the audit partner, rather than the physical act of 
enquiry by the IRBA that is important. This observation-induced ‘anxiety’ (U13) is magnified by 
internal quality review requirements taking place at each audit firm (for more detail see  IAASB, 
2009x; IAASB, 2009e), a process which effectively contributes to the creation of a network of 
surveillance:  
‘It is important not to look at s45 of the APA in isolation. Sure, the legislation does create a 
regulator that looks down on the auditor - auditors have the risk of inspection and disciplinary action 
for not complying with [the reporting duty] that becomes part and parcel of the whole quality review 
process carried out by the IRBA.  But there is also the risk that the issue that they didn’t report ends 
up coming out on the evening news, in which case they  are going to have a shit load of questions 
coming at them form all sorts of third parties. On top of that, auditors undergo regular internal 
inspections which would end up looking at whether or not RI’s are being dealt with properly to keep 
the [audit] firm’s risk to a minimum’ (E15). 
Complementing this ‘surveillance network’ is an element of peer review. For example,  Brivot 
and Gendron (2011) document how having one’s work rendered visible to others, coupled with 
the issue of being readily identifiable as non-compliant with set knowledge management policies 
works on the mind of individual professionals. When it comes to the RI provisions, it is the 
‘individual’ partner (s44 of the APA, 2005) who is ultimately responsible for compliance with the 
APA and ultimately accountable and known to his peers:   
‘At the end of the day, when it comes to reportable irregularities, the responsibility does not lie with 
a team member or the manager. It starts with you as the partner because you are the one signing 
off. So there is definitely a bigger sense of responsibility and the repercussions that will occur’ (E8).  
As the individuals whose signature appears on the respective audit report or letter to the IRBA 
(Appendix A), experts, in general, highlighted a strong awareness of reputational risk, as also 
mentioned in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. By virtue of the fact that the IRBA or audit firms 
themselves are in a position to carry out quality reviews at will, coupled with the risk that a 
failure to report an RI could later be exposed to third parties (U1; U10; E1), individual audit 
partners are rendered visible not only to regulatory authorities but to their fellow partners, staff 
and clients. Several respondents held this view, effectively echoing the sentiments of Brivot and 
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Gendron (2011) and Carrington (2010) on the importance of professional appearance. For 
example:  
‘I am a professional. I am proud of my firm. I am proud of my work. I have a duty to the people who 
work with me to make sure that we [discharge our professional duties] to the very best of my [sic] 
ability.... [I] also have a duty to my client... [I] take my work personally and so I have a sense of 
personal duty. I am also worried about the brand and reputation of my firm’ (E5). 
 ‘...and at the end of the day...you don’t just study seven years to become a Chartered Accountant 
just to forget about your [duties]’ (E7).  
‘And so, when you realise that all you have as a professional accountant is your technical skill and 
your professional reputation, you have to ask if you are willing to have that shattered by not 
complying with the APA. Imagine the scandal if you did not comply with a statutory duty. Even if 
you didn’t end up in jail, your name wouldn’t be worth a thing. You would be finished. Everyone you 






would know what you had done and would not be able to 
place confidence in you as a professional (E15)’.  
By virtue of being the member of the team ultimately responsible for compliance with the RI 
provisions, the risk of non-compliance rests almost exclusively on the partner. While fines and 
imprisonment serve as deterrents for the delinquent auditor (U2; E1), what is simultaneously 
identified is the sanction against the very ‘soul’ (E9) of the professional by having him ‘identified’ 
as non-compliant with the APA and rendered fully visible to his subordinates and peers as 
operating contrary to the statute. 
 
‘Look, the [consequences for not complying with the RI provisions] are about showing the auditor a 
big stick. But the biggest part of this is not the jail or the fine. These are professional people. One 
day in jail, let alone 10 years, is more than enough to dissuade them... So what the [APA] does is 
provide the auditor with a kind of stick, not in a physical sense, but in the sense that, if you are 
wavering, you probably go with reporting. It does not change the way you do the audit but now that 
you have stumbled across [an RI] you are going to report it’ (U1, emphasis added) 
Rather than rely on physical punishment, surveillance works insidiously on the mind of the 
individual by making him visible, calculable and known (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980; Smart, 
2002). ‘Visibility’ is, in turn, made possible by the ‘discursive’ (Boland, 1987), structured and 
individualising (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993) practices in which the reporting duty is 
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couched111. The result is that interviewees also alluded to an interconnection between visibility 
and normalizing sanction. The risk of fines and penalties, coupled with the possibility of being 
rendered ‘visible’ as a delinquent or non-complaint auditor, serves to motivate behaviour 
consistent with the ‘norms’ enshrined in the APA. From this perspective, the ‘normalising’ effect 
of disciplinary power is focused not just on the organisations and their senior management 
subject to audit. There is a real possibility that the RI provisions work on the mind of the auditor 
as much as they do on the minds of the auditee 
 
7.2 DISCIPLINARY POWER AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, interviewees were unanimous that the South African Government 
was responding to corporate failures both locally and abroad in developing the RI provisions.  
 
‘My suspicion is that the APA was pushed through after a lot of [corporate] failures and the self-
regulatory approaches appeared to be failing. But, to a large extent, Trevor Manuel’s [Minister of 
Finance at the time of the promulgation of the APA] mood had a lot to do with it. He has a mood of: 
“well, I am going to show these accountants up”. And that is what got under his nose when he 
started attacking the self-regulatory framework. I don’t think he wanted to stamp total authority on 
the auditors, but he certainly wanted to move away from the self-regulatory approach. That was the 
mood he was in’ (U4).  
 ‘The Minister warned the profession, at the time the Act was being discussed and finalised, that 
they had better “pull up their socks”. He had no idea of what auditing was actually about but he was 
warning them anyway. The whole presentation
112
 was definitely an effort at showing the profession 
that Government had the power to intervene and that they were watching the auditors’ (U11).  
As discussed in Section 7.1, disciplinary power is at work on the professional. Section 45 of the 
APA alters ideas of what it ‘means to be an auditor’ (E8) by creating a duty to bring certain 
transgressions to the attention of a regulator, over and above the traditional requirement to 
express an opinion on financial statements (Section 4.3). It renders individual partners 
‘accountable’ (E8; E9; U10) for what users almost unanimously described as a whistle-blowing 
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 Foucault (1977) explains that while overt disciplinary sanctions remain a part of modern society, alternate 
punishments designed to reduce non-compliance included repetitious exercises (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993), the 
labelling of the individual as non-conformist (Walsh and Stewart, 1993) and challenging the technical capabilities of 
professionals (Brivot and Gendron, 2011). 
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 The ‘presentation’ referred to was a discussion on the then Draft Accountancy Profession Bill (2001) which later 
became the APA.  
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duty that has the potential to bring significant transgressions to the attention of stakeholders 
(Chapter 6). This bolsters confidence in the formal, rational reporting requirement and, 
simultaneously, notions of pragmatic and moral legitimacy. The end result is that s45 of the APA 
is reaffirmed as an example of external regulation that most regarded as a credible means of 
positively contributing to the South African corporate governance environment. For example, 
commenting on the change from MI’s to RI’s (Section 2.1):  
‘This was because of disciplinary issues. There was a perception that [the auditors] can’t control 
[themselves] and that they weren’t taking the MI’s seriously enough. The aim of s45 [of the APA] 
was to try and address this and get the auditors to report more because that was seen as one way 
of improving accountability and compliance’  (U14). 
Further, on the relevance of consequences for the delinquent auditor under the APA:  
‘Does having a stick show that there are consequences? Does this make people more vigilant and 
thorough? ...I don’t want to come across as a disciplinarian, but I certainly think it does....  (U6).  
‘Reassurances’ are provided (E1; U10) that reporting under the APA makes practical 
contributions reinforcing elements of influence and exchange legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
Similarly, Section 2.3 pointed out that organisations are frequently evaluated according to their 
accomplishments and underlying procedures. That motifs of disciplinary power are inherent in 
the RI provisions implies that the RI provisions are ‘real’ (U1); that there are sufficient grounds 
for trusting in the reporting protocols (U14; E6); and, hence, that they provide a bona fide 
mechanism for effective, pro-social (Staub, 1978) whistle-blowing (U6). Likewise, the power of 
legal process and conceptions of the audit firm as ‘well-placed’ (U8; E9) to confer a sense of 
structural legitimacy (Section 4.3; Section 6.1) are enhanced by the fact that the RI provisions 
are prescriptive; try to limit the use of professional judgement; resonate with the ideal of 
rendering individuals ‘visible’ or more accountable; and carry consequences for non-
conformance (consider Power, 1994; Roberts, 2001). This may be especially important in the 
context of South Africa’s low audit litigation risk environment (consider, for example, Palmrose, 
1988; Palmrose, 1997; Cousins et al, 1998; Cousins et al, 1999; Liao et al, 2013):  
‘Big legal cases in South Africa are also very far and few between. So, I’m not sure that [litigation 
risk mediates auditor behaviour]. So, disciplining them - having sanctions in the legislation is an 
important alternative...It’s not sufficient to leave it open private litigation because, as I have said, 
private litigation in South Africa is not sufficient’ (U6).  
‘In the South African environment, our legislative processes are very slow. Having an immediate 
financial consequence [referring to the fines for non-compliance with the APA], or knock to 
212 
 
professional standing for ignoring the APA, is probably where the motivation [for reporting] comes 
from’ (U3). 
The result is that, 
‘...there is definitely a sense of being watched, being accountable and of consequences for not 
reporting. And that’s funny because nobody has ever been sued
113
. There is a sense of: “I don’t 
want to be the first one”, but it’s also about the fines, the jail term, the personal reputation. It’s about 
the embarrassment...and this tells us that the reporting duty is probably taken seriously’ (E6).   
Similar processes seem to be at work on at least some senior managers at audit clients where 
an ‘observation-induced anxiety’ achieves panoptic-like control that heightens a sense of 
transparency and individual responsibility on the part of the auditee (Section 7.1.2). The result is 
an example of external regulation that most respondents regard as a realistic means of 
positively contributing to the South African corporate governance environment. As explained by 
Power (1994) and Pentland (2000), there has been a shift away from assumed trust in expert 
systems to one where transparency, accountability and control have become paramount 
(Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Roberts et al, 2006). Section 45 of the APA ‘meshes’ with these 
expectations, achieving for auditors a sense of cognitive legitimacy in the process:  
‘If you do something wrong, it’s got to be reported. That’s why the RI’s make sense’ (U10). 
‘The auditor is closest to the client. So long as the monitoring is done correctly, it seems 
appropriate. You need to have people know that they are being reviewed and that there are 
consequences for their action. [In the absence of the RI provisions] you would have to employ a 
whole bunch of people who are not close to the client and then go and investigate. It comes down 
to the issue of there being a watchdog’ (U3).  
Stressing the importance of at least some type of monitoring function, several interviewees drew 
parallels between the USA promoting accountability and transparency with the use of external 
regulation - such as SOX and the Whistleblower Protection Act (1989) - and South Africa 
championing whistle-blowing through, inter alia, s45 of the APA (see also Ianniello, 2012, p. 
151).  For some respondents, the RI provisions are, therefore, perceived as a necessary (U10) 
and ‘inevitable’ (U6) quasi-police function aimed at enhancing corporate accountability and 
compliance.  
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 The possibility of elements of disciplinary power being part of a ceremonial process described in Section 6.2 is 
discussed in Section 7.3.  
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Finally, adapting the concept of mimetic isomorphism applied in an organisational setting can 
yield important insights for the relevance of disciplinary power inherent in s45 of the APA. As 
explained by Leon (2001, pp 3-4, cited in Brivot and Gendron, 2011): 
‘Surveillance always carries with it some plausible justification that makes most of us content to 
comply…The fact that the camera is installed in the bar or at the intersection in order to reduce 
rowdiness or road accidents seems reasonable enough... The advantages of surveillance for its 
subjects are real, palpable, and undeniable. We readily accept the point of it…’  
 
If surveillance, normalising sanction, processes of examination and mechanisms for reward and 
punishment are integral to modern life, as theorised by inter alia Foucault (1977; 1983), Hoskin 
and Macve (1986), Boland (1987), Brivot and Gendron (2011), Hopper and Macontosh (1993), 
then the RI provisions may be achieving a sense of legitimacy by cultivating a whistle-blowing 
duty, backed by sanctions for non-conformance, ‘under the umbrella of pre-existing taken-for-
granteds’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 586):  
 
‘The whole regulatory environment in the world has changed. Maybe [s45  of the APA] is not about 
trying to keep up [with international developments] in a negative sense, but in a positive way, 
saying that this is something we have in order to stay on the same level...It also gives cynics a 
value-added perspective about audit... [and therefore] it may be a case of trying to build up the 
audit profession’ (E6). 
‘…For a very long time, the audit and accounting professions in South Africa regulated 
themselves. I think that there was a conscious decision to move away from a system of self-
regulation to follow the trend in the rest of the world which relies on laws backed by penalties’ 
(U2).  
 
‘The fines and penalties are also something consistent with [other local and international laws]. I 
am a proponent of this parity. All of our markets should be at the same level’ (U6). 
 
South Africa’s move towards more exogenous control of the profession to parallel similar 
international developments is an example of mimetic isomorphism aimed at securing legitimacy 
(Section 6.2). As a developing economy, maintaining a level of regulatory parity with developed 
markets on which South Africa is dependent for international capital is of paramount importance 
(Konar et al, 2003; Diamond and Price, 2012; King, 2012). Replication of sanctions for non-
compliance along the lines seen in the USA’s model (Riotto, 2008; Sy and Tinker, 2008) forms 
part of this. Explicit fines and periods of incarceration under the APA are not only about 
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compliance but are integral to signalling the credibility of legislated reporting requirements. 
Central to this is a perceived parity between the requirements and consequences for non-
conformance found in the APA and comparable legislation whether in South Africa or abroad:  
‘Section 45 [of the APA] was definitely a case of keeping up with the Joneses’ (U5).  ‘The 
Government wanted to show that it was bringing in laws backed by steep fines and promoting 
whistle-blowing, just like the USA was doing with SOX...Government also wanted to show that it 
had the power to intervene in the audit profession [as compared with other jurisdictions struggling 
with audit-related scandals]’(U11).  
‘Does s45 of the APA create a sense of being watched...that causes people to be more vigilant and 
thorough? I certainly think it does. This country’s standard of compliance – I think it’s first in the 
world...and, of course, the system (a legislative disciplinary system) creates the machinery for that’ 
(U6).  
Similar ‘rationalisations’ for the RI provisions are found in the Nel Commission’s (2001) initial 
enquiries into, inter alia, the mandatory whistle-blowing duty. The conclusion that the RI 
provisions would operate in the public interest are partially justified on the basis of equivalent 
sanction-backed duties in several other countries, including France and Malaysia (E1; U11). Per 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150), ‘organisational structures increasingly come to reflect rules 
institutionalised and legitimated by and within’ the social arena. By analogy, one of the reasons 
for the RI provisions being readily accepted by some interviewees as a source of auditor 
legitimacy is because it mirrors the international move from self-regulation as discussed in 
Section 6.1. Interconnected with this is the threat of fines and periods of incarceration for the 
delinquent auditor along similar lines to other legislation both in South Africa and abroad:   
‘Major legislation such as SOX and company law in the UK, EU and South Africa have traditionally 
relied on sanctions in one form or another for non-compliance’ (U14). 
‘Punishment’ for departing from accepted norms was cited by most respondents as well 
established in South African customs and law (see, for example, POCA, 1998; van Aswegen, 
2000; FICA, 2001; IRBA, 2011). Accordingly, sanctions enshrined in s52 of the APA for failing to 
comply with the duty to blow the whistle are integral to cognitive legitimacy:  
‘If we think about our rules and regulations, what do we need for them to be taken seriously – 
punishment. If you do something that you shouldn’t there have to be repercussions otherwise you 
end up with anarchy. That is what the APA is about. You have this duty to whistle-blow and if you 
don’t do what you are supposed to, there are consequences. That is, in my opinion, why people 
take this legislation seriously – it has all the right “ingredients”: a legal duty which seems to be in 
the public interest; an independent regulator; and, at least in theory, some teeth’ (U14).  
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‘But the shift to more arms-length regulation does not amount to much if the change in policy does 
not have any teeth. It’s all very well and good to say that Americans have SOX and that their 
auditors have to report on control deficiencies and that our auditors have to tell the IRBA about 
reportable irregularities, so we are on par and, thus, everything is all right.  Just having whistle-
blowing on paper doesn’t count for anything. Why then can we see value in s45 of the APA? 
Because the client knows that the auditor is watching him and because the auditor knows he is 
being ”watched” by [others] -  that if he does not blow the whistle when he ought to he could go to 
jail and, even if he doesn’t end up in prison, everyone will know that he is a shit auditor’ (E16).  
 
Foucauldian motifs of power and control are effectively intertwined with the processes of 
mimetic isomorphism which saw a drive to more arms-length regulation in the name of 
preserving the South African Audit Profession’s claims to legitimacy (Section 6.1). A sense of 
enclosure, efficiency, surveillance and normalising sanction are readily comprehensible traits of 
external regulation and by incorporating these into the whistle-blowing duty, the RI provisions 
become an important source of legitimacy. This should not, however, be construed as 
suggesting that the panoptic metaphor provides a complete account for why the South African 
auditor is compelled to blow the whistle on certain irregularities. On the contrary, total enclosure, 
efficiency of the body and hierarchical surveillance are unlikely to be achievable in practical 
terms (McKinlay and Pezet, 2010; Brivot and Gendron, 2011). While some aspects of 
disciplinary power may be evident and reflected in views on auditor legitimacy, the limitations of 
the ‘panoptic gaze’ - and the possibility of Foucauldian power being interconnected with 
ceremonial displays of legitimacy and control - should not be overlooked. 
 
7.3: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE RI PROVISIONS 
 
Although the auditor is not obliged to seek out an RI actively, whether the ‘reasonable auditor’ 
would have detected an RI would be inextricably linked with how well the audit procedures 
described by ISA are executed (see IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 2009h). Nevertheless, Chapter 4 found 
that not all respondents were convinced that the RI provisions materially contributed to the 
quality of existing audit practices.  A possible exception was the issue of auditor reporting where 
Section 4.3 discussed how auditors are now compelled by law to dispense with client 
confidentiality and inform third parties of transgressions that would otherwise not have impacted 
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the audit opinion.  Even here, however, many respondents agreed that there is no guarantee 
that effective reporting always takes place.  
Considering the RI provisions as a source of legitimacy this trend continues. While some 
respondents feel that the whistle-blowing duty makes a contribution to the standing of the 
profession (Section 6.1), others adopt a more critical perspective, pointing to possible window-
dressing on the part of the legislature or the emergence of a legalistic mindset that does little to 
change audit practice (Section 6.2). These tensions stand in stark contrast with the illustrations 
of panoptic control courtesy of Miller and O’Leary (1987) and Hopper and Macintosh (1993). 
What these conflicting views highlight are the inherent limitations of the panoptic metaphor in 
explaining the case for s45 of the APA, including emerging resistance to the disciplinary 
potential of the RI provisions.  
 
7.3.1: LIMITATIONS OF THE RI PROVISIONS: RESISTANCE TO PANOPTICISM 
 
 
In examining the effect of increased visibility created by management controls, Cowton and 
Dopson (2002, p. 206) identify ‘considerable variation in the way in which [individuals] 
embraced...changed conceptions of performance’ as well as differences in reactions to the 
introduction of panoptic-like controls. Contrary to the predicted ‘normalisation’ of behaviour 
against defined standards (Foucault, 1977; Miller and O'Leary, 1987), a ‘variety’ of responses 
highlights a form of resistance to panoptic control (Cowton and Dopson, 2002) limiting the 
effects of principles of the efficient body, enclosure and disciplinary power (Gordon, 1980; 
Smart, 2002). Variation in the response to whistle-blowing under the RI provisions may be 
interpreted in a similar light. In contrast to the view that the RI provisions were a valuable part of 
the external regulation machinery, some experts argued that:   
 
‘We are suffocating the client with over-regulation. We are being totally senseless, doing things 
just to comply with the rules. It doesn’t make sense. It is not practically possible to follow the 






‘There is a very real risk that all that happens is just mindless compliance with the rules. All that 
may happen is that [auditors] find an RI and report it, not because they feel morally obligated, or 
believe that they will add value for shareholders, but because the [APA] told them to. What would 
happen if the same act told them to jump off a bridge? The sad thing is that some of them 
probably would’ (E5).  
 
Dealing specifically with how the IRBA considers the firm’s approach to the RI provisions: 
 
‘If we look at the issues that are raised in the practice reviews [carried out by the IRBA], they are 
often a complete waste of everybody’s time. But we have to go through the process because...it 
could end up at the IRBA’s Disciplinary Committee. And I think that the IRBA goes about its 
practice review, to a large extent, by getting hung up on whether or not things are documented 
just to show that one came in and ticked the box’ (E8). 
 
These views highlight two interesting points. Firstly, the variation between conceptions of the RI 
provisions as a ‘tick the box’ exercise (E8) or ‘waste of time’ (E5) on the one hand and as an 
example of auditors serving as a proverbial watchdog on the other (Section 6.1), implies that 
panoptic control and disciplinary power inducing normalised behaviour is not totally achieved. 
The Panopticon is illusory (Gordon, 1980). Secondly, in response to an increased sense of 
‘visibility’, individuals may seek to find new means of ‘escaping’ a perceived gaze (Gordon, 
1980; Cowton and Dopson, 2002; Roberts, 1991), A compliance-based attitude where 
adherence to, rather than internalisation of, defined standards becomes the primary objective. 
Indeed arms-length regulation may do little to encourage prudential professional judgement 
(McMillan, 2004). Instead, it can enclose or restrict professional conduct through prescribed, 
and potentially rigid, laws (Konar et al, 2003; McMillan, 2004; Vakkur et al, 2010). The chosen 
modus operandi of the RI provisions was cited by several experts and users as cultivating an 
attitude of simple compliance where the application of the law, even if in the public interest, is 
reduced to conformance; to determining what is and is not allowed by the APA and the IRBA’s 
(2006) guidelines on reportable irregularities (Section 6.2.1)114.  
 
Accordingly, the RI provisions are not unanimously described as whistle-blowing genuinely 
enacted in the public interest (Nel, 2001; Manuel, 2002), but as a set of ‘rules’ which the 
practitioner simply follows to avoid reprisal. The reporting duty, thus, comes to be seen as 
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something which is adhered to ‘just to comply’’ (E5) and which induces an over conservative 
approach to reporting as auditors err on the side of caution and report to the IRBA, not because 
they believe such is part of their moral duty, but as a means of avoiding sanction under the 
APA115 (U1; U8; U9). Dealing with how auditors may not have internalised the whistle-blowing 
duty as one in the public interest: 
‘Obviously the auditors do not want to find an RI because it creates obligations for them and 
sours the relations with the client. It also requires them to spend a lot of time, and it’s difficult to 
recover the money... [Therefore], I don’t think that they are happy to find a problem. Every auditor 
is probably most happy when they go through an audit and nothing is detected and there are no 
problems’ (U1).   
 
Similarly, contrary to the arguments of Section 6.1 that reporting duty is an integral part of the 
audit process whereby the auditor fulfils his ‘natural’ role as a ‘watchdog’ (U3;  E10; Nel, 2001; 
Manuel, 2002):   
 
‘Could [professional judgement be used to document the problem away? At the end of the day, if 
you look at the nature of the auditor, what we want to do is resolve issues. We often want to sit 
down with management and come up with the solution. But this legislation is not really saying to 
us: “let’s resolve the situation”
116
. It is saying to us: “tell someone that something has gone 
wrong” ...and so the legislation can work in the opposite way’ (E3). 
 
The RI provisions ‘are like saying to someone: “I’m going to tell the police”... and, although the 
police haven’t actually been informed yet, that is the equivalent in the minds of the client....People 
don’t like that. In a way, there is a relationship of trust between the auditor and the client. Now, 
you’ve gone to someone else and told them what [the client] did – and without discussing this with 
the client first. Yes, logically and ideally it’s dealt with by telling the client that you had to do it 
because that’s what the law says...but there is a lot of emotion involved....it’s human nature....The 
client is going to come to you and say: “You are supposed to be my auditor and you are supposed 
to keep this information confidential and now you are not’ (U10). 
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As an ultimate act of resistance, perhaps the RI provisions are simply ignored117?  This is a 
reasonable outcome given the criticism that external regulation does little to address ethical 
concerns and underlying capitalistic pressures at work on the profession directly (Sikka, 2004; 
Pesqueux, 2005), especially for smaller audit firms with few resources to resist client pressures 
(consider McMillan, 2004; Wyatt, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005; Agulhas, 2007). For example, 
commenting on the requirement to report an irregularity to the IRBA without delay and before 
informing the client (Section 2.1.3):  
 
‘If the auditor reports ‘you get a relationship problem immediately...so, to give you a chance to 
investigate and make proper decisions is absolutely vital. And that is not afforded by the provisions 
[which require the auditor to report ‘without delay’]...I don’t have any problems with the concept of 
reportable irregularities but [the issue] needs to be material and it needs to be prolonged. You need 
to give the guy a chance to remedy the situation...I’m not saying that you must scrap s45 [of the 
APA] but [in its current form] it discourages following the letter of the law. I guarantee you that the 
average partner will first talk to the client before he reports’ (U5).  
 
‘I would not rule out that partners are going to discuss the issue with the client first to make sure 
you have the correct facts. That may not be 100% in line with the legislation, but that is what has to 
happen on the ground. You don’t want to report and then end up with problems on your plate 
because you didn’t have all the facts’ (E4). 
 
Similarly, the implications of no longer reporting the matter to the regulator only if the 
irregularity is continuing after thirty days (Section 2.1.3):  
‘What I suspect most auditors normally do – and I know that it’s not in line with the legislation – is 
that they either give the client a chance to fix something  and report only if it does not get fixed or 
that the smaller issues get  documented away’ (E9). 
‘Ultimately, do these things get swept under the carpet? I don’t know. Hopefully not. Hopefully 
there are no partners that do that but one cannot be 100% certain’ (E7, emphasis added).  
A similar outcome is seen in the case of 19th century factory workers refusing to submit to 
managerial monitoring by revolting against completing time sheets (Hopper and Macintosh, 
1993; Cowton and Dopson, 2002). Auditors may, likewise, not follow strictly the provisions of 
s45 of the APA or, at the extreme, may simply ignore their whistle-blowing duties:   
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 This may not be an exaggerated claim unique to RIs. Sikka (2009), for example, argues that auditors, seeking to 
champion the interest of their clients, have shown an increased propensity to disregard legal requirements  
(Chapter 8).  
220 
 
‘But thinking about the auditors that I have come across, they all seem to be ethical and believe in 
the audit process. There will always be a handful that will be a problem...but I think auditors are 
nervous about not reporting’ (U7). 
 ‘How do we know that if the auditor finds a reportable irregularity he actually reports and doesn’t 
just ignore it? You would only know that by default. But I would think that that is very unlikely 
because of the very nature of auditing. The auditor would, in effect, be putting his personal position 
at risk for the client because if he didn’t report the RI it has not only a potential financial 
consequence, but a clear reputational and professional consequence as well. So, the stakes are 
high. This is not simply monetary – the stakes are high because it’s personal’ (U1).  
As discussed previously, the risk of being branded a delinquent auditor serves as a significant 
form of ‘punishment’ for the individual for whom professional appearance and standing are 
paramount (consider Edwards, 2001; Carrington, 2010). This is reinforced by penalties imposed 
by statute (IRBA, 2006). Accordingly, auditors ‘probably don’t’ simply disregard the RI provisions 
(U1).  Although they are ‘not happy to find a problem’ (E3), the risk of failed audits, damaged 
reputations, and possible intervention by the IRBA were cited as sufficient deterrents to 
circumventing the reporting duty: 
 
 ‘The fines, the penalties, and also the humiliation, that happens from not reporting – this is going to 
make sure that you, as the partner, are going to report’ (E7). 
‘The consequences of not [reporting] are just so severe and onerous for us that I can’t imagine any 
partner refraining from reporting’ (E8).  
 ‘In the long-run, these things [not complying with the APA] come out anyway’ with the result that 
‘the ramifications [of non-compliance] would just be too severe’ (E3).  
 
Other interviewees were, however, not as confident:  
‘At the end of the day, unless the auditor is extremely unlucky, it’s very difficult for the IRBA to 
know whether or not the auditor detected a reportable irregularity but failed to report it’ (U9). As a 
result ‘I think that they [auditors] do probably find things that they don’t tell us’ (U8).   
 
Ignoring the reporting duty may be a rational form of resistance to disciplinary power inherent in 
the RI provisions because of the illusory nature of panoptic control (consider Foucault, 1977; 
Gordon, 1980; Smart, 2002). The reality is that audit remains a process driven largely by the 
application of technical standards involving professional judgement by a closed audit team 
(IAASB, 2009c; IAASB, 2009k). Technologies allowing the auditor to record every piece of 
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evidence collected during the engagement (IAASB, 2009f) or for the IRBA perpetually to monitor 
auditors are not available. As argued by Power (1994; 2003) the audit process remains opaque 
making it impossible for persons outside the audit team to observe every aspect of the audit’s 
execution and evaluate the conclusions reached: 
 
‘The legislation cannot force you [to report]. If I wanted to, I could very easily [justify not 
complying with s45 of the APA] by saying that I missed it, or that I forgot, or that I didn’t see it. 
How could the IRBA even find out’ (E13)? 
 
‘Now you may say that the legislation is not aimed at the ethical partner but at less “gutsy” people. 
But would they report an RI anyway just because of some Act? We need to stop being idealistic. If 
you really don’t want to report, you can find ways and that there is an Act with penalties in it doesn’t 
mean much because you will almost never be able to find out how many RI’s there really are and 
how many got swept under the carpet’ (E16). 
There may also be an element of self-preservation (Roberts, 1991; Roberts, 2009) whereby 
disciplinary controls become reflexive, leading to the very problem that external regulations 
sought to address at inception. The elimination of the thirty day window before reporting to the 
regulator and the requirement for fraud, irrespective of perceived materiality, to be divulged 
(Section 2.1.3) were introduced to overcome the application of professional judgement or rogue 
auditors circumventing the whistle-blowing obligation (Nel, 2001). Paradoxically, given that the 
RI provisions do not achieve total panoptic control, the fact that the auditor may ultimately 
offend (and thus lose) a client due to blowing the whistle could lead to a process of reflexivity 
whereby auditors dispense with the RI provisions in the name of self-interest:  
 
‘You don’t want to lose a client. You are in the business of making money. Now the duty to report 
to the IRBA can cause you to lose the client. And I think that that is one of the reasons why I 
don’t think that [every audit firm] reports every issue’ to the IRBA (E9). 
 
‘The legislation aggravates the tension between reporting and managing the client relationship 
that could undermine the desire to report...I don’t have a problem with the concept of reporting 
irregularities and making it public....but [the current requirements of the APA
118
] discourage 
following the letter of the law. I will guarantee you that the average audit partner will first talk to 
the client before he reports, even though he, strictly speaking, is not supposed to’ (U5). 
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 The respondent is referring to the requirement to report an irregularity to the IRBA without delay and before 
informing the client.  
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 ‘It’s not always practical to follow things verbatim’ (E2).   ‘The legislation aggravates the tension 
between reporting and managing the client relationship... I will guarantee you that the average audit 
partner will first talk to the client [even though the APA precludes this] before he reports’ (U5). 
Several interviewees elaborated on the issue of compliance with the APA from an auditor’s 
perspective:  
‘When you look at a reportable irregularity you look at it from two angles. You look at it from the 
perspective of not reporting and then facing penalties or you are going to report and face the risk of 
being sued by the client’ (E6) or ‘maybe even lose the client’ (E10).  
‘So, do auditors, because of the additional reporting duties, added admin, and the risk of losing the 
client or being sued, just look the other way [when it comes to complying with s45 of the APA]?  
Look - that might cross your mind. Those auditors would just ‘have their own conscience to deal 
with’ (E7).     
‘After all’, there are always some auditors ‘who don’t take what they do seriously’ (U6) and, ‘try as 
you might, you can’t regulate ethical behaviour; you can’t force people to do something even if it is 
– at the end of the day – in the public interest’ (U13).  
These views should not be construed as implying that the RI provisions are completely 
irrelevant or that Foucauldian notions of power are fatally flawed.  Instead, what they highlight is 
the complex interconnection between power and resistance to power (Malsch and Gendron, 
2011; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). Notions of enclosure, efficiency and surveillance 
illuminate only part of the operation of the RI provisions. While these are reminiscent of 
Foucauldian notions of disciplinary power, ‘not all empirics fit neatly into Foucault’s model of 
analysis’ (Hopper and Macintosh, 1993, p. 210).  The model does not account for variations in 
the perception of the reporting duty. Contrary to the operation of a measure of normalising 
sanction, the mindset of auditors concerning whistle-blowing on their clients is far from 
homogenous.  Elements of resistance are present and characterise the operation of the 
legislation, similar to the findings of Hopper and Macintosh (1993), Cowton and Dopson (2002) 
and Brivot and Gendron (2011), albeit in a non-audit context. At the extreme, limitations of 
disciplinary power – coupled with self-preservation (see Roberts, 1991; Roberts et al, 2006; 
Roberts, 2009) could undermine reporting to the IRBA and dilute intended regulatory effects 
(see Sikka, 2009; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). The attest function continues to be 
characterised by application of technical standards and professional judgement (IAASB, 2009c; 
IAASB, 2009k; IAASB, 2009l; IAASB, 2009m) which render it opaque (Power, 1994; Power, 
1997) and make it impossible for surveillance mechanisms to achieve total panoptic control. 
This implies that some aspects of power and control are evident and do provide for a certain 
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degree of behaviour change in clients and their auditors. To some extent, however, an increase 
in transparency and accountability due RI provisions may be taken for granted.  
 
Respondents, however, remained confident that even though s45 of the APA (and its 
associated sanctions for non-compliance) do not discipline the mind of every auditor or senior 
member of a client’s management, the legislation remains an important part of the audit 
regulation landscape. In particular, they pointed to the possibility of merely an appearance of 
disciplinary power being integral to the legitimisation-potential of the legislation. It may be 
possible that belief in an ‘all-seeing’ surveillance network is a significant part of the ‘ceremonial 
process’ of audit regulation and legitimisation discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 6.2. 
 
 
7.3.2: FOUCAULDIAN MOTIFS CONTRIBUTING TO CEREMONIAL DISPLAYS OF 
LEGITIMACY   
 
If opacity of audit is a material source of legitimacy for the institution of auditing (Section 2.4), 
how can this be reconciled with the drive to render audit more transparent, as discussed in 
Section 7.1? With panoptic control possibly illusory (Gordon, 1980; Smart, 2002), this 
contradiction may point to a complex process of decoupling similar to that discussed in  
Section 6.2.  Elements of disciplinary power may not be valuable solely as a means of 
reinforcing a pragmatic and morally sound whistle-blowing duty but also in reinforcing the myth 
that the regulation contributes to the legitimacy of audit and that Government has ‘everything 
under control’ (see also  Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004): 
‘The [RI provisions] have zero effect on the client. Maybe there is probably 0.5% of the business 
community who know who the IRBA actually are. For the [majority of businessmen]...it’s just 
another acronym. They don’t know what [the IRBA is] or [RI’s] are and they probably don’t care. As 
a result, the legislation [s45 of the APA] can’t possibly generate an actual sense of surveillance on 
the client. A sense of power is just created because they’ve created a regulatory structure that audit 
is forced to comply with and part of that is being able to show how you can send someone to jail or 
give them a fine or take them to a disciplinary at the IRBA if somehow they find out you did not 




‘On its face, it looks like the [RI provisions] are about surveillance (and maybe a response to Enron) 
but the big issue for me is what the IRBA does with those reports. They probably don’t have the 
capacity to deal with all of them. They probably don’t have the business acumen or detailed 
knowledge of the facts to do anything. It’s just another judgement call and how do you make that 
call if you are far away from the client?...People need to come and show me the evidence. It seems 
to me that the biggest thing is just that the mechanisms and the penalties are there – just another 
control on paper to make it look like there are repercussions. How many auditors are in jail? None!’ 
(U5).  
The surveillance element of the APA derives some of its value, not by virtue of its actual 
disciplinary-power potential (Foucault, 1977; Gordon, 1980), but rather due to the legitimacy 
inherent in the appearance of a surveillance protocol. Based on the work of Suchman (1995), 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) incorporating an element of 
surveillance,  generally accepted as ‘undeniably plausible’ (Konar et al, 2003; Brivot and 
Gendron, 2011), may allow the RI provisions to internalise legitimacy based on the illusion of a 
disciplinary-power apparatus (Section 7.2). In the process, the whistle-blowing duty may add to 
the credibility of external audit, simultaneously reinforcing the cognitive legitimacy inherent in 
the good faith assumption that attest function operates as an important monitoring system 
(consider Hopwood, 1990; Power, 1994). Reiterating this view, Power (1994) and Pentland 
(2000) point to a growing sense of distrust that necessitates an increased role for audit as a 
means of improving perceived transparency and accountability (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
As discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, when the audit profession is itself beset by a crisis 
of trust, creating the appearance of additional control over the profession (backed by motifs of 
disciplinary power) is one means of preserving the credibility of the attest function and its ability 
to reassure non-experts of the reliability of financial reporting and of investment markets in 
general (see also Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004). 
  
As was the case in Section 6.2, the technicalities of the RI provisions are overshadowed by 
complex ceremonial processes. Practical difficulties encountered by either auditors, when 
adhering to the whistle-blowing duty, or the regulator, when trying to enforce it, are overlooked. 
These inherent shortcomings are decoupled from the image of a more regulated trustworthy 
profession by virtue of a power-control discourse. Likewise, a  paradox of trust (Section 2.4): 
that the only reason for additional regulation to ensure continued trust in the profession is 
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precisely because trust itself is weakened, is also ‘disconnected’ from the assumed role of the 
RI provisions in South African audits119:  
‘We can definitely place our trust in the auditor...If you are a public person and you know that the 
auditor is going into the entity [sic]...and you know that they have this requirement [the duty to 
report RI’s], I would feel a lot more secure in that anything bad will probably come out. And there is 
a problem if it does not come out [a reference to sanctions for non-compliance with s45 of the APA] 
and subsequently it is found that the auditor should have reported it’ (U7, emphasis added).  
‘Trust is important. Why do we have trust in [whistle-blowing by auditors]? There is a very explicit 
obligation for the auditor. It’s not something that the auditor can overlook because of the 
independence perspective and because of the financial, statutory and professional implications 
[referring to the consequences for failing to adhere to the APA]...Now there is no question, 
because there is a massive penalty, that they are going to report [irregularities]’ (U3, emphasis 
added).  
For complex organisational, corporate or financial systems to function, an innate or taken-for-
granted ‘trust’ in their operation is needed (Giddens, 1990; Giddens, 1991; Unerman and 
O'Dwyer, 2004). Foucauldian displays of power and control contribute to this. They reassure 
stakeholders that ‘normalised’ behaviour will ensue after prior failures. By contributing to a 
discourse of ‘control’ and ‘remediation’, motifs of disciplinary power inherent in the RI provisions 
appeal to individuals at a subconscious level, cultivating a confidence or ‘trust’ in the underlying 
capital systems which, in contrast, have not materially changed (Chapter 4; Chapter 5). 
Ironically, overt displays of power and punishment might have been less effective, making the 
tension between trust and the need for regulation obvious and allowing processes of reflexivity 
to result in a complete withdrawal of trust from financial markets (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; 
Black, 2008). A delicate balance is, therefore, needed between managing claims to auditor 
legitimacy and acknowledging that prior shortcomings need to be addressed. By doing so, the 
apparatus of surveillance, normalising sanction and examination can be brought to bear on both 
the auditor and auditee, allowing regulators to win the confidence of stakeholders in the process 
(Section 7.1). In line with the arguments of Guenin-Paracini and Gendron (2010), the mere 
appearance of ‘punishment’ of the auditor allows for the re-establishment of legitimacy and trust:  
‘You could very well end up with a situation where the partner goes to jail for not reporting an RI for 
longer than the perpetrator of the fraud in question. This is because of the public interest involved. 
Having these disciplinary mechanisms shows the public duty that the auditor is expected to fulfil. 
We have an improved sense of confidence in our auditors because of the consequences for the 
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 Special thanks must go to the participants and anonymous reviewers at the International Corporate Governance 
Conference (2012) for their comments in this regard.  
226 
 
delinquent auditor. The overriding requirement is the integrity of the market which is why you find 
such strict controls’ (U6). 
‘And one of the reasons for us to place our trust in what auditors are doing with RI’s is precisely 
because they have now assumed these extra duties and accept that they will be responsible for 
non-compliance – that they may end up in jail, or before the Disciplinary Committee or with a hefty 
fine’ (U13). 
The appearance of Foucauldian discipline and control is sufficient subtly to restore a sense of 
order (see also Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010). With ideals of discipline and punishment 
already integral to and generally accepted by modern society (Gordon, 1980; Brivot and 
Gendron, 2011), technical anomalies are easily overlooked (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) such that 
motifs of discipline, punishment and legitimisation come to ‘partake of the same process of 
mythification’ (Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010, p. 155). In this context, users were largely 
content to rely on the message: that there is this whistle-blowing duty backed by inspections, 
independent regulators and the force of law that serves the public interest.  Emphasising the 
apparent benefits of the RI provisions is the ascendance of external regulation (Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011), as discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 6.2.2. 
On the one hand, the popularity of external regulation and the ‘natural’ acceptance of 
punishment for non-compliance on the other would suggest that mandated whistle-blowing 
duties backed by fines and penalties are readily aligned with regulatory practice already 
enjoying a measure of cognitive legitimacy.   The ‘ceremonial myth’ – in this case the general 
belief in auditor regulation as an example of a disciplinary power in action – is exalted (consider: 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Power, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Power, 1997; Roberts et al, 2006; 
Gumb, 2007). In the meantime, reality remains largely unchanged (consider  Kaplan and 
Ruland, 1991; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005). As explained by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977, p. 357) although inconsistencies and practical difficulties remain, a motif of 
disciplinary power means that ‘the assumption that formal structures are really working is 
buffered from [those] inconsistencies’.  
This ‘buffering’ is important because, to be decoupled from the ceremonial value of s45 of the 
APA’s disciplinary power, it is important that individuals ‘be left to work out’ technical 
interconnections and resulting contradictions informally’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 357). 
What ultimately allows the RI provisions’ notion of disciplinary power to win the confidence of a 
majority of users is the ‘good faith’ of those constituents, derived from the formal structures and 
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logical reporting method at the heart of an institutional approach to whistle-blowing, as 
discussed in Section 6.2.  In essence:  
‘Delegation, professionalization, goal ambiguity, the elimination of output data, and maintenance of 
faith are all mechanisms for absorbing uncertainty while preserving’ the ceremonial process and 
decoupling it from underlying technicalities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 358).  
Highlighting this goal and output uncertainty inherent in the RI provisions:     
‘The audit firms certainly don’t tell you how many RI’s they reported; how many were 
administrative; how many were useful; and how these were resolved by the different regulators. 
There is no reconciliation that shows how these things [RI’s] get dealt with which is made available. 
Sure, independence and client confidentiality is one thing.  But the firms – and I am not just talking 
about the Big 4 – don’t want to disclose this because they may get a reputation for being too strict 
when it comes to reporting; or because of the opposite; or because they don’t want us to see that 
s45 [of the APA] may really be a waste of everyone’s time’ (E14).  
 ‘There is nothing wrong with the principle of whistle-blowing. The problem is that the IRBA does 
not seem to deal with it. What are the actual consequences of reporting an RI? Consider the 
following: ‘the CEO has stolen something and I tell him: “I am going to report you to the IRBA”. 
Now, if he turns around and says: “so what”’. What will I answer? I don’t know’ (E5).  
‘And the irony is that this section would not have stopped something like Enron. The old regulation 
[s20(5) of the PAAA] was no different.... [The auditors] knew what was going on [at Enron] and 
should have reported it but they didn’t.... I am not so sure if just having a piece of legislation would 
make any difference’ (U5).     
‘So the question is: so what? What happens to the RI’s? We don’t get told. If you report an RI to the 
IRBA, we don’t know how they are handled and what the processes are. All that we [the profession] 
have are some very general statistics about how many RI’s were reported
120
. There has been no 
research on RI’s - why we should report them and what the benefits are. In fact, you [the researcher] 
are the first person to ask questions about the RI’s’ (E2).  
These views should be juxtaposed with those of the majority of users121 who perceive that the 
reporting duty – because it is part of the professional auditing process – continues to have an 
important disciplinary effect:  
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 The researcher’s request for details on the nature of each RI was declined by the IRBA on the grounds of 
confidentiality.   
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 This was one of the only instances where users and experts had materially different views on the RI provisions 
arising mainly from the fact that users, even though subject experts, are not privy to the actual processes by which 
RI’s are reported and dealt with the by the IRBA. This confirms the findings of Power (1994) and Humphrey (2008): 
that certain aspects of audit cannot be observed by outsiders.  
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‘The RI’s definitely create a surveillance effect...The client thinks, or at least feels, the he is sort of 
being surveyed [sic] by the auditor and the underlying regulatory mechanisms. Does this also apply 
to the auditor? Does he feel like he is also under surveillance? I would think so’ (U2).   
‘And if we think of alternatives to the auditor, as a professional accountant, would they be viable?’ 
(U9).  
 ‘I would like to see a court of law actually police the reportable irregularity provisions – actually 
look at it realistically. I don’t think that they have the resources and the skills to do it, certainly not at 
the same level as the IRBA and the audit profession in general ‘(U6).   
And from the auditor’s perspective, ‘obviously, the auditor will not throw his career away and face a 
period of incarceration by taking a risk and not reporting [an RI] when he knows he ought to’ (U12).  
Reinforcing the arguments presented in Section 6.2, the potential for surveillance, examination 
and normalising sanction becomes an integral part of a complex ceremonial process whereby – 
even though the technicalities of audit are left unchanged – the belief that the RI provisions 
contribute to the standing of the profession remains. This is especially the case for users who, 
being unable to observe directly the audit process, operate according to the assumption that the 
whistle-blowing duty, backed by regulations, makes a valuable contribution to the corporate 
governance landscape. In this light the comments of Power (1994, p. 25) are still pertinent:  
‘Audit remains a ‘shiny black box...on the surface of which the aspirations of new regulatory 
programs can be reflected and made possible’ but where stakeholders still do not ‘look beneath the 




Chapter 6 considered the role played by the RI provisions in legitimising the South African 
Auditing Profession. This chapter extends this argument by highlighting how the reporting duty 
may be reminiscent of Foucauldian power and control. In particular, the whistle-blowing 
requirements influence ‘what it means to be an auditor’ (E7), creating a sense of enhanced 
accountability and individual responsibility on the part engagement leaders. This magnifies the 
effects of fines and imprisonment for not complying with s45 of the APA, striking at the very 
essence of the professional identity of individual partners and the reputation of their respective 
firms. Consequently, disciplinary power reinforces perceived improvements to audit quality 
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control systems (Chapter 4; Chapter 5) and claims to legitimacy (Section 6.1) by virtue of 
normalising pressures that create a reasonable expectation of active whistle-blowing by 
auditors. Concurrently, disciplinary power is at work on the audited. Irregularities that would 
otherwise have gone unnoticed are indirectly made public due to the auditor’s duty to bring 
these to the attention of the IRBA. Applications of technical audit procedures; the existence of 
independent reporting channels; and the possibility of inspection by either the IRBA or other 
regulator become reminiscent of the process of examination, surveillance and normalising 
sanction. This leads to the conclusion by some respondents that: ‘there is definitely a policing 
flavour’ (U9) to the APA which results in a view of the RI provisions as a corporate transparency 
and compliance enhancing mechanism.  
There was, however, no guarantee that every auditor reported every RI, irrespective of the size 
of the firm122, a view confirmed by all respondents. Several reasons for this were offered. Firstly, 
users and experts agreed that ethical behaviour cannot be legislated, a sentiment shared by 
Agulhas (2007), McMillan (2004) and Low et al (2008). Hence, there is an inherent risk of rogue 
auditors disregarding the RI provisions due to the practical limitations of the IRBA to observe 
effectively each audit engagement and the ever-present issue of application of ethical and 
professional judgement. Secondly, as predicted by Roberts (1991; 2009) and Pesqueux (2005), 
self-preservation and the effect of underlying capitalistic pressures are not totally resolved by 
the legislation with the result that auditors, fearful of sanctions or losing a client, may adopt a  
legalistic attitude when it comes to dealing with RI’s or simply disregard the duty to blow the 
whistle. This effect may be more pronounced for smaller audit firms or audit partners with a 
smaller portfolio of clients who, accordingly, lack the resources to mitigate these pressures. In 
this way, resistance to panopticism implies that s45 of the APA may have some effect on auditor 
reporting but that the effect is not as extensive as the panoptic metaphor implies.   
A second limitation of the power and control model is that, prima facie, ‘visibility’ stands in 
contrast with audit deriving an important source of its legitimacy from its opacity or claims to 
almost ‘mythical’ expertise (Section 2.3). Decoupling and mimetic isomorphism address this 
tension. As explained by Meyer and Rowan (1977) by ‘exalting ceremony and myth’, the RI 
provisions retain much of the underlying cognitive legitimacy associated with disciplinary power 
even though the technicalities of audit practice cannot be perfectly reconciled with Foucault’s 
(1977) model of power and control. The audit process cannot be directly observed (DeAngelo, 
1981b); technologies for documenting and evaluating every judgement made by the auditor do 
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 See, however, the limitations described in Section 1.4.2.   
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not exist (IAASB, 2009f); and the IRBA is unable to know, in a practical sense, whether or not 
every RI has been reported. Nevertheless, almost all users continued to accept the surveillance 
potential of the whistle-blowing duty as a material contribution to the corporate governance 
landscape.  
Together with the power of punishment itself to accentuate the legitimacy of the audit profession 
(Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010), a motif of disciplinary force becomes an important part of 
accepting s45 of the APA as a natural and logical part of the emerging external regulatory 
paradigm.  This is especially true for ‘outsiders’, not as a result of an expectation gap123, but 
because, despite elements of enhanced visibility, they remain unable to observe directly the 
audit process. Paradoxically, rather than serve as a stumbling block, this means that notions of 
visibility inherent in the disciplinary power framework are an inextricable element of the opacity 
of audit (Power, 1994; Power, 2003) allowing the RI provisions to afford legitimacy to the 
profession while, at a technical level, limitations to effective whistle-blowing remain. This 
confirms the thinking in Section 6.2: complex ceremonial processes are at work in regulating 
and legitimising the audit profession.  
These findings are a result of the first critical evaluation of the role of the RI provisions in South 
African audit. They also build on the evidence presented in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
The findings are relatively complex and certainly not free of limitations. Consequently, Chapter 8 
provides a summary of the main arguments raised in this thesis, highlights inherent 
shortcomings and identifies areas for future research. 
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 As discussed in Section 3.3, users are highly respected subject experts. These ‘inconsistencies’ cannot, therefore, 
be ascribed simply to misinformed expectations or a lack of understanding of the objectives of auditing.  
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8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Chapter 8 provides an overview of the thesis. Section 8.1 summarises the findings, emphasising 
major themes identified by the detailed interviews (Chapter 4; Chapter 6; Chapter 7) and, to a 
lesser extent, the correspondence analysis (Chapter 5). Interconnections between the results 
chapters are also stressed, followed by a summary of the thesis’s key contributions to the 
auditing literature (Section 8.2). Section 8.3 draws the reader’s attention to the limitations of the 
study and identifies areas for future research. Section 8.4 concludes.  
 
8.1: CONSOLIDATED FINDINGS  
 
While we may know much about auditing in positivist terms, we know comparatively little about 
the attest function in the real world (Power, 2003; Carcello, 2005; Humphrey, 2008; Humphrey 
et al, 2011). This is especially true when it comes to recent regulatory developments, 
purportedly aimed at improving audit quality control systems and restoring a sense of 
confidence in the audit process. As a result, this research has followed the recommendations of 
Humphrey (2008, p. 179), dispensing with the ‘reluctance to draw...on detailed contextual case 
studies’ for the purpose of illuminating audit practice in a non-experimental setting. No effort 
was made to ‘measure’ audit quality. That has already been done (Francis, 2004). Instead, the 
research considers the South African context in which, in addition to the duty to express an 
opinion on a client’s financial statements, auditors are required to report RI’s to the IRBA, 
something which several interviewees described as an example of whistle-blowing.  South 
Africa was chosen due to the fairly recent revisions to the reporting duties (Section 2.1) 
providing a current case for exploring a particular aspect of audit practice. It is also one of the 
few jurisdictions where auditors are faced with a broad, regulatory requirement to blow the 
whistle on clients, despite a duty of confidentiality (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006; Maroun and Gowar, 
2013). By concentrating on South Africa, this research provides one of the first interpretive 
accounts of auditing (and, by default, corporate governance) from a non-Anglo-Saxon 
perspective124 (see Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Maroun, 2012a). It simultaneously adds to the 
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 Per the Africa Leads Conference (2012), this thesis may well be the first example of critical auditing research from 
South Africa.  
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on-going debate on auditor reporting and quality (European Commission, 2010b; IAASB, 2012), 
concentrating on the continent’s largest economy to explore the relevance of a complementary 
reporting duty as an example of a corporate governance mechanism.  
This thesis commences with an investigation of the impact of s45 of the APA on perceived audit 
quality. Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 discuss how the prior research concludes that there is at 
least some merit in the call for a more arms-length regulation of the profession to improve audit 
quality (Bazerman and Moore, 2011; Lesage and Wechtler, 2012). South Africa’s RI provisions 
are no exception, addressing a need for improved reporting by auditors along similar lines to the 
European Community (CESR, 2007; European Commission, 2010b) and IAASB (2012). In this 
context, Chapter 4 considers whether the reporting duty has had any perceived relevance for 
participation on audits by engagement leaders (Section 4.1); adherence to ethical principles 
including client acceptance and continuance decisions (Section 4.2); and human resources, 
engagement performance and monitoring (Section 4.3). Each of these ‘quality metrics’ was 
derived from ISQC 1 (Section 1.2; Section 2.2). This allowed the research to consider audit 
quality control systems (and, indirectly, audit quality) more holistically than studies following a 
positivist approach which focus on a limited number of quality surrogates. While there is a risk of 
falling victim to the profession’s self-serving claims to technical expertise (Power, 2003), this is 
mitigated by the fact that ISQC 1 is subject to due process, is comparable to US GAAS, and 
echoes many of the principles found in the prior audit quality and corporate governance 
literature.   
The first results chapter found that there has been little perceived impact on audit practice as a 
result of the RI provisions. Considering ISQC 1’s emphasis on ethical business practice, 
including sound client acceptance and continuance protocols, most respondents reported that 
the RI provisions had only marginal relevance. For almost all experts, existing policies and 
procedures already accommodated the effect of the reporting duty. The same was true when it 
came to engagement performance and human resource practices. Respondents confirmed that 
the RI provisions had not altered the ‘nuts and bolts’ of audit by imposing additional 
requirements on auditors, other than to inform the IRBA, should the practitioner encounter an 
RI. More significant was a sense of professional duty, professional appearance, and 
conceptions of a personal duty to the respective firm, thereby confirming the findings of inter alia 
Carrington (2010), Wyatt (2004) and McMillan (2004).  This is not to say that the RI provisions 
are irrelevant.  
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Most interviewees felt that the whistle-blowing duty led to enhanced reporting by auditors 
resolving a tension between owing a public duty to bring transgressions into the open and the 
need to ensure confidentiality of client information. Section s45 of the APA increases the 
likelihood of reporting transgressions by providing a formal reporting mechanism that clarifies 
when and how one ought to blow the whistle, as well as a basis for rationalising reporting to a 
client. Complementing this is the fact that it is an independent regulator, rather than the auditor, 
who decides whether or not an RI is brought to the attention of the relevant third parties, 
effectively adding additional ‘layers of independence’.  Finally, the requirement to bring any act 
of fraud, or other irregularities, without delay, to the attention of the IRBA mitigates the risk of 
professional judgement or client pressure leading to reduced whistle-blowing, even when 
reporting is ultimately in the public interest (Section 4.3; Chapter 5).  
Going hand-in-hand with promoting effective whistle-blowing are claims of improved 
transparency and accountability and a resulting sense of enhanced auditor legitimacy.  
Section 6.1 argues that, by complementing the auditor’s reporting duties, the RI provisions 
appeal to the interest of constituents providing material benefits to stakeholders and, thus, 
serving as a source of exchange legitimacy. Concurrently, with trends in corporate governance 
pointing to the importance of improved disclosure for stakeholders (IOD, 2009; IIRC, 2011; IRC, 
2011), influential legitimacy may result. Complementing this is the perception of the whistle-
blowing duty as ‘the right thing to do’ (U1), ‘invaluable for the public interest’ (U9; E9) and 
iterating the auditor’s societal duty to serve as a ‘watchdog’ (U3; U10) which appeals to a sense 
of moral legitimacy. This is enhanced by the RI provisions being enshrined in statute, belief in 
their procedural rigour and an assumed practical ability for auditors to discharge the whistle-
blowing duty. By then appealing to the every-day ideal of audit serving as a ‘watchdog’, 
reinforced by a taken-for-granted belief in pro-social whistle-blowing discourse, a sense of 
cognitive legitimacy results. Adding to this is the fact that the RI provisions form part of the move 
from a self-regulatory approach paradigm which, in the aftermath of numerous corporate 
scandals, may be suffering from an impaired legitimisation potential (Section 2.3). Requiring the 
auditor to report transgressions signals a move towards arms-length regulation to preserve trust 
in the audit process. More specifically, the RI provisions may be part of the response to 
regulatory development abroad. With South Africa’s major trade partners and providers of 
capital appearing to favour external regulation (Manuel, 2002; Konar et al, 2003; Malsch and 




These results confirm the findings of Power (2003) - that audit is a social construct and that, 
paradoxically, it is able to confer legitimacy on organisations, yet depends heavily on legitimacy 
in its own right in order to do so. External regulation is not only about improving audit quality, as 
much of the prior literature suggests. By appealing to notions of pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimacy, it is an important means of securing belief in auditors’  ‘rituals’ of verification 
(Pentland, 2000), something particularly important given that the only ‘element’ of audit capable 
of direct observation is a single sheet of paper expressing an opinion on financial statements.  
Under the lens of institutionalism, more critical perspectives are also possible. Suchman (1995, 
p. 579) warns that ‘organisations often put forth self-serving claims of moral propriety and 
buttress these claims with hollow symbolic gestures’. Similarly, Power (1994) and Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2004) argue that seldom are regulatory developments untainted by various agendas. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, governments, having a vested interest in the functioning of capital 
markets, and, thus, audit, may use external regulation as a means to legitimise the assurance 
function superficially. With this in mind, Section 6.2 elaborates on how the RI provisions play an 
important perception management role. With an aim to demonstrating how South Africa is not 
lagging behind in the race for more external control over the profession post Enron et al, s45 of 
the APA may have been hastily enacted. It serves as an example of how Government, not 
having the ‘resources or the know-how’ to tackle problems facing the audit profession (for 
further commentary see McMillan, 2004; Wyatt, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005), ‘is now creating this 
legislation to make things look good from the outside’ (U4). Despite the additional reporting 
duty, audit remains the ‘black box’ described by Power (1994). Additional external regulation is 
simply creating the impression of audit being ‘immunised’ against subsequent failure.  The move 
towards more arms-length regulation to echo developments abroad forms part of this 
‘ceremonial display’. The debate on audit quality - and the role of new laws and regulations in 
improving it - is far from resolved (for examples, see McMillan, 2004; Vakkur et al, 2010; 
Bronson et al, 2011; Deng et al, 2012; Ianniello, 2012). There is no guarantee that external 
regulation, like SOX, will necessarily materially add to audit practice and quality and prevent 
future audit failures. What is, however, key is an assumption that the audit profession’s self-
regulatory franchise is no longer adequate to safeguard the interests of stakeholders and that 
external regulation is a powerful alternate source of legitimacy (Section 2.3). In this way, 
legislation that introduces material change may not be the primary purpose for the RI provisions. 
Also ‘important is making our otherwise inefficient Government look like it’s getting up off its 
arse when the you know what looks like it’s starting to hit the fan’ (U10).   
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Can these views be reconciled with those in Section 6.1? Further, how can Chapter 4 conclude 
that the RI provisions do not substantially impact on every aspect of audit practice but yet still 
serve as an important source of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy for the audit 
profession?  Section 6.2, inspired by the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and Suchman (1995), explains how complex processes of decoupling are used to 
cleverly interconnect disjointed or ‘conflicting’ institutional ‘myths’.  
In line with the findings of Humphrey (1990; 2012), perceptions of legitimacy arise from the 
image of external regulation making an important difference, something which is effectively 
decoupled from technical or operational contradictions. The formality of the reporting duty, the 
existence of an independent regulator, sanctions for non-compliance and taken-for-granted 
belief in the technicalities of audit are powerful images that reinforce claims to cognitive 
legitimacy. This is bolstered by the fact that, at least in theory, the auditor is capable of 
discharging his ‘pro-social’ reporting duty.  The increase in the number of reports issued to the 
IRBA when RI’s replaced MI’s (Section 2.1), as well as the theoretical contribution that several 
respondents felt the legislation offers, ‘prove’ that the RI provisions are working. The same may 
be said of the fact that South Africa is ranked first globally for the quality of its accounting and 
auditing standards (see IRBA, 2010b; IRBA, 2012c). That the RI provisions’ ‘contribution’ cannot 
be quantified, the audit processes remains opaque, the reporting duty is possibly vague and 
inconsistently applied and that the precise manner in which the IRBA deals with RI’s is not fully 
understood by stakeholders is largely overlooked. What matters is not the actual outputs, but 
‘simply that the legislation exists’ (E2, emphasis added).  In other words, ‘outputs, procedures 
and structures...can all signal that the [institution is legitimate]...even if these supposed 
indicators amount to little more than face work’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 588).  
 
The RI provisions make some contribution to actual audit quality and are a possible source of 
legitimacy (Chapter 4; Chapter 5; Section 6.1). Under the lens of institutionalism, however, the 
whistle-blowing duty also has a marketing role to play. By creating a reporting duty which 
appears broad and grounded in the desire to bring RI’s into the public domain, the RI provisions 
are assumed to be rationally effective. Good faith emanating, ironically, from the ambiguity 
inherent in the application of the RI provisions and the absence of clearly defined outcomes 
takes hold. The RI provisions are seen as part of an audit-reporting-quality discourse that 
reassures stakeholders of the credibility of the attest function and enhances its claims to 
legitimacy. Simultaneously, continued opacity of the audit process ensures the obfuscation of 
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inconsistencies between the technicalities of the APA and perceptions of constituents (see 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fogarty et al, 1991; Suchman, 1995); ‘absorption of uncertainty’; and 
a ‘contribution to a general aura of confidence’  (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 358).  Rather than 
see an apparent ‘tension’ between the findings in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Section 6.1, on the 
one hand, and Section 6.2, on the other hand, what the results confirm is that audit is part of 
complex socially constructed milieu and that, more broadly, ‘institutional environments are often 
pluralistic’ with ‘societies promulgat[ing] sharply inconsistent myths’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 
p. 356).  
 
In keeping with a more interpretive/critical style, the final results chapter considers the relevance 
of Foucauldian power and control. One of the shortcomings of positivist research is the focus on 
economic rationality to the detriment of powerful, yet difficult to explicate, socio-political forces 
(Section 2.2; Section 2.4).  Section 7.1 argues that, far from a technical economic instrument, 
the reporting duty is an example of technologies of surveillance, discipline and punishment. 
Specifically: the rigid approach to reporting; prescriptions on what irregularities are ‘reportable’; 
and holding individuals accountable for failure to report are reminiscent of principles of 
enclosure, efficiency and surveillance. This is complemented by the general theme of whistle-
blowing as a means of improving corporate transparency and accountability.  At the extreme, a 
‘disciplining gaze’ is cast on at least some users who note that the RI provisions give rise to a 
sense of being ‘watched’, something which has the potential to work on the minds of certain of 
the  audit clients. This reaffirms views of s45 of the APA making a positive contribution to audit 
practice, as argued in Section 4.3. For some interviewees it imposes a meaningful reporting 
duty in addition to the professional obligation to express an opinion on a client’s financial 
statements, bolstering existing corporate governance systems (consider Opperman, 2009; 
Roberts, 2009; Humphrey, 2012).  
 
Disciplinary power may also function on audit firms. Experts reported that the whistle-blowing 
duty ‘focused the mind’, offering a window into the conduct of the individual partner by the IRBA, 
internal reviewers and peers. The risk of sanctions, as well as the ‘disgrace’ of being labelled 
non-conformist, works on the very soul of some audit partners ensuring the reporting duty is 
complied with. In turn, this perspective provides an explanation for why exogenous control over 
the audit profession gains favour over a self-regulatory ethos. As a source of disciplinary power, 
the RI provisions become akin to a process of normative examination leading to a sense of 
surveillance and ‘normalised’ behaviour. Section 45 of the APA, therefore, contributes, not only 
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to increasing the information made available to stakeholders, but also in creating a valid 
expectation of active monitoring and reporting by auditors which is ultimately in the public 
interest.  
 
The utility of disciplinary power may also lie in its ability to confer a sense of legitimacy. This is 
alluded to by Leon’s (2001, pp 3-4, cited in Brivot and Gendron, 2011) statement that: 
 
 ‘Surveillance always carries with it some plausible justification that makes most of us content to 
comply...The advantages of surveillance for its subjects are real, palpable, and undeniable. We 
readily accept the point of it’.   
 
Section 7.2 drew a link between constructs of Foucauldian power and control and claims to 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. When one considers that modern society is 
characterised by subtle displays of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977; Smart, 2002; Roberts et 
al, 2006; Brivot and Gendron, 2011), fines, penalties and professional sanctions for non-
compliance with the APA reinforce a sense of cognitive legitimacy inherent in the RI provisions. 
Almost all respondents conclude that ‘if you are doing something wrong, it’s got to be reported’ 
(U10) and that for the legislation to play a credible role, it must have ‘all the right “ingredients”: a 
legal duty..., an independent regulator and...some teeth’ (U14). Discipline, punishment and 
external regulation are, therefore, interconnected with an assumed or taken-for-granted 
confidence in the reporting process. Traces of disciplinary power appeal to claims to pragmatic 
and moral legitimacy by fostering a ‘good faith’ belief in formal, rational processes and 
reassuring users that favourable reporting by auditors occurs, as was argued in Section 6.1.  
 
Motifs of disciplinary power may, however, be illusory. Specifically, the limitations of the 
‘panoptic gaze’ and the possibility of Foucauldian power being interconnected with ceremonial 
displays of legitimacy and control should not be overlooked.  Section 7.2 explores resistance to 
panopticism that leads to either a legalistic attitude towards the RI provisions or self-
preservation. Contrary to the predicted effects of disciplinary power, the role of the auditor is not 
universally altered. A sense of commitment to serving the public interest by reporting 
irregularities is not reinforced for all auditors. As an ultimate act of resistance, s45 of the APA 
may simply be circumvented, a plausible response given the practical difficulties of rendering 
the audit process more transparent, coupled with auditors’ fear that whistle-blowing could lead 
to the loss of the client. From this perspective, the RI provisions’ contribution to reassuring 
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stakeholders of the quality and credibility of the audit process may be more symbolic than 
pragmatic. 
 
A similar outcome results when one considers the tension between auditor legitimacy derived 
from its opacity (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Power, 1994; Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2008; 
Humphrey, 2012) and the potential for enhanced transparency per Foucauldian theories of 
power and control. At first glance, these theoretical perspectives seem mutually exclusive. 
Section 7.3 further adapts Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) model of decoupling to reconcile these 
apparent conflicting views and to reinforce the complex interconnections between auditor 
regulation, legitimacy and Foucauldian power and control. The section argues that motifs of 
discipline and punishment are integral to belief in external regulation being an effective 
response when the audit profession is beset by a crisis of trust. In particular, the whistle-blowing 
duty meshes with the conviction that trust itself is no longer sufficient necessitating the use of 
additional technologies of surveillance to heighten a sense of transparency and accountability 
(Power, 1994; Pentland, 2000; Roberts, 2009). This, together with the inherent limitations of 
panoptic-like control, implies that it may be the mere appearance of a plausible monitoring 
apparatus that is sufficient to win the confidence of stakeholders and confer a sense of 
credibility for the attest function.  As was argued in Section 6.2, any tensions between a facade 
of panoptic control,  resistance to additional surveillance,  the practical impossibility of achieving 
total enclosure and difficulties encountered when attempting to ‘normalise behaviour’ are 
effectively decoupled from the belief that the RI provisions are able to render processes more 
‘visible’.  
 
For several interviewees, the whistle-blowing duty backed by inspections, independent 
regulators and the force of law is a genuine part of the regulatory environment and a source of 
legitimacy for the audit profession. This is further ‘rationalised’ by the growing use of external 
regulation backed by sanctions for noncompliance; a desire for improved transparency; and 
‘natural’ acceptance of motifs of power and control as a means of encouraging desired 
behaviour. The ‘ceremonial myth’ – in this case the general belief in auditor regulation as an 
example of a disciplinary power in action – is exalted while practically, little change to audit 
practice results. Inconsistencies and practical difficulties that undermine the effectiveness of the 
RI provisions are ‘buffered’ from the ‘assumption that formal structures are really working’ 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 357).  
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On the one hand, this means that the RI provisions are not able to totally alter audit or its 
reporting duties. On the other hand, the RI provisions contribute a ‘control’ and ‘remediation 
discourse’. This appeals implicitly, almost subconsciously, to a need for enclosure or restriction 
of both corporates and auditors in the aftermath of publicised failures, cultivating confidence or 
‘trust’ in the underlying capital systems. A paradox results in that ‘trust’ becomes a product of 
additional regulation, the former only emerging because trust itself is no longer sufficient. What 
makes motifs of Foucauldian power particularly pertinent is their subtlety. Subtle displays of 
power are easily decoupled from the tension between external regulation and notions of trust 
which, if made more explicit, might highlight the flaws of expert systems culminating in a total 
loss of confidence.  
Contemporaneously, the appearance of enclosure, examination and surveillance re-establishes 
any lost legitimacy. As theorised by Guenin-Paracini and Gendron (2010), motifs of Foucauldian 
power and control, even if lacking actual effects, are often sufficient subtly to restore a sense of 
order. Given the taken-for-granted belief in the utility of discipline and punishment, technical 
stumbling blocks are easily overlooked. Ultimately, this suggests that Foucauldian power and 
control and mechanisms of legitimization come to ‘partake of the same process of mythification’ 
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8.2: SUMMARY OF KEY CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This thesis has made a number of important contributions. As noted above, it is one of the first 
detailed accounts of auditing in a non-Anglo-Saxon setting, addressing the need for additional 
corporate governance research from an African perspective (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). At 
the same time, the findings are grounded in an interpretive epistemology. This has allowed the 
research to escape the confines of agency-theory and its assumption of rational utility 
maximisation and economic efficiency as the driving force behind regulatory developments. By 
relying on detailed interviews with audit experts and informed users, the research has 
illuminated the operation and perceived implications of a particular aspect of audit practice, 
addressing the calls for more field-work inspired studies in auditing (Power, 2003; Humphrey, 
2008).  Interconnected with this is the use of ISQC 1 for describing audit quality control systems. 
Rather than focus on one or two assumed quality surrogates (Francis, 2004), multiple 
dimensions of audit quality/quality control systems are examined, allowing the research to 
contribute to the general understanding of audit quality, as well as highlighting how issues 
concerning audit quality control systems are dealt with in a practical setting.  
Second, the thesis provides the first exploratory account of South Africa’s RI provisions. 
Although there are numerous technical papers on the subject (examples include Dunn et al, 
1989; IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006) there has been no concerted effort to provide a detailed 
conceptual account of the role played by the RI provisions in South African audit. In doing so, 
this thesis has also highlighted a strong connection between a particular aspect of external 
audit, a reporting duty as an example of whistle-blowing and legitimacy theory. For example, 
and as discussed in Section 1.2, there is a considerable body of work dealing with the definition 
of whistle-blowing (Miceli and Near, 1984; Jubb, 1999); decision-making processes involved in 
the act (Leeds, 1963; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010); and 
implications for the whistle-blower (Hwang et al, 2008; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe, 2010). The 
prior research, however, deals almost exclusively with reporting of transgressions in a traditional 
employer-employee context and largely ignores assurance functions125.   
 
Likewise, there is a well-established body of work that examines audit from an institutional 
perspective (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Sikka et al, 1998; Power, 2003). As discussed in 
                                               
125
 An exception is Read and Rama (2003) who deal with whistle-blowing to and reporting of illegalities by internal 
auditors and Brennan (2007) who looks at whistle-blowing by trainee auditors.  
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Chapter 2, this research points to the social construction of audit practice. For example, and 
dealing specifically with the issue of auditor reporting, Unerman and O ‘Dwyer (2004) present 
the audit report as an example of a ‘token symbol’ embodying a cognitive belief in the role of 
audit, similar to the views of Power (1994; 2003) and Pentland (1993; 2000). Several authors 
have also explored how an assumed fraud detection duty forms part of an expectation gap that, 
ironically, contributes to the standing of the profession by allowing audit to remain opaque or 
‘mystical’ in the eyes of non-expert users while also preserving its image and claims to 
perceived utility (Fogarty et al, 1991; Humphrey et al, 1992; Sikka et al, 1998). How a specific 
duty to bring transgressions to the attention of an independent regulator with an aim to 
broadening what auditors actually report is not, however, considered.  This is especially 
pertinent given the recent calls for auditors to do more than just provide a generic audit report 
on a client’s financial statements (CESR, 2007; European Commission, 2010b; IAASB, 2012).  
In this regard, the research provides a novel assessment of the role of audit reporting duties, not 
only in the context of audit quality, but as a means of enhancing the perceived legitimacy of 
external audit. The research, thus, expands on the existing body of institutionally-focused audit 
research, simultaneously making a connection between whistle-blowing and conceptions of both 
audit quality and auditor legitimacy.   
 
Thirdly, much of the existing interpretative or critical research is discursive. The efforts of 
Fogarty (1991; 1992), Power (1994; 2003) and Sikka et al (1998), for example, make important 
contributions but identify, as an area for additional research, the need for contextual studies to 
illuminate the operation of complex socio-institutional phenomena (Humphrey, 2008). In 
providing a detailed account of the RI provisions under the lens of legitimacy theory, this thesis 
goes some way to addressing this need. In addition, the research does not refrain from 
including a more critical bite. How the RI provisions may form part of a complex ceremonial 
display is explicated, as well as processes of decoupling, providing a quasi case study that 
illustrates the assertions of the above researchers and  inter alia, Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
Suchman (1995) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  
 
Continuing in the spirit of more critical interpretation of audit regulation, the research explores 
the connections between the RI provisions and motifs of disciplinary power. Accounting 
research couched in a Foucauldian theoretic construct is fairly common (Section 2.4). Few 
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papers have, however, adopted this perspective in an auditing context126. The thesis provides 
one of the first accounts of principles of enclosure, efficiency and disciplinary power at work in a 
corporate governance setting (Section 7) adding to our understanding of the audit reporting. It 
also elaborates on the relevance of resistance to Foucauldian power and control, showing how 
legalistic mindsets and the drive for self-preservation may dilute the intended benefits of s45 of 
the APA (see also Sikka, 2009; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). 
Not only does this expand on the application of Foucauldian theories of power and control, it 
also allows the research to make a tentative connection between discipline and punishment and 
claims to legitimacy. Specifically, Chapter 7 has dealt with how hues of normalising sanction, 
examination and surveillance contribute to claims of enhanced audit quality and standing. The 
‘natural’ acceptance of disciplinary power in modern society is also highlighted, offering an 
explanation for why more external control of the profession may be favoured in the aftermath of 
corporate scandals. The plurality of audit regulation is then expanded on, with the thesis 
considering how motifs of disciplinary power may contribute to a complex ceremonial display 
reminiscent of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Suchman’s (1995) account of institutionalised 
environments.  
Overall, this research provides a detailed exploratory account of South Africa’s RI provisions. 
Mindful of the need for theoretical eclecticism (Llewelyn, 1996; Llewelyn, 2003), the prevalence 
of agency theory (Brennan and Solomon, 2008) and social-construct of auditing (Khalifa et al, 
2007; Humphrey, 2008), the research examines the RI provisions as an example of external 
regulation attempting to enhance audit reporting and quality, accord legitimacy and entrench a 
sense of added control and transparency. In doing so, it contributes to the exploration of audit 
practice, providing a conceptual account for external regulation in a South African context with 
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8.3: RESEARCH LIMITATIONS127 
 
This thesis is not without limitations. More needs to be done on exploring how the reporting duty 
interconnects with other regulatory developments taking place both locally and abroad, 
especially given the increasing globalisation of professional audit firms and institutionalisation of 
external regulatory movements in foreign jurisdictions (Humphrey et al, 2009; Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). While this thesis has shed light on a specific 
example of an auditor reporting duty, examining other regulations in different jurisdictions will 
further our understanding of how arms-length control of the profession is responded to and 
implemented by audit firms. In turn, this will require dedicated research on the culture of 
governance at the leading audit firms themselves (Sikka, 2004).  
 
Audit firms are profit-orientated entities. They strive for engagement efficiencies, lower costs 
and larger client bases and have a clear economic interest in regulatory developments (Sikka 
and Willmott, 1995; Sikka, 2009; Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen, 2009). To better 
understand the role of the RI provisions (and arms-length regulation in general), future research 
needs to consider the tactics that may be employed by audit firms to balance adherence to the 
law with the need to ensure sound client relations and profitability (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002; 
Sikka, 2009; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). This balancing act is most relevant in light of the 
dissonance between concerns about a growing propensity of auditors and clients to resist 
technologies of accountability and transparency (Sikka, 2009) and the proliferation of external 
regulation, in response to new crises of trust, aimed at precisely that (Malsch and Gendron, 
2011; Maroun et al, 2012). Consequently, while there is a vast body of positivist work testing 
audit quality surrogates (Section 2.2.2) what is needed is more exploratory research that delves 
into the nature and corporate ethos of audit firms, as well as the social and organisational 
context in which audit engagements are executed. This thesis has only partially addressed 
this128. It highlights how s45 of the APA plays a role in mitigating client pressures that would 
otherwise have hindered the reporting of irregularities but that the whistle-blowing duty cannot 
completely address the risk that auditors – driven by the desire to preserve the client 
relationship – may not always comply with the RI provisions (Section 7.3.1). Consequently, 
                                               
127
 This section of the thesis should be read in light of the limitations and delimitations identified in Section 1.4.2.  
 
128
 The aim of the thesis was to explore the role of the RI provisions in South African audits (Section 1.4) and not to 
deal specifically with threats to the fundamental principles and how these may be resolved.  
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future research will need to concentrate specifically on threats to compliance with the 
fundamental principles and on developing innovative (albeit normative) recommendations for 
tackling impediments to audit quality, such as economic dependence on clients and capitalistic 
business models at most audit firms (McMillan, 2004; Pesqueux, 2005; Sikka et al, 2009). This 
is especially true as the values of the audit firms will likely ‘guide all work within [these] firms, 
shape the conflicts of interests faced by auditors and facilitate audit failures’ despite efforts at 
more actively regulating the profession (Sikka, 2004, p. 195). 
 
Going hand-in-hand with this, is the need for theoretical and methodological eclecticism. For 
example, it would be interesting to explore how past events have impacted on regulatory 
change in South Africa, something which has only been touched on in this thesis. Additional 
insights could be gained by replacing ‘historical facts’ in a ‘known timeline’ with ‘counterfactuals 
in order to compare alternative and recorded outcomes’ (Lee, 2006, p. 919). Posing a series of 
‘what if’ questions concerning the development of the RI provisions could, for instance, reveal 
the relevance of South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to democracy or the release of the King 
reports for whistle-blowing by auditors. Analogously, Gidden’s (1990; 1991) mechanisms of 
modernity predict that changes to auditor regulation are part of the process of ‘internalising’ 
developments taking place abroad and locally with an aim to preserving trust in the South 
African capital market. Rather than see the RI provisions in isolation, the change from MI’s to 
RI’s may be part of a broader change in South Africa following its transition to democracy, 
including subsequent political, economic and social challenges. This implies that the RI 
provisions could be an inextricable part of the country’s social, economic and political past, as 
well as a product of developments taking place in various jurisdictions at different points in time. 
Reforms in other developing economies may follow a similar trend, re-emphasising the need for 
active corporate governance research in multiple countries to test existing theories and expand 
our understanding of how governance mechanisms evolve and function in different settings 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  
Part of this could include explicitly studying the relationship between trust, regulation and 
‘technologies’ of accountability. Claiming that arms-length regulation restores trust or confidence 
in the capital market system (Tremblay and Gendron, 2011) highlights a contradiction in that 
external regulation is only required because trust itself is no longer adequate (Black, 2008). In 
examining the role of the RI provisions (and other auditor-focused reforms) more needs to be 
done to understand the extent to which external regulation is able to substitute for trust and the 
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characteristics of arms-length regulation that allows it to do so. This thesis has tentatively 
pointed to motifs of disciplinary power and claims to legitimacy as possible traits. Future 
research could complement this by using Luke’s model on power dynamics to explore how 
relationships between governments, regulators and auditors shape regulatory developments 
and reassure stakeholders in the continued credibility of the attest function (see also Sikka et al, 
1998; Malsch and Gendron, 2009; Tremblay and Gendron, 2011). Likewise, how whistle-
blowing and external regulation shape the discourse on audit reporting and corporate 
governance in general could add to our understanding of external regulation as an instrument of 
legitimisation (Khalifa et al, 2007).  
In order to highlight different views on mechanisms of accountability, considering the opinions of 
multiple stakeholders is also important (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). Purposeful selection of 
respondents (Section 3.3) has ensured accurate, relevant and detailed commentary that adds to 
the quality of the findings. Reliance on a relatively small group of specific subject experts is, 
however, an inherent limitation of qualitative studies (Holland, 2005; Rowley, 2012)129. In 
particular, this meant that the role played by the RI provisions in either contributing to or 
reducing the ‘expectation gap’ could not be fully explored130.  Consequently, the results chapters 
did not provide conclusive evidence on different perceptions of the RI provisions by users, on 
the one hand, and experts on the other. One of the only exceptions was Section 7.2.3 where, 
contrary to the opinions of experts, most users felt more strongly about the positive effects of 
s45 of the APA’s associated disciplinary mechanisms. The divergence in views was, however, 
better attributable to the fact that users were not privy to detailed processes followed by the 
audit firms and the IRBA when dealing with the RI’s. With interviewees including some of the 
leading minds in the audit and corporate governance in South Africa, making a case for the 
presence of an ‘expectation gap’ was not appropriate. Future research may, therefore, make a 
contribution to the audit literature by examining the ‘elements’ of the audit expectation gap in 
South Africa and whether or not the RI provisions form part of a divergence in the understanding 
of the purpose and scope of external audit. In addition, exploring varied meanings of audit and 
perceptions of the RI provisions could highlight how competing worldviews, institutional 
structures, socio-political power and generally accepted ‘truths’ about the attest function 
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 In addition, the risk of interviewees withholding details or being misinformed cannot be totally mitigated (Oakes et 
al, 1998; Alvesson, 2003; Creswell, 2009) although the detailed and frequently critical commentary provided in 
preceding chapters implies that this was not a significant threat to the quality of this research.  
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 Audit expectation gap research, by its nature, requires the consideration of numerous classes of user groups and 
multiple participants to reach an informed conclusion on the nature and extent of any divergence of expectations 
(Humphrey et al, 1993a; Gold et al, 2012; Porter, 2012).  
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‘construct’ multiple (and possibly conflicting) roles for whistle-blowing by external auditors  (see 
Sikka et al, 1998; Khalifa et al, 2007). Alternately, Hwang et al (2008) point to the possibility of 
numerous social or cultural variables influencing perceptions of whistle-blowing, including 
variations in fear of retaliation (Miceli and Near, 1984; Nam and Lemak, 2007; Seifert et al, 
2010). Each of these may impact views on the role of the RI provisions.  Given the country’s 
diverse cultures, this may be particular relevant. For example, West (2006, p. 445) explains how 
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, which inspired the King Codes, ‘stands in 
contrast to the normative prescriptions from African intellectuals who espouse communitarian 
values including communal rights [and] consensual decision-making’. The same may apply 
mutatis mutandis to views on the RI provisions as a means of improving audit reporting or as an 
instrument of legitimacy or disciplinary power.  
Analogously, no effort was made to deal specifically with how large and small audit firms 
interpret the RI provisions131. Considering how opinions on the reporting duty vary between 
representatives from the Big 4 or smaller practices would contribute to the existing body of audit 
quality research based on a quality-size distinction. Concurrently, future research could focus on 
how varying organisational cultures and operating dynamics at large and small firms impact the 
assessment of the RI provisions and notions of audit quality, legitimacy and disciplinary power.  
This could be complemented by studying how age, experience or cultural background impacts 
the perceived role of the RI provisions by auditors (see also Fogarty, 1992; Schultz et al, 1993; 
Brennan and Kelly, 2007).   
Another aspect not specifically covered by the research is the definition of ‘audit quality’. ISQC 1 
is used to inform the commentary on the association between the RI provisions and audit quality 
control systems. While some effort has been made to show parallels between the ISQC 1 and 
the prior literature on audit quality, research inspired by a grounded approach could identify 
additional ‘elements’ of audit quality not explicitly dealt with by either the academic or 
professional literature and complement the views detailed in this thesis132. Related to this, the 
relevance of auditor litigation has not been dealt with in detail. Several writers have argued that 
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 One of the only instances where the size distinction was raised  by interviews was when explaining how smaller 
firms may lack the economic resources to withstand client pressures.  
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 This line of research would also add to the body of work on the relationship between various quality surrogates 
and elements of audit quality which, although extensive, is often carried out in developed economies. Further, Liao et 
al (2013) argue that determinants of audit quality may vary between high and low litigation risk environments. South 





litigation risk is a relevant determinant of audit quality (Palmrose, 1988; Liao et al, 2013; 
Schmidt, 2012). The possibility of s45 of the APA giving rise to a risk of civil action against 
auditors has, however, only been touched on. Future research may concentrate on this aspect 
of the RI provisions to further our understanding of whistle-blowing in an auditing setting. For 
example, considering the need to afford auditors greater legal protection for bona fide 
discharging their reporting duty, and how this could mitigate or compound the problems of self-
preservation (Section 7.3.1) or interact with motifs of legitimacy and disciplinary power (Section 
7.2; Chapter 6) could prove interesting. This is especially true given the need to strike a balance 
between offering legal protection for auditors against civil claims to improve audit quality while 
avoiding offering legislated protection for substandard audit practice (Cousins et al, 1999; Sikka 
et al, 2009; Liao et al, 2013; Maroun and Gowar, 2013).   
Finally, the reader’s attention is drawn to the cross sectional nature of this study. Research 
findings may vary over the long-run. How historical accounts of audit regulation and quality differ 
from modern perspectives is not directly addressed by this thesis. The result is that while this 
study has provided a detailed study on the role of the RI provisions in South African audits, it by 
no means offers a complete account.  
 
8.4: CLOSING REMARKS133 
 
South Africa’s RI provisions play an important part in the auditor-regulatory machinery. By 
creating a duty for auditors to blow the whistle on the client, s45 of the APA contributes to the 
quality of information made available to stakeholders. Related to this, the reporting requirement 
has a role to play in enhancing corporate compliance with laws and regulations, improving 
corporate transparency and accountability in the process. There is also evidence to suggest that 
it has relevance for audit quality, most notably independence. Related to this, is the ability of the 
legislation to confer a sense of moral, pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy on the profession, 
particularly, by enhancing the image of the auditor as a ‘watchdog’ that is ‘meant’ to serve the 
public interest. Interconnected with this is the move towards more exogenous control of the 
global audit profession, especially after numerous scandals have led to the rigour of the self-
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 This thesis is carbon neutral. A total of twenty five tree seedlings have been planted to offset carbon emissions.   
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regulatory franchise being questioned. Finally, for some respondents, motifs of disciplinary 
power are present, reinforcing a sense of the RI provisions being an effective mechanism for 
improving corporate governance standards.     
The legislation is, however, far from perfect. For these benefits to be enhanced, more active 
disclosure by the IRBA is needed. In carrying out this research, several respondents highlighted 
the need for greater transparency. While some statistics on RI’s are available, more detailed 
information on the number of issues reported; pertinent details; and how these issues are being 
addressed could add to the credibility of the reporting process and accentuate claims to 
legitimacy and improved reporting quality. Related to this, the sanctions embodied in the APA – 
and associated threats to professional standing – play a role in ‘working on the minds’ of at least 
some users and experts. Motifs of discipline and punishment can create a valid expectation of 
auditors discharging their reporting duties. By more actively informing the market place of this 
reporting duty, these gains may be magnified. This would simultaneously make the reporting 
duty part of the governance parlance of even non-expert users and signal to both auditors and 
auditees that the RI provisions are regarded as an important aspect of the professional 
assurance function.  
Presently, there is a risk that the RI provisions are perceived by some stakeholders as merely 
part of a symbolic display designed to reassure constituents of the soundness of the audit 
function and regulatory machinery.  While these ‘displays’ are successfully decoupled from the 
technicalities of the reporting duty and, accordingly, still add to the standing of the profession, 
‘we need more than just imagery’ (U3). As explained by Suchman (1995), superficial claims to 
credibility lack longevity. They fail to build on the audit profession’s existing ‘legitimacy reserve’ 
in the long-run. One recommendation is for ambiguities inherent in the reporting duty to be 
resolved to ensure consistent application of the whistle-blowing obligation and avoidance of its 
circumvention due to legalistic behaviour. Complementing this is the possible need for direct 
legal protection for the whistle-blower to mitigate threat of legal action or risk of losing the client 
overriding the duty to report to the IRBA. While care would need to be taken to avoid sheltering 
poorly executed audits from legal action (Cousins et al, 1998) where the auditor, acting in good 
faith, blows the whistle, a clear, and practically relevant, defence against legal action from 
clients and third parties needs to be carefully considered (see also Maroun and Gowar, 2013). 
Finally, if sanctions for non-conformance are to continue being seen as effective safeguards 
against economic pressures working against reporting, reviews by the IRBA need to be more 
rigorous. They need to concentrate on whether or not the audit firms have internalised the spirit 
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of the legislation rather than just having checked the relevant boxes to demonstrate compliance. 
Going hand-in-hand with this is a clear need to tackle the pressures on audit firms themselves. 
The RI provisions go some way to achieving this by creating a mechanism for reporting, backed 
by a legal duty that offers auditors an ‘escape hatch’ or ‘buffer’ to justify reporting when in the 
public interest to do so. What the APA does not do is directly address underlying capitalistic 
pressures, including the mentality of serving the client rather than the stakeholder. A concerted 
effort is needed by both practitioners and academics to explore how these problems can be 
addressed. Rules for the rotation of audit partners or prohibition on non-audit services may not 
be a comprehensive solution. New and creative means of tackling an erosion of professionalism 
is needed, including enhanced training that leaves the image of the auditor as a ‘watchdog’ that 





II: APPENDICES  
 
The following appendices accompany, but are not part of, the thesis. Appendix A provides 
additional information on s45 of the APA. Appendix B contains results from the pilot studies. 
Appendix C complements the discussion on the derivation of the correspondence plot in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. Appendix D and Appendix E contain the ethical clearance and 
template consent form respectively. Appendix F is a list of interviewees and Appendix G lists 
conferences where sections of this thesis have been prevented.  
 
APPENDIX A: SECTION 45 OF THE APA 
 
A1: DEFINITION OF A ‘REPORTABLE IRREGULARITY’ AND RELATED TERMS  
 
Section 1 of the APA defines a ‘reportable irregularity as ‘any unlawful act or omission 
committed by any person responsible for the management of an entity’ (s1 of the APA, 2005). 
This ‘unlawful act or omission’ must be one which:  
a) ‘has caused or is likely to cause material financial loss to the entity or to any partner, 
member, shareholder, creditor or investor of the entity in respect of his, her or its 
dealings with that entity; or 
b) is fraudulent or amounts to theft; or 
c) represents a material breach of any fiduciary duty owed by such person to the entity 
or any partner, member, shareholder, creditor or investor of the entity under any law’ 
(s1 of the APA).  
The APA does not define ‘an unlawful act or omission’ or ‘person responsible for management 
of an entity’. While it is not the intention of this research to examine the technical structure of 
s45 of the APA in detail, a brief discussion of the elements of the definition of a reportable 




‘Unlawful act or omission’ 
In Reportable Irregularities: a Guide for Registered Auditors, the IRBA (2006, p. 5) suggests that 
an ‘unlawful act’ would be some act, whether due to intent or negligence, which is effectively 
contrary to statutory or Common Law. ‘Unlawful acts’ may therefore include a breach of laws in 
various jurisdictions in which an entity operates if it can be shown that the person responsible 
for management of that entity ought reasonably to have known that that act or omission was 
effectively unlawful (IRBA, 2006, pp. 6-7).  In making this determination, however, it is 
acknowledged that the auditor is not a legal expert (IAASB, 2009h; IAASB, 2009g). As such, 
whether or not a particular act or omission constitutes a reportable irregularity due to its being  
‘unlawful’, will generally be based upon the advice of an informed expert qualified to practise law 
and may very well only be resolved by the appropriate court of law (IRBA, 2006).  
What is key for an auditor is the fact that he only has the duty to report the ‘unlawful act or 
omission’ under s45 of the APA where, based on professional judgement, he has prima facie 
evidence that causes him ‘to be satisfied’ or ‘have reason to believe’ that the ‘unlawful act or 
omission’ meets the definition of a ‘reportable irregularity’ (IRBA, 2006, p. 7). Further 
examination of this matter is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
‘Responsible for management’ 
For an ‘unlawful act or omission’ to trigger a reportable irregularity, it needs to be undertaken by 
those ‘responsible for the management of the entity’ (s1 of the APA, 2005). While the APA does 
not define this term, it does provide a definition for ‘management board’. This would imply that 
the person responsible for the management of an entity will probably be somebody with the 
responsibilities and duties traditionally associated with the board of directors or, in relation to 
some other entity, the equivalent governing body (s1 of the APA, 2005; Gawith, 2006; IRBA, 
2006; PwC, 2006).  
The IRBA (2006) and IAASB (2009b) suggest that the person responsible for management of 
an entity would normally, either individually or as a group, be responsible for the setting of the 
strategic objectives and operational policies of the entity. This includes making decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources to ensure fulfilment of those objectives and policies and 
the establishment of supporting policies and processes. Such can include the selection, review 
and approval of accounting policies, the financial statements, and the appointing of agents to 
act on behalf of the company (IRBA, 2006). This implies that a person responsible for 
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management has an entity-wide decision making portfolio. Therefore, a branch manager, even if 
vested with considerable decision making authority at a local level, will not be responsible for 
entity-wide management and will probably not be regarded as a person ‘responsible for 
management’ as understood by s45 of the APA. This should be contrasted with an executive 
committee which may be tasked with the driving a firm’s strategic mission. Such a body would 
probably be regarded as ‘responsible for management’ under s45 of the APA (PAAB, 2003; 
SAICA, 2004; IRBA, 2006).  
 
Characteristics of an ‘unlawful act’ or ‘omission’ 
For an unlawful act or omission to give rise to a reporting duty under s45 of the APA, it must 
have caused, or be likely to cause, material financial loss to the entity or certain stakeholders in 
respect of their dealings with the respective entity. Alternately the ‘act or omission’ should 
amount to a material breach of fiduciary duties owed to such persons. An act of fraud or theft, 
irrespective of its materiality, would also characterize the act or omission as reportable (s1 of 
the APA, 2005; Gawith, 2006; IRBA, 2006; PwC, 2006; Wielligh, 2006).  
For this purpose, the IRBA (2006, p. 15) suggests that ‘fraud is the unlawful and intentional 
making of a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial 
to another’. Likewise, theft is the 'unlawful taking of a thing which has value with the intention to 
deprive the owner…of that thing'. A breach of fiduciary duty amounts to a failure to act solely for 
the benefit of the respective stakeholder and a failure to avoid potential conflict of interests 
(IRBA, 2006; IOD, 2009).   
What is important to note is that management’s act or omission need only be characterized by 
one of these traits to trigger a reporting duty under s45 of the APA (Gawith, 2006; IRBA, 2006; 
Wielligh, 2006). If, for example, an act or omission has caused or is likely to cause financial 
loss, then it is necessarily reportable. If the act or omission is not expected to give rise to a 
material financial loss, the auditor would consider whether or not the other two conditions are 
applicable (IRBA, 2006). For this purpose, the determination of whether or not financial loss or a 
breach of fiduciary duty is material would require the application of professional judgement and 
the consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors (IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 2009s; 
IAASB, 2009n). In making such an assessment, however, the auditor should not take into 
account any benefit that might arise from the irregularity.  
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To conclude that an act of bribery, for example, may not be a reportable irregularity on the basis 
that the dealing is profitable as a whole would be contrary to the spirit of the legislation and the 
good name of the profession (SAICA, 2004; IRBA, 2006; IRBA, 2011).   
 
A2: DUTIES OF THE AUDITOR TRIGGERED BY S45 OF THE APA 
 
The following section elaborates on the reporting duty as summarised in Section 2.1.  
Initial reporting 
In terms of s45 of the APA, where ‘an individual registered auditor of an entity’ (an auditor) is 
satisfied or has reason to believe that a reportable irregularity has taken or is taking place in 
respect of that entity, he must, without delay, send a written report to the IRBA (s45(1)(a) of the 
APA, 2005) (See also A6 below). In addition, the APA requires that:  
‘The report must give particulars of the reportable irregularity... and must include such other 
information and particulars as the registered auditor considers appropriate’ (s45(1)(b)  of the APA, 
2005). 
In considering whether or not an act or omission is reportable, the auditor is required to take 
cognizance of all information which comes to his attention, irrespective of the source of the 
information (s45(5) of the APA, 2005). This is true even for information which would otherwise 
have been protected by confidentiality or which is brought to the auditor’s attention by third 
parties (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2006). For example, any criminal conduct alluded to in the financial 
press would need to be considered by the auditor in deciding whether or not a duty to report 
under s45 of the APA has arisen (IRBA, 2006). The relevance and reliability of the source can, 
however, be taken into account when deciding if a reporting duty has been triggered (SAICA, 
2004; IRBA, 2006). 
Accordingly, the auditor may need to carry out further investigations in order to decide whether 
or not an act or omission amounts to a reportable irregularity. The extent of these investigations 
will be a matter of professional judgement. It should be appreciated, however, that the APA 
does oblige the auditor to design specifically and carry out audit procedures aimed at detecting 
reportable irregularities (IRBA, 2006; IAASB, 2009h). 
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Such should not, however, be used as ruse for providing the client with an opportunity to 
remedy the unlawful act or omission to circumvent reporting or for the auditor to ignore the 
presence of an actual or suspected reportable irregularity (Nel, 2001; IRBA, 2006). Therefore, 
once the auditor has concluded that an act or omission amounts to a reportable irregularity, 
s45(1) of the APA requires the auditor to report 'without delay’ (Gawith, 2006; IRBA, 2006; PwC, 
2006; Wielligh, 2006).  A ‘reasonable auditor test’ would likely be applied when considering 
whether or not the auditor has discharged this duty. In other words, if the auditor has reported 
‘without delay’ will depend on the time that a reasonable auditor would have taken to carry out 
necessary investigations before reporting was considered necessary (IRBA, 2006, p. 25).  
A failure to report a reportable irregularity in compliance with s45 of the APA can lead to a fine, 
imprisonment or both (s52 of the APA, 2005). The APA does not, however, offer legal protection 
for an auditor who erroneously, but in good faith, reports a matter to the IRBA (s46 of the APA, 
2005; IRBA, 2006, p. 25).  A delicate balance must be achieved between ensuring that s45 of 
the APA is complied with and ensuring the auditor is not over zealous in his reporting to the 
IRBA.  
Subsequent reporting 
With the initial report issued to the IRBA, the APA requires the auditor to notify the client within 
three days of the fact that a report has been issued. The auditor is expected to take reasonable 
measures to discuss this report with the client’s management (s45(3)(a&b) of the APA, 2005). 
Thereafter, the auditor is required, within thirty days, to send a second report to the IRBA 
informing them that either the reportable irregularity has been resolved; or  that it continues; or 
that no irregularity was taking place (s45(3)(c) of the APA, 2005). 
‘Reasonable measures’ are not defined in the APA but the IRBA (2006, p. 31) notes that the 
auditor has neither the means to force management to interact with him nor the obligation to do 
so. He is simply obliged to afford management a reasonable opportunity to respond to the initial 
report issued to the IRBA.   
Reasonable measures would include extending a formal written invitation to management to 
discuss the initial report and making reasonable meeting times available. Carrying out detailed 
searches for members of the management board or mass calls in the media would not be 
required. If the auditor has taken reasonable measures to enter into active dialogue with the 
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management board but he is unable to do so through no fault of his own, he cannot be 
prosecuted for shortcomings on the part of the management board (IRBA, 2006).  
 
A3: DUTIES OF THE IRBA 
 
Under the APA,  
‘[the] Regulatory Board must as soon as possible after receipt of a report [whereby the auditor 
confirms that the reportable irregularity exists and is continuing], notify any appropriate 
regulator in writing of the details of the reportable irregularity to which the report relates and 
provide it with a copy of the report’ (s45(4) of the APA, 2005). 
For this purpose, an 'appropriate regulator' could include ‘national government departments, 
regulators, agencies... [or similar institutions]’ (s1 of the APA, 2005). The reportable irregularity 
may be investigated as necessary by the relevant authority. This may include investigations by 
the Director of Public Prosecutions and other organs of State which have been set up to combat 
fraud and corruption (IRBA, 2006). A more detailed discussion of the nature, timing and extent 





The following section is intended to provide examples of the issues which could constitute a 
‘reportable irregularity’. The examples are not intended to be all-inclusive.  
Basic example of a reportable irregularity 
During the year, the auditor discovers that his client has not paid income tax. The person 
responsible is the branch financial manager. In this case, no reportable irregularity exists. The 
failure to pay over normal tax is an unlawful omission on the part of the client. It could result in 
material financial loss (fines) to the client. The omission does not, however, involve the client’s 




 Determination of whether or not an act or omission is unlawful: Dual audits 
It might be the case that more than one auditor is responsible for a particular audit. This can 
occur, for example, where a company appoints two audit firms - a so-called ‘joint audit’. In such 
circumstances, the duty to consider whether an unlawful act or omission amounts to a 
reportable irregularity will lie with each individual auditor (IRBA, 2006: 8). Where both registered 
auditors are ‘satisfied’ or have ‘reason to believe that the unlawful act or omission’ meets the 
definition of a ‘reportable irregularity’, each auditor may be required to report to the IRBA under 
s45 of the APA. Alternately, a combined report may be issued by the auditors.  
In a situation where only one of the registered auditors is of the opinion that there is a reportable 
irregularity, he is obliged to report the matter to the IRBA. The fact that the other auditor is of the 
opinion that there is no reportable irregularity does not detract from the responsibilities of the 
first auditor in terms of s45 of the APA. The onus to report ultimately rests with each individual 
auditor. In such a case, however, the IRBA recommends that a copy of the report be sent to the 
other auditor who averred that there was no reportable irregularity.  
(Adapted from IRBA, 2006) 
 
Cross-border audits 
In the context of growing globalization, audit firms are increasingly being called upon to engage 
in cross-border audits (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2006). Unlike SOX, the APA does not apply to 
jurisdictions outside South Africa (Maroun and Gowar, 2013). The IRBA (2006), therefore, 
provides guidance as to how s45 of the APA would operate in these cross-border audits.  
Example 1 
A holding company is a South African entity for legal purposes. The auditor identifies an act or 
omission of a foreign subsidiary of that holding company which amounts to a breach of South 
African law or a law of that foreign country. Local (South African) management was involved in 
the underlying act or omission. In such a situation, the auditor would have the responsibility to 
report the irregularity in relation to the South African holding company. There is no duty to report 
the irregularity in respect of the foreign subsidiary as s45 of the APA does not apply outside of 




It was discovered that the operations manager of an audit client in Country X, and a subsidiary 
of a South African company, was paying bribes to government officials in Country X in order to 
obtain government tenders.  On further investigation, it was discovered that the subsidiary’s 
manager was instructed to commit these acts by the operations manager in Country X as this is 
common business practice in Country X. This is a breach of law in County X. Does this act 
amount to a reportable irregularity? 
 The act is not regarded as one perpetrated by a person responsible for the management 
of the South African entity. Although the bribery of the government officials is regarded 
as unlawful, in this case, the ‘unlawful act or omission’ was executed on the part of 
management in Country X.  
 It can be argued that the bribery of government officials could result in material financial 
loss to the entity. This could come in the form of fines; other penalties imposed by the 
State; the loss of customer goodwill; or impaired sustainability due to weak ethical 
business conduct. It may also be suggested that the bribery of public officials amounts to 
a material breach of fiduciary duties on the part of management in Country X. 
 In making an assessment of whether or not the act in question is likely to cause material 
financial loss, the auditor should not take into consideration any benefit that is expected 
to result from the unlawful act or omission. For the auditor to conclude that the net 
present value of the transaction tainted by bribery is positive, and, thus, to the ultimate 
benefit of the stakeholders, would clearly not be in line with the spirit of the legislation 
and the ideals of transparency and ethics enshrined in King-III.  
 The conclusion is that there is no reportable irregularity. The reason for this is that the 
unlawful act or omission was not attributable to the South African company. As a result, 
there is no duty on the part of the auditor to report the issue to the IRBA. Due to the fact 
that s45 of the APA does not apply in Country X, there is also no duty on the part of the 
auditor to report to the authorities of Country X under the APA. It should be noted, 
however, that other laws or regulations - such as anti-corruption or terrorism legislation - 
may impose a duty on the auditor to report this issue to the authorities in Country X. This 






Assuming the same information as in Example 2, except that the subsidiary is as a South 
African entity:  
 As discussed in Example 2, the act would be one which is unlawful and giving rise to a 
material breach of fiduciary duty or financial loss.  
 In this instance, the subsidiary would be South African. The branch manager may very 
well be regarded as a person responsible for the management of the subsidiary and, 
therefore, a reportable irregularity may result. If not, even though the act or omission is 
unlawful and could result in material financial loss or breach of fiduciary duty, no 
reporting obligation under s45 of the APA results.  
 If this manager is not responsible for the management of the parent company, there is 
no reportable irregularity at the parent company level. Although the act of bribery would 
probably otherwise have given rise to a reportable irregularity, it has not been 
perpetrated by those responsible for management at a group or parent company level.  
If, however, the subsidiary’s manager was acting on the orders of the parent company’s 
management board, there could be a reportable irregularity at a parent company level. 
The auditor may consider the need for legal counsel.   
(Adapted from IRBA, 2006) 
 
A5: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
It should be appreciated that the registered auditor only has an obligation to report an 
irregularity in respect of an audit client (IRBA, 2006). Section 1 of the APA defines an 'audit' as: 
‘[the] examination of, in accordance with prescribed or applicable auditing standards: 
a. financial statements with the objective of expressing an opinion as to the fairness or 
compliance with identified financial reporting framework and any applicable statutory 
requirements; or 
b. financial and other information, prepared in accordance with a suitable criteria, with the 




The first part of the definition refers to the audit of financial statements. The IRBA (2006) has 
maintained that a duty to report would also apply to a review carried out in terms of ISRE 2410: 
Review of Interim Financial Information Performed by the Independent Auditor of the Entity 
(International Standards on Review Engagement [ISRE] 2410) (IAASB, 2009z). The 
engagement would provide only a moderate level of assurance but does, nevertheless, lead to 
the auditor expressing an opinion on the financial statements.  
Even if it was maintained that ISRE 2410 (IAASB, 2009z) does not result in the auditor 
expressing an opinion on the financial statements, what is important to note is that for s45 of the 
APA to be applicable, the capacity within which the auditor operates is not important. Despite 
the fact that the auditor provides his client with only a review service, he is ultimately 
responsible for the audit of the financial statements of that client (IRBA, 2006). This, together 
with the fact that the auditor is obliged to consider all information that comes to his attention 
when concluding on whether or not to report, implies that s45 of the APA could apply to such 
review engagements (IRBA, 2006). 
Where an engagement is undertaken within the scope of ISRE2400: Engagements to Review 
Financial Statements (ISRE 2400) (IAASB, 2009y) a different conclusion may be reached. The 
IRBA (2006) suggests that in such a situation, the practitioner is not the auditor of the client but 
is providing only a review service. This is in contrast with an engagement undertaken in terms of 
ISRE 2410 (IAASB, 2009z) where the practitioner is the client’s appointed auditor and happens 
also to provide a review service to the client. Due to the fact that the practitioner provides only 
moderate assurance, one interpretation of the definition of ‘audit’ per s1 of the APA leads to the 
conclusion that s45 of the APA does not apply (IRBA, 2006).  
Looking at the ordinary meaning of ‘express an opinion’ in s1 of the APA, however, the 
conclusion that s45 of the APA continues to apply is possible. Despite the fact that ISRE 2400 
(IAASB, 2009y) deals with a review engagement where only moderate assurance is provided, 
the practitioner may, nonetheless, be regarded as giving an opinion on the financial statements, 
albeit that the opinion is stated in the negative (s1 of the APA, 2005; IAASB, 2009y; IAASB, 
2009z).  Further discussion of this difference in application of s45 of the APA is beyond the 
scope of this study (for details see Maroun and Wainer, 2013).  
The second part of the definition of an ‘audit’ per s1 of the APA would apply in the case of an 
audit of other information, be it financial or non-financial information, with the exception of 
financial statements (IRBA, 2006). It is, thus, submitted that special purpose engagements 
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within the scope of ISAE 3000: Assurance Engagements other than Audits or Reviews of 
Historical Financial Information (International Standards on Assurance Engagements [ISAE] 
3000) (IAASB, 2009u) or ISAE 3400: The Examination of Prospective Information (ISAE: 3400) 
(IAASB, 2009v) could fall within the scope of s45 of the APA.   
In contrast with audits, an agreed-upon procedure engagement or an engagement to compile 
financial information falls within the scope of International Standards on Related Services 
(ISRS) and does not require the auditor to express an opinion (IAASB, 2009aa). For this reason, 
the engagement would not meet the definition of an ‘audit’ and would thus not trigger a reporting 
duty in terms of s45 (IRBA, 2006).  What is important to realise, however, is that if the auditor is 
providing services to a client that would not otherwise have been regarded as an ‘audit’ per s1 
of the APA, but that client happens also be an audit client, then s45 of the APA would continue 
to be relevant. For example: if an audit firm is carrying out a forensic investigation at a client (as 
an agreed upon procedure) and is satisfied or has reason to believe that there is a reportable 
irregularity, this could trigger a duty to report if the firm is also the client’s auditor. Even if the 
client for whom the agreed-upon procedures were carried out was not an audit client but the 
matter in question related to an audit client, this could give rise to a duty to report. The reason 
for this is that the individual registered auditor is obliged to take into account all information from 
all sources which comes to his attention in deciding whether or not to report to the IRBA (IRBA, 
2006). 
 
A6: EXAMPLE OF THE FIRST REPORT TO THE IRBA  
 
LETTERHEAD OF THE RESPECTIVE AUDIT FIRM 
Adv Francois Opperman 
Professional Manager: Compliance  
Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors 







NAME OF AUDITEE: [INSERT THE NAME OF THE AUDIT CLIENT] 
REGISTRATION NUMBER: [INSERT THE ENTITY’S REGISTRATION NUMBER] 
 
This letter is in accordance with the requirements of the Auditing Profession Act No. 26 of 2005 
(the Act), section 45 – Duty to report on irregularities. 
 
My firm has been engaged by [insert name of entity] to:[Delete if not applicable] 
 
1. Audit the company’s annual financial statements. 
2. Audit the entity’s financial statements with the objective of expressing an opinion on their 
fairness within an identified financial reporting framework. 
3. Audit financial and other information, prepared in accordance with suitable criteria, with the 
objective of expressing an opinion on the financial and other information. 
4. Review interim financial and other information with the objective of expressing a limited 
assurance opinion on the interim financial or other information. 
 
I have reason to believe that a reportable irregularity, as defined in the Act, has taken, or is 
taking place. I am not able to make a legal determination in respect of the suspected unlawful 
act or omission but have exercised professional judgement, based on the evidence or 
information which has come to my knowledge, including undertaking further investigations of 
information as were considered necessary in the circumstances. Particulars of the reportable 
irregularity are: [Provide particulars, including any other information and particulars considered 
appropriate] 
 
Please acknowledge receipt of this report. 
 
Yours sincerely [Name of registered auditor134] 
Registered Auditor 
Chartered Accountant (SA) 
(SAICA, 2007, pp. 4-6) 
                                               
134
 The registered auditor who sends this report should be the registered auditor responsible and accountable for the 











[Members of the management board] 







This letter is in accordance with the requirements of the Auditing Profession Act, No. 26 of 2005, 
(the Act), section 45 – Duty to report on irregularities.  
 
The Act defines a reportable irregularity as any unlawful act or omission committed by any 
person responsible for the management of an entity, which – 
 
(a) has caused or is likely to cause material financial loss to the entity or to any partner,     
member, shareholder, creditor or investor of the entity in respect of his, her or its 
dealings with the entity; or 
(b) is fraudulent or amounts to theft; or 
(c) represents a material breach of any fiduciary duty owed by such person to the entity or 
any partner, member, shareholder, creditor or investor of the entity under any law 
applying to the entity or the conduct or management thereof. 
 
I have reason to believe that a reportable irregularity has taken or is taking place and, as 
required by the Act, I have reported particulars of the irregularity to the Independent Regulatory 
Board for Auditors (IRBA) in a written report dated [insert date] a copy of which is attached. As 
indicated in that letter, I am not at present able to make a legal determination in respect of the 
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suspected unlawful act or omission but have exercised professional judgement, based on the 
evidence or information which has come to my knowledge, including undertaking further 
investigations of information considered  necessary in the circumstances. 
 
The Act requires me as soon as is reasonably possible, but no later than 30 days from the date 
on which the individual auditor’s report was forwarded to the IRBA, to send another report to the 
IRBA which must include: 
 
1. A statement that I am of the opinion that: 
(a) no reportable irregularity is taking place; or 
(b) the suspected reportable irregularity is no longer taking place and that adequate steps 
have been taken for the prevention or recovery of any loss as a result thereof, if relevant; 
or 
(c) the reportable irregularity is continuing. 
2. Detailed particulars and information supporting the statement above. 
 
Please note that, where the reportable irregularity is continuing, the IRBA has a responsibility to 
notify any appropriate regulator in writing of the details of the reportable irregularity and to 
provide it with a copy of my report. 
 
I invite you to discuss my report to the IRBA, at a meeting to be arranged as soon as possible, 




[Name of registered auditor] 
Registered Auditor 
Chartered Accountant (SA) 
 












Adv FF Opperman 
Professional Manager: Compliance 
Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors 





SUBSEQUENT REPORT: REPORTABLE IRREGULARITY NAME OF AUDITEE: [INSERT 
THE NAME OF THE AUDIT CLIENT] 
REGISTRATION NUMBER: [INSERT THE ENTITY’S REGISTRATION NUMBER] 
 
I refer to my report of [date of initial report]. 
 
I have included a copy of the written notice which was sent, together with the abovementioned 
report, to the members of the management board of the entity within three days of my having 
sent the first written report to you. I have discussed that report with the members of the 
management board and have afforded them an opportunity to make representations in respect 
of the report. I have also undertaken further investigations as I considered necessary. 
 
I have included written representations made by members of the management board of the 




Although I have taken all reasonable measures to communicate with the management board in 
respect of the suspected reportable irregularity, the board has failed or declined to engage in 
discussions with me. However, I have undertaken such further investigations as I considered 
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necessary / I have also been unable to undertake such further investigations as I considered 
necessary. [Delete if not applicable] 
 
I report that, in my opinion, no reportable irregularity has taken place or is taking place / the 
reportable irregularity is no longer taking place and that adequate steps have been taken for the 
prevention or recovery of any loss as a result thereof, if relevant / the reportable irregularity is 
continuing [Delete if not applicable]. 
 
Details and information in support of my statement above are as follows: 
 
[Provide details and information] 
 
Please acknowledge receipt of this report. 
 
Yours sincerely 
[Name of registered auditor] 
Registered Auditor 
Chartered Accountant (SA) 
 




APPENDIX B: PILOT STUDIES  
 
This Appendix contains the pilot study used to test the appropriateness of the correspondence 
analysis (Chapter 5) and of the agenda used to administer detailed interviews.  
  
B1:  PILOT OF THE CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the correspondence analysis, Creswell (2009) 
recommends the piloting of the research instrument (see also Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  This 
is designed to test the adequacy of the data collection process, as well as the ability of 
participants to complete accurately the correspondence schedule. It may also highlight 
unexpected events and conditions that can be remedied before the formal data collection 
process begins. The purpose of the pilot study is not, however, formal data analysis and 
interpretation and, as a result, a final correspondence analysis bi-plot is not generated using the 
data collected during the pilot.  
 
Sample  
The correspondence analysis was piloted at one of the Big Four Audit firms during April and 
May 2011 in Johannesburg, South Africa. Participants included audit managers with 
approximately three to five years of experience. The mean experience was 4.3 years. A total of 
twenty-five people were invited to participate. Of these, twenty-four (96%) completed the 
correspondence table correctly. One participant resigned from the respective firm during the 






The pilot study was run using the data collection strategy outlined in Section 3.4.  Although the 
detailed interview process was not piloted at this stage, a copy of the core agenda points 
(Appendix B4) was included in a follow-up e-mail confirming the meeting for the completion of 
the correspondence table. In line with the approach used by Holland and Doran (1998), the core 
agenda points were provided one working week before the scheduled participation date. The 
correspondence tables were completed at the participants’ offices and were done individually for 
the sake of confidentiality and to avoid group responses which may be affected by, inter alia, the 
presence of dominant members of the group or other peer pressures (Creswell, 2009; Rowley, 
2012). The correspondence table (Section 3.2.2) is reproduced here for convenience.  
 
TABLE 3.1: CORRESPONDENCE TABLE (REPRODUCED) 
  Quality Trait
135
 Provisions of s45 of the Auditing Profession Act 
      
    RI’s are to 
be reported 








report an RI 















RI’s include a 
material 






    C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
R1 Development of a culture of 
leadership with more 
participation by the 
engagement leader (para 9) 
       
R2 Awareness of the importance 
of ethical compliance (para 14 
&18) including client 
acceptance and continuance 
procedures (para 28) 
       
R3 Acknowledging the importance 
of resources & competency of 
engagement team (para 36) as 
well as the need for full 
compliance with ISA (para 46) 
       
R4 Ensuring appropriate 
consultation on contentious 
matters and resolution of 
differences of opinion (para 
51) 
       
                                               
135
 Paragraphs refer to the provisions of ISQC 1.  
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TABLE 3.1: CORRESPONDENCE TABLE (REPRODUCED) 
  Quality Trait
135
 Provisions of s45 of the Auditing Profession Act 
      
    RI’s are to 
be reported 








report an RI 















RI’s include a 
material 






    C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
R5 More attention paid to internal 
quality control and continuous 
improvement processes  
including documentation 
standards (para 74) 
-       
R6 Enhanced transparency and 
confidence in the audit process 
and increased perceived value 
for stakeholders (including 
improved reporting quality) 
       
R7 Enhanced sustainability for 
audit firms including reduction 
in overall audit risk 
       
R8 A sense of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the informed public 
       
R9 A sense of personal 
responsibility for auditors and 
auditors being held to account 
       
 
Upon completion of the correspondence tables, participants were asked for their views on the 
data collection instrument. Most agreed that the process followed was quick and simple and that 
the correspondence table was easy to complete. No material omissions or other errors were 
noted and nothing came to the attention of the researcher to suggest that the instrument was 
not suitable for the purpose of the research (Appendix B2; Appendix B5).  
 
B2: Appropriateness of the correspondence analysis  
 
Creswell (2009) and Cohen et al (2002) point to the importance of choosing the correct data 
collection instrument. To this end, the nature of any analysis - as well as the body of participants 
- should be considered when selecting a quantitative technique. As discussed in Section 3.3 
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and Appendix B1, participants selected to complete the correspondence table are practising 
accountants and auditors or auditing and accounting academics.   
Observations by the researcher suggested that complex statistical techniques and data 
collection instruments may be foreign to many participants (see also Humphrey, 2012; Maroun, 
2012a). This has two important implications: firstly, there is a risk that participants may not 
respond well to certain data collection techniques, leading to inaccurately completed surveys 
and lower response rates. Secondly, Creswell (2009) and O’Dwyer et al (2011) recommend that 
a copy of the final report be made available to participants for ethical and quality control 
reasons. If participants are not able to read and fully comprehend the report findings, this 
negates the benefits of providing participants with the final report. The end result is a material 
threat to the quality and ethical standing of the research. For this reason, the appropriateness of 
using correspondence analysis as the data collection instrument was briefly considered.  
Expanding on the results from the pilot study, the same sample of participants was asked seven 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions. These included: 
1. I would rather complete the correspondence analysis table than a questionnaire. 
2. I prefer using an ‘X’ to mark single cells to completing a scale moving from ‘strongly 
agree ‘to ‘strongly disagree’.   
3. I want the correspondence sheet or questionnaire to fit a single page.  
4. Given the aims of the research, I think that the correspondence analysis is appropriate.  
5. If I were e-mailed the correspondence table to complete, I would complete it honestly, 
accurately and promptly.  
6. Looking at the correspondence table, I am comfortable that there are no material ethical 
concerns for participants.  
7. If I were to receive a copy of the report, I would prefer reviewing a two-dimensional 
graph rather than comprehensive statistical analysis.  
For the purpose of answering these questions, participants were, after the completion of the 
correspondence table discussed in Appendix B1, provided with an equivalent questionnaire. For 
this purpose each of the row headings in Table 3.1 above was re-formatted into a questionnaire 
using a five point likert scale. The questionnaire was limited to the same number of questions as 
in the correspondence table to prevent the length of the questionnaire being the main 
determinant when choosing a preferred data collection instrument. A questionnaire with this 
design was chosen as the alternative data collection instrument due to its frequency of its use in 
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the prior literature (see, for example, Porter, 1993; Brennan and Kelly, 2007; Creswell, 2009; 
Steenkamp et al, 2009; Collis, 2010)136.  The responses are summarized in the charts below.  
 
Results and commentary 
The results suggest a strong support for the correspondence analysis. Ninety-seven percent of 
participants in the pilot study preferred a correspondence table to the detailed questionnaire 
(Question 1) and using an ‘X’ to mark corresponding cells, rather than the five-point Likert scale 
(Question 2). A total of 93% confirmed that the data collection instrument should fit a single 
page (Question 3). In summary, 85% of participants felt that the correspondence table was 
appropriate for the research (Question 4). Confirming the findings from the pilot study’s quality 
control checklist (Appendix B5), 95% of respondents indicated that they would complete the 
correspondence table honestly and promptly (Question 5). Participants were unanimous in their 
view that there were no ethical concerns (Question 6) and that they would prefer reviewing a 
final report including the two-dimensional plot similar to that shown in Figure B2 to a 
comprehensive statistical analysis (Question 7).  




                                               
136
 The purpose of this extended ‘test’ was to give the researcher a sense of how well participants would respond to 































Question 1 I would rather complete the correspondence analysis table than a 
questionnaire. 
Question 2 I prefer using an ‘X’ to mark single cells to completing a scale moving 
from ‘strongly agree ‘to ‘strongly disagree’.   
Question 3 I want the correspondence sheet or questionnaire to fit to a single page.  
Question 4 Given the aims of the research, I think that the correspondence analysis 
is appropriate.  
Question 5 If I were e-mailed the correspondence table to complete, I would 
complete it honestly, accurately and promptly 
Question 6 Looking at the correspondence table, I am comfortable that there are no 
material ethical concerns for participants.  
Question 7 If I were to receive a copy of the report, I would prefer reviewing a two-





Although the pilot study and informal survey did not draw on the perceptions of a large number 
of participants, the intention is not the extrapolation of the findings or execution of formal 
research on the use of different data collection instruments. Rather, the pilot study and informal 
survey have been used to test the appropriateness of the quantitative data collection instrument 
in the context of this study only. To this end, nothing has come to the attention of the researcher 
to suggest that the correspondence analysis is not well suited to this study137.  
 
                                               
137
 To further test the appropriateness of correspondence analysis, traditionally applied in a marketing context 
(Bendixen, 1996), a correspondence analysis was used by the researcher in a comparable interpretive context and 




B3:  PILOT OF THE DETAILED INTERVIEWS 
 
This research focuses on the perspectives of those who are directly involved with audit and 
have been contributing to the development of audit practice in South Africa. Semi structured 
interviews (Section 3.2) are the primary data collection instrument. Respondents included audit 
partners as well as informed users of audit reports with several years of experience and, in 
several cases, included some of the leading minds in South African audit and corporate 
governance circles (Section 3.3)138. This gives additional assurance that the research produces 
relevant and reliable insights (Creswell, 2009; O'Dwyer et al, 2011).  
To ensure that the detailed interviews ran smoothly; that the questions posed were suitable for 
the purpose of this research; and that any errors in the proposed interview agenda were 
identified and corrected, the data collection and analysis process, discussed in Section 3.4 was 
piloted (Creswell, 2009; Rowley, 2012). For the purpose of the pilot study, four interviews of 
between 45 minutes and three hours were conducted in Johannesburg and Pretoria during April 
2011. Two respondents were from one of South Africa’s Big Four audit firms and two were from 
a leading South African university. 
The interview agenda was used flexibly to guide the interviewee. This allowed the interview 
process to be relatively unstructured to ensure detailed discussion while retaining focus on the 
purpose of the research. Questions were, as much as possible, neutral and non-leading 
(Creswell, 2009). At the same time, respondents were, on occasion, asked to explain a 
particular concept or statement in different words or from different perspectives to address 
‘script coherent expressions’ or resolve any ambiguities (Alvesson, 2003). The tone was 
professional and non-intrusive. Although the sequence in which the issues were addressed – as 
well as the detail provided by each respondent – varied, the same themes were covered during 
each interview and the same point was used to commence each interview, namely: a brief 




                                               
138
 The research uses ‘U1-13’ and ‘E1-16’ to identify the user and expert interviewees respectively, which exclude 




Data analysis was by means of a ‘data analysis spiral’ (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Rowley, 2012) 
as discussed in Section 3.4. No follow-up sessions and resulting reclassification of data took 
place as the purpose of the pilot was simply to ‘test’ the broad axial codes discussed in Section 
3.2 and Section 3.4. Preliminary notes on the different phrases, principles and concepts were, 
however, made to summarise each transcript and to generate a template ‘code register’ or 
‘legend’ to allow for easier data analysis when the primary interviews commenced.  
At this stage, no material issues were noted. In particular, preliminary analysis of the pilot 
transcripts suggested that the interview agenda was sufficiently broad to address each of the 
research questions while balancing the need to avoid excessively lengthy interviews (Rowley, 
2012).   
 
B4:  AGENDA FOR DETAILED INTERVIEWS 
 
As recommended by Holland (1998a), a brief agenda should be provided to participants several 
days before the interview as a matter of courtesy and to allow them to prepare. The agenda 
should not be in such detail that it allows participants to rehearse responses (Alvesson, 2003; 
Rowley, 2012). A more detailed agenda is, however, used by the researcher to manage to the 
interview process, although this agenda is not provided to the interviewee. 
 
CORE AGENDA FOR EXERTS  
 
1: Introduction 
 Note of thanks.  
 Position in the firm and number of years of experience. 
 Brief discussion of prior experience including the nature and number of clients and 
background of the audit firm. 




2: Discussion Points 
1. Ethical Issues: What, in your opinion, have been the implications of s45 of the APA on 
the relevance and importance of adherence to ethical principles for your audit 
engagements? 
2. Leadership responsibility: Have the duties under s45 of the APA and the risk of 
penalties for failing to comply with these duties led to you spending more time at audits 
and playing a greater leadership role on your audits? 
3. Human resources: In your opinion, does s45 of the APA and its associated risk of 
penalties for non-compliance lead you to regard human resource practices at your firm 
as more or less important and why?  
4. Client acceptance and continuance: Do you think that s45 of the APA leads to a more 
robust client acceptance and continuance review process and why?  
5. Documentation and audit evidence: In your opinion, has the application of s45 of the 
APA caused a change in the nature, timing and extent of your audit work and 
documentation? Why or why not? 
6. Monitoring and continuous improvement: Does s45 of the APA make your firm more 
aware of the need for continuous monitoring and improvement? Has it led to a change in 
your firm’s values? Why do you have these views? 
7. Overall impression: What value do you think there is in having s45 of the APA and why 
do you have these views? If you could change the APA, what would you change? 
Having detected an RI, do you feel that, on the whole, the firm would have been better 
off if no RI had been found at all? 
8. Structure and purpose of RI’s: Why does s45 of the APA exist? Why do you think the 
legislation specifically requires auditors to report irregularities without delay to the IRBA? 
Do you think that there is an added sense of transparency and accountability due to the 
reporting duty? Would you delete s45 of the APA? 
9. Standing of the Profession: Do you think that s45 of the APA was introduced to add to 







CORE AGENDA FOR USERS 
 
The audit process is a highly technical one (for example, see IAASB, 2009c; Ernst&Young, 
2010; FRC, 2010; PwC, 2010; FRC, 2011). Together with the application of professional 
judgement, the result is that audit is rendered ‘opaque’ for non-experts (see Power, 1994; 
Power, 2003; Humphrey, 2012). For this reason, users may not be able to respond to the same 
detailed questions provided in the first agenda. To assess the perceived impact of s45 of the 
APA on audit quality, the following agenda is used: 
1: Introduction 
 Note of thanks.  
 Position in the firm and number of years of experience. 
 Brief discussion of prior work experience and employer background. 
 If part of international firm, discussion of the extent of local discretion in conduct of 
audits. 
2: Discussion Points 
1. General questions: Has your audit firm explained what a ‘reportable irregularity’ is and 
what their duties are in connection with reportable irregularities?  
 Had you ever heard of ‘reportable irregularities before’? What was your first 
reaction when you were told about the audit firm’s reporting duties?  
 If you were told that the number of RI’s reported had increased considerably over 
time, why would you think this is the case? 
2. Ethical Issues: Have you noticed a change in the audit firm’s independence practices? 
Do audit firms seem to placing more or less emphasis on independence and what do 
you think the reasons for this are? 
3. Leadership, human resources, documentation and client acceptance and 
continuance:  What do you think the impact of s45 of the APA and its associated 
penalty provisions are on audit firms?  If you were a partner:  
 would you be more or less involved on an audit? How would you change the 
process of recording your audit evidence if at all?  
 would you change the staff complement and supervision/monitoring process?  
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 would you be more or less concerned about accepting new clients? How and 
why would you make changes, if any? 
4. Overall impression: On the whole do you think that s45 of the APA has changed the 
way that auditors carry out engagements?  
 Do you think that s45 of the APA has allowed you to rely more on the audit 
report?  
 Do you believe that auditors, having found an RI are interested in proposing 
solutions to resolve the underlying problem?  
 Do you have the impression that they wished they had never found the RI and 
why? Why do you think they adopt this outlook?  
 If you could change s45 of the APA, what would you change? 
 Would you delete s45 of the APA? 
 
DETAILED QUESTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF INTERVIEWS 
 
The following agenda was used to prompt additional responses from interviewees during the 
course of the interview. These points were not provided to the interviewee in advance and were 
used only to stimulate additional discussion or ensure focus on the research questions as 
needed.  
 
Complementary Agenda Points 
1. Ethical Issues: What implications have s45 of the APA had on the perceived 
relevance and importance of adherence to ethical principles on a statutory audit 
engagement? 
 
o Have the reporting responsibilities of s45 led to an increased drive to ensure that 
staff complies with ethical obligations laid out by the IFAC Code of Conduct 
and/or the audit firm’s internal ethical standards? 




o Have independence requirements in connection with listed entities become more 
onerous due to RI’s and MI’s and what are the differences due to changes in the 
legislation?  
o How has the introduction of s45 led to changes, if at all, in the firm’s ethical 
standards? In other words, did the replacement of the MI’s by RI’s lead to a 
refinement of ethical standards? 
o Do partners feel that a breach of independence would be more or less significant 
due to the fact that RI’s have replaced MI’s?  
o In connection with the above, do partners believe that either RI’s or MI’s would 
cause a breach of independence to be any more severe than if these sections 
had never been introduced? 
o What would the implications for ethics in the auditing profession be if the 
reporting obligations of s45 were repealed? 
2. Leadership responsibility: Do the provisions of s45 of the APA cause engagement 
leaders to take a greater leadership responsibility role on statutory audits? 
o Do partners feel that s45 of the APA has led to increased involvement in the 
audits and to partners accepting a greater degree of responsibility for audits? 
o How has this changed due to the replacement of material irregularities (MI’s) with 
reportable irregularities (RI’s)? 
o What drives leadership responsibility at the audit firms? 
o What would the implications for leadership responsibility be if the provisions of 
s45 of the Audit Profession Act (APA) were to be removed? 
3. Human Resources: What are the implications of s45 of the APA on the perceived 
importance of human resource practices? In particular, what are the implications for 
the perceived importance of the skill and competency of engagement team members 
as well as the adequacy of time and resources available to those team members to 
execute an engagement? 
o Has there been increased training to ensure that partners have the necessary 
skill and competency to carry out engagements? 
o Was this training limited to dealing simply with the provisions of s45 or did s 45 
lead to other training requirements? In other words, has s45 led to an increased 
drive to ensure that general improvements in audit quality are made? 
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o The above two questions should be asked in connection with the training of junior 
staff. 
o Is more consideration given to the composition of the engagement team and to 
the time allocated to carry out the audit engagement due to the fact that s45 
establishes reporting obligations on the firm? Are these considerations the direct 
result of the RI provisions or are they a by-product of the firm’s quality 
mechanisms?  
o How is the need of ensuring that adequate consultation takes place on an 
engagement affected by the provisions of s45? Were there any changes in this 
regard when RI’s replaced MI’s? 
o To what extent are partners concerned that staff on audit assignments lack 
adequate skills to carry out the audit? Has this changed due to the replacement 
of RI’s with MI’s? Is the concern driven by brand preservation only? Do RI’s 
cause partners to value highly skilled staff more? 
o Have RI’s and MI’s had any implication for human resource practices? 
o What is the effect of the potential increase in the exposure to civil and criminal 
sanctions due to the replacement of MI’s by RI’s? 
 
4. Client Acceptance and Continuance: Does s45 of the APA lead to a more robust 
client acceptance and continuance review process and how does this interface with 
the need for risk management by audit firms? 
o Has s45 led to a change in the performance and evaluation system? In other 
words, has this section led to changes or concerns regarding the acceptance of 
new clients or retention of existing clients?  
o Do partners perceive a greater risk in connection with new clients because there 
could be RI’s? 
o What would happen in connection with client continuance if you found an RI? 
How would this be different if it were a MI? 
o Do partners feel that the replacement of MI’s by RI’s has led to a material change 
in the assessment of client acceptance and continuance? 
o Do the differences, if any, add value to the audit firm, the client and the general 
users of the financial statements? 
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5. Documentation and Audit Evidence: What was the impact of s45 of the APA on the 
engagement performance and documentation standards and protocols at audit firms? 
Is there a causal link between the existence of s45 of the APA and any changes in any 
aspect of the conduct of statutory audits since 2005 (when s45 came into effect), and if 
so, how strong is the link? 
o To what extent does s45 cause partners to doubt whether or not the audit 
evidence obtained supports the audit opinion? How has this changed from the 
old MI provisions? 
o Have the audit firms reassessed the adequacy of the audit procedures that they 
carried out for clients? Was there a change to the internal manuals used in these 
firms? 
o Is more attention paid to engagement briefing? What has the impact been on the 
supervision, review and consultation processes? 
o Are partners more or less concerned about the effect of important judgements 
made during the course of the audit? 
o Have the provisions of s45 led to more detailed and comprehensive 
consultations? Have these provisions led to the discovery of other facts and 
circumstances that would have gone undetected?  
o Do you feel that the consultations are restricted simply to ensuring that statutory 
duties are met? 
 
6. Monitoring and Continuous Improvement: has s45 of the APA led to a more 
comprehensive continuous improvement and strategy formulation process at the audit 
firm level? 
 
o Have s45 or the old MI provisions led to a change in the performance and 
evaluation system?  
o Have these sections led to changes and/or concerns regarding the appointment 
of new partners. Do the two sections have different impacts? 
o How, if at all, does s45 impact on client relations and specifically adds to, or 
detracts from, the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit? 




o Does the firm’s quality control system (which includes continuous improvement 
mechanisms) been tailored to account for s45? Has s45 placed pressures on the 
firm to enhance its internal monitoring systems with an aim to improving quality in 
general? How is this different from MI’s? 
 
7. Quality in General:  
 
o Do partners feel that the reference to ‘fraud’, irrespective of the value concerned 
in the definition of an RI is appropriate? What would the effect of detecting an RI 
be on audit materiality? Have adjustments to materiality been made in the 
planning phase of the audit? 
o Is it appropriate for the auditor to assess the materiality of the RI/MI where the 
‘materiality’ in question may not necessarily be equivalent to the materiality used 
for the purposes of the audit? In this context, do audit partners feel that the 
methodology for determining materiality is appropriate or not?  
o Do partners feel that RI’s and MI’s add value to the auditing process and to the 
client?  
o Could the removal of the 30-day window period lead to the client and auditor 
being less able to resolve the underlying problem? Does this lead the client 
deliberately to conceal the RI?  
o On the whole, do the penalty provision and additional administrative load 
associated with detecting an RI make you inclined to hope that audit procedures 
will not detect an RI? 
o Do partners feel that the legislation has improved confidence in the audit 
profession and the image of the audit profession? 
o In light of the dramatic increase in the number of RI’s being reported to the IRBA 
as opposed to the number of MI’s historically reported, what is the primary cause 
of this increase? 
 Is it attributable to the fact that s45 requires us to report immediately to 
the IRBA, as opposed to the old MI provisions which required the auditor 
to report to the client first? 
 Does the fact that the APA introduces a risk of imprisonment for up to 10 
years or a fine stimulate additional reporting? 
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 Do the RI provisions and the differences between the RI and MI 
provisions add to improved transparency and accountability? Have the 
amendments added to increased reliance of key users on the client’s 
financial reports? Have these changes led to an increase in the public’s 
faith in the audit process? 
 Has the general climate of high profile audit failures led to an increase in 
reporting? Are there other factors that stimulate the firm to report more? 
 Do the above factors influence the need to report more than the need to 
ensure improved audit quality and general reliance of the public in the 
audit process in the context of high profile audit failures? That is, is 
reporting stimulated simply due to the statutory obligation? 
o Do you think that it is appropriate that the RI and MI provisions apply only when 
acting in the capacity of an auditor? 
o If South Africa had no RI or MI provisions, would this be beneficial or not and 
why? 
o Ultimately, do partners feel that the provisions relating to RI’s and MI’s are useful 
or not? 
 
8. Standing of the profession: 
 
o Do you think that there is a connection between s45 of the APA and regulatory 
developments taking place overseas?  
o How important is the fact that South Africa has been ranked first globally for the 
quality of its auditing and accounting standards? 
o Does s45 of the APA add to the credibility of the audit process? Is it an example 
of auditors being required to report more and does this appeal to the interests of 
different stakeholders? 
o Do you think that the reporting duty is justifiable?  
o Does s45 of the APA make sense? Is it an example of whistle-blowing and does 
whistle-blowing make sense? 
o Do you think that the duty to report leads to an added sense of transparency or 
accountability from the point of view of clients and auditors?  
o Do you think that s45 of the APA is a type of surveillance mechanism?  
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o Why are there penalties for auditors for non-compliance with the APA? Do the 
penalties make sense?  
 
B5:  QUALITY CONTROL CHECKLIST  
 
After the completion of the correspondence analysis and detailed interviews, participants were 
asked to provide feedback on the data collection process. This has been used to complete the 
quality control checklist (Table B1) below.  
























































Correspondence table is difficult 
to complete or not readily 
understood 
 
  Participants complimented 
the instrument for the fact that 
it was easy to interpret and 
simple to complete. No 
additional quality elements 
were noted.   
Questionnaires using scales are 
not often well received by the 
audit profession  
  Participants commented that 
they preferred the 
correspondence table to 
questionnaires. The main 
reasons given were:  (1) the 
analysis was on a single 
sheet;  
(2) it was easier to complete 
and less time consuming and; 
(3) symbols used on the 
questionnaires were seen as 
irritating in some cases.   
There were no ethical reasons 
that prevented completion of the 
correspondence analysis or 
detailed interviews 
  Participants were asked to 
comment on whether or not 
they perceived any threats to 
the fundamental principles 
enshrined in the IFAC Code 
and any internally used codes 
of ethics. All responded in the 
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Data collection process ought to 
be efficient and professional. 
Use of confidentiality ought to 
improve response sincerity 
  No negative responses were 
received concerning the 
collection process.  
Participants indicated that 
they preferred being 
anonymous.  
Correspondence analysis should 
be able to produce an easily 
interpreted two dimensional plot 
with acceptable loss of data 
richness  
  No issues noted – please 
refer to Appendix B2.  
Detailed interviews shed light on 
the research question and 
provided detailed, contrasting 
perspectives 
  No issues noted – refer to 




Technical consultants should be 
able to easily review the 
manipulation and analysis of the 
correspondence plot and 
understand the arguments 
raised based on the detailed 
interviews 
  Discussion with the technical 
consultant based on the 
results of the pilot studies 
gave no indication that review 
of data manipulation and 
analysis would be 
problematic.  
Material omissions detected in 
the correspondence analysis or 
detailed interviews (i.e. coverage 
issues noted) 
  Discussion with participants 
and the technical consultant 
as part of the peer debriefing 
highlighted no material 
omissions. The pilot study 
(Appendix B1; Appendix B2; 
Appendix B3) highlighted no 
issues.  
Participant mortality issues    As discussed in Section 3.3 




In addition to the above, this study has also followed the guidance provided in ISA 620: Using 
the Work of an Auditor’s Expert (ISA 620) (IAASB, 2009r). Although ISA 620 is intended for 
external audit engagements, it offers insights into relying on the work of experts and has been 
adapted for the purpose of this study. This is summarized as follows: 
TABLE B2: RELYING ON THE COMMENTS OF EXPERTS AND INFORMED USERS 
Recommendation per  






























Description of implementation  
Consider the competency, 
capabilities and objectivity of 
the participants (para 9). 
 Yes  All experts and informed users have several 
years of relevant experience. Many participants 
are thought-leaders in their respective areas.  
 Participants reminded of the need for honesty 
and candour 
 Responses to be kept confidential for 
assurance purposes  
 Participants provided with interview agenda for 
transparency and result accuracy; agenda is 
brief to prevent result rehearsal  
Does the researcher have an 
understanding of the field of 
expertise of the chosen 
participants to assess 
commentary (para 10)? 
 Yes  Detailed literature review has been completed 
to provide a context for the study 
 The researcher is a member of SAICA with 
several years of experience 
 Peer debriefing allowed for 
 Presentation of preliminary findings at formal 
conferences 
Consider the need to discuss 
the scope and purpose of the 
work of the expert (para 11). 
 Yes  Participants were contacted personally and 
informed of the nature and scope of the 
research.  
 An agenda served as an interview protocol `and 
participants were given time to prepare for the 
interview. 
  
Are measures in place to 
evaluate the adequacy and 
reasonableness of the expert’s 
commentary (para 12)? 
 Yes  Refer to Table 3.8 and Sections 3.2, Section 






TABLE B2: RELYING ON THE COMMENTS OF EXPERTS AND INFORMED USERS 
Recommendation per  






























Description of implementation  
Has appropriate reference 
been made to the use of 
experts (para 14)? 
 Yes  Participants will be assigned a number for 
referencing purposes.  
 Individual identities are protected. 
 
Is the use of the work of an 
expert ethical (IFAC, 2006)? 
 Yes  Refer to Section 3.6 and Table 3.8 
 
Conclusion 
During the course of the pilot study and preliminary data collection and analysis work, nothing 
has come to the attention of the researcher to suggest that there are material weaknesses in the 
design of the correspondence analysis. This has been confirmed as part of the peer debriefing 
process referred to in Section 3.  
 
APPENDIX C: DATA MANIPULATION AND ANALYSIS: CHAPTER 5 
 
This section provides additional information on the data analysis, supporting the generation of 
the correspondence bi-plot presented in Chapter 5 and discussed in Chapter 3. Table C1 
summarises the results of the correspondence analysis. The final correspondence table resulted 
in a 9 active rows x 7 active columns contingency table. Plotting this in two dimensions ensures 
ease of interpretation and retains 81% of the data’s exploratory potential139. At 48 degrees of 
freedom, the Chi-Square statistic of 113.9 is in excess of the critical value at the 5% confidence 
level, providing evidence to suggest that there is a statistically significant dependence between 
rows and columns. In other words, and as discussed in Chapter 4, there is a correlation 
                                               
139
 Per Bendixen (1996), with 7 columns included in the correspondence table, the data would plot perfectly in a 6-
dimensional space. This is confirmed by Table C2.  Such a plot would, however, be impossible to visualise and 
interpret. For this reason, a trade-off exists between quality of the plot and ease of interpretation.  
287 
 
between the RI provisions and conceptions of audit quality per ISQC 1 (adapted from Bendixen, 
1996; Turner and Maroun, 2010; Maroun et al, 2011).    



















Number of dim. 
 
2 
Expl. inertia (%)   81.13 
 
Likewise, Table C2 and Figure C1 confirm that the inclusion of additional dimensions would not 
have added materially to the quality of the plot given added complexity.  












      
 
 
      
 
 Dimension 1 0.2201609 0.0484708 58.31 51.56 51.56  
 Dimension 2 0.1667333 0.0278 33.44 29.57 81.13  
 Dimension 3 0.0849525 0.0072169 8.68 7.68 88.81  
 Dimension 4 0.0826398 0.0068293 8.22 7.26 96.07  
 Dimension 5 0.0584928 0.0034214 4.12 3.64 99.71  
 Dimension 6 0.0164405 0.0002703 0.33 0.29 100  
 
      
 
 Total  
 
0.0940088 113.09 100 100  
 















The initial Stata-generated graphical representation of the correspondence analysis is 
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The plot presented in Figure C2 includes both rows and columns in the two-dimensional space. 
Bendixen (1996) recommends that the axes be interpreted in terms of rows with column points 
plotted or vice versa. This research seeks to examine the perceived correlation between 
elements of the RI provisions and quality attributes outlined in ISQC 1. As such, ‘quality traits’ 
serve as statement or row headings and are plotted along the x- and y-axes (which are defined 
by ‘elements’ of the RI provisions). These axes are interpreted according to the contribution that 
each row or column heading makes to the respective axis. In this instance, since there are 7 
column headings, any making an inertial contribution of more than 14% is included in the final 
analysis and, thus, defines on the respective axes. Considering Table C4, C3 and C7 contribute 
13% and 70% to Dimension 1’s total inertia respectively. Similarly, C2, C3 and C6 account for 
55%, 16% and 15% of Dimension 2’s inertial load. The contributions made by C1, C4 and C5 
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purpose of the analysis. The result is the following axis labels for the final correspondence plot 
found in Chapter 5:  
TABLE C3: LABELLING OF THE AXES  
Axis Label 
Positive x-axis (axis 1) C3: Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal sanction 
Negative x-axis (axis 1) C7: RI’s involve management only 
Positive y-axis (axis 2) C2: Reporting to take place immediately vs. after 30 days under the 
PAAA 
Negative y-axis (axis 2) C3: Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal sanction 
C6: RI’s include a material breach of trust and fiduciary duty 
 
The plotting of individual row headings in the now defined two-dimensional space is carried out 
in a similar fashion using the data found in Table C5. R1 (12%), R5 (24%), R6 (20%) and R9 
(37%) each has an inertial contribution in excess of 10% with respect to the first dimension and, 
accordingly, is included in the bi-plot. Likewise, R2, R4, R5, R7 and R9 have inertial contribution 
in excess of the average and are thus plotted against the second axis140  (adapted from 
Bendixen, 1996; Turner and Maroun, 2010; Maroun et al, 2011). The final bi-plot appears in 
Chapter 5 (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
                                               
140
 R2 makes an inertial contribution of slightly less than the average expected contribution. As such, it has been 





TABLE C4: STATISTICS FOR COLUMN CATEGORIES IN SYMMETRIC NORMALISATION (REPRODUCED)  
  
              
  







    
Mass Quality %inert 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib 
 
  C1 RI’s are to be reported to the IRBA 
 
0.193 0.209 0.069 
 
-
0.091 0.053 1% 
 
0.178 0.155 4%   
  C2 
Reporting to take place immediately vs. after 30 days under the 
PAAA 
 
0.119 0.91 0.206 
 
0.298 0.12 5% 
 
0.878 0.79 55%   
  C3 
Failure to report an RI could lead to liability and criminal 
sanction. 
 
0.194 0.971 0.117 
 
0.384 0.57 13% 
 
-0.37 0.401 16%   
  C4 Wrongful reporting could lead to a claim for damages 
 
0.204 0.752 0.063 
 
0.27 0.55 7% 
 
-
0.188 0.202 4%   
  C5 RI’s include fraud, irrespective of materiality level 
 
0.119 0.405 0.092 
 
-
0.284 0.244 4% 
 
0.266 0.162 5%   
  C6 RI’s include a material breach of trust and fiduciary duty 
 
0.09 0.613 0.072 
 
-
0.014 0.001 0% 
 
-
0.525 0.612 15%   
  C7 RI’s involve management only 
 
0.081 0.965 0.38 
 
-
1.379 0.955 70% 
 
-
0.161 0.01 1%   
  
              
  
  
         
100% 
   
100%   








TABLE C5: STATISTICS FOR ROW CATEGORIES IN SYMMETRIC NORMALISATION (REPRODUCED) 
                                
  





Dimension 2   
  
   
Mass Quality %inert 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib 
 
Coord Sqcorr Contrib   
  R1 
Development of a culture of leadership with more participation 
by the engagement leader (para 9) 
 
0.089 0.895 0.08 
 
0.546 0.775 12% 
 
0.248 0.121 3%   
  R2 
Awareness of the importance of ethical compliance (para 14 
&18) including client acceptance and continuance procedures 
(para 28) 
 
0.159 0.71 0.055 
 
-
0.162 0.177 2% 
 
0.323 0.533 10%   
  R3 
Acknowledging the importance of resources & competency of 
engagement  team (para 36) as well as the need for full 
compliance with ISA (para 46) 
 
0.094 0.753 0.019 
 
-
0.221 0.573 2% 
 
0.142 0.18 1%   
  R4 
Ensuring appropriate consultation on contentious matters and 
resolution of differences of opinion (para 51) 
 
0.16 0.81 0.11 
 
-
0.026 0.002 0% 
 
0.559 0.808 30%   
  R5 
More attention paid to internal quality control and continuous 
improvement processes  including documentation standards 
(para 74) 
 
0.064 0.9 0.225 
 
-
0.904 0.544 24% 
 
-0.84 0.356 27%   
  R6 
Enhanced transparency and confidence in the audit process and 
increased perceived value for stakeholders (including improved 
reporting quality) 
 
0.126 0.703 0.151 
 
-
0.589 0.68 20% 
 
-
0.124 0.023 1%   
  R7 
Enhanced sustainability for audit firms including reduction in 
overall audit risk 
 
0.054 0.501 0.085 
 
0.284 0.121 2% 
 
-0.58 0.38 11%   
  R8 A sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the informed public 
 
0.14 0.547 0.03 
 
0.165 0.3 2% 
 
-
0.172 0.247 3%   
  R9 
A sense of personal responsibility for auditors and auditors being 
held to account 
 
0.114 0.936 0.246 
 
0.841 0.768 37% 
 
-
0.453 0.168 14%   
  
              
  
  
         
100% 
   
100%   
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APPENDIX E: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Instigating the role of reportable irregularities in South African audit 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:  REP(EM)/10/11-51 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain 
the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the Information 
Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join 




 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate 
in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it immediately without 
giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the 
point of publication. 
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 













agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to 
take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the 
project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 






Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) 
of the proposed research to the participant. 
















APPENDIX F: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
TABLE F1:  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
# Type Job title or description141 
1 Expert 1 Audit Partner 
2 Expert 2 Audit Partner 
3 Expert 3 Audit Partner 
4 Expert 4 Audit Partner 
5 Expert 5 Audit Partner 
6 Expert 6 Audit Partner 
7 Expert 7 Audit Partner 
8 Expert 8 Audit Partner 
9 Expert 9 Audit Partner 
10 Expert 10 Audit Partner 
11 Expert 11 Audit Partner 
12 Expert 12 Audit Partner 
13 Expert 13 Audit Partner 
14 Expert 14 Audit Partner 
15 Expert 15 Audit Partner 
16 Expert 16  Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 
17 Expert 17  Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 
18 User 1 Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 
19 User 2 Audit committee member  
20 User 3 Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 
21 User 4 Audit committee Member/Investor 
                                               
141
 Job titles and descriptions have been altered to preserve the identity of respondents. A distinction between 
participants is for transparency only. It is not the intention of this research to explore variations in the perceptions of 
different classes of users and experts as discussed in Section 1.4.2.   
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TABLE F1:  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
# Type Job title or description141 
22 User 5 Audit Committee Member 
23 User 6 Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 
24 User 7 Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 
25 User 8 Audit Committee Member 
26 User 9 Institutional investor 
27 User 10 Institutional Investor 
28 User 11 Institutional Investor 
29 User 12   Audit standards, compliance, internal reviewer or external reviewer 








As discussed in Section 3.5, several aspects of this thesis have been presented either at 
conferences or form part of related publications in peer review journals. A list of conference 
proceedings is provided below:  
TABLE G1: LIST OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS  
Name of conference Date Location  
PhD Colloquium – King’s 
College London 
May 2012 London, United Kingdom 
PhD Colloquium – King’s 
College London 
May 2011 London, United Kingdom 
British Accounting and Finance 
Association  
April 2012 Brighton, United Kingdom 
Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting  
June 2011 Florida, United States of 
America 
Southern African Accounting 
Association  
June 2010 George, South Africa 
International Corporate 
Governance Conference 
October 2012 Johannesburg, South Africa 




III: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
In addition to the definitions found in Section 1.3, the following frequently used terms have 
meanings specified:   
 Agreed-upon procedures refer to an engagement where an auditor carries out 
procedures (often similar to audit procedures) which the auditor, the client and 
appropriate third parties have agreed to. The auditor issues a report of factual findings. 
No assurance is provided. The recipients of the report draw their own conclusions from 
the auditor’s report (IAASB, 2009b; IAASB, 2009aa). 
 Audit firm: a sole practitioner, partnership or corporation or other entity of professional 
accountants (IAASB, 2009b) 
 Audit quality: is the joint probability of detecting and reporting material financial 
statement errors (DeAngelo, 1981a; DeAngelo, 1981b; Palmrose, 1988). For the 
purpose of this thesis, ‘audit quality’ is evidenced by the extent of adherence to the 
principles outlined in ISQC 1 (Section 2.2.2).  
 Audit risk: the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the 
financial statements are materially misstated (IAASB, 2009b; Kaplan and Williams, 
2012).  
 Auditor: an individual registered with the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors 
to carry out audits (as defined in Section 1.3).  
 The Big 4: in alphabetical order, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 Confidentiality: to respect the confidentiality of information acquired as a result of 
professional and business relationships and, therefore, to not disclose any such 
information to third parties without prior and specific authority, unless there is illegal or 
professional right or duty to disclose the information in question. The duty of 
confidentiality includes the prohibition on using information for the personal advantage of 
the individual auditor or third-party (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 2012).  
 Engagement leader: see – partner 




 Fiduciary duty: the legal duty of a fiduciary to act in the best interests of the beneficiary; 
the obligation to act solely for the benefit of another party and to avoid a conflict of 
interest between his or her own interests and those of the other party (IRBA, 2006) 
 Fundamental principles: those principles laid out by the Code of Professional Conduct 
issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (see also IFAC, 
2006). These include: integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, 
confidentiality and professional behaviour. 
 Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors: a juristic person established under the 
s3 of the APA which is responsible for, inter alia, promoting the integrity of the South 
African Audit Profession; protecting the public in their dealings with registered auditors; 
prescribing standards of professional conduct and practice; promoting auditing research 
and education (s4 of the APA, 2005).   
 Integrity: to be transparent and honest in all professional and business relationships 
(IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 2012) 
 Legitimacy: ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
 Management board: in relation to the entity which has a company, the board of 
directors of the company and, in relation to any other entity, the body or individual(s) 
responsible for the management of the business of the entity (s1 of the APA, 2005; 
IRBA, 2006).   
 Monitoring: a process comprising an on-going consideration and evaluation of the firm's 
system of quality control, including a periodic inspection of a selection of completed 
engagements, designed to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that its system of 
quality control is operating effectively (IAASB, 2009b; IAASB, 2009e) 
 Objectivity: to not allow bias, conflict of interest or undue influence others to override 
professional or business judgements (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 2012) 
 Partner: the individual responsible for the engagement and its performance and for the 
report that is issued on behalf of the firm (s44 of the  APA, 2005; IAASB, 2009x).  
 Professional behaviour: to comply with relevant laws and regulations and avoid 
actions that discredit the accounting and auditing profession (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2011; 
SAICA, 2012).  
 Professional competence and due care: to maintain professional knowledge and skill 
at the level required to ensure that the client receives competent professional services 
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based on current developments in practice, legislation and techniques. This includes the 
duty to act diligently and in accordance with applicable technical and professional 
standards (IFAC, 2006; IRBA, 2011; SAICA, 2012).  
 Review: appraising the quality of the work performed and conclusions reached by 
others.  
 Review engagement: an assurance engagement where the objective is to enable the 
auditor to state, whether on the basis of procedures which do not provide all the 
evidence that would be required in an audit, anything has come to the auditor’s attention 
that causes the auditor to believe that the financial statements of a client are not 
prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting 
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